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In this dissertation I examine how the complex, and often contradictory, 
discourses of being a ‘Pacific person’ are played out in, and through, New 
Zealand rugby. In particular, I interrogate how these discourses—manifest in 
various forms of public expression—structure, regulate, and, potentially, 
challenge traditional notions of nationality. In the opening chapters I first explore 
how liberal values and the goals of inclusion and pluralism have been an 
important part of defining New Zealand identity. In this regard Pacific peoples 
are playing an ever-more important role. I suggest, however, that an emergent 
‘Pacific multiculturalism’  actually reinforces white cultural power. It also masks 
the way national belonging has been racialized in New Zealand, and the role 
rugby has, and continues to, play in inscribing the Otherness of Pacific peoples. 
What I suggest is needed is alternative or resistant models of ‘culture.’ In the 
concluding chapters I turn to the notion of diaspora as one potential alternative. 
Rearticulating the insightful ideas of Paul Gilroy in my penultimate chapter, I 
argue that diaspora can be productively adapted as a model to comprehend the 
lives, travels, migrations, and significances of Pacific athletes. I suggest they 
provide important diasporic resources for rearticulating modes of belonging that 
exceed national boundaries. Methodologically, this project is a discursive 
analysis of the public discourses of Pacificness circulating in a diverse range of 
documentary, literary, and media sources. I suggest that this critical analysis of 
the performance, practice, and institutions of Pacific/New Zealand rugby 
provides a unique context within which to examine the ensemble of discourses 
and forces by which identity is understood and produced, and through which 
the Pacific subject in constituted. My hope is that, in accord with Gilroy (1993), 
this analysis both identifies and actively produces alternatives to divisive 
discourses of national and ethnic absolutism. That is, my goal is to produce a text 
which not only critiques, but offers strategies of resistance to, the practices, 
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PROLOGUE 
An Immigrant’s Tale 
 
At around 2pm on the afternoon of May 29, 2007 a contractor employed on 
behalf of Mercury Energy arrived at the Mangere Bridge home of Lopaavea and 
Folole Muliaga. The Muliaga’s had fallen behind on bill payments, and the 
contractor’s task that day was to cut off their power. It was only one of a number 
of disconnections he had carried out that day. Folole, an early childhood teacher, 
answered the door. What happened next is the subject of debate, but it is known 
that, after some discussion, the contractor was allowed to enter. He walked 
through the front door toward the back of the house, out through a rear door, 
stopping at the power meter attached to an exterior wall. Power to the Muliaga’s 
house was cut. Within hours Folole Muliaga was dead. 
What caused Folole’s death is uncertain. What we do know is that she had 
been off work since February, and that she had been sent home from nearby 
Middlemore Hospital only a few weeks earlier. She had been admitted with a 
cardio-respiratory complaint and was discharged with a mains-powered 
breathing support device. When the power was cut the device was disabled. 
According to her eldest son, Iatitaia, 20, within minutes, Folole became faint, 
complaining also of difficulty breathing and being unable to see. She collapsed. 
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‘Yeti’, unable to call emergency services because the Muliaga’s phone had also 
been disconnected, ran crying down the drive to the house of a neighbour. The 
72-year-old widow on whom he called, placed the call. After taking instructions 
from the dispatcher, she went next door to the Muliaga’s and began giving Folole 
CPR, something she had never done before and which she had only ever seen 
“done on TV.” She continued her efforts until ambulance officers arrived shortly 
thereafter. Folole, however, was unable to be revived. 
It is not clear as to whether Folole’s breathing machine was keeping her 
alive. Nor is it clear whether the contractor was informed that the machine 
required electricity to run. Deference to authority, something entrenched in 
Samoan society, was cited as a possible reason for Yeti not making stronger 
objections when the contractor came calling, and for not acting when his mother 
started to become faint. His mother, he told the press, had asked that he not call 
an ambulance. “That is a typical Samoan thing,” claimed a family spokesman, 
“They don’t like their kids to be worried.” There have been subsequent claims 
that it may not have mattered anyway, that Folole was “already gravely ill” even 
before her power was cut, that she was “not expected to live much longer” 
(Fisher, 2007). Other reports stated that Folole had stopped taking life-saving 
prescription, opting instead for ‘traditional’ healing methods. Blame, it seemed, 
could not be easily pinned down. 
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Fault, though, was something New Zealanders seemed eager to find. The 
media, in turn, was only too happy to oblige. They proposed any number of 
hypotheses, versions of events differing from one day to the next. By and large, 
coverage was sympathetic, painting Folole as the human face of ruthless 
economic ‘reforms.’ The gist was, according to a New Zealand Herald editorial, “a 
company charged with providing an essential service acts according to its 
commercial remit even when it means someone dies” (Editorial: Muliaga death, 
2007). That the Prime Minister herself lead calls for tougher regulation of 
electricity retailers only strengthened this line of reasoning. Those closer to the 
‘right’ conversely implied the tragedy was the family’s own fault, dismissing 
charges from the ‘left’ as an “obscene, liberal gangbang” (Laws, 2007, p. A10). 
Michael Laws, a former Member of Parliament, rebuffed suggestions that 
Folole’s death was “an indication of the heartless soul that beats within SOEs.” 
“That’s the insidious racism of white liberals,” he wrote. “They excuse all 
manner of actions or inactions because of the ethnicity of the culprit or victim. 
They claim that ‘cultural differences’ can impede commonsense” (Laws, 2007, p. 
A10). 
No matter what side of the political spectrum though, nor whom they saw 
as responsible, Folole Muliaga’s death was deeply embarrassing for most New 
Zealanders. It revealed the poverty that generally goes under the radar of most 
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Kiwis, and “the heartless image of New Zealand that sped around the world” 
(O’Sullivan, 2007) made many uncomfortable. “That’s not how we like to think 
of ourselves here in New Zealand,” wrote Tapu Misa. “We take care of our own. 
We like to think we care. The idea that a sick woman died because her family 
couldn’t afford to pay an overdue power bill is unthinkable. It challenges our 
view of who and what we are, and disturbs our comfortable existences” (Misa, 
2007). In New Zealand social welfare and ‘caring’ have been part of the national 
mythology (McClure, 1998). Welfare state economics may be a thing of the past, 
but, more so than in many other developed countries, New Zealand still holds an 
image of itself “as a caring community, the government as benevolent, and the 
state as a collective responsible for its members from cradle to grave” (Seuffert, 
2006, p. 77). Folole’s death betrayed that image. 
It made us question too the state of race relations. This was not supposed 
to happen in a country that is “long touted as having the best race relations in the 
world” (True, 1996, p. 120). Yet Folole was a consequence that made us confront 
the cause. Since the mid-1980s New Zealand has experienced the fastest growth 
in inequality in the OECD, and, according to recent statistics, the earnings of 
Pacific people, like Folole, remain lower than those of the rest of the population, 
even allowing for differences in employment, education and age. Pacific people 
are also more likely to be unemployed, they are under-represented in skilled 
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occupations, and their lower incomes force them into what the Ministry of Pacific 
Island Affairs politely calls “poor housing outcomes.” The flow-on impacts, in 
turn, are considerable. Educational results for Pacific peoples remain poor 
compared with the rest of the population and they are over-represented in the 
negative statistics for health. Folole’s breathing difficulties were believed to have 
been related to her obesity, another health problem, along with diabetes, 
commonly associated with Pacific peoples. The statistics make grim reading, but 
can be generally avoided, left to the policy wonks and government agencies. 
Folole’s death, however, put an all too human face to the numbers. 
If the ‘enterprise society’ (Kelsey, 1997) wasn’t working for some, and 
when this ‘some’ are overwhelming ‘brown’, how then to assuage the guilt, the 
burden of being Pakeha? In the case of Folole Muliaga the response was to 
reassure the public that the system was working, that this was a sad, but 
exceptional, case. This was made easier when Social Development Minister 
David Benson-Pope revealed that, in regard to welfare assistance, the Muliaga’s 
were receiving “their full and correct entitlement.” If the Muliaga family was 
struggling to pay their power bill then it wasn’t ‘our’ fault. As one Dominion Post 
reader put it, “though it would reduce the family’s feeling of guilt to blame 
someone else, the ultimate responsibility for Mrs Muliaga’s death must lie with 
them.” “Tragic as it is,” wrote another, “the fact remains—the power bill hadn’t 
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been paid. The consequences should come as no surprise. It’s basic.” In this way, 
turning the blame inward, on an individual, on a family, became a way of 
testifying to the fact that basic equality was preserved. By invoking the liberal-
egalitarian principles at the core of the New Zealand imaginary (Consedine, 
1989), the speaker appears rational, inequality can be legitimized (Wetherell and 
Potter, 1992). New Zealanders could continue to pretend that they live in nation 
that is cosmopolitan, multicultural, and raceless. 
This is not to say that ‘race’ could be avoided entirely. Indeed, accusations 
of ‘racism’ flew from both sides of the political divide. To hang the tragedy on 
‘cultural insensitivity’ was to be pandering to the “covert racism” of “PC 
liberals.” Conversely, blaming the Muliaga’s was the “ugly” work of “new-right 
fanatics,” entirely expected from “remorseless capitalists” or those or who 
frequent “Talkbackland’s intellectual wastedumps.” The right-wing version 
suggested Folole had died not because the welfare system had let her down, but 
because these ‘Samoan immigrants’ had been incapable of looking after 
themselves. We could condemn a ‘culture,’ point the finger at these ‘Pacific 
peoples’ for letting themselves become the burden of their ‘cultural’ demands. 
The Muliagas chose to continue paying a tithe to their church instead of their 
power company; the Samoan Assembly of God Church had failed to return the 
favour; ‘Samoan pride’ had stopped the family from asking for help; Folole had 
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wrongly chosen to put her trust in traditional ‘Samoan healing.’ In sum, it was 
Folole and her family who put ‘tradition’, its laws and its rituals, over and above 
their welfare. Being ‘Samoan’ was at fault. The liberal version on the other hand 
shunned reference to intra-community problems. Instead, it stressed how 
Samoans should be allowed their claims to difference in a multicultural society 
(Modood, 2007). It declared the police investigation as lacking in “cultural 
awareness” and condemned “the racist, blame-the-victim views that seem to 
have gained such a foothold in our communities.” The ‘system’ was flawed, and 
what was required was ‘ethnic targeting’ of services and resources, all while 
preserving the right of ‘Samoans’ to ‘their’ ‘culture.’ 
In this way, Folole’s actualized ‘Samoan-ness’ was as useful to right-wing 
as to liberal, left-wing agendas. Despite the ideological contestation, both played 
on a dominant discourse that endorsed the equation between communities and 
their reified ‘culture’, and between that culture and a ‘social problem’ (Baumann, 
1996, p. 24). Race, in effect, was twisted. In the “post-white” (Hill, 2004, p. 11) 
moment, the language of race was substituted instead with the “euphemism of 
culture” (Smith, 1992, p. 137). Both the New Right and the anti-racists converged 
on a “belief in the absolute nature of ethnic categories” (Gilroy, 1992, p. 50), 
envisioning “cultures supposedly sealed from one another forever by ethnic 
lines” (Gilroy, 1987, p. 55). Whether left or right, ethnic criteria “were explicitly 
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used as yardsticks to measure physical and cultural distance from the majority 
and gauge potentiality for assimilation into the state and nation” (Pearson, 2005, 
p. 27). In doing so both sides revealed what they considered a ‘New Zealander’ 
to be—and it was not the Muliagas. Their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness was 
enough to set them apart from an equally reified ‘New Zealand culture.’ Though 
the boundaries of defining who is an ‘ordinary New Zealander’ may have 
“blurred over time” (Ward and Lin, 2005, p. 161), public and political discourse 
continues to exploit this expression to distinguish Pakeha (and, occasionally 
Maori) from newer migrants, to celebrate particularity. Rather than questioning 
the social order by being already ‘inside,’ the Muliagas were pushed rhetorically 
to the ‘outside’ of this ordinariness. They became members of a disadvantaged 
community within a community, but never one of ‘us.’ They were, to borrow 
from Paul Gilroy (2004), “culturally lost souls” adrift between being the aliens 
they ought to be and the New Zealanders they were unlikely ever to become. 
As I write, Folole has not dropped entirely from the headlines. Just this 
morning the Chief Coroner announced guidelines for the upcoming inquest into 
her death (interestingly, one of the seven “areas of investigation”?: “the level of 
comprehension and understanding of Mrs Muliaga’s medical condition held by 
those close to her”). But such stories are unlikely to have much purchase in 
coming days. Most New Zealanders’s eyes are turned elsewhere. To Europe. To 
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the rugby fields of France. To rugby’s 6th Coupe Du Monde. Going into the 
tournament, New Zealand’s national side, the All Blacks, are—once again—
overwhelming favorites, having “been close to unbeatable in the past three 
years” (Kayes, 2007). Their form, coupled with their pedigree, means the 
expectations of winning are high. There is the added burden too of the All Blacks 
having failed to deliver on the grandest stage since the inaugural tournament 
some twenty years ago. And, New Zealanders are nothing if not emphatic in 
their passion for rugby. Reporting on the All Blacks departure last week, the 
widely-read Planet Rugby described the scene thusly: “The New Zealand 
population made it pretty clear what they expected from their rugby 
ambassadors…that anything less than a win would be considered as having 
failed.” Similarly, of the prospect of the William Webb Ellis trophy eluding the 
All Blacks for a fifth time, commentator Graeme Moody predicted New 
Zealanders would “act like a pack of psychos.” “I mean, look at last time!”, he 
says referring to New Zealand’s unexpected to loss Australia in 2003, “The 
country needed general therapy!” Whether or not the All Blacks turn their fancy 
into triumph, however, the World Cup will be a privileged site for the playing 
out of, the identification of, and the performance of New Zealand’s national 
identity. Whereas New Zealanders are generally ambivalent about the idea of 
‘nationalism’ and patriotic performances—“acutely self-conscious about their 
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geographic isolation and prone to almost obsessive public expressions of self-
doubt” as Pearson and Kothari (2007, p. 47) put it—when it comes to rugby they 
seem to feel perfectly free to do so. “Aside perhaps, from Anzac Day,” suggests a 
recent editorial in the Sunday Star-Times, “there’s probably never a time when 
New Zealand is more united as a country—north and south, urban and rural—
than when a rugby international looms” (Cate, 2005, p. B2). It’s as if the black 
shirt is proof of the existence of the nation; as if rugby pulls this little country out 
of the shadows of anonymity. 
And, if there are few better sites in and through which New Zealanders 
express their sense of belonging than an All Black test, there is also, in Cate’s 
opinion, “never a time when we [New Zealanders] are more proudly and un-
self-consciously a nation of the ‘Pacific’ either” (Cate, 2005, p. B2). The growing 
number of Pacific peoples pulling on the All Black jersey in recent years 
undoubtedly marks a significant symbolic shift in New Zealand’s national 
imaginary, in the way we, to paraphrase Hamilton (1990), ‘look at ourselves.’ 
Reflecting on the team during a recent game against England, columnist Finlay 
Macdonald was “struck by how exotic the All Blacks now appear—tattooed, 
dread-locked, surnames festooned with apostrophes.” “If these were among our 
most prominent cultural ambassadors,” he writes, “then we are projecting an 
ethnographic image somewhat advanced from the dour old verities of yore” 
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(Macdonald, 2005, p. C11). Such is the “trend” argues the Herald’s Gregor Paul, 
that “It’s not inconceivable that come the 2011 World Cup, New Zealand as hosts 
kick-off the first game with a match-day 22 that consists solely of players who 
come from a Pacific Island background.” However unlikely that prospect, it 
wouldn’t be contentious to suggest the number of Pacific players today as being 
a far cry from 1970 when Bryan Williams was the sole All Black of Pacific 
descent. Indeed, rugby has become the tale of just how far Pacific people have 
come. Supposedly, we see in rugby evidence of how, in Immigration Minister 
David Cunliffe’s words, “Pasifika New Zealanders are well-established members 
of our community—growing in numbers and going from strength to strength.” 
Tellingly, in recent speeches both New Zealand’s Minister of Pacific Island 
Affairs and his Associate also cite rugby as emblematic of New Zealand’s recent 
(re)emergence as a “Pacific Nation.” 
Pace Folole, this too is where the immigrant story went right. Pacific 
peoples are now an integral part of New Zealand’s resident population, and that 
they are heavily represented in our most prominent sports team is seeming 
validation of this point. But, though since the late 1970s natural increase has 
contributed more than 80 percent of the growth in New Zealand’s Pacific 
population, the success of Pacific peoples is still largely framed as an immigrant 
tale. As Bedford (2000, p. 17) notes, “like many groups that are not white or 
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Maori in New Zealand, [Pacific people] still tend to be stereotyped as 
immigrants.” When successful Pacific people, and Pacific All Blacks in particular, 
command the attention of the nation they do so because they reinforce the 
magnanimous contours of our national identity. They are the comforting 
versions of what Chock (1991) calls the “myth of opportunity”: typically stories 
that center on an immigrant (most often male) whose arrival in a new country 
and “desire for betterment, striving in adversity, and putting down of roots 
make him a ‘new man’” (p. 282). To tell stories of Pacific peoples’ success is thus 
to “speak about the nation in all its benevolence and generosity. National 
ideologies such as…mobility, openness, and inclusiveness come to life any time 
the nation’s Others claim socioeconomic achievement. Stories of success turn the 
ethnic into the national as the former partakes of, and legitimizes, narratives of 
the latter” (Anagnostou, 2003, p. 279). 
The telling of such stories, in focussing on individuals, works to mediate 
between the individual, rugby and the nation. The individual, rugby, and the 
nation are simultaneously composed on the same terms (Chock, 1991). The 
narrative of achievement via the metonymy of the ‘hero’, the ‘role model’, 
buttresses the ideology of New Zealand as an inclusive, egalitarian cultural 
democracy. The All Blacks and their Pacific stars are, in Laidlaw’s (1999) terms, 
“a metaphor” for New Zealand society, rugby an “avenue for youngsters from 
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the wrong side of the tracks”, the All Black fan bearing witness to “the new 
society at work, and in harmony” (p. 183). Rugby and the All Blacks, Joe 
Rokocoko, Mils Muliaina, Ma’a Nonu, Isaia Toeva: such is the richness of New 
Zealand society. In true neo-liberal fashion these “opportunity stories” (Chock, 
1991) are habitually reduced to such individuals, to those who make visible and 
concrete New Zealand’s narrative of itself as open and meritocratic. They 
embody the ideal of becoming and being a New Zealander, making manifest the 
“narrative of achievement” (Anagnostou, 2003), rendering the immigrant tale 
comprehensible. 
No-one better grounds the paradigm of opportunity better than Tana 
Umaga, New Zealand rugby’s first captain of Pacific descent. Following his 
retirement from international rugby in 2006, Umaga was widely praised not only 
for his on-field exploits but his impact on New Zealand’s Pacific community. 
This “husband and hero” has become, according to an editorial in The Dominion 
Post, “a role model to young Pacific Islanders who straddle two cultures.” Says 
former (‘Samoan-born’) All Black centre Eroni Clark: “When a young Pacific 
Islander makes it, every Pacific Islander takes notice. When you see people come 
through those difficulties like Tana did, it’s important for people to see that and 
to continue to believe in their dreams” (quoted in Burnes, 2006, p. 16). Though 
Umaga himself has been somewhat equivocal of taking on such a role—claiming 
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he is “New Zealander first”—he is indelibly linked to his biography: the classic 
story of the immigrant made good. According to one tribute, “Tana Umaga could 
have been just another statistic—the son of immigrant parents born on the wrong 
side of town with no hope of success, let alone greatness” (Matheson, 2006). 
Here, then, is New Zealand’s most prominent sign of equal opportunity—“The 
son of poor immigrants leaps to the top in our open society—from Wainuiomata 
to the White House” (Hubbard, 2006). New Zealand for many Pacific people is 
the “land of milk and h(m)oney” (Anae, 2004, p. 96), and Umaga is a brace to 
such longings, a symbol of promise for those entertaining the dream of making it 
in Niu Sila. Already this year, some 19,000 Samoans—or 10 percent of Samoa’s 
population—have applied for one of the 1100 available work visas under the 
Samoa Quota Scheme. I’m sure that as they wait in the long queues—in the thick, 
Samoan heat—to pay for the privilege of merely applying, there’s more than one 
hopeful with thoughts of Umaga in their head. 
Though Umaga has now retired (to the ‘richer’ pastures of coaching in 
Toulon) and Folole has been laid to rest in a Papatoetoe cemetery, I can’t help 
thinking that their lives somehow meet in those immigration offices and 
departure lounges, that they are part of the same tale of this World Cup Year. No 
doubt in the coming days we’ll catch glimpses of Tana, the spectator in the 
stands. The press will dutifully report on his discreet, and likely ‘inspirational’, 
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visits to the All Black camp in Marseilles. Such is the mana he still commands. 
And, of course, if it’s not Tana, then much be will be made of one, or all, of the 
other ‘brown boys’: of Jerry Collins, or Rodney So’oialo, or Mils Muliaina, or 
Josevata Rokocoko. The general tenor will be a feelgood tale of “the happy 
marriage of [Pacific] cultures into the rugby fabric” (Paul, 2007). At the same 
time, Folole’s story will have an epilogue, albeit quieter than that of the days 
following her death. It will be replete with hand-wringing and apologia (and 
little effective change). But I think it will be a muted story. Not only in the sense 
of being drowned out by more palatable apologues in France, but because it’s a 
more difficult story to tell, because it gives lie to any notions of cultural unity, to 
the multicultural (All Black) story we prefer to tell ourselves about ourselves1. 
Folole is a reminder that every culture is riddled with closets—some of them 
quite capacious. However uncomfortable it may be, though, we need prize the 
door ajar and peer, even if briefly, into what Himani Bannerji (2000) would call 
“the dark side of the nation.” We need to bethink the immigrant tale as told 
through rugby and expose the conceptual feat it performs in emptying difference 
of its political and cultural content. We need to realize that it takes on “signals of 
particularized social being or cultural personhood” (Bannerji, 2000, p. 54), and 
                                                          
1 Below I use the term ‘multicultural narrative’, so it is apposite here to note Geertz’s (1975) 
famed description how narratives are integral to human culture because culture is constituted 
through the  “ensemble of stories we tell about ourselves.” 
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the sameness it implies must be questioned. Its discourse of liberal plurality, and 
the processes of national cultural homogenization that underlie it, are 
ideological, and must be recognized as such. I only hope that within this 
dissertation the equality which, in principle, exists within the game, can throw 




The Politics of (Not) Belonging 
A few days out from the 2006 Census there it was. The email I had heard so 
much about. Sitting amongst the other electronic detritus that is my inbox was a 
message, its subject-line reading, rather vaguely, “Our Heritage.” I knew it 
wasn’t spam nor virus nor even one of those dubious “pass-on-for-good-luck” 
missives that you sometimes receive and dismiss, then hastily forward on 
anyway. This was a message whose contents I was by now well acquainted with. 
The media had already told me what was in it, and a click of my mouse merely 
brought up words I had seen before. Yes, this was it; the famed communiqué 
from some un-sourced fellow Kiwis encouraging me to tick the box marked 
“Other” for Question 11 of the Census, to dutifully write “New Zealander” in the 
space beside. There was “no box provided to say ‘Yes, I am a New Zealander and 
I am proud to be one’” it said, so when I was asked for my ethnicity I should 
instead “choose the option ‘Other’…and state [my] ethnicity as ‘New 
Zealander.’” By doing so I would become part of the “fight for our right [and, 
thus mine included] to be recognised as who we are in this proud and strong 
country of ours.” If “enough New Zealanders” joined this fight it continued, 
“then maybe, just maybe, we can get the powers that be to sit up and recognise 
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that we are proud of who we are and that we want to be recognised as such, not 
divided into sub-categories and all treated as foreigners in our own country.” 
Forward the email on it finished, to “friends, people you work with, Kiwis you 
know overseas, anyone” (though sadly I wouldn’t “receive amazing good luck 
by doing so”), then “remember…at census time… ‘Other—New Zealander!’ (and 
proud of it).” 
So much talk of “pride”, “we”, “us” and “our”. It made it seem that in 
making a political statement I could also find an identity, an ethnic home to call 
my own. In some ways I didn’t even need to voice my dissent on Census night. 
Just receiving the email was enough to make me feel part of something bigger, 
something shared. In a modern-day Benedict-Anderson-kind-of-way I was part 
of a community, united as we were by broadband or dial-up instead of 
newspaper or novel (see Anderson, 1983). I was even only a few degrees 
separated from the hallowed halls of parliament. Gerry Brownlee, deputy-leader 
of New Zealand’s opposition National party, had also been on the recipients 
list—and this was a political ball he could run with. As a member of a party to 
whom the very idea of ‘group’ interests seems anathema (see Pearson, 2005), it 
wasn’t entirely surprising that Brownlee was soon before the House voicing his 
support for the campaign, decrying the lack of an option to describe oneself 
merely as a New Zealander. For Brownlee it was “ridiculous” that he had to 
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describe himself as a European instead of a New Zealander, “boasting of his 
multi-generational indigenousness and upholding the rights of his children not 
to be labelled as anything” (MacDonald, 2006, p. C9). Perhaps it’s time “officials” 
stopped “perpetuating the myth that we are a country that is ethnically divided” 
(Census forms, 2006) he suggested. As overly-romantic as they seemed, and not to 
mention Brownlee’s apparent conflation of ‘ethnicity’ with ‘nationality’ or 
‘ancestry’, the remarks received a measure of support. Certainly, Brownlee had 
tapped into the budding regard of ‘New Zealand European’ as largely 
meaningless, given it takes in “everyone descended from a former inhabitant of 
the continent stretching from the Arctic Circle to the Mediterranean Sea, not 
forgetting the off-shore British Isles” (Rudman, 2006; see also Kan’s [2006] 
wonderful satiric take on this). Even Race relations conciliator Joris de Bres 
conceded that “we should be able to identify ourselves as something other than 
European” (quoted in Schouten, 2006, p. A5). What many overlooked in the 
midst of the anti-European din, however, was that Statistics New Zealand had 
already made a subtle step in the pro-New Zealander direction: whereas those 
who wrote-in “Kiwi” or “New Zealander” during the previous Census in 2001 
(some 89,100) had been “unceremoniously tossed back into the European pot 
anyway” (Rudman, 2006), in 2006 “New Zealander” had become its own 
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category (It’s official, 2005; ‘Kiwi’ a dinkum response, 2006). Demographers had 
seemingly discovered an entirely new ethnicity. 
Less ‘science’ or utopic, post-racial blindness than a government 
department’s way of dealing with growing popular disaffection, the advent of 
New Zealander as an official ethnic category—albeit as a post-analysis ‘Other’—
purportedly addressed, according to Statistics New Zealand’s chief demographer 
Mansoor Khawaja, “the wish of the people” (quoted in ‘Kiwi’ a dinkum response, 
2006). New Zealand society was “changing” and the amendment was a nod to 
“public opinion,” to a “growing trend for people to respond as ‘New Zealander’” 
(Statistics New Zealand General Manager Dallas Welch, quoted in It’s Official, 
2005). Such motivations are far from inconsistent with the notion of ethnicity 
being “self-defined”, as is Statistics New Zealand’s policy (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2005). Yet the move to classify New Zealander separately was (and, is) 
hardly unproblematic. Obviously it didn’t go far enough for those who wanted a 
simple option-to-tick on the Census forms. It was also at odds with those such as 
de Bres who preferred the more ‘indigenous’ though equally politically-loaded 
‘Pakeha’ (see also Spoonley, 2006). Most significant I would argue however is 
that the acknowledgment of New Zealander as a distinct, ethnic category is an 
implicit, nay ‘official,’ endorsement of the parlous ‘one law, one value’ rhetoric of 
the National party and their ilk (most famously see Brash, 2004). The question 
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must be asked whether ‘New Zealander’ is a term intended  to unite or divide: 
Does being a “proud” New Zealander come at the expense of particular cultural 
traditions and communities, and/or risk splitting us into white, “mainstream 
New Zealand” as promoted by Brownlee (see Brownlee, 2005) “versus the alien 
others” (Misa, 2006). 
What haunts these debates is what Stuart Hall insightfully dubs “The 
Multicultural Question” (Hall, 2000): while officially bicultural, by fact New 
Zealand is a multi-cultural society; and, thus by definition is culturally 
heterogeneous. “It would be fair to say” writes Arvind Zodgekar, “that New 
Zealand is in the process of becoming a multi-ethnic society and New Zealand’s 
racial and cultural set-up is certainly becoming more rich and varied” (2005, p. 
147). On the face of it, it would also seem fair to concur with Zodgekar’s 
contention that this increasingly diverse society is precipitating a “growing sense 
of independence from the colonial past” (p. 140). Yet as Hall reminds us, the 
multicultural question is in close relationship to the phenomenon of the 
‘postcolonial’ (Hall, 2000). Only in the strictest sense, though, does such a term 
mean we are beyond colonialism. We are in colonialism’s aftermath, far from free 
of colonialism’s influence. The post-colonial, as Hall remarks elsewhere (Hall, 
1996), merely “marks the passage from one historical power-configuration or 
conjuncture to another…Problems of dependency, underdevelopment and 
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marginalization, typical of the ‘high’ colonial period, persist into the post-
colonial.” We have to remember too, that ‘colonialism’ was not simply a matter 
of territorial conquest or the establishment of imperial/Western institutions. 
Rather, colonialism was as much an operation of discourse. It may have been 
established by guns, but colonialism’s power was in the discursive operations of 
empire. 
As an operation of discourse, colonialism “interpellate[d] colonial subjects 
by incorporating them in a system of representation” (Tiffin and Lawson, 1994, p. 
3). And, because they are already written in that system of representation they 
are not only interpellated, but inscribed. The colonized subject becomes what 
Carusi calls “subject-effects,” the “subject as a discursive instance which is the 
effect of a variety of structures or discursive practices” (p. 104). Colonialism is 
therefore, in essence, an apparatus for constituting subject positions through the 
field of representation (Hall, 1997). These representations involve ideological and 
rhetorical strategies of classification and control. In particular, as Partha 
Chatterjee (1993) describes it in The Nation and its Fragments, the colonial project 
aimed to establish “the normalizing rule of colonial difference, namely, the 
preservation of the alienness of the ruling group” (p. 10). And by this ‘colonial 
difference’ Chatterjee is, of course, referring to the way in which the ‘other’ was 
represented “as inferior and radically different, and hence incorrigibly inferior” 
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(p. 33). Such discourses were not divorced from their material contexts, for 
representations, images, and stereotypes were productive of colonial ‘violence.’ 
As Obeyesekere (1992) has observed, a 
Discourse is not just speech; it is imbedded in a historical and cultural 
context and expresses often in the frame of a scenario or cultural 
performance. It is about practice…Insofar as the discourse evolves it 
begins to effect the practice (p. 650). 
 
These representations of the other thus varied according to the urgencies of the 
colonial context. In the Pacific several distinct themes emerged: Islanders were 
‘primitive’—pre-logical and without “intellectual, social political, and religious 
structures that would allow them to cope with modernity” (Hanlon, 1994); they 
were indolent; and, they were ruled by their bodies. One of my motivation in this 
dissertation is to begin to unravel this complex genealogy of the Pacific, to 
consider how the Pacific and its people have been conceptualized. 
This colonial discourse consists, in the first place, of a series of negations 
(Memmi, 1965). In Memmi’s words, “the colonized is not this, is not that” 
(Memmi, 1965). That is, colonial discourse participates in a process of ‘othering’ 
(Spivak, 1988). Derived from the work Hegel, Lacan, Satre, and others, othering 
“is an ideological process that isolates groups that are seen as different from the 
norm of the colonizers” (p. 148). Like Memmi, for Spivak (1988), othering is 
dialectic. Just as it creates the colonized, colonization creates the colonizer 
(Memmi, 1965). We can see this in the portmanteau figure of the primitive, a 
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discursive figure endemic within (neo)colonial narratives of the Pacific Islands 
(Denoon, 1997). The primitive was very much the ideological counterpoint to 
European modernity, gauged by a lack of progress, his ‘distance’ from 
civilization. In this way, the primitive was always comparative. ‘They’ were once 
how ‘we’ had been, locked somewhere in ‘our’ (repressed) past. Yet not only 
were they different in a temporal sense. Difference was also racialized; the 
primitive became a racial other (Hall, 1997). Originally a nonfigurative category, 
primitivism, as Mary Brewer notes, “increasingly came to be registered visibly as 
a physical demarcator: mental and moral differences became linked to physical 
differences in an updated, color-coded version of the Great Chain of being” 
(Brewer, 2005, p. 3). Initially idolized, the primitive by the eighteenth-century 
was identified by their appearance, and thus primitivism was assumed to be 
biologically-grounded. The presumed ascendant position of white Europeans 
and the debased condition primitive, the difference between inferior and 
superior, was thus preordained. In colonial discourse, the recognition of 
difference was thereby “made innocent, made to appear natural” (Pickering, 
2001, p. 71). 
Throughout the nineteenth-century this (racialized) colonial discourse was 
closely associated with the nation-state. Colonialism was penetrated by 
nationalist rhetoric, forms, and practices and nations and nationalism are 
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profoundly important in the formation of colonial practice. In a sense, 
nationalism is always a product of colonialism (Balibar, 1991). As van der Veer 
(1995) notes, colonialism and nationalism “go hand in hand in both the 
colonizing and the colonized countries of the world. The colonial project 
produced reified national cultures both in the colonies and ‘at home’” (p. 3). 
Nationalism extended the range and depth of colonialism and “reproduced it in 
subtle and not so subtle ways” (Dissanayake, 1994, p. ix); if the nation was born 
in modern Europe then it was spread by colonialism. The establishment of the 
nation-state was also important for the development of capitalism under 
modernity. In particular, the Age of Empire, as the age of capitalism, was built on 
spatial differentiation, on the building of boundaries. Colonial states imposed 
borders which necessitated the invention of nations with which they were to 
coincide. The resulting nation-states adhered to the “illusion” (Balibar, 1991) that 
citizens would share fundamental characteristics, including cultural values and 
ethnicity. Nationalism was thus a colonizing activity in itself “in erasing local 
differences in order to create a homogeneous national culture” (Dirlik, 2007, p. 
43). Irrespective of deep internal social divisions and inequalities the nation had 
to “imagined” (Anderson, 1983) as communal, as shared. There was no 
underlying reality of nationhood to be brought into consciousness (Davidson, 
2000). “Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men,” Ernest Gellner 
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famously wrote, “are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes preexisting 
cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often 
obliterates preexisting cultures: that is a reality” (Gellner, 2006). 
It is important to note that this act of imagining involves a degree of 
‘closure.’ Colonialism imposed administrative regimes and national boundaries 
that were inorganic and designed to serve the interests of imperial, colonial, and 
metropolitan domination. With an obvious nod to Foucault, what emerged is 
what Giddens has called a “bordered power-container” which “exists in a 
complex of other nation-states” and strives to maintain an “administrative 
monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries” (Giddens, 1985, p. 45). 
Hence, nations may be imagined, but they are “limited” in that “even the largest 
of them…has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” 
(Anderson, 1983). So in this way, the nation is imagined not only in communion, 
but in difference, to an ‘outside.’ As Cheah (1999, p. 10) writes, imagining the 
nation “is essentially a comparative process in which the nation is always 
haunted by something that is at one and the same time both spatially other or 
exterior to it.” In like fashion, a national identity presumes an other from whom 
is different. As Spencer and Wollman (2002) note 
If identity is about sameness, about identifying with those considered 
similar, it is also about difference, distinguishing oneself from those who 
are dissimilar…Any notion of group identity in particular necessarily 
involves some kind of process of categorization in order to distinguish 
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between those who are similar enough to be included and those who are 
different and therefore to be excluded (p. 58). 
 
National identity is therefore a divisive process of separating ‘us’ from ‘them’, 
‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’ (Billig, 1995). 
But if national identity is constructed to differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’, then 
it also works to separate those who ‘belong’ from those who do not. The borders 
of the colonial world placed some ‘within’ and some ‘outside.’ The issue then 
arises of how such ‘boundaries’ are constructed. We could suggest that who we 
are not is dependent upon the creation a standard, an unmarked normality 
against which to discern their deviations. That is, nationalism is a normative 
evaluation: “a judgement about what ought to be, rather than what the case is” 
(Pearson, 2003, p. 86). In New Zealand the yardstick was a largely British 
inflection. The close connections to Empire meant Anglo-Saxon elites became the 
‘core ethnie’ (Smith, 1986). While the terminology may have begun as ‘people’ or 
‘nation’, it was supplanted by white, nationalist forms of supremacy. Settlers by 
and large viewed themselves “as part of a transnational British kin 
group…bound together by ties of ‘race’ and national origin, within and across 
the metropolis and its colonial outposts” (Pearson, p. 994). What ‘New Zealand’ 
also shared with Britain was a sense of whiteness, a sense of “sharing the 
topmost rungs of a world league table of racial types with their British kin” 
(Pearson, 2003, p. 87). Their self-description of themselves as inheritors on this 
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Anglo-Saxon lineage justified their status as settlers because it at once named a 
range of others—especially indigenous Maori—as inferiors. Deviations from 
whiteness became the predominant form of identifying difference and license; 
whiteness came to function as both norm and core; and, whiteness became the 
measure for conferring ownership of a New Zealand citizenship and the 
privileges and entitlements accrued from that status. So for example, 
naturalization procedures were established on the basis that New Zealand “was 
a British country and other people either did not belong or could stay only in 
sufferance” (McKinnon, 1996, p. 12). There were clear biases too toward the 
British Isles when it came to migration, producing what McKinnon has coined a 
nation of (white) “kin-migrants.” A sense of ‘belonging’, of being a New 
Zealander, then, was tied to whiteness (Murphy, 2003). 
This brings to light an interesting paradox. The racialization process in 
which New Zealand imagined itself as white necessarily involved immigrants 
and Maori for they aided the establishment of boundaries and categories, as well 
as the constitution of the white ethno-national core—again, it is important to 
recall that “to understand the process of inclusion, we must consider it 
simultaneously as a process of exclusion” (Zolberg, 1996, p. 57). Following the 
Second World War, however, New Zealand’s ‘colonial subjects’ began ‘arriving’ 
in ever-greater numbers. Demographically, ideologically and culturally, New 
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Zealand was “transformed by the post-colonial chickens who came ‘home’ to 
roost—and in the process remade the metropolitan coop” (Farred, 2004, p. 58). 
This is the anarchy of empire (Kaplan, 2002). Imperial “aggression abroad” 
generating would eventually provoke protectionism at “home”: 
…underlying the dream of imperial expansion is the nightmare of its own 
success, a nightmare in which movement outward into the world 
threatens to incorporate the foreign and dismantle the domestic sphere of 
the nation (Kaplan, 2002, p. 12). 
 
This is especially true of the special historical and constitutional relationships 
that exist between New Zealand and many states in the Pacific. With regard to 
migration from the Pacific, concessionary policies—either de jure or de facto in 
nature—have long been in place as result of New Zealand’s colonial connections 
and also because of what the former Minister for Immigration, Kerry Burke, has 
described as New Zealand’s close cooperation with South Pacific countries and 
its “special responsibility to assist with their developmental efforts” (p. 7). In the 
immediate post-War years most New Zealanders probably gave these policies 
little notice. Indeed, workers from the Pacific were almost a necessity as New 
Zealand’s industrial economy flourished. But as economic conditions 
deteriorated, Pacific Islanders “…being more visible than other groups, became a 
convenient scapegoat for some of the economic problems facing the country” 
(Krishnan et al, 1994, p. 78). New Zealand was once again forced to confront the 
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“problem of otherness” (Braudel 1990) and once again it became apparent that 
whiteness had lingered on as an ideal in the ‘postcolonial’ world. 
This problem of otherness is one New Zealanders are still dealing with 
today. And, if Brownlee and Brash’s comments are anything to go by then it is a 
problem with which they are not dealing well. White cultural norms and 
imperatives remain embedded in the postcolonial state and, to borrow from 
Richard Dyer, white people still “colonize the definition of the normal.” 
Following work in whiteness studies, it would be fair to suggest that 
Pakeha/whiteness still operates as the unmarked norm against which other 
‘ethnic’ identities are marked and racialized. This is not to suggest that whiteness 
is ‘invisible’ as some have suggested (cf. McIntosh, 1998)—some Pakeha are 
hyper-aware of their whiteness. Rather, belonging in New Zealand cannot be 
reduced to the conventional analytical framework of ‘race’ and ‘race relations.’ 
Whiteness in New Zealand must instead be connected to what Ware (2001) 
describes as “the politics of the geo-body…since ideologies of ‘race’, ethnicity, 
and belonging are fundamentally bound up with the histories of the nation and 
how it is defined by competing forces” (p. 185). In this particular case, what I am 
suggesting is that the category ‘New Zealander’ has been defined over and 
against the category ‘immigrant’, and Pacific immigrants in particular. 
Exclusionary immigrations acts and naturalization laws are not only means by 
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which to regulate ‘citizens’ or the ‘state’ but also form part of an orientalist 
discourse (Said, 1985) of defining the cultural and racial ‘other.’ The Pacific 
immigrant acts as something of ‘screen’ (Lowe, 1996) on which the nation 
projects its very whiteness. 
About this Dissertation 
To many what I have argued above may seem remarkable. We—well, we 
Pakeha—like to think that we have “no race problem”, and enjoy “the best race 
relations in the world” (see Love, 2006; True, 1996). A recent survey sponsored 
by New Zealand’s Human Rights Commission has by the same token found that 
New Zealanders “were generally more optimistic than in previous years” about 
the future of race relations (HRC, 2006). New Zealand is also, for all intents and 
purposes, a ‘multicultural society.’ Our Governor General has said as much. 
Delivering a speech last year Anand Satyanand suggested that 
We are a diverse country…increasingly so…Our country can be said to be 
one that gives people a go whatever may have been their background. 
New Zealand’s contemporary diversity lies in our multiculturalism…I am 
sure the older people here today will agree New Zealand’s identity has 
evolved markedly…We now recognise that we are a truly multicultural 
country (Satyanand, 2006). 
 
Census data suggests Satyanand may be right. The latest figures saw the number 
of New Zealanders identifying themselves as “European”—in New Zealand 
generally-accepted as a euphemism for ‘white’—drop to 67.6 per cent from 80 
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per cent in 2001 (Statistics New Zealand, 2007). Meanwhile the fastest growing 
populations were ‘Asians’ and ‘Pacific peoples.” Taking “a peek into the future” 
one journalist was moved to speculate that while “New Zealand used to be white 
Europeans, dairy farming, rugby, and a Sunday roast; in 40 years it could be 
more about taro, curry, Chinese noodles, and conservation” (Ponniah, 2006, p. 
A8). 
It’s not entirely surprising that the author here should choose ‘taro’ as a 
one of the expressions of social and cultural change. New Zealand has, as 
Pearson and Kothari (2007) have observed, developed something of a penchant 
for “deploy[ing] food as symbolic of cultural politics, particularly in terms of 
national identity” (p. 46). And, perhaps there is no better emblem of New 
Zealand’s “rapidly browning culture” (Perrott, 2007) than this tropical plant. A 
“Pacific specialty” (as the South Pacific Commission calls it), the taro has become 
something of a totem of cultural identification. As the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the UN explains, “People of Pacific Island origin continue to 
consume taro wherever they may live in the world, not so much because there 
are no substitute food items, but mainly as a means of maintaining links with 
their culture.” Put simply, the taro is both an internal and external signifier of the 
Pacific community. And, it is a community that is growing, its growth rate far 
outstripping the New Zealand population as a whole (SNZ, 2007). In Race 
 33 
Relations Commissioner Joris de Bres’s eyes, Pacific people are also “Increasingly 
accepted as having a prominent and positive role in helping shape New 
Zealand’s identity” (de Bres, 2005, p. 52); a view shared by the Minister of Pacific 
Island Affairs, Winnie Laban, who believes “New Zealand’s identity in the 
twenty-first century [is] as a Pacific nation.” “I feel today,” she continues, “very 
proud and happy to see the cultures of the Pacific alive, thriving and 
contributing very positively to New Zealand’s economy and national identity” 
(Laban, 2006). 
It is one thing, however, for a society to be multicultural in the sense of 
having restaurants that offer ‘ethnic’ foods like “taro, curry and Chinese 
noodles” or to showcase ‘Polynesian’ music, art, and literature. In such a society 
“people may appreciate these differences without being deeply affected by 
them” (Lugones and Price, 1995, p. 103). It is the difference between what 
Lugones and Price (1995) call structural multiculturalism—wherein 
multiculturalism “informs the institutional structure of society”—and ornamental 
multiculturalism—the “reduction of other cultures to ornaments” (p. 103). To 
rephrase Liu and Sibley’s (2004) take on biculturalism in New Zealand, it is the 
contrast between multiculturalism in practice and multiculturalism in principle. 
These are, of course, issues taken up well in Stanley Fish’s provocative essay on 
“Boutique Multiculturalism” published in the journal Critical Inquiry in 1997. 
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Others have covered similar ground as well, pointing to superficial (Luckett, 
2000), commercialized (Hall, 2000), consumerist, corporate (Chicago Cultural 
Studies Group, 1992), and Bennetton (see Giroux, 1994) multiculturalism (for 
further discussion, see Hall, 2000). Acknowledging a debt to these scholars, in 
Chapter 1 I propose the like phenomenon of ‘Pacific multiculturalism.’ My 
analysis takes off with the All Blacks who in their very make-up suggest that 
New Zealand arrived in the ‘postcolonial [Pacific] present’ (Pattynama, 2005). On 
one level my arguments echo those aforementioned in noting the way in which 
ethnic ‘culture’ can be reduced to set of meaningless signifiers, and how ‘ethnic’ 
culture, when filtered through the Pakeha imagination, turns cultural practices 
into ‘ornamental’ culture (Lugones and Price, 1995). However, I also consider the 
ideological work of Pacific multiculturalism. Obviously, Pacific multiculturalism 
serves to disguise persistent racial tension within the nation. New Zealand today 
is still struggling with the legacy of various migrations and the profound impact 
of the second immigrant generation of ‘native’ citizens who ‘unsettle’ (Pearson, 
2000) the nation, dis-placing, in the process, traditional sites of national identity. 
This is not to suggest that the “fantasy of a white nation” no longer exists, that 
whiteness does not continue to order relations between different people in the 
nation (Hage, 2000). Borrowing this notion of a ‘white nation fantasy’ from Hage 
(2000), I examine how the ideas of cultural and racial difference can be 
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articulated to the national ‘project.’ In particular, essential to this project in New 
Zealand are notions of equality and egalitarianism. It therefore necessitates the 
institutionalization of difference (Asad, 1993) to secure its hegemony. White New 
Zealanders tolerate difference because anything less would undermine liberal 
image upon which the national identity has been built. Inclusion and pluralism 
are evidence that the meritocracy still holds. 
I stress the word tolerate here, because tolerance “presupposes that its 
object is morally repugnant, that it really needs to be reformed, that is, altered” 
(Goldberg, 1993, p. 7). This is the paradox of Pacific multiculturalism: “the 
commitment to tolerance turns only on modernity’s ‘natural inclination’ to 
intolerance: acceptance of otherness presupposes and at once necessitates 
delegitimation of the other” (p. 7). This is the order of the nation-space. White 
New Zealanders assume their place at the center or core of the nation, while 
others exist only on the margins—to be tolerated. To again borrow from Hage, I 
wish to suggest that the New Zealand nation as a space is “structured around a 
white culture, where…non-white ‘ethnics’ are merely national objects to be 
moved or removed according to white national will” (2000, p. 18). Consider 
Laban’s suggestion that “Our [presumably ‘New Zealand’s’] national identity is 
being enriched by the contributions of Pacific people right across the board from 
sports to science. Having our Pacific communities active in their cultures is 
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something this Labour-led Government strongly supports” (Laban, 2006; 
emphasis added). This “discourse of enrichment” presupposes a different mode 
of existence for ethnic cultures (Hage, 2000, p. 121). It places the dominant 
(white) culture in a more important position because it suggests non-white 
cultures function only to ‘enrich’ the core”: ‘we’ value ‘their’ contributions—
which implies that ‘they’ are not one of ‘us.’ In Ang’s (2001) terms Pacific 
multiculturalism is a built on the contradictory process of “inclusion by virtue of 
othering” (p. 139). 
At the center of this white nation fantasy is a belief in an insuperable 
white sovereignty; it is a fantasy of white dominance. Problems arise, however, 
when anything other than this state of affairs appears on the (ideological) 
horizon, when the white nation-space is invaded. The Other produces a kind of 
racio-spatial anxiety among the ‘white-and-very-worries-about-the-nation-
subject’ (Hage, 2000, p. 10). It also produces specific type of discourse, what Hage 
names as “the discourse of white decline” (2000, p. 180). In Chapter 2 I examine 
how just such a discourse has emerged around the ‘white flight’ of young males 
from rugby. White boys are apparently being swamped by overgrown 
Polynesian man-children who represent a psychic and physical threat to the next 
generation of New Zealand men. I first connect this discourse to the challenge 
posed by the “multicultural real” (Gilroy, 2005), what Hall (2000) has describes 
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adjectivally as the multi-cultural, to homogeneous notions of place, identity, and 
knowledge. Rugby has been marked out as the ‘natural’ domain of white men 
and different bodies belonging in other places are in a sense ‘out of place’; 
Polynesian boys are, in essence, what Nirmal Puwar calls “Space Invaders” 
(Puwar, 2004). They also threaten the proper development of Pakeha boys. If 
rugby ‘makes men’ (to steal from Nauright and Chandler [1996]), then where do 
white boys go to learn to ‘be a man.’ In the second part of this chapter I therefore 
relate white flight to announcements of a current (or at least impending crisis) in 
Pakeha masculinity, to what one recent local newspaper series dubs simply “The 
Trouble with Men.” 
The white-flight-panic discourse is also notable for the way in which the 
threat to white power and privilege is played out through the register of bodies. 
The body substitutes for the political. The (political) trauma of white men losing 
control finds its metaphorical analog in the traumatized bodies of wounded 
white boys whose life possibilities are constrained by the ‘natural’ superiority of 
young Polynesians. The image of white boys “having the daylights knocked out 
of them” (Romanos, 2002, p. 19) is a symbolic pain, an allegory of white male 
privilege slipping away. There is also a somatic norm being violated here. Young 
white males are normal. Young Polynesian males are not only different but a 
problem. Polynesian vis à vis white bodies are situated in two diametrically 
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opposed positions. In Chapter 3 I trace the roots of the binarized thinking and 
the repercussions of this history for contemporary understandings of the athletic 
Polynesian body. Starting by tracing the genealogy of natural Polynesian 
athleticism, I go on to argue that Polynesian bodies are discursively bound to an 
ideological matrix of primitive, instinctive coporeality. Examining media 
representations of rugby players of Pacific-descent, I the offer a contextualized 
cultural analysis of the present-day perpetuation of these colonial discourses. It is 
suggested that classic stereotypes of Polynesian physicality, and hence their 
natural intellectual inferiority, continue to exercise a hegemonic role in the 
representation of Pacific peoples. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 I take up bodily movements of a different kind. In 
Chapter 4 I examine the physical movement of Pacific (sporting) bodies across 
boundaries. I initially connect the migration of Pacific athlete/laborers both from 
and to New Zealand to a wider literature on athletic talent migration. There is 
room for suggesting that to understand how, why, and where these athletes we 
need to take account of the traces of colonialism and the way in which new forms 
of (bodily) (neo)colonization operate in the present. I also examine the paradox of 
what is perhaps a defining feature of our current ‘Age of Migration’: that while 
boundaries have become more porous, they have simultaneously become more 
entrenched. The flows of athletic labor represent the great liberatory potential of 
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Pacific peoples, a chance to think beyond oppressive nationalism or repressive 
state structures. Yet in the athletic labor market there are new modes of 
governmentality that define, discipline, and regulate the migration choices of 
Pacific athletes. In particular, a series of international and regional organizations 
and institutions—the International Rugby Board (IRB) first and foremost—
mitigate against the more ‘flexible’ (Ong, 1999) practices, strategies, and 
subjectivities of Pacific rugby players. While ‘sports system’ may indeed by 
decidedly ‘global’ (Maguire, 1999), their movement is still deeply dependent on a 
juridico-legal status shaped by ‘nation-based’ thinking and the disciplinary 
norms of capitalism. They may be freer to “escape localization” (Ong, 1999, p. 19), 
but these modern-day sporting nomads are never free of the regulations imposed 
by various outside agencies. 
In Chapter 5 I consequently aim to think beyond the reduction of 
‘boundary crossing’ to bodily movement. In one sense I am thinking here of 
‘virtual migration’ (Aneesh, 2006) and the rise of ‘virtual communities’ in 
cyberspace (Rheingold, 2000). Bodies increasingly cross borders, but so too do 
ideas, images and information, and ‘transnational’ activities need not necessarily 
involve face-to-face contact. The “space-compressing power of modern 
electronics” (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, 1999, p. 224) allows persons to 
engage in transnational activities without actually moving and forms of 
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solidarity no longer “rest on an appropriation of space” (Gupta and Ferguson, 
1992, p. 9). This reconstitution and redefinition of space and spatial relation for 
how we conceive ‘identity’ and ‘community’ among Pacific peoples. As such, the 
chapter begins from the premise that such terms as “conceived within the 
framework of nations/societies is making place for a post-inter/national sociology 
of hybrid formations, times and spaces” (1995, p. 63). One example is has been 
“comeback” (Georgiou, 2006, p. 3) of the notion of diaspora as a way of 
conceptualising current sociological concerns around ‘the global’ and ‘the local.’ 
Diaspora., as it has more recently been conceived, implies a decentralized 
relation to concepts such as ethnicity and community and complicated our 
understandings of ‘origin’ and ‘destination.’ As Stuart Hall contends: 
From the diaspora perspective, identity has many imagined ‘homes’…it 
has many different ways of ‘being at home’—since it conceives of 
individuals as capable of drawing on different maps of meaning and 
locating them in different geographies at one and the same time—but it is 
not tied to one, particular place. 
 
It could be suggested that past migrations have more recently born a migrancy of 
identity. In this chapter I argue that one way to understand this ‘migrancy’ is to 
see diaspora as a specific mode of articulation in an ongoing process of 
negotiating, in this case, Pacific, identity. Articulation is, of course, a nod to 
Stuart Hall’s conception of identity as a political expression through a specific 
“linkage” that is not “necessary, determined, absolute, and essential for all time,” 
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but “a form of connection that can make a unity of different elements, under 
certain conditions” (Grossberg, 1997, p, 141; see Hall, 1990, 1996). I take Hall’s 
ideas in hand with those of Paul Gilroy who similarly sees diaspora as a mode of 
linkage that enables us to rethink commonality without falling back on 
essentialist notions of experience or consciousness. One particular idea of 
Gilroy’s that I work with in this chapter is his heuristic “black Atlantic” 
framework (Gilroy, 1993). I problematize the black Atlantic, asking how it can be 
“fitted to, articulated with” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 262) the unique set of historical 
forces and practices that compose the social context within which the identities of 
Pacific peoples are both constituted and negotiated. Extending the work of Ben 
Carrington, who himself extends Gilroy’s to the realm of sport, I argue that the 
lives, travels, migrations, and significances (dare I say the ‘movements’) of 
Polynesian athletes assist in the development of “absent copresences” (Georgiou, 
2006) within the Pacific diaspora. They bring together different spaces and 
provide a means through which to articulate the “conditional” and 
“conjunctural” (diasporic) allegiances of Pacific peoples (Hall, 1996). 
My concluding chapter continues on the theme of movement. It could, 
however, perhaps be called an extended coda rather than a conclusion in that it is 
less a summary than a post-ipso rationale. It is an effort to overcome some of the 
pessimism which characterizes that which precedes it. It is an attempt to be 
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sensitive to rugby’s enchanting aspects in light of the attention given to those 
that are so disenchanting. Appropriating the work of C.L.R. James, I offer a 
different reading of the cultural politics of rugby. No cultural practice is ever 
truly autonomous, yet at the same time we cannot reduce all social interaction to 
the social structure. Like James saw in cricket, perhaps, in some way, rugby can 
be a resistive cultural act for Pacific peoples. Rugby may be an idiom through 
which creativity and resilience can flourish in the face of (neo)colonial 
oppression. To be sure I could easily be accuses of ‘doublethink’, an allusion in 
George Orwell’s 1984 to “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s 
mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.” Yet, as James may have 
warned us, while rugby is never truly free from its social reality, neither can we 
deny its aesthetic values. I do not even attempt to answer James’ famous 
question as to what ‘art’ is, but surely rugby has a technical sophistication, a 
symbolic resonance, and, perhaps, an aesthetic value? (St Louis, 2007). However 
rule-bound the game, rugby produces creativity; and, maybe these moments of 
creativity have a wider resonance, a political significance. We would also be wise 
to remember that rugby has an audience, and as such, to bear in mind that 
cultural consumption and identification is not merely a matter of complicity or 
submission to forces of dominance. Perhaps, then, there is (at least some) 
subversive potential in the sight of say Tana Umaga splitting open defences with 
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his Jamesian “eye for the line.” Perhaps we can begin think of how to rearticulate 
the internal racial discourses of rugby in a manner sensitive to its ‘translation’ 
(Bhabha, 1994) by those who play and those who watch. Maybe, then, in these 
final pages we actually find a place to start. 
As a final word, and as a comment on my theoretical leanings, I wish to 
suggest that, taken in toto, this dissertation can be read as an examination of what 
could be called the cultural politics of postcolonial rugby in New Zealand. More 
specifically, this dissertation is, in essence, a critical analysis of postcolonial 
‘cultural [rugby] discourse.’ In the Appendix below I outline what I mean, and 
how I use, terms such as ‘discourse’ and ‘critical discursive analysis’, but given 
that it is so central to my analysis and underpins not only my epistemology, but 
theoretical ontology, it is important to briefly explore my approach to 
‘postcolonialism’ and to remark on how ‘postcolonial criticism’ provides a 
theoretical and political impetus for what follows. To be sure, the legacy of 
colonialism, and especially the (white) British empire, is immediately visible in 
contemporary New Zealand, where, according to Statistics New Zealand “the 
total European grouping, including New Zealand European, has been reducing 
in size and proportion of the population for some years” (2007, p. 7). In urban 
centres such as Auckland and Wellington the numbers are even more marked. In 
Auckland, for instance, less than 50% of residents identified as European at the 
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last census. By contrast the fastest growing populations were those who 
identified either as ‘Asian’ or ‘Pacific Islander.’ The growing visibility of Pacific 
peoples in particular act as a perpetual reminder of the ways in which the once 
metropolis is intimately connected to the ‘peripheries.’ Biculturalism, 
multiculturalism, ethnic diversity, and the economic turn to Asia are evaporating 
New Zealand’s former ties to Britain, severing too the country’s symbolic 
connections to the old imperium. In a very particular sense of the term, then, 
New Zealand has become a ‘postcolonial’ nation. 
But what do I mean here by my suggestion as to New Zealand’s 
‘postcoloniality’? In one sense, ‘post’ as a prefix serves to delimit the scope and 
chronology of a field of study. So it could be suggested that ‘post’ intimates one 
set of ideas being supplanted by another (all be they cognate). As a descriptive 
the post-colonial could thus be (mis)taken as signaling the ‘end’ of colonialism—
or the ‘time after’ colonialism—a period in which colonial institutions has been 
superceded by new (postcolonial) cultural, political, and intellectual practices. To 
do so, though, would be in Michael Pickering’s words, “quite wrong” (2001, p. 
155). The prefix ‘post’, he writes, 
obscures the continuing processes of neo-colonialism and continuing 
inequities in global power while also reproducing the paradigm of 
unilinear developing time on which the Victorian notions of progress and 
primitivism depended (p. 155). 
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The implied break between the colonial and the postcolonial belies the 
persistence of colonialism in the period following formal ‘decolonialization.’ As 
Stuart Hall (1997) insightfully sums, postcolonialism  merely “marks the passage 
from one historical power-configuration or conjuncture to another…Problems of 
dependency, underdevelopment and marginalization, typical of the ‘high’ 
colonial period, persist into the post-colonial.” 
Difficult as any definition might be, and acknowledging the “fundamental 
historical and political predicaments” (Featherstone, 2005, p. 6) of doing so, to 
suggest this dissertation to be “an examination of the cultural politics of 
postcolonial rugby” perhaps necessitates that I provide some kind of definition 
of how I use the term ‘postcolonialism’—however arbitrary such a definition 
may be. A useful starting point in this regard is Helen Tiffin’s suggestion that 
postcolonialism can be taken to mean those “writing and reading [and perhaps 
‘playing’?] practices grounded in some form of colonial experience occurring 
outside Europe but as a consequence of European expansion into and 
exploitation of ‘the other’ worlds” (see also Ashcroft et al, 1989). These ‘practices’ 
must also be understood as a critique of the historical formations of colonial 
domination and of colonial legacies. In this respect, I see this dissertation as very 
much a ‘postcolonial’ text, in that it is a critique of colonialism and assumes that 
‘post’ does not mean ‘past.’ I also follow work in/on post-colonial theory over the 
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last fifteen or twenty years in the way attention is given as much to the colonial 
past and its deleterious effects as to the issue of how the post-colonial (Pacific) 
subject has reconstructed the (New Zealand) metropolis. Following Paul Gilroy 
(2005), I wish to suggest that the political conflicts that characterize today’s 
‘multicultural New Zealand’ can only be understood in the context supplied by 
its imperial and colonial history. As Gilroy writes, the imperial and colonial past 
“continues to shape political life” in “over-developed-but-no-longer-imperial” 
countries such as New Zealand. This past also shapes present, emergent 
multicultural relations. In particular, ideas forged during the colonial enterprise 
form the backbone of resistance to contemporary multi-culture. The collapse of 
imperial certainties into a kind of postcolonial cosmopolitanism has stoked a 
kind of “melancholia” (Gilroy, 2005) among many Pakeha, the result of the 
profound impact of the second immigrant generation of ‘native’ citizens who, in 
effect, unsettle the nation and displace, in the process, traditional sites of national 
identity. 
One of the principle outcomes of postcolonial theory is the way it directs 
our attention to “the many ways in which colonisation was never simply external 
to the societies of the imperial metropolis” (Hall, 1996, p. 246). In this way, 
postcolonialism calls into question the clearly demarcated inside/outside of the 
colonial system. In fact it could even be said that the interactive nature of the 
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‘post-colonial’ is the defining theme of post-colonialist studies: it is, in Rattansi’s 
(1997) words, the “investigation of the mutually constitutive role played by 
colonizer and colonized, centre and periphery, the metropolitan and the ‘native’, 
in forming, in part, the identities of both the dominant power and the subalterns 
involved in the imperial and colonial projects of the ‘West’” (Rattansi, 1997, p. 
481). Vis-à-vis multiculturalism, postcolonialism also directly confronts the 
uncomfortable memories of colonialism. It recognizes that both colonizers and 
colonized are linked through their histories, that the ‘metropolis’ and ‘periphery’ 
are inter-connected. This means also that debates over who ‘belongs’ to the 
nation are framed by Empire. The question of national belonging is organized 
and managed through arguments about idealized characteristics complexly 
entangled in their colonial pasts. In this way, postcolonialism brings history back 
in. 
Postcolonial studies could, in sum, be described as an interdisciplinary 
commitment to theorizing the problematics of colonization and decolonization. 
In Gregory’s (2000) view, postcolonialism is a 
critical politico-intellectual formation that is centrally concerned with the 
impact of colonialism and its contestation on the cultures of both 
colonizing and colonized peoples in the past, and the reproduction and 
transformation of colonial relations, representations and practices in the 
present (p. 612). 
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At the root of post-colonial theory and criticism are questions of power and 
knowledge, and particularly the power to represent the self and others. 
Representations and modes of perception have been fundamental weapons of 
colonial power and rule, and we can perhaps best conceive of colonialism as an 
operation of discourse. Western/colonial power was exercised through a 
particular kind, a particular kind of language and we cannot understand how 
colonialism and imperialism worked (and work still) unless we examine the 
discursive means through which ‘the West’ claimed the power of representation 
and reality. 
My doorway into understanding ‘colonial discourse’ in this dissertation is 
through Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism. Though colonial discourse and 
Orientalism are not necessarily interchangeable, Orientalism captures some of 
the discursive strategies of cultural projection, incorporation, debasement, and 
erasure which underpin my understandings of how the Pacific was ‘produced’ in 
the binary cast of Europe’s (inferior) other. Capturing how ‘Europe’ was defined 
through a oppositional idea and experience, Said says of ‘the Orient’ that it “has 
helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, 
experience” (Said, 1979). In a process now more commonly referred to as 
‘othering’, Said describes how the Orient came to be represented as 
fundamentally different from ‘the Occident.’ This ‘othering’ of the Orient, 
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involved the creation of “elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, 
and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny, 
and so on” (Said, 1979) that worked to secure European superiority by 
suggesting ‘Orientals’ to be the opposite of the rational, peaceful, liberal Western 
subject. The Orient was, in essence, the “distorting mirror” (Said, 1979, p. 27) 
by/in which Europe defined itself and celebrated its superiority. As Said 
suggests, European culture gained its strength and identity “by setting itself off 
against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self” (p. 3), the 
sum and substance of Orientalism being the “ineradicable distinction between 
Western superiority and Oriental inferiority” (p. 42). Though Orientalism is 
located in a particular cultural and historical space, following Said, I suggest in 
this dissertation that one of the abiding consequences of [Pacific] Orientalist 
discourse is the way in which “in this framework the Orient [or, here the Pacific] 
became the negative imprint of the Occident” (Turner, 1989, p. 633). I believe that 
we can also extend Said’s theory of a dominant (Orientalist) discourse to the 
Pacific. Like statements of the Orient, accounts of the Pacific, in vocabulary, 
imagery, and style, enabled Europe’s imperial powers to successfully 
appropriate the Pacific as its own. And, again in a nod to Said, we could 
furthermore suggest that “Pacific Orientalism” (Wilson and Hereniko, 1999) still 
permeates the Western cultural subconscious. 
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In exposing the West’s propensity to “demean and dominate the other” 
Said also demonstrates how representation is never neutral. Drawing on 
Foucauldian discourse theory Said shows how representations are laden with a 
“will to power,” a will “to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a 
manifestly different…world” (p. 12). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Orientalism has 
become perhaps the central text for practitioners of discourse analysis and 
postcolonial critics. Following Said, colonialism has increasingly come to be seen 
“as an ideological production across different kinds of texts produced historically 
from a wide range of different institutions, disciplines, and geographic areas” 
(Young, 2001, p. 343; my emphasis). As I intimate above, and as Chris Tiffin and 
Alan Lawson write in the introduction to their recent book The Textuality of 
Empire, colonialism is now most frequently understood as an “operation of 
discourse, and as an operation of discourse it interpellates colonial subjects by 
incorporating them in a system of representation. They are always already 
written by that system of representation” (Tiffin and Lawson, 1994, p. 3). What 
this project contributes to this postcolonial literature, however, is the way in 
which I see postcolonial discourse as not merely ‘a culturalism’ (Dirlik, 1994). 
The linguistic and literary bias of ‘postcolonial studies’ is not only notable for its 
relative inattention to popular cultural forms such as sport, but in the way it is 
conventionally ‘textual.’ In many ways I am attempting to address Dirlik’s 
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contention that the ‘post-colonial’ grossly underplays “capitalism’s structuring of 
the modern world” (Dirlik, 1994). It could readily be argued that much 
postcolonial work is thin on detail, hung up on questions of discourse, and 
marred by textualism (Clayton, 2003). While I certainly privilege discourse in the 
present analysis (I describe this dissertation, after all, as a critical textual 
analysis), I hope to guard against reducing (post)colonialism to matters of 
discourse. My emphasis here is on how discourse operates in a concrete 
historical situation (‘postcolonial’ New Zealand) and in actual practice. My 
interest is not language generally, but rather, “specific languages or meanings, 
and how they are deployed at particular times, in particular places” (Hall, 1997, 
p. 6). My aim is place postcolonial theory in an engagement with “material 
practices, actual spaces, and real politics” (Yeoh, 2001, p. 457). As opposed to 
being a tale of a generalized condition of colonization and its aftermath, this 
dissertation is an attempt to engage a specific historical and cultural context. 
My underlying premise is that discourse is always in constant production 
and exists only in as much as it can be connected to determining structures and 
institutions. As Davis (2004) notes, discourse “does not exist purely in the realm 
of the symbolic or ideological…Discourses are concrete in so far as they emanate 
from specific points of view” (p. 165). In Hall’s terms, discursive systems have 
“‘real’ social, economic, and political conditions of existence and ‘real’ material 
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and symbolic effects.” In his view ideas only become effective if they do, in the 
end, connect with a particular constellation of social forces. Taking this notion in 
hand, I am thus less concerned with the ‘how’ or ‘poetics’ of representation and 
discourse, than with the “linkage[s] between the articulated discourse and the 
social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not 
necessarily, be connected” (Hall, 1986, p. 53). On these lines we can suggest that 
the focus on culture and representation need not necessarily be a diversion from 
political realities of postcolonial struggle because historical representations of 
imperialism and colonialism are culturally and historically constructed. On one 
hand, social and historical processes are textual because they can only be 
recovered in representation, yet texts, in all their various guises, must be read in 
fuller, more contextualized ways. Texts do not stand in for social processes, 
discourse for material reality, for texts cannot be disconnected from context. 
According with Hall (1997) I also wish to stress here that as I have taken it herein 
‘discourse’ is not simply another word for ‘representation.’ Rather, as Loomba 
(2005) reminds us. “discourse analysis involves examining the social and 
historical conditions within which specific representations are generated” (p. 97). 
Hence, any study of colonial discourse “ought to lead us towards a fuller 
understanding of colonial institutions rather than direct us away form them” (p. 
97). 
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A further major theoretical and conceptual borrowing from postcolonial 
studies in this dissertation is its concern with conflicts of identity and cultural 
belonging, and particularly cultural identity in ‘colonised’ societies. Of specific 
regard is the way former colonial powers have had to change their self-
assessment. Postcolonial theorists alert us to the fact that as much as 
decolonizing European powers thought they could “[leave] the consequences of 
imperialism behind them” (Hall, 1992, p. 626), the previously ‘colonized’ are now 
inside as much as outside of the nation-states of the West, precipitating a 
pluralization of national cultures and identities. Old certainties and hierarchies of 
identity have certainly been called into question in the post-colonial moment. In 
particular, the end of colonialism would at first appear to signal the demise of 
the unrivaled ascendancy of colonialism’s normative whiteness. As numerous 
scholars have suggested, whiteness was a tacit norm of the colonial endeavor. 
Fanon, for instance, has shown how upon arrival whiteness became a kind of 
universal standard to which colonial subjects are compelled to aspire (Fanon, 
1967). For Fanon, (cultural) imperialism constructs an undifferentiated whiteness 
and a conception of Other only as being defined as ‘non-white.’ The colonized 
black self, he argues, must continually confront his or own ‘otherness’ in the 
presence of a normalized culture of whiteness. What I therefore initially draw 
from scholars such as Fanon and, in particular, Albert Memmi (see Memmi, 1965, 
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1968, 2000), is the way in which whiteness emerged as an indispensable 
component of colonialism. From more recent scholarship in the area of 
postcolonial studies is the way in which whiteness died with the passing of 
(high) colonialism. As Alfred J. López remarks, as an ideal, the “cultural residues 
of whiteness linger in the postcolonial world” (2005, p. 1). One of colonialism’s 
most obvious cultural remnants is what López elsewhere calls “a postcolonial 
‘will to whiteness’ that lurks in the burgeoning states national racial unconscious, 
as an unacknowledged, because unexamined, national aesthetic” (López, 2001, p. 
95). Much of the dissertation can be viewed as similarly concerned with the 
colonial legacies of whiteness. To date there has been little scholarship in 
postcolonial studies exploring the relationship between whiteness and the 
consolidation and maintenance of colonial power (López, 2005). In several of the 
chapters below, however, I attempt to connect studies of whiteness that are more 
typically concerned with ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ to a specifically colonial or 
postcolonial context. How, I ask, has the representational power of whiteness 
operated in the service of colonialism and how does it continue to serve 
neocolonial regimes? To what extent do “white cultural norms remain embedded 
in the postcolonial or postindependence state”? (López, 2005, p. 4). 
Finally, I take from postcolonial studies its injunction to ‘rethink’ Empire 
and, in particular, the way “the political and institutional histories of ‘the centre’ 
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and its outer circles may be more mutually constituted than we used to think” 
(C. Hall, 1996, p. 70). Postcolonial scholarship seeks to expose the way in which 
the binary thinking of ‘colonizer/colonized’ works to perpetuate the colonial 
dominance of the West and the subordination of the colonized and once-
colonized Other (Spivak, 1988). In doing so postcolonial unmasks the ‘us’/‘them’ 
relationship implicit in Othering as inherently unstable. It reveals to us the fact 
that there is no ‘real’ Other ‘out there’ to be located. Othering instead occurs 
through language and discourse. What this means is that the self-Other binary is 
always in flux, and as a consequence opens the space for resistance—something 
that “lies at the heart of the postcolonial debate” (Michel, 1995, p. 92). In the way 
it challenges binary oppositions and the “fundamentally static notion of identity” 
(Said, 1993, p. xxviii), post-colonial theory suggests that there are other 
narratives, other discourses. Postcolonial theory thus moves us toward more 
amore ambivalent (Bhabha, 1994), syncretic conceptions of postcolonial identity. 
Homi Bhabha has been particularly influential in such developments, with his 
call “to think beyond narratives or originary and initial subjectivities and to focus 
on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulations of cultural 
differences.” In the latter parts of this dissertation I take up the parallel 
arguments of Paul Gilroy and the way in which his notion of The Black Atlantic 
attempts to move beyond the colonizer/colonized relationship (Gilroy, 1993). 
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Finally I heed Hall’s insistence that cultural identities “far from being eternally 
fixed in some essentialized past” are “subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, 
culture, and power” (Hall, 1990, p. 212-213; see also Hall, 1992). For this very 
reason, I wish to suggest that as much as rugby may still be seen as a symbolic 
site representing New Zealand’s imperial legacy, it also functions as what Mary 
Louise Pratt dubs as a postimperial “contact zone” (Pratt, 1992). Like the types of 
interactive, relational identities theorized by Bhabha, Gilroy, and Hall rugby 
suggests not only the legacy of past colonial encounter but the ‘transcultural’ 
(Pratt, 1992) challenges to it. In this way, I take postcolonialism to be a process of 
disengagement, rather than a break, from colonialism. Postcolonialism as I see it 
is “an anticipatory discourse” (Quayson, 2000, p. 9), and ongoing process “of 
anticipating and striving for truly decolonized future realities, identities, 




Pacific Multiculturalism: Rugby, Race, and the Egalitarian Myth 
 
Writers on sport…automatically put what was unpleasant out of sight 
even if they had to sweep it under the carpet. The impression they created 
was one of almost perpetual sweetness and light 
- C. L. R. James 
 
The problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of the color-blind 
- Vijay Prashad 
 
On my last trip to North America, I flew Air New Zealand, New Zealand’s 
‘national airline.’ Like most people in those nervous moments before take-off, I 
rummage through the seat-pocket in front of me, searching for the in-flight 
magazine. Generally, when I find it, I turn to the back; the audio-visual guide is 
something of a best friend on a near eleven-hour flight. Today, though, 
something else caught my interest first. On the cover is a young girl, maybe 
seven or eight, performing in Auckland’s Pasifika Festival. Her hair is pulled back, 
colorful feathers flowing from where it is fastened at the top of her head. She is 
dressed in a jute ‘ie lavalava adorned across the breast with the same kind of 
feathers that jut from her hair. From the position of her arms and her sway, we 
can tell she is dancing. I’m not sure what: a siva, a sasa?; I think it’s a taualunga, 
but can’t be certain. It doesn’t really matter: for the average tourist she could be 
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easily mistaken for an aspiring ‘Hula girl,’ performing some sort of ‘native’ 
movement, to ‘island’ music we can’t hear, but somehow know. It’s an 
interesting image to have on the cover of what is, for all intents and purposes, a 
marketing brochure for New Zealand Tourism. Interesting in that, this is a 
country better known for “rugby and Lord of the Rings” (as local comedian Te 
Radar once drolly put it), with, perhaps, “a bit of Maori stuff on top” (Smith, 
2005, p. 22). Air New Zealand, though, was showing(/selling) us a different 
picture of New Zealand, and, evidently, New Zealanders; as they put it, this was 
a different “shade of Kiwi.” Here was an image meant to invoke “a whole new 
genre of New Zealanders”, one of the “third culture kids” who are “now making 
their mark felt of the New Zealand mainstream” (Schaer, 2007). 
It’s an easy reading to make. If we missed the message, the subtitle makes 
it clear: this is a piece about “Our Pacific Culture.” Of course, by ‘our’ they mean 
‘New Zealand’s.’ The new New Zealand we are told is one that is “fast becoming 
brown.” And, there are strong grounds too for making their claim. 
Demographically and culturally, at no time in its history has New Zealand been 
so self-aware, and so unashamed, of itself as “a Pacific nation.” Among 
statisticians and demographers ‘browning’ is a reference to the fact that, as an 
‘ethnic group’ (to use official parlance), the Pacific population is growing at a 
rate far in excess of their ‘European’ counterparts. By 2021 the Pacific population 
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is projected to grow by some 59 percent over 2001, while the proportion of Pacific 
peoples is estimated to rise from 6 per cent to 9 per cent of all New Zealanders 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2006). Beyond the numbers and the stats, that New 
Zealand is “becoming browner” (Macfie, 2005) is also evident in how the country 
is both defining, as well as projecting, its cultural identity. The recent 
“‘efflorescence’ of things Pacific” (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005, p. 210) has provided 
the grounds for what academic Misatauveve Melani Anae describes as the 
“infiltration of a Pacific identity at a national level” (Anae, 2004, 92). This is well 
reflected in the arts, music, television, film, and literature, all areas where Pacific 
peoples are making major, and highly visible, contributions (for further 
discussion see Anae, 2006; Mallon and Pereira, 2002; Pearson, 2004; Teaiwa and 
Mallon, 2005). The influence of Pacific culture has also “surfaced in institutional 
contexts” (Anae, 2004) including education, research and government 
departments and policy. Little wonder, then, that renowned photographer Glenn 
Jowitt should offer this vision of how New Zealand should promote itself to the 
world: “I think that representing ‘us’ as Polynesia is the way to go.” 
The list of Pacific people who have made a mark at regional, national and 
international level is indeed extensive. So too are examples of their growing 
influence on New Zealand social and cultural life. For instance, we could point to 
Scribe’s seven Tui Awards, Ben Lummis’ crowning as New Zealand Idol, the 
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wildly successful animated series bro’Town, or the fact that a record 210,000 
recently turned out for Auckland’s Pasifika Festival. But if Polynesians are, as 
one recent report suggests (Smith, 2005), “changing the face of New Zealand” 
then for me there is no better example than the appointment of Ionatana Falefasa 
‘Tana’ Umaga as All Black captain. The first Pacific person to be named as such, 
Umaga was roundly hailed at the time as “a fitting reflection of New Zealand 
society” (Kayes, 2004, p. 14). Certainly, he was an apt choice given the national 
game has been dominated in recent years by players of Pacific descent (his role in 
a team with “a predominantly brown look about it” wrote one columnist, 
“always seemed to be a logical choice” [Singh, 2006]). Multiculturalism aside, at 
the same time Umaga neatly symbolized other tenets deeply ingrained in the 
New Zealand psyche. It is significant in the way it played out the myth of 
classless egalitarianism which remains one of the core elements of New 
Zealand’s national identity (Consedine, 1989; Nolan, 2007). Alongside this 
egalitarian ideal, it has become commonplace to believe that racism has no place 
in New Zealand, that it applies to other societies, but not here. Umaga’s becoming 
captain was this color-blind, egalitarian narrative writ large: born in the working-
class suburb of Wainuiomata to parents who had immigrated from Samoa, he 
has become, despite the “odd stumble and fall from grace” (Kayes, 2004, p. 14), 
one of New Zealand’s most recognized and respected sportsmen, attracting “the 
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same publicity usually afforded the prime minister and other high-powered 
celebrities” (Rees, 2005, p. 25). 
On one level the beatification of Umaga could well be read as a sign that 
Pacific peoples are no longer marginalized in the New Zealand national space, 
that they no longer occupy the position of the ‘other.’ More likely, however, it 
reflects New Zealand’s desire to seen as an inclusive, multicultural nation. That 
is, it has less to do with celebrating Umaga, than celebrating ourselves. To 
borrow from Anagnostou (2003), Umaga is an example of how: 
To tell stories of ethnic success is to speak about the nation in all its 
benevolence and generosity. National ideologies such as…mobility, 
openness, and inclusiveness come to life any time the nation’s Others 
claim socioeconomic achievement (p. 279). 
 
Umaga, I argue, can be read as an apparent vindication of what Chock (1991) 
dubs the “myth of opportunity.” And, as an “opportunity story” (Chock, 1991), 
he serves an important ideological function: first, as a tale of national 
redemption, a way of forgetting the racially-charged ‘dawn raids’ and expulsions 
of the past (see de Bres, 2005; and, second, his story represents what Ang (2001, 
p. 98) calls a “public fiction” that implies New Zealanders “live in a 
harmonious…and peaceful country where everyone is included and gets along.” 
That is, through Umaga the national subject can be interpellated as tolerant. 
There is too a further ideological consequence of this myth. If New Zealand 
society in the popular imagination provides the unfettered opportunity for 
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upward mobility, if the barriers once facing ethnic minorities have been 
removed, then equality of opportunity for all New Zealanders becomes a given. 
If individual talents, motivations, and morals account for social statuses, then the 
failings of minorities are purely their own (McNamee and Miller, 2004). This type 
of liberal individualist myth suggests difference is not an obstacle to 
achievement, abrogating the real structural constraints that affect minority 
socioeconomic mobility, and ignoring “current inequalities that fall primarily 
along racial lines” (Ebert, 2004, p. 174; see also Freeman, 2005). In assuming an 
open, race-neutral context, the egalitarian narrative reinforces the current racial 
order, “suppressing a plain dealing and unsentimental consideration of the 
continuing constitutive role of processes of racialized and ethnicized othering” in 
contemporary New Zealand (Ang, 2001, p. 139). 
And, this, I argue, is where rugby enters the scene. That New Zealanders 
still hold fast to the illusion of being an democratic, egalitarian society, without 
hierarchies entrenched in race or inherited privilege, has much to do with the 
continual invocation of a history of diversity and tolerance—something marred 
only by ‘exceptional’ events in a less-enlightened past. Such myths are structured 
and reproduced through variegated and temporally-extended representational 
strategies, narrated, obscured and embodied in various elements of public 
culture. The narrative construction of the past can be found in a variety of 
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materials; in texts, objects, monuments, landscapes and images. And, of course, 
to this list we should add sport. As Nauright (2003) argues, “the nostalgic use of 
sport and the history of sport has been one of the most significant areas in the 
process of sustaining identities and solidarity through shared experiences of 
heroic deeds in specific societies” (p. 38). Sport is also imbued with a 
contemporary relevance, in that the sporting past is frequently drawn on to 
“legitimate a present social order” (Nauright, 2003, p. 35). 
Against this symbolic power of the All Blacks, in this chapter I would like 
to offer a different reading. Rugby, I will argue, for all its cosmopolitanism, often 
serves to obfuscate deeper ethnic schisms. Beneath the united façade of pakeha 
men playing side-by-side with their Maori and Pacific Island brethren, rugby is 
not nearly as inclusive as Kiwis would like to, or have been led to, believe. 
Though rugby may offer a context where New Zealanders can engage on mutual 
terms, it gives lie to the fact that the acceptance of Pacific peoples as fully-fledged 
Kiwis is far from unanimous. And, rugby is neither immune to the discourses of 
race and nation: they are always there, struggled over and occasionally erupting. 
In Gilroy’s terms it could be argued that rugby is an “important site on which the 
limits of the nation as well as its character are routinely established” (1987, p. 62). 
As such, the ideas of national belonging and ethnicity that it maps out are a 
window into the “ambivalent kinships” that have marked the Pacific migrant 
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experience (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005, p. 207). As much as rugby turns “the 
ethnic into the national” (Anagnostou, 2003, p. 279) it generates messages 
bearing significant ideological contradictions, creating feelings of both belonging 
and alienation, and revealing a fundamental unease with the growing cultural 
prominence of Pacific peoples. However much they may have succeeded in 
rugby, Pacific peoples remain an ambiguous presence in New Zealand. 
Rugby: The Game for All New Zealanders? 
To begin, it important to first trace the rise of what could be called ‘the 
rugby mystique.’ By this I am referring to the way in which rugby has come to be 
seen, to borrow the title of Peter Bush’s best-selling tribute to the sport, The Game 
for All New Zealand. In many ways it is remarkable that this is the case. Rugby 
began, after all, as the sport of an elite. As Dunning and Sheard (2005) have 
shown, in its distinguishing form, rugby emerged in the milieu of the English 
Public School System during the early 1800s. Throughout public schools at the 
time ‘manliness’ emerged as an ideal, supported by the resurrected belief that 
strength of character could be achieved through sturdiness of the body. These 
views of the body and mind also had religious motivations stemming from the 
Protestant élite. Their basic premise—which found its most famed expression in 
the cult of ‘Muscular Christianity’—was that participation in sport could 
contribute to the development of not only physical fitness and ‘manly’ character, 
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but also of Christian morality. As the reformist Charles Kingsley once wrote in 
Education and Health, “games induce not merely to physical but to moral health.” 
With new emphasis given to physical activities, sports such as rugby became 
part-and-parcel of the education of the young men of the British upper (and later, 
aspiring) classes. Under the guidance of headmasters like Thomas Arnold of 
Rugby and G.E.L. Cotton of Marlborough, rugby would became an integral part 
of “the wider reforms that were designed to instil discipline and exert ‘social 
control’ over the behavior of pupils” (Harvey, 1999, p. 93). To its advocates rugby 
provided the ideal means through which to enact “a ‘manly’ education tempered 
by civilizing restraints” (Dunning and Sheard, 2005, p. 74). It would remain a 
sport played and administered by a relatively homogeneous upper middle class 
well into the 1870s. 
Rugby arrived in New Zealand in the context of these class-bound origins. 
Here too it began among the elite. As Crawford (1996, p. 151) has argued, the 
“games cult” and the influence of muscular Christianity was transferred to the 
prestigious boys schools of New Zealand, in doing so creating a mystique that 
made the good “games player” a privileged person in society. However, though 
clearly transported from English public schools by old boys to New Zealand, 
rugby in the new colony “spread quickly through other social classes” (Phillips, 
1987, p. 90). As During (1998) observes, “What in England was mainly an upper-
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class game…became in New Zealand a symbol of mateship, intrepidness, 
coloniser-colonised reconciliation. All this without the game losing its imperialist 
aura” (p. 35). 
Why the exclusive nature of the English game did not reproduce itself in 
New Zealand has been the subject of some debate (see Ryan, 2004). The reason it 
spread so quickly, though, has generally been posited as owing to one or a 
combination of factors. There was certainly an element of pragmatism in that 
rugby demanded little in the way of equipment, and, unlike cricket, was better 
suited to New Zealand’s rugged landscape (Phillips, 1987; Ryan, 1993, 2004). 
Phillips has also argued that the sport was a neat fit with New Zealand’s pioneer 
culture. Echoing Dunning and Sheard’s contention that “rugby’s great roughness 
may have made it more appealing to groups among whom traditional concepts 
of masculinity continued to prevail” (p. 119), Phillips contends that, in New 
Zealand, “rugby appealed to values already deep rooted among the male 
community” (p. 92). In Phillips’ view rugby was the epitome of rural, colonial 
masculinity: “The effort, cooperation and egalitarianism required of pioneers in 
taming a rugged landscape supposedly produced an especially tough New 
Zealand male ‘type’ ideally suited to the combative demands of the rugby field” 
(Ryan, 2004, p. 167). 
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As much as rugby took root because of a distinctive male culture, a 
number of authors have additionally suggested that rugby provided an 
important basis for social integration (Crawford, 1985, 1986; Fougere, 1989; Perry, 
1994, 2004). According to Erik Olssen the structure of rugby “allowed ethnic, 
religious and local loyalties to be expressed yet transcended them.” Geoff 
Fougere (1989) has similarly written of how “rugby tied together the collection of 
localities and provinces into a national body” even before New Zealand “had 
anything resembling a national market, or even a very effective national state” 
(p. 12). As he writes, 
what is achieved through rugby is the symbolic uniting of men over and 
against all of the differences of background, occupation, education, 
income, experience and belief that otherwise divide them. This vision of 
male comradeship is not imposed from above, but built painstakingly 
from the level of the local club through provincial and national levels…At 
the peak of this structure, giving final definition to its meaning and 
purpose…the national team—the All Blacks (Fougere, 1989, p. 116). 
 
Perry (2005) notes that in this way “distinctions between social classes, between 
town and country, between regions, between colonisers and colonised, were both 
dramatised and bridged” (p. 158). As New Zealand became increasingly urban 
during the late 1800s rugby continued to serve a similar integrative role. The 
enthusiastic following for the sport made possible “a new sense of belonging, a 
ritualistic involvement in a larger group” (Crawford, 1986) even as New 
Zealand’s towns and cities expanded. In a society “experiencing rapid urban 
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development and the growth of civic consciousness” the game became “one 
answer to the industrial anomie” of the time (Crawford, 1986). As Crawford 
notes, the rituals surrounding the game drew communities together: “The action, 
excitement and movement as a team must have served as a strong antidote to the 
alienation experienced in the work situation by the player who was an unskilled 
labourer.” Such was rugby’s place that Laidlaw (1999) now laments a time when 
rugby was once “a cornerstone of every community” (p. 21). 
The most popular, and sustaining, myth to explain rugby’s popularity, 
though, is its purported classlessness; something that fit with New Zealand’s 
image of itself as ‘a working man’s paradise’ (to use the words of one erstwhile 
Prime Minister). As True (1996) notes, into the early-twentieth century “it was 
common for the people of New Zealand to be told by successive governments 
that they were a ‘classless society’” (p. 112). If England was home to inequality, 
then in New Zealand it found its counter. And, rugby moved to the centre of this 
egalitarian myth. Echoing the pioneer community, “rugby was appropriate for, 
and complimentary to, a New Zealand community forged by a democratic press 
of ‘mateship’ and familiarity” (Crawford, 1996). The word mateship here is 
worth noting. Mateship, which Mulgan (2004) defines as “the peculiarly colonial 
ideal of male solidarity and friendship” (p. 42), is a kind of fraternal 
egalitarianism deeply invested with connotations of communality. It came to be a 
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signifier of the ideals shared by men living closely together in the harsh 
conditions of the frontier. Rugby, like colonial life, appeared hospitable to a 
rough-and-ready egalitarianism and the pioneer disdain for authority and 
commitment to pragmatism. As the novelist Lloyd Jones writes, 
In New Zealand, the sport reinforced the vision of the classless and 
inclusive society. And in a society that had still to build its infrastructure, 
every pair of hands had its use. Much the same applies to the game of 
rugby (Jones, 2003). 
 
Rugby thus became a way through which (Pakeha) men came to understand 
themselves as a settler society within a domestic culture grounded in the rigors 
of the colonial life, rather than as an English satellite. 
This image of egalitarian mateship was cemented by the 1905 All Black 
tour of the United Kingdom. Much has been made of the way the British press 
were fascinated by the apparent lack of classlessness among the team (Phillips, 
1987). One wrote, for instance, of the way: 
All grades of opinion from the university professor to the navvy, the 
socialist, the freethinker, aye, any class of religious thought—Roman 
Catholic of Protestant—the black man, the brown man, and the white man 
have all one common place of the football field. What they are doesn’t 
matter—it’s their abilities as players that count” (cited in Phillips, 1987, p. 
116). 
 
Whereas the British were wont to associate rugby with “the aristocratic acts of 
individual brilliance”, the All Blacks “seemed a new species, an egalitarian band 
of natural gentlemen” (Phillips, 1987, p. 117). The perception of subsequent 
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teams over the next 70 or so years reinforced this image of the All Blacks as 
modest, unassuming, ‘ordinary blokes.’ Phillips notes how even into the 1970s 
one biographer of the immortal Colin Meads was keen to assure readers that 
“Meads sees himself as an ordinary bloke with a farm to work, sheep to shear, 
land to be cleared, a cow to milk. As a bloke who loves a beer with his mates” (p. 
118). Today, rugby writers, rugby journalists in particular, have been essential in 
facilitating and perpetuating the egalitarian myth. In the best-selling book How to 
Watch a Game of Rugby Spiro Zavos reflects on how 
Most New Zealand males, from erudite scholars to burly shearers, have 
experienced the dying fall of the light after a hard match and the 
linament-scented mateship of the dressing room. It is one of those tribal 
experiences that has helped to create that unique and underrated species, 
the New Zealand man (Zavos, 2005). 
 
Elsewhere, Zavos writes of his own experience: 
The sports arena was my path, perhaps my only way, to respectability and 
self-knowledge. Thinking about this, I realized that sporting achievement 
is—or should be—colour blind, because it is (or should be) focused on 
what a person does, not his or her background, culture, class, religion or 
looks. Kids who try to make it in society through sport, know this 
instinctively (Zavos, 1997). 
 
Chris Laidlaw writes similarly of how “the secret of most of New Zealand’s 
rugby success this century has been a simplicity of approach; a focus on 
essentials and an innate self belief by individuals who have had to make it on the 
basis of their own personal effort” (p. 185). 
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The power of the rugby myth, though, is ironically best seen among those 
who lament the fact that the All Blacks are no longer ‘ordinary blokes.’ Romanos 
(2002), for instance, decries how “in every sense, top players inhabit a different 
orbit to the man in the street, the butcher, the accountant, the teacher, the 
plumber” (p. 91). “The All Blacks used to be ordinary New Zealanders” he 
writes. “Not any more. All Blacks now belong to an exclusive rich people’s club” 
(p. 69). This nostalgic image of the ‘everyday’ All Black past, is perhaps no better 
exemplified than in a 2001 editorial in the New Zealand Herald: 
Time was when we felt very close to the All Blacks. But that was when the 
country’s finest players downed milking cups, hammer and even the 
occasional office notebook to don the black jersey. That was when Colins 
Meads went into town every Friday to get in the weekly supplies, just like 
farmers in every corner of the land. Then the All Blacks were part of the 
community, and totally accessible. They enjoyed an elevated status, but 
not an elevated income…No more…Today’s All Blacks are wealthy 
professionals. 
 
Speaking of the ills of professionalism the former All Black Andy Haden 
expresses a similar disquiet, a grieving over more ‘democratic’ days. He remarks 
that he “naively thought professionalism would be egalitarian…but the players 
are no longer ordinary blokes.” Writing in the New Zealand Political Review the 
liberal commentator Chris Trotter mourns similarly of the fact that “the 
professionalization of the All Blacks has fatally undercut the egalitarian ideals 
which fuelled New Zealand’s abiding rugby legends.” 
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However, although the myth of rugby as the game of the ‘everyman’ may 
have died (or at least be on the wane), it has not affected the popular view that 
the game is nonetheless meritocratic. The perceived virtues of a meritocracy still 
hold firm sway in New Zealand. Liu (2005) has noted how New Zealand holds 
liberal-democratic values, anchored in ideals of freedom and equality, as central 
to nationhood. This has particular salience to race, where the predominant 
(Pakeha) view has long been that “all New Zealanders were ‘one people’ who 
enjoyed some of the best race relations in the world” (Macdonald, 2004,p. 218). 
McCreanor (1993) has referred to this normative account of New Zealand race 
relations as the “standard story”: 
The standard story of Maori/Pakeha relations…says that Maori/Pakeha 
relations are the best in the world…Mutual respect for each other’s 
strengths and tolerance for idiosyncrasies has integrated the Maori people 
into a harmonious, egalitarian relationship with the more recent arrivals, 
the whole thing working constructively for the common good. This 
narrative explains Maori failure as due to their inability to cope in the 
modern world because of inherent flaws in their character or culture (p. 
61). 
 
Rugby has played a critical part in sustaining this narrative. Like McCreanor 
notes more generally, central in this regard to rugby is the role of played by 
Maori. As MacLean argues, Maori rugby is “at the heart of rugby’s role in New 
Zealand’s cultural politics” (MacLean, 2005). From the game’s very inception in 
New Zealand the achievements of Maori rugby players have been “celebrated by 
Pakeha as solid evidence that the country was indeed a paradise of racial 
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harmony” (Bellich, 1986). Symbolically, Maori participation in rugby “became 
proof of assimilation, co-operation and racial harmony” (MacLean, 2005, p. 14), 
helping to “establish in Pakeha eyes a myth of racial integration” (Phillips, 1987, 
p. viii). Their participation, especially at the national level, “provided affirmation 
for the then dominant…belief that race relations in New Zealand were among 
the best in the world” (Watson, 2007, p. 783).  
The received versions of New Zealand history have certainly accorded 
this integrationist myth great weight. In his widely-read History of New Zealand 
Michael King has asserted that, while Pakeha and Maori domains remained 
fundamentally separated until World War II, “the one national activity to which 
Maori contributed was rugby” (King, 2003, p. 386). He goes on to suggest that 
success in rugby “equated to greater recognition for Maori and therefore led to 
the dominant culture granting them a higher standard of citizenship” (Watson, 
2007, p. 783). Terry McLean (1975) writes similarly of how “the particular 
importance of rugby in New Zealand has been both mystical and critical. It was 
supremely an outstanding catalytic agent in the fusing of races, Polynesian and 
Caucasian” (McLean, 1975, p. 15). This myth enjoys widespread popularity in 
New Zealand, perhaps largely because it is a favored narrative of current rugby 
writing and journalism. As Malcom MacLean notes, popular sports writing 
continues to “[grant] legitimacy to the all-one-people view of New Zealand” 
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(2005, p. 19). Contemporary writers, he argues, are “proficient exponent[s] of this 
hegemonic discourse” (p. 19). By way of examples: Zavos (1997) contends that 
“rugby in New Zealand, from the 1880s, provided the paradigm for how New 
Zealand society should have opened up to the Maori community last century 
and this century”; in Laidlaw’s (2005) view “the All Blacks are infinitely more 
representative of their various peoples than the Springboks. And for that matter 
British teams in which black players still remain something of a novelty. In New 
Zealand it is the opposite (2005, p. 5); Paul (2007) is even more romantic in his 
suggestion that “rugby actually lead or is better than society…Social barriers and 
prejudices might have existed in New Zealand’s wider society throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, but not in rugby”; finally, the All Blacks have also been 
described as “a model meeting point for people of any race” (Editorial, 2002), 
and as “one of our most successful examples of multi-culturalism in practice” 
(Thomas, 2006, p. A23). 
To be sure, the race-rugby-nation homology has been frequently 
undermined by New Zealand’s problematic relationship with South Africa. The 
NRFU, for instance, agreed not to select Maori players for tours to South Africa 
between 1921 and the mid-1960s. Over time, however, many in the New Zealand 
public became increasingly uncomfortable about rugby’s complicity with an 
apartheid regime. Richards (1999) suggests that by the 1960s most New 
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Zealanders had come to accept that any future tours to South Africa could no 
longer exclude Maori players. The 1967 tour, for instance, was cancelled after the 
New Zealand government had vehemently voiced its opposition to South 
Africa’s refusal to allow Maori to tour. This ‘No Maori, No Tour’ (Richards, 1999, 
2006) stance was gradually extended to include opposition to all sporting 
contacts with South Africa. This led to the game becoming a symbol of national 
division when Anti-apartheid protestors staged a series of demonstrations 
against the touring Springboks in 1981. Up to 150,000 people were involved in 
more than 200 demonstrations the length and breadth of the country. The eight 
weeks that the Springboks spent in New Zealand have been described by one as 
“the most intense, prolonged civil unrest in New Zealand’s history” (Richards, 
2006, p. 16; see also Chapple, 1984). What was notable was that the protests were 
not just about apartheid, but racism at home. The Maori protest movement had 
by that time become firmly established and joined the marches against the tour. 
As Phillips (2006) notes, as they did so “they confronted non-Maori New 
Zealanders with the searching question: ‘If you campaign against race in South 
Africa, what about at home’” (p. 19). 
However, although rugby went into a period of decline succeeding the 
“crisis” (Nauright, 2003) provoked by the tour, it was soon to recover following 
New Zealand’s win in the inaugural Rugby World Cup in 1987. Rugby had also 
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gone through a period of restructuring in which it moved to extend its appeal 
beyond those with which it had been traditional identified. Part of this re-
imaging was done so as to render it congruent with the interests of advertisers 
and sponsors. Players were eroticized, game action was increasingly dramatized, 
and narratives and visual imagery shifted as the game tried to broaden its 
demographic reach (Perry, 1994, 2004, 2005). Such was the success of the new 
media-rugby-big business alliance that by the 1990s rugby had all but regained 
its pre-1981 status (Nauright, 2003). Catalyzed by the national navel-gazing 
following ’81 Tour, rugby’s concerted marketing campaign has pitched a new 
image to the New Zealand populace: the re-made game, so the spiel went, is now 
a fair, inclusive, family affair. 
Aiding and abetting this re-branding was the fact that the rugby had 
largely moved beyond its foundation in face-to-face relations. Whereas rugby 
may have once been built on participation—“built painstakingly from the level of 
the local club through provincial and national levels” as Fougere (1989, p. 116) 
describes it—we are today more likely to ‘encounter’ our rugby brethren by way 
of mediation, via “the realm of simulation” (Perry, 2004, p. 297). In this realm 
rugby’s messages are infinitely more flexible. First, in the sense of being able to 
reach, or more rightly produce, a large, heterogeneous audience (men, women 
and children of all ages, classes, levels of education, ethnicities and so on). No 
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longer is rugby dependent on “the aficionado’s romance with the language and 
lore of his sport” (Hendricks, 1991, p. 4). Second, in not being wholly grounded 
by experience(/materiality), rugby in its mediated form was a ‘text’ more open to 
multiple and contradictory readings. Part of the rugby strategy in particular was 
to produce polyvocal texts that were at once specific and national. Administrators 
realized that rugby, in essence, could be marketed to a national audience via a 
narrative of difference, of ‘multiculturalism.’ 
As an example, one of the more notable features of the game’s re-branding 
has been the prominence, indeed foregrounding, of aspects of tikanga Maori (or, 
Maori practices and customs). The haka is particularly significant. According to 
Teaiwa and Mallon (2005), it is “a crucial element of the All Blacks’ image and 
rugby culture in New Zealand. It has arguably become a symbol of New 
Zealand’s shared culture and heritage through sport” (p. 217). Jackson and 
Hokowhitu (2002) similarly contend that “inasmuch as identity, particularly 
national identity, is constructed out of difference, the haka can be seen to play a 
pivotal role in defining New Zealand identity both domestically and abroad.” 
Critically, however, as they go on to note, performances of the haka by the 
national rugby team are symptomatic of how tikanga Maori has historically been 
misappropriated by Pakeha interests—particularly those such as the NZRU—
who have sought to use the haka for commercial gain. Not only does use of the 
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haka raise crucial issues linked about intellectual property rights and the 
authority of representation, but as Hokowhitu (2004) notes haka’s use is 
disembedded from any meaningful Maori framework and has largely become a 
nationalistic spectacle in Pakeha terms (see also Perry, 2004). The contemporary 
haka is thus plagued by the overarching problem of decontextualization, or the 
“act of detaching objects from their original cultural contexts” (Kreps, 2003, p. 
149). In Falcous’ (2007) terms, while the haka provides the “illusion of bicultural 
unity” and is accentuated “as emblematic of the nation” it is only as an 
“exoticised spectacle disembedded from depthful engagement with diversity.” 
Other academics, and occasionally even members of the mainstream 
media (see, for example, Sport a mirror of society, 2006), have also exposed the 
rugby myth for what it is: precisely that, a myth (Ryan, 2005). Recent scholarship, 
in particular, has challenged the received understandings of rugby as an agent of 
national and racial integration. Ryan (2005) is particularly wary of the way rugby 
was perceived to be a ‘level playing field.’ He notes how the NZRFU distanced 
itself from fixtures between Maori and touring sides by only according them 
‘unofficial status.’ Watson (2007) makes a similar observation, suggesting “the 
NZRFU was, at best, ambivalent in its attitude towards Maori rugby between 
1870 and 1914” (p. 785). Ryan also questions the belief that rugby was even 
widely-played by Maori in the late-1800s. The majority of Maori players, he 
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argues, in fact belonged to “an influential elite who were determined to engage 
with the increasingly dominant Pakeha society” (Ryan, 2005). Finally, while 
MacLean (1996) suggests that a “crucial element of the relations of symbolic 
power of a singular New Zealand was the inclusion of Maori as ‘just like us’”, he 
argues that incorporation has been decidedly ambivalent. For MacLean, the 
national hegemonic identity “suggests a number of areas of contention centred 
primarily on the contradiction between hegemonic masculinity as incorporating 
Maori and colonial relations that exclude Maori” (MacLean, 1996). 
Brown Boys in the Back-line: On the Proper Uses of ‘Polynesian’ All Blacks 
Often myth is more important than reality. The accuracy of the ‘rugby 
story’ has obviously mattered less than the way the game functions as a symbolic 
display of bicultural partnership. As Francis (1997, p. 174) reminds us, when it 
comes to core national myths, “literal truth” has never been “a measure of their 
power or their usefulness.” In a Barthesian sense, the myth is more palatable 
because it does not question the prevailing structures of power. Of course, to 
mention Barthes is to also recognize the ideological work of ‘myth.’ The myth is 
posited as the normal state-of-affairs, legitimating the status quo, suppressing 
difference. In rugby there is a familiarity proceeding from history, in that, for 
New Zealanders it affirms and promotes the supposed racial democracy in 
which they live. It should also be mentioned that race relations in New Zealand 
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have, of late, taken something of a beating. Many were embarrassed by the 2006 
report of UN special rapporteur Rodolfo Stavenhagen which concluded that 
“persistent disparities” continue between Maori and non-Maori, and that many 
of these were consistent with “a history of discrimination” (Stavenhagen, 2006; 
for further discussion see Mutu, 2007). The recent arrest of 17 Maori rights 
activists on weapons and terrorism offences has also “exposed wounds that most 
people outside New Zealand could be forgiven for assuming had healed long 
ago” (Henley, 2007). Hence, the ‘rugby myth’ today takes on an added 
ideological burden: as Francis (1997) notes, even if “the myths we have used to 
explain our history no longer make much sense”, in an “age of anxiety” we 
revert to them like something of an “habitual tic”, a “nostalgic hankering for the 
past rather than an accurate understanding of it” (Francis, 1997, p. 174). Because 
it is one of the country’s ‘central myths’—a story that seems to express a 
fundamental belief that New Zealanders hold about themselves—the deceptive 
idea of Maori and Pakeha being partners “in the scrum and wider society” 
(Brabazon, 2006, p. 182) has not died easily. As one reporter for the UK’s 
Guardian rhetorically (and sardonically) asked: “Maori do very well, don’t they, 
in all walks of life? And look at the All Blacks! New Zealand and the Maori, 
they’re pretty much OK, aren’t they? No big issues there” (Henley, 2007). 
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What critical analysis there has been of the maintenance and perpetuation 
of this (false) image has largely concerned the deep contradiction between the 
wholesale (mal)appropriation of tikanga Maori and the fact that, in Stavenhagen’s 
words, the “gap in social and economic conditions is actually growing larger and 
an increasing proportion of Maori are being left behind” (Stavenhagen, 2006): 
that is, critics continue to problematize rugby via its complicity in the 
depoliticization of culture, or what Fish (1997) may have called ‘boutique 
[bi]culturalism.’ Without wishing to dismiss nor diminish either the relevance or 
import of such work, the continued focus on the bicultural context of New 
Zealand identity politics would seem to deny the symbolic and representational 
rights of other minorities. Can those groups that are neither Pakeha nor Maori 
continue to be “frozen out of the debate on the identity and future of the 
country” (Thakur, 1995, p. 272) given the increasing cultural and ethnic diversity 
of New Zealand’s population? This is a particularly salient question for rugby 
when Pacific people now account for more than 30 per cent of New Zealand’s 
professional rugby players. How can a New Zealand of ‘multicultural drift’, the 
process, as Stuart Hall may have described it, whereby images of Pacific people 
are “slowly pulled into the mainstream of representation” (Hall, 2000), be 
reconciled with a New Zealand still struggling with the “unfinished business” of 
Maori-Pakeha relations? (Kotchari, Pearson, and Zuberi, 2004, p. 139). More 
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pointedly, does the increasing visibility of Pacific people interrupt the flow of 
rugby’s dominant narrative discourse as a compact between two ‘founding 
cultures’? 
On these lines, I wish to discuss what I herein call ‘Pacific 
multiculturalism.’ Best exemplified in rugby, Pacific multiculturalism is first and 
foremost a form of multiculturalism that softens the otherwise sharp edges of 
cultural difference. Difference is incorporated into the national imaginary but 
only in a way which occludes or minimizes specific political activisms and their 
histories. More pointedly, in drawing on and reinforcing ‘ethnic’ difference it 
does so in a hierarchical way: while it provides an apparently more inclusionary 
construction of New Zealand national identity, it mobilizes difference as part of 
the crisis-management of monoculturalism. In the very celebration of their 
difference the All Blacks sideline bicultural anxieties and, ironically, perpetuate 
an unmarked and normative New Zealand (read Pakeha) ethnicity. For all the 
rhetoric, rugby is as much a conduit of division as an agent of integration and 
change. Beneath the united, multicultural façade, rugby is not nearly as inclusive 
as Kiwis would like to, or have been led to, believe. This is especially true with 
regard to Pacific peoples whose involvement in the national game continues to 
evoke feelings of ambivalence among both Maori and Pakeha alike (Teaiwa and 
Mallon, 2005). 
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At this point it is worth noting that Pacific peoples have a long and 
distinguished history in New Zealand rugby. Their influence in the first half of 
the twentieth century was obviously by no means great given so few Pacific 
peoples lived in New Zealand prior to the post-World War Two economic boom 
(the 1945 Census puts the number at only 2159). However, Pacific peoples have 
been a feature of the All Blacks since at least 1931 when Pago Pago-born Frank 
Solomon first appeared in a test against Australia at Eden Park, Auckland. In 
these early years Pacific peoples were so much a novelty that they were often 
assumed to be Maori, and Solomon himself played for the New Zealand Maori 
on their 1927 internal tour. Like Solomon, few Pacific players in the decades 
preceding the 1960s were recognized as such, either by selectors or the public at 
large (Schaaf, 2003). By the 1960s, though, as migrants arrived in their thousands, 
there was a developing sense of a New Zealand-based ‘Pacific Island’ identity 
forming from community growth and consolidation. During this time rugby was 
perhaps second only to the church as a mechanism of social support, acting, 
again like the church, as a means by which to foster and sustain community life 
in a new location (Spoonley, 2002). ‘Ethnic’ teams also contributed to the 
building of what Macpherson (2003) has called “moral communities” which 
helped to preserve traditional social values and practices. The more successful 
teams, such as those of Auckland’s Ponsonby Club, were an enormous source of 
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community pride and helped to forge and reinforce collective cultural, ethnic 
and national identities (Pitt and Macpherson, 1974). 
If these teams helped to build self-esteem among Pacific peoples, then, in 
contrast, palagi New Zealanders viewed them with more than a degree of 
misgiving. As I later discuss in more detail, the attitudes of New Zealanders 
toward Pacific Island migrants throughout the 1960s and 1970s were less than 
savory: Pacific Islanders, so the stereotype went, were not only unwilling (or 
unable) to assimilate, but, worse, had a tendency toward violence, criminal 
behavior, and immorality (Loto et al, 2006; Mitchell, 2003; Ross, 1992; Spoonley, 
1990). Similar sentiments spilled onto the rugby field. Echoing early ideas about 
Maori (see Hokowhitu, 2004; Star, 1992), Pacific players were dogged by the 
perception that they were savage, emotionally impulsive, aggressive, and 
violent. Prior to Bryan Williams star-turn on the 1970 tour of South Africa, Pacific 
players also remained something of an unknown quantity—at least in terms of 
their skill. In the early 1970s, the public was more likely to see press reports 
about on-field brawls between Pacific and Maori players than to hear about the 
many accomplishments of Pacific players. Even Western Samoa, which is today 
considered a ‘breeding-ground’ of rugby talent (see Gregory, 2004), was seen at 
the time as something of a “rugby backwater” (Neazor, 1999, p. 163). Pacific 
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players were viewed as great ‘athletes’, but lacking both the discipline and rugby 
acumen to ascend into the national fold. 
Williams, however, changed all that. On the 1970 tour, his first, he was an 
undoubted star, scoring 14 tries in 13 appearances. Playing into his notoriety, 
1970 marked the first time non-white players were permitted to tour the 
Republic. Williams, a part-Samoan, was particularly beloved by black South 
Africans, and despite the fact that the South African government officially 
considered him an “honorary white”, he was undeniably not Pakeha. And, 
Williams was also wildly popular at home. Even among Pakeha fans he was a 
favorite (though as broadcaster and former politician Willie Jackson has noted, 
ethnicity is often “conveniently forgotten when the All Blacks [are] winning” 
[quoted in Romanos, 2002, p. 179]). For Pacific people though Williams was a 
hugely influential role model, an indication of what could be achieved “against 
the economic and social odds in New Zealand society” (Te’evale, 2001, p. 220). 
As former All Black, and current Auckland coach, Pat Lam has said of Williams’ 
effect on his career: 
It meant a lot to my dad and uncles to see Bryan Williams become an All 
Black. Even now when Samoans do well it gives my family a sense of 
pride. Parents had an example of someone they could highlight. They 
could hold up guys like Bryan…as people from a similar background who 
had been successful (quoted in Paul, 2007). 
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Few outside the Pacific community probably recognized him as a Samoan or 
even a ‘Pacific Islander’ as such, but within a decade of Williams hanging up his 
boots, “the number of Pacific Islanders operating at the top level of the game had 
increased significantly” (Paul, 2007). 
By the mid-1970s rugby had ostensibly opened the door to the possibility 
of a “broad kinship” among the rapidly diversifying New Zealand populace—all 
“despite the ‘dawn raids’ and ‘overstayer’ deportations of the same period” 
(Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005, p. 213). Indeed, following Williams, All Blacks of 
Pacific heritage such as Bernie Fraser (Fijian), John Schuster, Joe Stanley and 
Michael Jones (all Samoan) all went on to become household names. Williams 
himself has said of rugby during the divisive years of the 1970s that it 
helped break down barriers in [New Zealand] and helped Pacific 
Islanders gain respect and acceptance. Growing up here at that time we 
were never encouraged to display our culture. But rugby was a way in 
which we could express ourselves (quoted in Paul, 2007). 
 
Williams is even more sanguine when asked about the rugby’s racial climate 
during the era: 
I never felt I was subjected to any abuse. Every now and again someone 
might call me a black so-and-so but it was heat of the moment 
stuff…That’s the beauty of rugby. It has always been an egalitarian sport, 
accepting of different physiques, religions, beliefs and races (quoted in 
Paul, 2007). 
 
Pacific peoples entering rugby in ever greater numbers following 
Williams have merely fed into this rugby-as-(non racist)-meritocracy ideal. 
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Arguably, ‘Pacific Island’ All Blacks have become every bit as powerful as Maori 
once were in projecting an image of acceptance. The successes of Pacific peoples 
in rugby are appealing in the way they offer faith in the New Zealand way of life, 
in the myth of egalitarian society. As journalist Gregor Paul describes the Pasifika 
contribution to New Zealand rugby, “as feelgood stories go, the happy marriage 
of cultures into the rugby fabric is hard to beat” (Paul, 2007). 
A number of North American critics have noted how the sporting 
successes of African Americans have been used to “reinforce an argument that 
the US is an open society, and that blacks are improving their economic and 
social positions” (Wonsek, 1992, p. 457; see also Andrews, 2000; Cole and 
Andrews, 2001). The high-profile successes are relatively few, but nonetheless 
they suggest African Americans can, and regularly do, achieve both economic 
success and upward social mobility. The implication is not only that sport is a 
space devoid of racial discrimination, but so is society more generally. Such 
thinking has long been echoed in New Zealand. Hokowhitu (2004b) elaborates 
on the New Zealand case, with particular regard to Maori: 
In a neoracist age, the overriding tenets of positivist discourse are 
egalitarianism, democracy, and social equality—the predetermined 
conclusions of an advanced and civilized western world. The successful 
Mäori sportsman…acts as an exemplar of a subject in an egalitarian state 
who has triumphed over adversity to succeed; combine this with the 
common notion that sport reflects society, and the essential suggestion is 




The situation is little different for Pacific peoples, where those succeeding in the 
Pakeha world of rugby seem to prove that Pacific people at least have equality of 
opportunity. 
In key socio-demographic indicators, however, and particularly 
education, occupation and income, there remain significant disparities between 
Pacific peoples and other New Zealanders (Statistics New Zealand, 2002). These 
social and structural factors are regularly effaced in favor of emphasizing the 
individual achievements of a small number of high-profile Pacific athletes. 
Recently, for example, Tana Umaga was lauded by the popular media as living 
proof of the mythological Kiwi meritocracy. Much was made of Umaga’s rise to 
prominence, despite hailing from the “unfashionable” (Kayes, 2006, p. D6), 
“working class” (Harding, 2006, p. 18) suburb of Wainuiomata. “Tana Umaga” 
writes Matheson (2004), “could have been just another statistic—the son of 
immigrant parents born on the wrong side of town with no hope of success, let 
alone greatness.” “Through nothing but hard work”, Umaga was able to “[turn] 
his career around to such an extent that his legacy now rests comfortable 
alongside the likes of Sir Wilson Whineray, Sir Brian Lochore, Graham Mourie 
and Sean Fitzpatrick—the All Blacks’ greatest ever captains” (Matheson, 2004). 
The power of Umaga’s image was in its suggestion that anyone in New Zealand 
could ‘make it’, regardless of class or ethnicity. As Anthony Hubbard notes of 
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Umaga: “Conservatives can promote him as a sign of equal opportunity. The son 
of poor immigrants leaps to the top in our open society—from Wainuiomata to 
the White House” (Hubbard, 2006). 
The presence, as well as the success of Pacific peoples in rugby should not, 
though, be mistaken as evidence of the abatement of racist attitudes toward 
Pacific peoples in New Zealand during the 1980s and on. This is hardly 
surprising, for as Grant Jarvie reminds us, “such accounts of sport which make 
general inferences about the changing nature of racial relations in society based 
on a consideration of athletic participation rates” are misleading in their 
tendency to ignore “the broader issues of power and domination within society” 
(Jarvie, 1991, p. 3). While Pacific peoples may have been breaking into rugby, 
they continued to be dogged by perceptions that they were “lazy, violent, 
substance abusing and economically dependent” (Loto et al, 2006, p. 105). They 
remain too at, or near, the bottom of all socio-economic measures, including 
education, housing, employment, income, and health (Ministry of Pacific Island 
Affairs, 1999, pp. 8-9; Statistics New Zealand, 2007). Moreover, the greater 
numerical involvement of Pacific peoples does not mean that rugby itself was 
non-racist. As Robyn Jones argues, “a situation that results in the presence of 
significant number of an ethnic minority people in the higher echelons of a sport 
is as indicative of racist social processes as if they were absent from it” (Jones, 
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2002, p. 47). Certainly, akin to the stereotyping of Maori (Hokowhitu, 2003), 
Pacific players continue to be stigmatized as “savage, emotionally impulsive, 
aggressive, and violent” (Hokowhitu 2002, p. 266; see also Chapter 3). 
A Forgetful Nation?: Whiteness and Pacific Multiculturalism 
 
I remember sharing my outrage with other Samoans. The most appalling thing is 
the fact that we didn’t know. Here we were learning about the Six Day War and 
various dukes and kings and there’s our own history, which seemed to have 
been covered up. 
-Oscar Kightly 
 
As in the past when the contributions of Maori to All Blacks successes 
“provided comforting evidence of New Zealand as a racially integrated society” 
(Phillips, 1996, p. 286), rugby today works in such a fashion as to sustain its 
central place in the national imaginary precisely because of its continued efficacy 
as a symbol of social integration. Today, though, this is increasingly achieved 
through recourse to a partial history, via excising rugby’s connections to a racist 
past (we forget, for instance, that Maori were barred from All Black tours to 
South Africa in 1928, 1949 and 1960). It holds a flattering mirror up to us that 
erases every distortion. Denuded of the complexities and complications of (real) 
history, rugby has become the model of a prospective future by way of a 
retrospective turn. Supposedly in rugby we can see how things have always been 
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(a space of equal opportunity), how things are (proof of co-operation and racial 
harmony), and how things could be (a sign of our multicultural future). 
Demonstrating such political use of ‘rugby nostalgia’, former Race Relations 
Conciliator, and one-time All Black, Chris Laidlaw writes: 
differences between the races have always been set aside for rugby. It is a 
fascinating point of convergence for Maori, Pakeha and Pacific Islander; 
one of the few real bridges between each of the cultures. The romance, the 
legends, the folklore of the great matches and the great players are not a 
Pakeha monopoly. They belong to all (1999, p. 22; emphasis my own). 
 
Rugby thus provides a continuity and connection with past achievements, 
glories, and heroes in national culture—a culture that historically links it to war, 
mateship and, perhaps most importantly, racial tolerance. Within the national 
narrative rugby provides a symbolic reassurance that, as in the past, 
egalitarianism and opportunity are still alive in contemporary New Zealand. 
Simultaneously the All Blacks also allow us to forget the past. They 
engender a kind of cultural amnesia that circumvents the question of history and 
thus perpetuates contemporary oppression. Behdad (2005) argues of the United 
States that it is an “amnesiac nation”; a nation built on a “historical amnesia” that 
enables it “to disavow a past and present built on the exclusion of others.” This 
echoes Renan’s (1882) famous description of how the political project of founding 
a nation often entails an act of forgetting, an erasure of those elements that might 
threaten the coherence of the national narrative. Those things which must be 
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forgotten are not necessarily confined to the past but exist in the present: 
forgetting functions in both the diachronic and synchronic sense (Bhabha, 1994). 
What the All Blacks allow us to forget in the present is perhaps obvious: the real 
conditions that most Pacific peoples face—that Pacific peoples are, to use the 
words of the Ministry of Social Development “over-represented in all negative 
socio-economic statistics.” Understanding what is forgotten in the past perhaps 
requires some further elaboration—beginning with the first mass migration of 
Pacific Islanders to New Zealand in the 1950s. 
In the post-World War II economic boom, rapid industrialization in New 
Zealand led to an increasing demand for migrant labor. With low rates of 
unemployment and a growing industrial sector, the Pacific Islands were coveted 
by the New Zealand government as a source of “unskilled labor” (see Bedford, 
2003; Brosnan, Rea, and Wilson, 1995). The result was that, while there were less 
than 7,000 Pacific Islanders in New Zealand prior to World War II, by 1971 this 
had grown to more than 40,000 (Ferguson, 2003). But by the 1970s New 
Zealanders had become increasingly nervous at the number of immigrants 
arriving from the Pacific Islands: the economic downturn led many to blame 
immigrants for the looming recession and, more pointedly, the rising rate of 
unemployment. ‘Pacific Islanders’—I use scare quotes here because many were 
in fact New Zealand citizens—were seen to be either taking jobs or merely 
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‘bludging’2 off government welfare handouts. The New Zealand government 
initially responded by introducing “stricter controls over entry” (Bedford, 2003)3. 
The rhetoric of ‘immigrant as problem’, also served to pave the way for more 
extreme measures. Perhaps the most startling of which were the ‘dawn raids’ 
instigated in 1976 by the National Party Government of Robert Muldoon. On 
coming to power in 1975 Muldoon had called on ‘overstayers’ to register with the 
Labour Department during an ‘amnesty’, after which the government would 
begin a series of ‘random checks’ designed to uncover any remaining illegal 
immigrants. Yet, while this latter course of action was ostensibly directed at all 
overstayers, as Bedford (2003) has suggested, it became “much easier to focus 
attention on potential ‘brown’ overstayers from the Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, 
Samoa, and Tonga than to try to find ‘white’ overstayers from the UK and 
Europe.” Thus, throughout the latter part of the 1970s, the homes of thousands of 
Pacific Island immigrants and ‘citizens alike were raided in the early hours of the 
morning by police in search of ‘illegal overstayers.’ Paul Gilroy has noted how, in 
Britain during the 1970s, “‘immigrant’ became synonymous with the word 
‘black’”: in a similar fashion in New Zealand during this same period, 
‘immigrant’ became synonymous with ‘Pacific Islander’ (Gilroy, 1987, p. 46). In 
                                                          
2 A common phrase in New Zealand meaning to live off somebody else’s earnings or on welfare 
(usually to avoid work and shirk responsibilities). 
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accord with New Zealand history (see Greif, 1995; Pearson, 2001; Phillips, 2007), 
“racial and ethnic criteria were explicitly used as yardsticks to measure physical 
and cultural distance from the majority and gauge potentiality for assimilation 
into the state and nation” (Pearson, 2005, p. 27). In this case, (white) European 
workers were viewed as assimilable, whereas Pacific Islanders were less likely to 
be absorbed into the social body. Irrespective of citizenship or residency status, 
as Mitchell (2003, p. 139) argues, “there was an implicit assumption of what a 
New Zealander was and that Pacific Islanders in New Zealand collectively fell 
outside of this definition.” 
Even today something of the social stigma of once being ‘undesirable’ 
immigrants clearly persists in the discursive framing of Pacific peoples. Though 
they are clearly ‘at home’ in New Zealand, no longer ‘out there’ in the Pacific, 
one of the identifiable and recurring themes of dominant “Pakeha discourse” 
(McCreanor, 2005) is continued allusions to Pacific peoples as ‘foreign’, as the 
‘Other. References to Pacific people as ‘overstayers’, ‘coconuts’, ‘bungas’ or 
‘FOBs’ (‘fresh off the boat’) may now be a lesser feature of the New Zealand 
vernacular, yet as Loto et al. (2006) have found, “the legacy of a domineering 
relationship between the Palagi majority group and Pacific minorities that is 
captured by such derogatory terms is still evident in public forums such as the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 In particular, the British Nationality Act was repealed in 1977. The Act had previously 
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media.” Put simply, citizenship has not been sufficient for Pacific peoples to 
transcend the prejudices of race. 
There is an interesting parallel here to Wu’s (2002) description of Asian 
Americans in the United as “perpetual foreigners” (p. 79). He notes that while 
discrimination on the basis of race is increasingly seen as immoral, the lines that 
distinguish ‘citizens’ from ‘aliens’ are largely considered acceptable. With Asian 
Americans, however, Wu contends that “it is clear that lines that appear to be 
based on citizenship can cover up lines that are based on race” (p. 91). By this 
Wu means to suggest that citizenship is always already defined by race, by 
whiteness, and that as a consequence 
it becomes convenient to refer to the innocuous lines based on citizenship 
in lieu of the odious lines based on race. Non-Asian Americans can 
discriminate against Asian Americans by turning us into non-citizens, 
either officially…or informally by casting doubt on our status. Our 
objection to such discrimination is obviated before it is even made, 
because the discrimination looks legitimate as having been founded on 
citizenship rather than race. 
 
Regardless of their citizenship status, Pacific peoples are similarly dogged by 
such a “perpetual foreigner syndrome.” And, even All Blacks—generally the 
preeminent national ‘body’—are not immune. In one telling example after the All 
Black team for the 2003 World Cup was named a caller to a local talk back show 
aporetically asked, “Why in a country where we have so much rugby talent do 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(indirectly at least) granted Samoans New Zealand citizenship. 
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we have to select four Samoans in the All Blacks?” There is unquestionably a 
certain contingency to a Pacific person achieving ‘New Zealander’ status. This is 
true also for Pacific All Blacks. Historically and materially, Pacific peoples have 
played crucial roles in the building and sustaining of New Zealand identity. In 
particular, as ‘immigrants’ they have been “fundamental to the construction of 
the nation as a simulacrum of inclusiveness” (Lowe, 1996, p. 5). Yet this project of 
imagining the nation is haunted by the fact that Pacific peoples are still seen as 
“the foreigner within”, even when born in New Zealand and the descendants of 
generations born here before (Lowe, 1996). They enrich New Zealand culture but 
are not part of it. They are only ever afforded a kind of “dependent integration” 
(Hage, 2000) which positions the Pakeha subject as the ‘authentic’ or ‘normal’ 
New Zealander. 
This ‘normal’ New Zealander is, of course, Pakeha. Conceived as it was in 
the colonial world order, it is hardly surprising that the common narrative of 
New Zealand identity is peppered with allusions to whiteness. Indeed, for much 
of its history New Zealandness has been synonymous with whiteness. It is the 
product of conscious social engineering, via controlled immigration, favoring 
and encouraging some classes of immigrants over others, and the enactment of 
policies prejudiced against the alien within (Ip, 2003; Murphy, 2003). That is to 
say, New Zealand’s ‘borders’, both cultural and symbolic, have historically been 
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racialised and premised on whiteness, with whiteness providing the parameters 
of inclusion and exclusion. Following work in whiteness studies, it would be fair 
to suggest that Pakeha/whiteness operates as the unmarked norm against which 
other ‘ethnic’ identities are marked and racialized. This is not to suggest that 
whiteness is ‘invisible’ as some have suggested (cf. McIntosh, 1998)—some 
Pakeha are hyper-aware of their whiteness—but rather, belonging in New 
Zealand cannot be reduced to the conventional analytical framework of ‘race’ 
and ‘race relations.’ Whiteness in New Zealand must instead be connected to 
what Ware (2001) describes as “the politics of the geo-body…since ideologies of 
‘race’, ethnicity, and belonging are fundamentally bound up with the histories of 
the nation and how it is defined by competing forces” (p. 185). In this particular 
case, what I am suggesting is that the category ‘New Zealander’ has been defined 
over and against the category ‘immigrant.’ Exclusionary immigrations acts and 
naturalization laws are not only means by which to regulate ‘citizens’ or the 
‘state’ but also form part of an Orientalist discourse of defining the cultural and 
racial ‘other.’ The immigrant acts as something of ‘screen’ (Lowe, 1996) on which 
the nation projects its very whiteness. 
Categories of otherness delimit what it means to belong to the nation in 
that the making of New Zealand is achieved as much through exclusion as by the 
appeal to unity. This is the doubled-edged character of national identity: its 
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capacity to define not only who is a member of the national community but also 
who is not, to define who is a ‘foreigner.’ The demarcation of a national cultural 
identity “inevitably entails processes of inclusion and exclusion,” on determining 
“who and what belongs inside and who and what belongs outside” (Tempelman, 
1999, p. 17). On a fundamental level, “the very notion of an identity presumes an 
other from whom one is different. If identity is about sameness, about identifying 
with those considered similar, it is also about difference, distinguishing oneself 
from those who are dissimilar” (Spencer and Wollman, 2002, p. 58). In the case of 
national identity, the rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is predicated on views of who to 
exclude as much as who to include. As Triandafyllidou (1998) argues, “for the 
nation to exist, it is presupposed that there is some other community, some other 
nation, from which it needs to distinguish itself.” Moreover, as she continues, 
the identity of a nation is defined and/or re-defined through the influence 
of ‘significant others’, namely other nations or ethnic groups that are 
perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, authenticity and/or 
independence…for the nation to exist there must be some outgroup 
against which the unity and homogeneity of the ingroup is tested 
(Triandafyllidou, 1998). 
 
Pacific multiculturalism, then, is akin to what Hage (2000) has labeled 
‘White multiculturalism.’ For a long time New Zealand had a de facto ‘White New 
Zealand’ immigration policy whereas today the New Zealand government 
proudly touts itself as a multicultural Pacific nation. Yet White multiculturalism 
is a peculiar feature of dominant white groups (in this case Pakeha) that 
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generously ‘allow’ others to co-exist with them. For Hage, multiculturalism is 
part of a “white nation fantasy” that works through “New Racist” practices that 
regulate and manage inclusion as a way of maintaining the white nation. As 
Hage writes, 
White multiculturalists…share in a concept of themselves as nationalists 
and of the nation as a space structured around a White culture where 
Aboriginal people and non-White ‘ethnics’ are merely national objects to 
be moved or removed according to a White national will. 
 
In New Zealand Pakeha ethnicity has underpinned New Zealand culture, its 
institutions and the nation itself since the beginning of European settlement 
(Phillips, 1987). It largely still does. As McKinnon (1996, p. 7) observes, 
while each post-1840 generation of New Zealanders felt itself less ‘British’ 
than its predecessors, an outside observer is still…struck by the extent to 
which ‘New Zealandness’ is shot through with ‘Britishness’ (and not least 
because it is rarely commented on or analysed). 
 
Migration has undoubtedly changed New Zealand into a post-white society 
(Hill, 2004). However, the new multicultural representations of nationhood 
emerging in recent years do not necessary signify a radical break with previous 
more exclusionary versions of nationhood. Instead Pacific multiculturalism 
merely reshapes and reinforces older identity discourses through recognizing 
limited and unthreatening forms of difference, through the containment of the 
multicultural real (Gilroy, 2005). It further cannot be ignored that “‘Britishness’—
Anglo cultural hegemony—remains an essential part of New Zealand’s national 
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culture and identity” (Forrest and Dunn, 2006, p. 225). And, perhaps not 
coincidentally, while official parlance and ceremony has acquired a more 
“multicultural feel” (Blake, Smith, and Standish, 1998, p. 30), the United 
Kingdom has once again become the largest source of permanent migrants to 
New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2007; Walsh, 2006). 
Politically, the popular elision of racism from rugby’s past works to 
maintain this status quo, this Pakeha hegemony. It constitutes what Avril Bell 
calls “a refusal of discussion” (2004, p. 92). As opposed to any critical reflection 
on colonial history, rugby draws on those mythological wellsprings of New 
Zealand’s egalitarian culture—no one is denied a place, success is open to all—as 
a means to “close off discussion before it can begin” (Bell, 2004, p. 92). That 
Maori, for instance, were early participants in the game of rugby is taken as 
evidence that New Zealand was always a racially-integrated society. Similarly, 
the growing number of ‘Pacific Islanders’ representing New Zealand in recent 
years becomes proof positive of an open, multiracial society—belying a past in 
which Pacific communities were subjected to dehumanizing dawn police raids 
and random street checks of their citizenship. In seeming to rise above the 
current contingencies of national race relations politics, the All Blacks offer New 
Zealanders what Bruce and Hallinan (2001) may have dubbed “an easy way 
out.” Without actually taking any action, without offering any practical 
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approaches to dealing with de facto racial inequality, the continuing significance 
of race can be explained away and racism denied: how can we be racist?: just look at 
the All Blacks! The issue of history as a site of moral wrong is sidelined in favor of 
a presentist fallacy of a multicultural unity in difference. 
What must be emphasized here is the way difference has long been 
appropriated as defining characteristic of New Zealand. Like the sanitized forms 
of nostalgia to which I have already alluded, the discourse of diversity 
demonstrates how nation-building is not simply a process of erasure. As a 
‘project’ the nation is first and foremost a form of categorization premised on the 
imagining of solidarity. Numerous critics have suggested that this process is 
generally predicated on the construction of a common national culture, on 
national cultural homogeneity. That is, national identity must be seen to 
transcend individual and group differences. As Mike Featherstone (1990) notes, 
“the image of the culture of a nation-state is one which generally emphasizes 
cultural homogeneity and integration” (p. 1). Homi Bhabha, has argued that the 
“nationalist discourse” must therefore suppress certain elements in its effort to 
construct the “impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force” (1990, p. 3). 
Linking nationalism to Western modernity and power, Bhabha continues, 
suggesting that “political supremacy…seeks to obliterate…difference.” As he 
puts it elsewhere, “the nation must align itself, spiritually as well as physically or 
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carnally, with the ‘race’…to be protected from all degradation” (Bhabha, 1991). 
However, pace those critics who see nationalism as nearly always destructive of 
cultural difference, New Zealand is testament to Eva Mackey’s claim that 
nationalism, and by implication power and dominance, may “function through 
more liberal, inclusionary, pluralistic, multiple and fragmented formulations and 
practices concerning culture and difference” (Mackey, 1999, pp. 4-5). Borrowing 
from Mackey, it is my contention that the discourses of New Zealand identity 
make room for both erasures and inclusions—they possess what Asad (1993) 
would call an “improvisational quality” that may (sometimes simultaneously) 
subsume, accommodate, or institutionalize difference. 
On this latter point, and returning again to rugby, we cannot ignore the 
political and economic efficacy of difference. Biculturalism, and more latterly, 
multiculturalism, in New Zealand have “clearly been advantageous in 
fashioning an acceptable national self-image in a world where colonialism and 
racism are bad for business” (Williams, 1996, p. 184). The All Blacks, as one of 
New Zealand’s few global ‘exports’, are entangled, then, not only within how 
‘we’ see ourselves, but how the world sees ‘us.’ It should be noted that Pakeha 
New Zealanders have always been deeply insecure about their national identity. 
This owes itself partly to “Pakeha New Zealand’s peculiar dependence on the 
UK” (Bannister, 2005) but also in part to the country’s geographic, political and 
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military isolation. That is, our ontological insecurity stems from an inferiority 
complex vis-à-vis Britain as well the self-doubt bred of failing—sometimes 
literally—to register on the world map. In a Lacanian sense, New Zealanders 
thus depend on the gaze of others to confirm their own existence. This also 
explains why New Zealanders are somewhat “obsessed” with the national 
identity question (Brown, 1997). Who we are bothers (Pakeha) Kiwis because we 
are always trying to ‘mark our patch.’ Says Avril Bell (2007), “We can’t stop 
thinking about it. It’s why we always ask tourists if they like New Zealand five 
minutes after they touch down at the airport.” Some have subsequently been 
moved to suggest the country as being in the throes of a national identity ‘crisis’ 
(During, ). This is true only if we take ‘crisis’ to mean in a state of “perpetual 
crisis” (Seuffert, 2005). Reflection about national identity in New Zealand is 
wide-ranging, anxiety-ridden and constant. As David Pearson argues, the 
‘national identity crisis’ is not simply as case of “the shock of the new”, but a 
reflection of “historical continuities” that “encompass longstanding tensions” 
(2000, p. 91). Even today New Zealand still exhibits all the yesteryear symptoms 
of a small society slowly finding its feet (the love-hate relationship with ‘Mother 
England’, the stress between ‘settlers’, Maori, and ‘new arrivals, two among 
many examples). It’s hardly surprising, therefore, that New Zealand clings 
tightly to the things that make ‘us’ ‘unique’, that we are continually staking our 
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claim to Russell Crowe, Phar Lap, pavlova, or Crowded House. And, for a 
country that may not cut much of a dash internationally, our obsessive desire to 
find what makes ‘us’ us finds a salve in the All Blacks and in the diversity they, 
quite literally, embody. 
Many New Zealanders have also been lead to believe that the All Blacks 
are one of the few frames of reference that people abroad have of New Zealand. 
The All Blacks are frequently taken beyond sport to symbolise a country. 
Describing his arrival at Heathrow on his first tour with the team, Chris Laidlaw 
writes that “it became apparent that to most people outside New Zealand, the 
All Blacks were New Zealand and New Zealand were the All Blacks. One and 
the same; indivisible” (1999, p. 18). This type of metonymy has also been 
manifest at the current Rugby World Cup in France. Much has been made of the 
purported French love affair with the All Blacks as well as the coupling of team 
and country in French minds. Where goes the All Blacks (and their supporters), 
so goes the country. As New Zealand writer Trevor Richards recounts of Paris 
during the tournament: “New Zealand is very distant. Now, because of the 
rugby, it seems much closer.” The perception of rugby-as-country is only 
bolstered by the rhetoric of marketers and politicians (the two of course often 
being in collusion). The government has effectively appropriated the marriage to 
sell their investment in the 2011 World Cup, while a high-profile research firm 
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tells us that “focus groups from around the world” identify only three New 
Zealand ‘icons’ of significance: “sheep, green and the All Blacks” (Cumming and 
Masters, 2007). When we are continually told they are our most important point 
of difference, is it not little wonder that such significance is attached to the All 
Blacks? And, of course, this investment in the rugby-country coupling is only 
heightened by the way it weds itself so neatly to the myth of racial harmony. The 
All Blacks in essence put the tolerant nation on display to the world. 
But, to return to my suggestion that Pacific multiculturalism may actually 
promote intolerance. Shifts in immigration policy during the 1990s have 
promoted greater ethnic heterogeneity and the state has moved to more formally 
endorse ‘cultural difference’ (Roberts, 1997). It is apparent too in popular culture, 
which increasingly makes space for what the Labour government labels “the 
diversity of cultures making up the New Zealand population.” Signs of an 
emergent ‘multiculture’ (Gilroy, 2005; Hall, 2000) noisily announce themselves in 
film and literature, television and the visual arts, music and fashion. Whereas the 
‘other ethnic minorities’ were once “waiting in the wings in the theatre of local 
ethnic life” (Pearson, 1996, p. 263), they are now firmly center stage. So if New 
Zealand is seemingly in the midst of what our Governor General dubs “the 
process of transitioning to a multicultural nation” (Satyanand, 2007), how, then, 
can I claim New Zealandness to be still synonymous with whiteness, with 
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Pakeha culture? My contention is that multiculturalism and Pakeha dominance 
in New Zealand are not necessarily at odds. Pacific multiculturalism ‘works’ in 
New Zealand precisely because it contains the increasingly active role of Pacific 
‘Others’ in New Zealand’s cultural and political life. Ostensibly multiculturalism 
is a public good, evidence of a break with a racist past and a mark of growing 
cultural tolerance. But the celebration of diversity has a dark side. 
Multiculturalism in New Zealand is first and foremost what Ghassan Hage has 
labeled “a discourse of enrichment” (Hage, 2000, p. 132). Minorities have a 
‘value’ in terms of what they ‘bring to the table.’ Difference is tolerated precisely 
because of the way it ‘enriches’ the national space. Such a discourse has the effect 
of placing limits on inclusion: diversity is acceptable only if it buttresses (i.e., 
enriches) the project of nation-building and national unity in New Zealand. 
Hence, Prime Ministerial challenger Don Brash’s injunction to turn away 
‘migrants’ who “don’t share New Zealand’s bedrock values.” “We should not” 
he offered, “welcome those who want to live in New Zealand reject but reject 
core aspects of New Zealand culture” (Brash, 2006). Diversity, while celebrated, 
is thus defined and limited. Frequently lines are drawn at demands for political 
rights or when difference threatens to disrupt the ‘whole’ New Zealand identity. 
I borrow this notion of national culture as a ‘whole way of life’ from Eva 
Mackey’s insightful discussion of multiculturalism in Canada (Mackey, 1999). 
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Just as in Canada, the idea of a ‘mainstream’ national culture is implicit to the 
official version of multiculturalism in New Zealand (consider Brownlee’s 
comments in Chapter 1). This supports the idea of Pakeha as the ‘norm’, in 
relation to ‘multicultural’ New Zealanders who are merely contributing the 
whole way of life (Mackey, 1999). Pakeha retain their governmental position via 
a multicultural fantasy of tamed ethnicities existing around a primary Pakeha 
cultural core. 
Pace those who argue national identity as being “predicated on the 
elimination of ethnic distinctions” (Lesser, 1999, p. 3), in New Zealand difference 
has been pressed into the service of nation-building—and Pacific peoples are 
front and centre in this national project. Yet this Pacific multiculturalism is a 
carefully-managed form of difference. It appears as a negation of Pakeha 
ethnocentrism at the same time as it both needs and creates the ‘Pacific other’ 
That is, Pacific multiculturalism is “itself a vehicle for racialization”: it establishes 
Pakeha culture as the “ethnic core culture while ‘tolerating’ and arranging others 
around its ‘multiculture’” (Bannerji, 2000, p. 78). The “ethics and aesthetics” of 
Pakehaness, with its “colonial imperialist/racist ranking criteria”, define and 
construct “the ‘multi’ culture” of New Zealand’s Pacific others (p. 78). In other 
words, New Zealand’s self-identity 
has been secured partly through the construction of internal Others, 
whose markedness assures the existence of a national identity that, 
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remaining invisible or unmarked, is successfully inscribed as the 
norm…the ethnic identity of the dominant group is privileged as the core 
of imagined community (Alonso, 1994,  p. 390). 
 
Pacific people are perhaps first and foremost among the “necessary ‘others’” 
who Mackey (1999, p. 16) suggests have become “central pillars” of an ideology 
of tolerance that expresses itself through the discursivities of ‘difference’ 
(multi/sub/minority/ethnic culture) and that must name ‘others’, that must mark 
‘us’ and ‘them.’ 
Conclusion: The Contradictions of Inclusion 
In my time spent in New Zealand writing this dissertation I have been 
struck by the sheer ubiquity of a ‘one nation forged on a rugby field’ rhetoric. In 
real terms there has been a growing disjuncture between rugby’s social base and 
the characteristics of the society it purportedly represents: the expansion of the 
urban middle classes, the gains of feminism, the rising visibility of various 
Polynesian communities and the political resurgence of Maoridom all seem at 
odds with the traditional marriage of rugby to rural, Pakeha masculinity 
(Phillips, 1987). Yet somehow rugby, and the national team, the All Blacks, 
persist as one of the more, if the not the most, potent agents and symbols of 
national identity formation. What I have suggested, however, is that rather than 
being ‘a game for all New Zealanders’, contemporary rugby in New Zealand can 
be seen to “serve the functional needs of the dominant national group” 
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(Triandafyllidou, 2001, p. 4). Rugby, and the All Blacks in particular, are part of 
the wider discourse of celebration, of claims that New Zealand, as a nation, has 
embraced the values of cultural pluralism and tolerance. As a narrative of 
progress, the game purportedly speaks to a “deeper truth about the new New 
Zealand and its people”, the “exotic” nature of the All Blacks—“tattooed, 
dreadlocked, surnames festooned with apostrophes” (MacDonald, 2005, p. 
C11)—patent recognition that Pacific Islanders are officially “an increasingly 
large part of the New Zealand identity” (Laidlaw, cited in Hubbard, 2006, p. C2). 
In reality, however, to take the All Blacks as evidence of a new ‘Pacific’ (or 
‘Oceanic’) identity for New Zealanders would be to ignore the liminal world of 
Pacific peoples: they live in New Zealand, are members of its civil society, yet as 
‘ethnics’ they are never able to be fully-incorporated into the social body. 
The discourse of Pacific multiculturalism ensures that they will always be 
different, wherein difference is measured in terms of distance from Pakeha 
culture. That is, diversity in fact works to sustain to Pakeha power. As Wade 
(1998, p. 4) argues, 
just as in colonial power relations the coloniser’s sense of domination is 
fed by a narcissistic desire for the submission of the subordinate other, so 
the nation-builders define their own superiority in relation to the diversity 
they observe and construct—and desire. 
 
My argument is that national belonging in New Zealand still functions according 
to an investment in an ethnonational ‘core’ (Brubaker, 1996; Mackey, 1999) 
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around which a ‘hierarchy’ of New Zealandness is constructed (Pakeha of course 
being at the top). New Zealander is a racialized term with nation and race clearly 
intersecting in the bodies of Pacific peoples. This racialization operates via a 
model of ‘normal’ New Zealandness that is white and unmarked, and ultimately 
sustained by the exclusion-yet-retention of the foreigner, the other, within. New 
Zealand may no longer—if it ever was—be a ‘white nation’ (Hage, 2000) but the 
self-other divide—which, Ang (2001, p. 142) reminds us, “is the epistemological 
basis of the very possibility for racism”—is an inherent feature of the new Pacific 
multiculturalism. Forced into a place-taking politics within the dominant terms 
of belonging, the “structural hierarchy between majority (singular) and 
minorities (plural)” (Ang, 2001, p. 142) has not been nullified by the elevation of 
Pacific people onto the national cultural stage. 
However a pretty picture the All Blacks paint, they do not stand outside 
the dominant hegemonic discourses of race that continue to infuse New Zealand 
culture. At the level of rhetoric and ideology, they project an image of New 
Zealand as open to diversity, the personification of the so-called liberal nation-
state: rational, reflective, civic, egalitarian. They invite us, via a “discourse of 
enrichment” that works difference into an over-riding unity, to join in the chorus 
of “celebrating our national identity” (Hage, 2000). But we cannot ignore how 
this new Pacific multiculturalism functions as an ideological discourse designed 
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to, in Ang’s (2001) words, provide New Zealanders “with a favorable, flattering, 
even triumphant representation of the national self” (p. 98). I emphasize 
ideological here in that Pacific multiculturalism is “forgetful of many things” 
(Behdad, 2000, p. 143), presenting the people of New Zealand “with a public 
fiction that they live in a harmonious, tolerant and peaceful country where 
everyone is included and gets along” (Ang, 2001, p. 98). Further, Pacific 
multiculturalism is overlaid with distinctions between Pakeha and non-Pakeha. 
We may not suppress diversity “to the altar of Anglo-Saxon conformity” (King, 
2000), yet whiteness/Pakehaness nonetheless forms, to borrow Haney López 
(1996), “the linchpin” for all systems of racial and national meaning in New 
Zealand—it is the “absent centre” (Ang, 2001, p. 101). 
The All Blacks’/New Zealand’s (for the “metaphoric relationship…cannot 
be reduced to simile” [Brabazon, 2006, p. 181]) self-image as a liberal polity open 
to all-comers irrespective of race or background is also at odds with how the 
politics of exclusion are still legitimated through the language of race. New 
Zealand’s immigration policies have, according to Brooking and Rabel (1995), 
traditionally favored European, particularly British, settlers, often restricting 
entry to persons from specific source countries in the UK and Western Europe 
(see also Ward and Lin, 2005). Although this unofficial “white New Zealand 
policy” (Ongley and Pearson, 1995, p. 773) was abandoned in the 1970s, and 
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recent tentative moves toward a fully nondiscriminatory policy notwithstanding, 
the new national narrative of openness and tolerance belies longstanding 
tensions among Pakeha about the “immigrant minorities in their midst” 
(Pearson, 2000, p. 91). And, this is not just about contemporary moral panics, 
about new arrivals. The legacies of the past cannot be simply done away with by 
invoking a presentist multicultural fantasy (Povinelli, 2002). As Bedford (1997) 
has argued, “people who are not obviously of Maori or European descent” 
continue to be stereotyped as ‘immigrants’, “especially when the debate about 
levels of overseas migration to New Zealand becomes emotion-charged and 
heated” (or, in the case of the All Blacks, when they start losing [see Chapter, 2]). 
Bedford highlights here the continued saliency of racial appearance and ‘looks’ 
“in demarcating the boundaries between those who are unconditionally accepted 
as ‘real’ [New Zealanders], and those who are constituted as ‘foreign’ and 
forever cast beyond the pale of the [New Zealand] nation” (Beford, 2000). In New 
Zealand, who ‘belongs’ is still premised on corporeal difference, or what Barnor 
Hesse describes as “signifying colonial distinctions between assemblages of 
‘Europeanness’ and ‘non-Europeanness’” (Hesse, 1999). Scholars in Asian 
American studies have suggested that for people of Asian descent living in the 
United States, “having ‘Asian looks’ (marked by phenotypical features such as 
skin colour, hair type and eye shape) serves as a ‘cue’ denoting…‘Otherness’ that 
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precludes their unconditional acceptance as ‘American’” (Yamamoto, 1999). 
Borrowing an incisive turn of phrase from one of these authors, it could be said 
that Pacific people in New Zealand are similarly afflicted by “the perpetual 
foreigner syndrome” (Yu, 2001). The ineradicability of visible ‘racial’ markers 
carried in the body has been transferred across generations of Pacific people, 
with the “racialisation of ‘looks’” (Yu, 2001) remaining a key constituent of the 
discursive boundaries of the New Zealand nation. In Loto et al’s (2006) terms, the 
legacy of the “domineering relationship between the Palagi majority group and 
Pacific minorities”, the “exclusion or ‘othering’ of ethnic minorities”, endures in 
the new multicultural New Zealand. 
Openness to cultural difference should therefore be seen as intersecting 
rather than undermining New Zealand’s national identity. That New Zealand is, 
in the words of its Minister for Ethnic Affairs, a “multi-ethnic and multicultural 
society” has become a badge of national identity. As oxymoronic as it sounds, 
diversity is the means by which New Zealand constructs a unified national 
culture, differentiated and defined in difference to other settler colonies. The 
New Zealand twist in this regard is, vis-à-vis Australia or Canada, 
multiculturalism with a ‘Polynesian’ flavor. Rather than emulating its Pacific 
Rim counterparts, New Zealand has sought to emphasize what Minister of 
Pacific Island Affairs Phil Goff describes as “its Pacific character.” “Migration 
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from the Pacific has shaped and changed our identity as a Pacific nation,” he said 
in a recent speech. “The strong Pasifika community…gives us a sense of 
identity.” Like Goff, other members of the Labour government are also 
increasingly playing up ‘Pacificness’ as part of what “makes us unique” (Laban, 
2007). Yet this new form of Pacific multiculturalism and Pakeha dominance in 
New Zealand are not necessarily at odds. Pacific multiculturalism ‘works’ in 
New Zealand precisely because it contains the increasingly active role of Pacific 
Others in New Zealand’s cultural and political life. 
Pacific multiculturalism may be something of an paradox in that the 
discursive uses of it, in Homi Bhabha’s terms, “mark social processes where 
differentiation and condensation seem to happen almost synchronically” 
(Bhabha, 1994). Obviously, ‘the nation’, as Benedict Anderson (1983) famously 
reminds us, needs an ideology of unification and legitimation. At the same time 
the cultural pluralist discourse of the All Blacks is evidence of how this ideology 
also needs and creates the Other: in this case, the once undesirable ‘Pacific 
Islander’ is “discursively inserted into the middle of a dialogue” of multiracial 
unity (Bannerji, 2000, p. 96). But the introjection of belonging draws on and 
reinforces racial differences and hierarchies of difference (Triandafyllidou and 
Veikou, 2000). Pacific peoples, even as All Blacks, are never simply New 
Zealanders. They are, in Bannerji’s (2000) terms, “pasted over with labels” that 
 115 
provide them with extraneous identities: Samoan, Tongan, Fijian, immigrants, 
Pacific peoples. For them New Zealand is always a hyphenated space, a space 
between two identities. The hyphen, as in Samoan-New Zealander, “links two 
identities together in an attempt to integrate the marginal into the dominant, 
while at the same time defining each as separate” (2002, p. xviii). The 
hyphenated identity thus works, as Carrera points out, as a “subordinating term 
to the dominant culture.” To be a Pacific person, to be a Samoan-, or Tongan-, or 
Fijian-New Zealander, is to be less than a full New Zealander. And, as Bannerji 
continues, concomitant with the “mania for the naming of ‘others’ is one for the 
naming of that which is [New Zealander]” (p. 65). That is, the very act of naming 
delimits membership. As I have shown in the chapter only Pakeha have the 
privilege of being simply a ‘New Zealander.’ For Pacific peoples this is the 
paradox of belonging and not-belonging, of living in the national space while not 
being ‘New Zealanders.’ No matter how ‘multicultural’, New Zealand national 
identity still bears the traces of Eurocentric discourse, and of ambivalence toward 
immigrants. Even in rugby we see evidence of there being a cultural Pakeha core 
which generates a “coexistence of hostility and hospitality” (Behdad, 2005) that 




Where Have All the White Boys Gone? Or, Soccer’s for Sissies: Spatial Anxieties and 
The Browning of New Zealand Rugby 
 
With rugby becoming increasingly dominated by Maori and Pacific Islanders, 
Pakeha men are in search of a new dreaming. 
- Tara Brabazon 
 
For a former All Black, Chris Laidlaw has never been afraid to speak his mind—
even when it comes to matters rugby. His book Mud in Your Eye, an acerbic over-
view of the state of the New Zealand game, created something of a “media fuss” 
when it was released in 1973, its candor upsetting former team-mates and 
rugby’s administrators alike (Knight, 2007). “It wasn’t appreciated,” he later 
wrote. “I was published and I was damned” (Laidlaw, 1999, p. 20). Perhaps it 
wasn’t entirely surprising from a one-time Rhodes Scholar, a man who later went 
on to become both a Human Rights Commissioner and New Zealand’s Race 
Relations Conciliator. If Mud in Your Eye wasn’t your typical biography, Laidlaw 
wasn’t your typical All Black. His current capacity as a prominent radio host, 
and sometime newspaper columnist, ensures that Laidlaw remains a prominent 
commentator on New Zealand society generally, and rugby specifically. And, he 
stills continues to occasionally upset. He certainly rubbed New Zealand rugby’s 
powers-that-be the wrong way in 2002. In a now infamous Dominion Post 
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column, Laidlaw suggested New Zealand selectors as favoring Pakeha over 
Maori and Pacific players. Of the side that played Australia in the Tri-Nations 
series the week prior, he wrote that “It was as Pakeha in complexion as New 
Zealand has possibly ever fielded. Setting aside a very tenuous Maori connection 
or two, this was essentially the All-Whites dressed in black.” “The fact that [team 
selectors John] Mitchell and [Robbie] Deans have opted overwhelmingly for a 
Pakeha squad might be an accident and it might not,” he continued. “I think 
not.” 
The comments set off something of a media frenzy. By and large the press 
rushed to the coaches’ defence. An editorial in the nationally-read New Zealand 
Herald succinctly captured the tenor: calling racism a “poisonous subject”, the 
author writes that “it is unfortunate that anyone has seen fit to question the racial 
make-up of an All Black team. Rugby in this country has never given it a 
thought. It is…offensive to all New Zealand that the question should even have 
been raised” (Rugby does not deserve racial slur, 2002). Others looked for support 
from former players and even the opposition: prominent rugby-writer Jim Kayes 
quotes erstwhile All Black Frank Bunce as saying that there was “no way you 
could brand [Mitchell and Deans] or their selection policy as racist” (Kayes, 2002, 
p. 1); the Dominion Post cited suggestions that an All Black team could be picked 
on race as being “shocking” to South African manager Gideon Sam (Manager 
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caught out by race row, 2002, p. C12); and, no doubt many in the media throng 
were comforted to hear Springbok coach Rudolf Straeuli declare “I know John 
very well and I know that he is not a racist” (quoted in Colquhoun, 2002, p. 15). 
More than anything the reaction showed just how much rugby continues to 
fetishized in New Zealand (MacLean, 1998), the way that New Zealanders 
continue to see the game as isolated from the profane worlds of politics and race 
relations. It was also interesting to see the media’s ‘naturalization’ of race-related 
matters. Mitchell’s decisions were largely rationalized on the basis of ‘natural’ 
differences in the playing attributes of Pakeha and ‘Polynesians.’ “Flair” wrote a 
journalist in The Southland Times, “may provide a great spectacle, but it doesn’t 
put trophies in the cabinet” (Burdon, 2002, p. 24)—‘flair’, of course, standing in 
here for ‘Pacific Islander’ or ‘Polynesian.’ Even Laidlaw himself played to this 
biologically-driven discourse. Accusations of racism could just as easily be 
leveled at his view that “Polynesians” weren’t being picked because of their 
“tearaway tendencies” (contra, he argues, Mitchell’s conservatism). Laidlaw may 
be right in suggesting Mitchell to be picking along racial lines, but he is equally 
guilty of perpetuating deeply-entrenched, racial stereotypes by failing to 
question them. Ironically, both sides of the fence were reinforcing the myth of 
non-racialism. 
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I take up these issues in more detail in the following chapter, but what 
also interests me about this case is that an ‘All Pakeha’ team even seems 
plausible. Not in the sense of rugby now being inexorably a ‘multicultural space,’ 
but, rather, that Laidlaw was writing at a time when Pakeha men were supposed 
to be fleeing the game in droves. Only a few months earlier, the widely-
circulated magazine New Zealand Rugby World felt ‘white flight’ to be such a 
phenomenon that it was moved to ask (on its cover, no less) “Where Have All the 
White Players Gone?” And, only weeks after Laidlaw’s comments, respected 
sports journalist Joseph Romanos released the provocatively-titled The Judas 
Game (Romanos, 2002). Subtitled “The Betrayal of New Zealand Rugby”, the book 
ostensibly outlines how “the traditions, the values and the camaraderie that once 
made rugby great have all been betrayed.” More pointedly, Romanos considers 
rugby to be “a game in crisis” (p. 11), with “problems…at every level” (p. 241). 
One of the biggest issues for rugby as he sees it, though, is that “playing numbers 
are dropping dramatically” (p. 241)—nowhere more-so than among the young. 
And the cause? White flight. That Laidlaw had cause to wonder “if some kind of 
Polynesian purge wasn’t under way”, seemed wholly at odds with what others 
saw as a “trend”—as Romanos labels it—towards rugby’s “browning.” “This is 
not supposed to happen” writes a Southland Times reporter of Mitchell’s All Black 
team that played Australia. “Against all predictions, New Zealand’s premier 
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sporting outfit is not suffering from the ‘white flight’ syndrome which so many 
have said will be the scourge of the game in this country in the coming decade” 
(Burdon, 2002, p. 24). 
In this chapter I wish to critically examine the twinned discourses of 
‘white flight’ and the ‘browning of New Zealand rugby.’ ‘White flight’ has 
become something of ‘standard story’ (Fish, 1980) of rugby and race in New 
Zealand. In fact, it has almost gone without question that it is (a), happening, and 
(b), cause for concern. On one level, white flight could be taken as a mere 
manifestation of the ‘threat’ posed by soccer, a sport in which, according to Sport 
and Recreation New Zealand (SPARC), “overall participation has increased 
significantly” (SPARC, 2003, p. 2). But the unease is more likely about the 
questions posed by rugby no longer being the exclusive preserve of white males. 
Firstly, it is an issue of race, and the discomforting prospect of the nation being 
represented solely by Pacific men. The “tight embrace between rugby and New 
Zealand identity”, means, as Brabazon (2006) notes, that “its symbolism is 
intensely political” (p. 180). In what ways, then, are fears over rugby’s browning 
a reaction to changes in New Zealand’s social and cultural landscape? Borrowing 
from Ghassan Hage, I make the case that ‘white flight’ forms part of a broader 
“discourse of Anglo decline” (Hage, 2000, p. 179). This specific genre of White 
discourse has long historical roots, and reasserts itself in calls for both tighter 
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controls on immigration, resentment of (so-called) ‘race-based’ political policies, 
and in attempts to realign New Zealandness with whiteness. I argue further, 
though, that white flight is not solely an issue of race, about Pakeha per se and 
their desertion of rugby. It is more specifically an exodus of white boys and white 
men. The browning of rugby is a disruption not merely of whiteness, but an 
invasion of Pakeha masculinity. In New Zealand the male stereotype remains that 
most closely identified with the process of national definition. New Zealand, as 
Jock Phillips once argued, has been, “oppressively ‘a man’s country’” (1987, p. 
vii). More than twenty years later there remains a “resolute blokiness” (Coleman, 
2006) about New Zealand life and cultural expression. The role of rugby in this 
regard, though often overstated, cannot be easily ignored. Hence, I make the case 
that the browning of rugby can be read not only as a threat to white power, but, 
moreover, to the power of white men. 
New Racism in an Election Year 
 
…the state of emergency is also always a state of emergence. 
- Homi Bhabha 
 
When I first arrived back in New Zealand in 2005, the country was building for a 
general election. The incumbent Labour government was polling strongly, and 
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expected to be re-elected for a third term. Prime Minister Helen Clark was by far 
the preferred leader, and she had already secured assurances of support from the 
Greens and Progressives in readiness for forming a coalition government. Labour 
had cause for optimism too in the fact that at the last election, in 2002, they had 
soundly beaten their main opponents, the National Party; such was their 
unpopularity, National had slumped to winning only 21 per cent of the vote or 
22.5 per cent of seats. But a strange thing happened on the way to the election 
booth in 2005. On election night no single party or recognized bloc won a 
majority, and Labour’s advantage over National in the unicameral House of 
Representatives was only a slim two seats. The newly formed Maori Party won 
four seats, taking three of the Maori electorates from Labour, and National, in an 
astonishing turn-around, secured 21 more seats than in 2002. Such was the 
closeness of the result that it took nearly two weeks, and the counting of special 
votes, for the Labour-led coalition to finally be declared the winner—but their 
power had been severely eroded, and they held government by—literally—the 
most tenuous of margins. 
Like all elections, one can only speculate as to the direction of voting that 
night; and, of course, the press was only too happy to do so. Whether it was 
Labour’s reticence over tax cuts or the ‘Speedgate’ affair—in which the PM’s 
motorcade driver and two police officers were found guilty of speeding as they 
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drove Clark to a rugby game—what was often missed in public commentaries 
after the election was the fact that “the result did not reflect a significant swing 
away from Labour” (Miskin, 2005). The difference was actually the resurgence of 
National. Its 39 per cent of the vote—only 2 per cent below Labour—was a jump 
of some 18.2 per cent over 2002, and marked the party’s best result since 1990. In 
his introduction to the revised edition of New Zealand Government and Politics 
Auckland University professor Raymond Miller argues that “most of the credit 
for [National’s] recovery was due to the efforts of its new leader and former 
Reserve Bank governor, Dr Don Brash” (Miller, 2006). An interesting choice for a 
political leader, Brash was both inexperienced and lacking in charisma, 
especially in comparison to the savvy, if divisive Clark. On the campaign trail 
too, he was often in (his own) strife: of his pale showing in a televised leaders’ 
debate with Clark he suggested that “it’s not entirely appropriate for a man to 
aggressively attack a woman and I restrained myself for that reason” (NZPA, 
2005); he was forced to retract his denial of having any prior knowledge of an 
anti-Green/anti-Labour pamphlet distributed by members of Exclusive Brethren; 
and, he was so error-prone in front of the media that even his former chief of 
staff described him as a “gaffe-prone Mr Magoo” (quoted in Eden, 2006). Yet for 
all his political naivete and awkwardness, Brash nonetheless managed to woo 
“mainstream voters with populist solutions to perceived problems in the areas of 
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race relations, law and order, social welfare, and taxation” (Miller, 2006). Perhaps 
more than anything, though, it was a speech to Orewa Rotary Club in January 
2004 that defined Brash as a political figure, through the election and beyond. 
The focus of the speech, as Brash put it, was “the dangerous drift towards 
racial separatism in New Zealand” (Brash, 2004). Of the Labour government 
Brash argued that they were steadily moving New Zealand towards becoming a 
“racially divided nation, with two sets of laws, and two standards of 
citizenship.” What he called “special privileges for any race”—but, in particular, 
Maori—came in for the harshest criticism. “In parallel with the Treaty process 
and the associated grievance industry,” he stated, 
there has been a divisive trend to embody racial distinctions into large 
parts of our legislation, extending recently to local body politics. In both 
education and healthcare, government funding is now influenced not just 
by need—as it should be –but also by the ethnicity of the recipient. 
 
Citing the controversial income distribution research of sociologist Simon 
Chapple4, he went on to contend that “Maori-ness explains very little about how 
well one does in life. Ethnicity does not determine one’s destiny.” Brash then 
concluded with a pledge to end “race-based” legislation and funding, and a 
promise to “remove the anachronism of the Maori seats in Parliament”: 
There can be no basis for special privileges for any race, no basis for 
government funding based on race, no basis for introducing Maori wards 
                                                          
4 For further discussion of the controversies over Chapple’s paper on Mäori socioeconomic 
disparities (Chapple, 2000) see Baehler (2002). 
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in local authority elections, and no obligation for local governments to 
consult Maori in preference to other New Zealanders. 
 
Prior to the speech polls showed that the National Party “was lagging so far 
behind the governing Labour Party that electoral success in 2005 seemed remote” 
(Middleton, 2005, p. 479). Within a month, however, National’s support jumped 
17 percentage points; it was, Miller (2006) notes, “the most dramatic rise in the 
history of polling in New Zealand.” 
Up to that point, and socially at least, Brash could have been seen as 
something of a ‘liberal’: he voted in favour of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 
and is divorced and remarried. Politically, he was more difficult to pin down, 
glibly claiming when asked of his political leanings to not know, as Macdonald 
(2003) notes, what ‘right’ or ‘left’ meant. But as a Colin James, a columnist for the 
New Zealand Herald, put it, with his hard line on ‘race-based funding,’ Brash and 
his advisors realized that there was “political hay to be made in the suburbs with 
such a stance” (James, 2004). It was, James elsewhere writes, a “Sir Robert 
Muldoon-style populist big idea: no special treatment for Maori based on race”5 
(James, 2004). The allusion here is incredibly apposite. As Prime Minister 
                                                          
5 Elsewhere James defends what he calls Brash’s “values” (James, 2004). He casts Brash as a 
“newcomer,” suggesting any “wedge politics” to be the province of the “standard-issue 
politicians” who lie behind him. For his description of wedge politics he cites British journalist 
Andrew Sullivan’s version in the case of President George W. Bush: “You use a disliked 
minority—black criminals, gay couples; you get your opponent to defend them; then you get to 
win over all those offended by the association.” 
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between 1975 and 1984, Muldoon was, according The Economist, “fond of 
dismissing criticism by claiming he was ‘on the side of the people’” (cited in 
Moore, 2003, p. 3). Labeling himself an ‘ordinary bloke’6, he drew much of his 
core support from the middle and lower-middle classes by appealing to their 
social conservatism (Nagel, 1998). As his biographer writes, “Muldoon had an 
astute political instinct for issues of concern to large sections of the public and 
the ability and audacity to exploit them…[Muldoon] was not afraid to divide 
society by playing upon emotion and prejudice” (Gustafson, 2000, p. 150). Shieff 
(2006) argues that, in similar fashion, with what came to known as the ‘Orewa 
Speech’, Brash “tapped a well-spring of anxiety in Pakeha who felt that ill-
defined Maori entitlements under the Treaty of Waitangi had come to take 
precedence over Pakeha interests” (p. 100). Middleton (2005) contends likewise, 
that Brash “merely brought to the surface the subterranean rumblings in bars, 
kitchens, and workplaces” around New Zealand (2005, p. 479). 
Notably, Brash has not been the only New Zealand politician of late to 
engage in such racially-tinged ‘wedge’ or ‘dog-whistle’ politics. Winston Peters is 
probably the most well-known in this regard. He has rightly been labeled an 
“anti-immigration politician” (Ward and Liu, 2005, p. 165). Though he has 
noticeably toned down his statements since becoming—in one of the great 
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political ironies—Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peters is (in)famous for attacks on 
Asian ‘immigrants’, accusing them of everything from driving up the cost of 
housing to causing traffic problems in Auckland. He has also targeted the Somali 
community (Peters speak up, 2004), and once said of Muslims in New Zealand that 
the moderate and militant, fit hand and glove. Underneath it all the 
agenda is to promote fundamentalist Islam. Indeed, these groups are like 
the mythical Hydra, a serpent underbelly with multiple heads, capable of 
striking at any time and in any direction (Peters, 2005). 
 
Peters is obviously an extreme case, an example of what one local academic aptly 
calls an “identikit populist. A man with a ready-made message whose familiarity 
never seems to dull its appeal to the discontented and disconcerted the world 
over” (Bale, 2002). Yet, the popularity of the rhetoric of Brash or Peters has 
obviously played well with voters. Public opinion has also been divided over 
Algerian asylum seeker Ahmed Zaoui, with one commentator in the UK’s 
Guardian suggesting the case to be “imperiling Kiwis’ reputation for tolerance” 
(Fickling, 2003). Tolerant or not, there is certainly enough evidence to support 
population scholar Richard Bedford’s contention that “New Zealanders are quite 
happy to travel and experience different cultures. But we don’t want them here” 
(quoted in Editorial, 2005). 
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“They’re Giants. Let’s Find Another Sport”: Wounded White Boys and the 
Pakeha Game 
If we don’t want immigrants ‘here’, neither does it seem do want them on 
our rugby fields. In recent years there has been a rising chorus of concern about 
the declining number of Pakeha boys taking up the game (Deaker, 1999; 
Matheson, 2001; Romanos, 2002; Thomas, 2003; Williams, 2001). What irks these 
commentators is not so much these boys are going elsewhere, but that they are 
being replaced by their Maori and Polynesian counterparts. Young white males 
are represented as dropping out a rapid rate while the number of Maori and 
Polynesian boys has purportedly undergone a “staggering increase” (Romanos, 
2002). According to critics the pool of white players in New Zealand is getting 
smaller and smaller every year while some schoolboy teams, to borrow a phrase 
from one administrator, now “read like passenger lists from Polynesian 
Airlines.”7 Supposedly young Polynesians are coming to dominate rugby to such 
an extent “that many curtain-raisers…rarely feature a white player” (Deaker, 
1998, p. 162). “When I go to rugby grounds on a Saturday morning” recounts one 
writer, “the percentage of Polynesian and Maori boys playing is striking. In some 
teams, the odd white boy stands out as being different” (Romanos, 2002, p. 177). 
“There’s no doubt about it,” another concurs, “this is a serious problem” 
                                                          
7 The now defunct international arm of the national airline of Samoa. 
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(Matheson, 2001). According to Laidlaw (1999, p. 183) “a page in New Zealand’s 
sporting evolution is being rapidly turned. The 21st century will be an age in 
which [rugby] will be dominated by young Polynesians.” 
The problem for these writers doesn’t end at school- or junior-level. At the 
professional level here too purportedly a “transformation is well under way” 
(Laidlaw, 1999, p. 183). Certainly, there has been a noticeable browning of the 
elite ranks. Little more than 10 years ago there were 25 players of Pacific Island 
descent contracted to play for New Zealand’s Super 12 franchises. In 2007, 50 of 
the 162 contracted players could trace their roots to either Fiji, Samoa, or Tonga. 
Around 9000 of the roughly 21,000 players in Auckland are ‘Polynesian’—
making Pacific peoples the most significant ethnic group. Further inspection of 
the numbers reveals that Pacific peoples account for almost 60 per cent of all 
players in the region aged 12 and over and almost 70 per cent of those playing 
senior rugby (Paul, 2007). At least 42 of 91 All Blacks selected in the decade 
between 1991–2000 were of Maori or Pacific descent (Ryan, 2007). The inevitable 
question for the anxious is where this all leads, the prospect that there could 
possibly come a day when the All Blacks “no longer feature a single white face” 
(Laidlaw, 1999, p. 183). Doubtless the skeptic would find little comfort from one 
local rugby scribe who recently posited that such is “the growing dominance of 
Polynesian athletes” that “it’s not inconceivable that come the 2011 World Cup, 
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New Zealand, as hosts, kick-off the first game with a match-day 22 that consists 
solely of players who come from a Pacific Island background” (Paul, 2007). 
But the roots of that prospect lie back with the schoolboys. This is where 
the declining position of Pakeha males in rugby begins. What is most interesting 
in this regard is the way in which Polynesian dominance is rugby enables New 
Zealand’s racial hierarchy to be turned on its head, “so that [Pakeha] can be 
positioned as a seemingly legitimate unprivileged subject” (Kusz, 2007, p. 99; 
emphasis added). In essence, young Pakeha boys are increasingly framed as 
‘victims.’ The overwhelming success of Polynesian males in both the junior and 
senior ranks are framed as an exclusionary force which constrains the 
possibilities of Pakeha boys. Surveying the junior rugby scene Laidlaw (1999) 
writes: 
All over the country the pattern is repeating itself. More and more school 
and age group teams are reliant on youthful Polynesian vigour to make 
the difference. Hulking youngsters dominate the landscape at almost 
every game. Fifteen year olds weighing a hundred kilos, and playing 
centre, have become the norm. It is an arresting sight, not least for the 
modestly proportioned Pakeha lads who get run over every Saturday and 
wonder how many more times they must be offered up as a human 
sacrifice. As a parent-spectator I have found myself wincing on the 
sideline as the footsoldiers of mainly Pakeha teams are comprehensively 
flattened by the heavy armour of their mainly Polynesian opponents (p. 
182). 
 
The image of Pakeha boys, then, is that they are suffering at the hands of the 
Polynesian counterparts. 
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This discourse relies first on the obvious stereotype of whites’ athletic or 
physical inferiority to Polynesians. Polynesian dominance is taken as ‘naturally’ 
conferred through their advantages in physical development. This is perhaps the 
most common and widely-promulgated explanation for white flight. As 
Matheson (2001) confidently asserts, “Without question, the most common 
reason [for white flight] is that the young white athlete is intimidated by the 
growing number of Polynesians playing the sport” (p. 21). Demonstrating the 
degree to which the argument is taken as common-sense, Romanos (2002) 
suggests that “You do not need to be a scientist to know that an eight-year-old, 
12-year-old or 15-year-old Polynesian boy will almost inevitably be much bigger 
than a white boy the same age” (p. 171). Or as one club coach puts it, “It 
generally comes back to one thing—the sheer athletic ability of the Polynesian 
versus the European. A 14-year-old Polynesian will almost always shit all over 
the white kid” (quoted in Matheson, 2001). It is thus the size of Pacific Islanders 
that is driving white boys away from the sport. 
I take issue with the naturalization of racial athletic aptitudes in the next 
chapter but for now it is perhaps enough to note that it is for all intents and 
purposes taken as a truism that Polynesian boys are more physically developed. 
As the Auckland Rugby CEO David White is quoted as saying, “Whether we like 
it or not, Polynesian kids mature physically earlier, they’re big and strong and 
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we can’t hide from that” (quoted in Thomas, 2003, p. 133). The veracity of such 
contentions is all but assumed—or as one former All Black puts it, “undeniable.” 
Such views obviously construct a racially-deterministic argument that repeats 
“assumptions about the violent, powerful, but ‘nobly savage’” Polynesian 
(Brabazon, 2006, p. 184); a dangerous line of reasoning that, as I say, I wish to 
pick up in the following chapter. Setting aside momentarily the way the success 
of Polynesian players is attributed to innate or instinctive ‘qualities’, however, it 
is interesting to note the way young white males are figured as having their 
agency constrained. First, this a result of what Hoberman (1997) may have 
described as a “spreading white inferiority complex.” Apparently, white boys 
have simply given up. “There are reports,” writes Laidlaw, of some talented, but 
physically intimidated young Pakeha players growing dispirited by these 
disparities in size and firepower and giving the game away” (1999, p. 182). 
According to Romanos they are “sick of having the daylights knocked out of 
them by boys who have such physical advantages” (2002, p. 19). One coach 
similarly despairs of the decision facing Pakeha boys: “Look at the choice he has. 
The young white kid can say to himself, ‘I am a skinny little kid. I am 13 years 
old. I can go and play with my skateboard or I can go and run against that 80kg 
Polynesian guy and get absolutely hammered.’ Why would he want to play 
rugby?” These physical advantages are seen to be exacerbated by a ‘Polynesian 
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style’ of play that exploits the purported differences in size. According to one-
time All Black Norm Hewitt, “the Island boys all look up to [players like] Jonah 
Lomu8, and they want to play like him. They get the ball and want to run over 
their opposition” (the opposition being, in his words, “little white boys, who are 
about half as big”). Again, this reaffirms the idea of an ‘innate’ style of play, that, 
like their size, Polynesian boys are handed their abilities on a “genetic plate” 
(Hokowhitu, 2003, p. 212). 
On the surface, then, the white flight crisis appeals to neutrality by 
rendering Polynesian boys as naturally different, naturally bigger, and thus, 
naturally a threat to their Pakeha counterparts. That these differences are natural 
is important because it normalizes the white-flight-panic discourse, permitting 
statements that could otherwise be interpreted as racially-motivated. One is 
reminded here of Bonilla-Silva’s implication of such ‘color-blind’ rhetoric in the 
production and reinforcement of the status quo (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). Of 
particular note is the way color-blind racism can function through a 
naturalization “frame of reference”—the “set path for interpreting 
information”—that Bonilla-Silva suggests as “allowing whites to explain away 
racial phenomena by suggesting they are natural occurrences” (p. 28). We could 
perhaps suggest this as typical of (new) racism generally in that it is a process 
                                                          
8 A famed All Black of Tongan heritage. Lomu is discussed further in the chapter to follow. 
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and an ideology of naturalization, of constructing social relations as natural and 
unchangeable. As Rocchio (2000) contends, appeals to nature, or the natural state 
of things, are “popular mode[s] of rhetoric for maintaining the status quo of 
inequality and its modes of categorized oppression” (Rocchio, 2000, p. 75). 
Rhetorically, the strategy works by making frequent recourse to phrases such as 
‘that’s the way it is’—something that normalizes what is spoken. We see 
evidence of such techniques in the white-flight-panic discourse. Romanos (2000), 
for instance, argues racism is a non-factor when it comes to explaining white 
flight. “[Racism] is not the case at all”, he writes. “What happens is that boys, 
and their parents, are intimidated by the size of the Maori and, particularly, the 
Polynesian boys of the same age” (p. 170). Laidlaw (1999) similarly chastises the 
“dedicated schools of politically correct thought that insist that we are all the 
same. We aren’t, and it couldn’t be more obvious when an ethnically mixed 
bunch of early teenagers take the field” (p. 182). Racism is thus disavowed; the 
fear is based in biology; Polynesian boys are naturally a threat. 
Despite these claims to the contrary, race sits at the center of the white-
flight discourse—even if it is never acknowledged. However, we can only see 
this by implicating the white-flight debate in wider discourses about the 
declining position of white males in New Zealand rugby and sport more 
generally. To borrow from Thomas (2003) (in one of the more astute analyses of 
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white flight), it seems reasonable to ask whether “is it just a roundabout, mealy-
mouthed way of expressing alarm over the browning of the game and 
specifically the All Blacks” (p. 135). Palmer (2007) has observed how “there is a 
common perception among sports followers and sports media that Maori and 
Polynesian athletes are dominating [New Zealand’s] high-profile and elite sports 
teams” (p. 311). In addition to a string of articles in the press, two recent 
documentaries have visited the issue. One, titled The Brown Factor (TVNZ, 2004), 
is decidedly romantic on the browning of Kiwi sport, with the talking heads 
heaping praise on sport’s positive impact on race relations. As one puts it, “sport, 
particularly professional sport, has broken down more racial barriers than 
anything else put together.” The video is also notable for the way it repeats 
dominant race ideologies that attribute the success of Polynesians to their 
inherent physicality. This, though, is even more explicit is the second 
documentary, Polyunsaturated (TV3 Network, 2003). In brief, the program is 
remarkably reminiscent of the now infamous 1989 NBC News article Black 
Athletes—Fact and Fiction in the way it sets out to discover “the physical reasons 
for the Polynesian superiority in rugby” (emphasis my own; on Black Athletes see 
Davis, 1990). It states from the outset that Polynesian players “are faster and 
stronger than Pakeha.” Like The Brown Factor it also takes as given that the 
“browning of New Zealand rugby” is very real. The ‘proof’ offered is usually 
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something akin to the statistics I have quoted above: the growing number of 
Pacific Islanders playing in the Super 14 and that fact at least 42 of 91 All Blacks 
selected in the decade between 1991–2000 were of Maori or Polynesian descent 
(NZRU, 2008). More frequently, however, the evidence is anecdotal, the words of 
coaches or administrators or even casual fans. This is typical of the analysis of 
white flight generally. Deaker (1998), for instance, considers white flight to be 
“very real” pointing only to his own observations during “years on the 
sidelines.” From his vantage he sees “a minute number of Europeans playing 
senior club rugby and a drop off in the numbers coming in at lower levels”—
neither of which he substantiates. Romanos equally alleges “white players” to be 
“in a small minority in terms of senior rugby” (2002, p. 181). He bases this 
contention on his observation of senior rugby in Auckland, neatly side-stepping 
the fact that two-thirds (66.9 percent) of New Zealand’s Pacific peoples live in the 
Auckland Region. It is hardly, then, a representative sample of ‘New Zealand’ 
rugby. 
My point here is not to enter into the debate about whether or not the 
browning of New Zealand rugby is actually happening (although it is interesting 
to note that, by the most recent SPARC figures, there are five times as many 
Pakeha than Pacific men playing rugby in New Zealand). What is more pertinent 
is that, happening or not, the browning of New Zealand sport is perceived to be 
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so. Why this is cause for concern is never clearly articulated in media discourse 
on the browning of rugby. We can, however, perhaps discern something about 
the wider disquiet in two comments from Romanos and Deaker, both of which 
are echoed elsewhere (e.g., Matheson, 2001). Writes Romanos in one telling 
summation of his argument: 
It is easy to listen to this and say, ‘So what? Aren’t there as many people 
as ever playing rugby?’ But that’s too simplistic. The All Blacks have 
always represented New Zealand; they are the sports team that New 
Zealanders have identified with. I wonder if all New Zealanders still feel 
that the All Blacks are representative of New Zealand in general, when 
half of them (sometimes more) are brown-skinned. Where are we going 
with this? Will New Zealand rugby at national and international level 
comprise of a group of brown-skinned players playing, being cheered on 
by white spectators and television viewers? That’s certainly been the trend 
in some of the professional sports in the United States. 
 
Deaker shows a similar uneasiness about the potential for New Zealand rugby to 
“emulate the United States where so much of their televised sport seems to 
feature wonderfully skilled black athletes competing while whites make up the 
bulk of the spectators.” “Somehow young white players have to be encouraged 
to remain in the game if rugby is to truly remain our national sport” he argues. 
“Pakeha kids aged fifteen to twenty to twenty must be positively assisted to stick 
with it at an age where they are getting belted over by more mature Polynesians” 
(Deaker, 1999). 
There is obviously an interesting anti-American slant to both of these 
statements. Each could be articulated to local fears about the creeping 
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commercialization of rugby which has accompanied the game’s turn to 
professionalism in the mid-1990s (see Hope, 2002; Richardson, 2005; Thomas, 
2003). After New Zealand’s failures at recent World Cups a number of 
commentators have argued that “business-men administrators, corporate 
sponsors, public relations people, and other management types [have] corroded 
the traditional All Black spirit” (Hope, 2002, p. 235). Elsewhere I have argued 
that the commercialization of New Zealand sport is frequently framed by local 
pundits as a portent of the impending ‘Americanization’ of New Zealand sport 
(Grainger and Jackson, 2005); and in Romanos’ and Deaker’s comments we see 
how such fears take on a racial slant: the game divided—between brown players 
and a white audience—is an ‘Americanized’ game, purportedly anathema to All 
Black history and the team’s role as New Zealand’s most prominent cultural 
ambassadors. But there is something of a cultural investment in the politics of 
(racial) memory here too. Concurrent to what some see as the “crass 
commercialism” (Little, 2003) taking over the game have been the concerns about 
how professionalism is affecting the players themselves. The modern All Blacks, 
as Hope (2002) observes, have been “deemed to be professional yet pampered, 
athletically skilled yet robotic, individually committed yet passionless as a team” 
(p. 235). What they lack, according to the nostalgists, is a ‘mongrel element’, the 
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so-called ‘hard men’ of All Black yore. Amid the post-World Cup scapegoating 
since rugby became professional many have found solace 
in memories of a select few high-profile forwards from farming 
backgrounds such as Colin Meads, Brian Lochore and Ian Kirkpatrick—
men who epitomised the qualities of toughness and dedication that the 
[modern] All Blacks generation of ‘soft’ and ‘pampered’ All Blacks had 
apparently lost (Ryan, 2005, pp. 151-152). 
 
Ryan (2005) links this regard for history to a “‘rural myth’ whereby the 
emergence, growth and early success of New Zealand rugby has been attributed 
to the exploits of pioneer farmers and the fabric of rural society generally” (p. 
152). According to this myth rural rugby produced ‘hard men’ in contrast to “the 
urban environment of softness, easy living and pampered decadence—a world 
apparently inhabited by contemporary All Blacks” (pp. 154-155). We can build 
on this argument by suggesting that this longing for the rural ‘heartland’ is a 
nostalgic longing for the ‘good ol’ days’ when the centrality of Pakeha men was 
taken for granted. In New Zealand we cannot ignore the interconnection 
between rurality and whiteness. It is almost as if the ethnic Other is rendered 
invisible by rurality. This racialized contrast between urban and rural posits the 
countryside as the site of authentic and healthy national racial production, just as 
the city is the site of racial degeneration (Bonnett, 1998). It is telling that Ryan’s 
examples of the idealized, heartland All Black are all Pakeha. And, consider the 
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comments of one prominent local broadcaster when asked about the state of 
New Zealand rugby: 
I think it’s fantastic that we have this wonderfully athletic group of people 
[i.e., Pacific people] that can help us develop our sport…But I also want 
the hard, tough white farmer to be a part of my All Blacks side…[the type 
of player who is] there for 80 minutes in a ruthless uncompromising way” 
(quoted in Matheson, 2001, p. 32). 
 
Rugby, then, plays an important role in coding whiteness under the guise of 
rural nostalgia. 
Obviously, it is interesting that the (Pakeha) speaker here also rhetorically 
creates a distance between Pakeha, who ‘own’ the game (it is “our”, read a 
Pakeha, game after all) and Pacific people who merely contribute to it. There are 
distinct echoes of the discourse of cultural enrichment examined in the previous 
chapter. But I also read such statements as typical of the white-flight-panic 
discourse generally. The force in the argument, I argue, lies in the cultural 
ascription of the bodies of the Polynesian other as ‘abject.’ Anxiety is generated 
because the certainty of boundaries between the (European) subject and 
(Polynesian) object, between normal and abnormal, are threatened (Kristeva, 
1982). In essence, they “threaten to contaminate the body politic, to destroy the 
very fabric of cultural identity and nationalism” (Smith, subjectivity, p. 143). 
Pacific bodies challenge the national status quo because their ‘abject’ bodies 
threaten the symbolic order in which whiteness is taken as the norm. And, as 
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Mary McDonald proffers, appeals to norms are “infused with modern power 
whereby failure to refer back to norms renders particular bodies unintelligble 
and abject” (McDonald, 2006, p. 516). 
The Pakeha Game: Polynesian Bodies Out of Place 
In making this allusion to abject bodies it important to first point out that 
rugby is a “racialized space” (Bonnett and Nayak, 2003). Cultural geography has 
alerted us to how the social construction of race becomes one with the occupation 
of (sporting) space. In this case, rugby, and the rugby field, have traditionally 
connoted whiteness via the metonymy of rugby and the Pakeha All Black 
(Cosgrove and Bruce, 2005; Phillips, 1987). As an Other, Polynesian boys 
destabilize the social and moral order. Panic arises from the fact that spatial and 
social boundaries are threatened—something only exacerbated by alarmist 
media coverage of white flight. Pakeha anxieties, to borrow from Ang (2001), “do 
not simply revolve around ‘race’, but also, significantly, have to do with land, 
with territory or more precisely, with claims on land and territory” (p. 127). One 
of the principle ideas underlying national sovereignty is that “members of a 
certain cultural group—a nation—have a privileged relationship with a certain 
territory…The nation’s homeland is the ground, in a near literal sense, of its 
members’ sense of self” (Poole, 1999, pp. 127-128). This “imagined geography”—
to borrow from Said (1978)—which binds place and identity, can provide the 
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basis for a shared identity, articulated through a shared sense of ‘place’ or 
‘home.’ As a structure of feeling that transforms space into a ‘homeplace’, 
nationalism also “interpolates individual and collective subjects as embodiers of 
national character” (Alonso, 1994, p. 386). Arguably, rugby and the All Blacks 
perform precisely this function. Hence the reason one commentator on the 
browning of the All Blacks is moved to describe the change as “disturbing” and 
“something not quite right, something insidious” (Matheson, 2001, p. 21). 
One also thinks here of Hall’s (1990) reminder about identity and the way 
it entails the social, material, and imagined erection of boundaries. Cultural 
identities, he argues, are “points of identification”, “not essences, but 
positionings” (p. 226). Identities, in this way, can be understood as constructed 
by “occupying certain spaces that exclude the Other by creating borders” (Stehle, 
2005, p. 47; emphasis added). Identity, as a temporary determination, can be seen 
as mapped onto places and areas because subjects “achieve and resist their 
systems of identification in and through social space” (Stehle, 2005). Identities 
are geographically contingent. Within this process of locating ourselves as social 
subjects we are also attributing characteristics to places (or, more correctly, space 
achieves an identity as a place). Particular places take on specific identities. What 
is at issue here, then, is the manner in which space is conceptualized, organized, 
and controlled; raising, in turn, questions of the working of power. On this 
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matter, I start from the presumption that, though never fixed or immutable, 
“hegemonic cultural practices will always attempt to fix the meaning of space” 
(Natter and Jones, 1997, p. 150), to “produce a homologous alignment between 
space and identity.” 
Turning to New Zealand, the national spatial epistemology is deeply 
ensconced in colonial and Eurocentric ways of categorizing the world, it is 
predicated upon a dominant self-image of itself “as a white European enclave” 
(Ang, 2001, p. 133). Put differently, New Zealand’s cultural and symbolic borders 
have historically been racialised and premised on whiteness. This categorization 
of the national space as white “also relies upon the ability to survey and navigate 
social space from a position of authority” (Hage, 1998). The cohesion and 
maintenance of Pakeha identity is predicated on a territorial/spatial power in 
which they imagine themselves as “guardians of national space” (Hage, 2000). To 
borrow from Hage (2000), Pakeha have always positioned themselves as 
“masters of national space, and that it was up to them to decide who stayed in 
and who ought to be kept out of that space.” As Hage continues, as much as the 
national space is about defining who is desirable/undesirable, “what is also 
implicit in this mode of classification is an image of the nationalist as someone 
with a managerial capacity over this national space” (2000, p. 42). This echoes 
too, those who have argued that “whiteness is a ‘standpoint’ or place from which 
 144 
to look at oneself, others and society” (Frankenburg, 1993). The Other (Maori, 
non-European immigrant) in New Zealand is an “object to be managed”, while 
the Pakeha self is “spatially empowered to position/remove this other” (Hage, 
2000, p. 42). The Other in New Zealand is therefore “wholly and hierarchically 
different from the white[/Pakeha] self” (Fine, 2004, p. 132). Immigration regimes 
have until only recently assumed a white New Zealand society and are informed 
by a presumed racial hierarchy of a groups’ relative ‘inferiority’ or 
‘undesirability’ (Ip, 2003; Murphy, 2003; Ward and Lin, 2005) The traditional 
relationship between what Hage dubs the ‘manager’ and the ‘managed’ is, 
however, being eroded by growing cultural diversity and the call to recognize 
the entitlements of indigenous Maori. For Pakeha, power and privilege are 
something of a zero-sum game: “‘their’ gains”, explains Delaney (2002), “must be 
‘our’ losses” (p. 11). 
In this way, we can read white flight as a moral panic in the sense used by 
Sibley (1995). Sibley suggests that 
moral panics articulate beliefs about belonging and not belonging, about 
the sanctity of territory and the fear of transgression. Such panics bring 
boundaries into focus by accentuating the difference between the anxious 
guardians of mainstream [read Pakeha] values and excluded others (1995, 
p. 43). 
 
In Kristeva’s terms the Polynesian body is an abject body because it represents a 
failure to secure boundaries from that which “disturbs identity, system, order”, 
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that which “does not respect borders positions, rules” (1982, p. 4). New Zealand’s 
social policy has been popularly characterized as being increasingly 
multicultural, yet the fantasy of a white nation still exists and orders relations 
between different people in the nation (see Chapter 1). The nostalgia which 
surrounds Pakeha rugby can be seen as a manifestation of the dominant 
imagining of the New Zealand nation as being a predominantly white space. 
Indeed, for Pakeha the national self is a distinctly spatialized self. That is, 
the national self is built on the premise that there is a stable and fixed 
correspondence between the (bounded) nation and identity. Such a conception of 
culture, as Clifford (1988) argues, carries with it “an expectation of roots, of a 
stable, territorialized existence” (p. 338). Put differently, the link of people to 
places is achieved through ascriptions of native or ‘indigenous’ status, 
‘authenticity’ emerging out of “the interaction between a people and their 
geographical environment” (Naish, 1997). For Pakeha this creates a kind of 
ontological unease, their cultural identity problematized because “Pakeha 
culture is the result of a fairly recent transplantation” (Bell, 2006). It is difficult to 
make claims to place when history, for Pakeha, provides “a reminder of their 
‘uprooted’ and colonizing past” (Bell, 2006). What Grant Farred explains vis-à-vis 
South Africa is apropos of the case of Pakeha New Zealanders: “to name white 
[New Zealanders] ‘settlers’ is to mark them as aliens when they present 
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themselves as unproblematic nationals” (Farred, 1997, p. 72). Bell reminds us too 
that their “moral uncertainty [as] settler peoples…is heightened by their origin as 
colonizers. Pakeha are not only the descendants of migrants, they are the 
descendants of colonizing migrants” (Bell, 2006, emphasis added). And, of course, 
the recent works of historians such as James Belich, Judith Binney and Anne 
Salmond tear at the Pakeha conceit that colonialism was in any way a ‘civilizing’ 
mission: the word itself is now more likely to initiate a certain soul-searching 
about the reality and history of oppression than it is to invoke any sense of 
imperial triumphalism or moral virtue. 
The problematic articulation of race and space has been further 
complicated by the erosion of ‘Britishness’ given the way it has historically 
sustained the white nation fantasy. The British first established settlements in 
New Zealand in 1788, and with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 
British immigrants were granted legal rights as citizens. In the years that 
followed the sole source of immigrants was subsequently the British Isles. 
Indeed, from the Treaty’s signing, local and British governing elites worked to 
ensure New Zealand “was a British country and other people either did not 
belong or could stay only under sufferance” (McKinnon, 1996, p. 12). As Pearson 
(2000) describes it, “the New Zealand colony had a civic and ethnic ‘British 
core’”, with the country remaining “the most British of the offspring of the 
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‘Mother Country’” (p. 98). Into the late 1800s the effects of the introduction of 
‘foreigners’ remained “a constant fear” (Marotta, 2000, p. 179) of the provisional 
government. Via restrictive immigration policy, New Zealand, like other British 
settler states, began to erect “Great White Walls” (Price, 1974) intended to “shield 
them from ‘racial contamination’” (Pearson, 2005, p. 27). Though, unlike 
Australia, a ‘White New Zealand Policy’ (Murphy, 2003; Ip, 2003; Ip and Pang, 
2005; Marotta, 2000) was never explicit, immigration policy was largely enacted 
through an ethnic preference system that ensured preferential treatment for 
immigrants from so-called ‘Traditional Source Countries’ and, later, parts of 
Northern or Western Europe (Scandinavians, for instance, were said to more 
assimilable into the ‘British way of life’ [Borrie, 1991]). It took until 1987 for the 
traditional source preference list to be abolished and a fully ‘non-discriminatory’ 
immigration policy to be adopted. 
As a result of the “formal deracialization of entry requirements” (Pearson, 
2000, p. 100), by the end of the 1980s the total percentage of migrants from 
Europe and the United States fell from 54 per cent to 29 per cent (Marotta, 2000). 
But the myth of a national identity dependent on its British origin was being 
threatened not only by changing demographics. In the first instance, New 
Zealand’s economic and political ties to Britain were already weakening by the 
late 1970s. Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community in 1973, in 
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particular, undermined the sense that to be a New Zealander was to be nested 
within a broader British identity. As Britain’s focus shifted to Europe, New 
Zealand, like other dominions, was “forced and/or wished” to go its own way, to 
“reformulate [its] own national identity anew” (Pearson, 2000, p. 95). 
Further corroding the sense of Britishness was the so-called ‘Maori 
Renaissance’ (Walker, 1990). The rapid urbanization of Maori during the 1960s 
was followed in the 1970s by a renewal in Maori activism led by trade unionists 
and students. Under sustained pressure, the state was forced to address 
widening ethnic equality and reply to the calls of Maori leaders for greater 
political and economic autonomy. Their initial response was to officially promote 
and affirm “aspects of ‘traditional’ Maori culture” in the hope that “ethnic 
inequalities might be more effectively reduced, and, perhaps, eventually 
eliminated” (Sissons, 1993, p. 100). When it became apparent during the mid-
1980s that this “strategic promotion of Maori culture” had failed in such an 
objective, the state turned instead in the direction of “Maori self-administration 
and the securing of state legitimacy” (Sissons, 1993, p. 100). To this end, the 
newly-elected Labour government of 1984 set about reaffirming biculturalism as 
part of a new ideological and policy framework. The changes, in brief, included 
bicultural service delivery, expanding the power of the Waitangi Tribunal 
(including the recognition of historical Treaty grievances), concessions on land 
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rights and fishing resources, and the selective incorporation of Maori cultural 
symbolism within state institutions. 
Whether or not 1984 marked the beginning of a “Maori Constitutional 
Revolution” (as one Pakeha academic has claimed), Maori were undoubtedly 
“given a level of recognition that had been absent for more than a century” 
(Patman and Rudd, 2005, p. 101). The shift towards Maori self-administration of 
education, justice, and social welfare, the airing of Treaty grievances, and the 
establishment of major Maori industry initiatives including fishing, aquaculture 
and farming, mark further the “move towards bicultural ‘partnership’” (Pearson, 
2000, p. 102). The new bicultural order, though, has raised questions about where 
power lies and how it is shared in the democratic nation state, and, certainly, not 
all Pakeha are comfortable with sharing, or even ceding, power to Maori. 
Populist politics have been want to interpret Maori imperatives—particularly 
those supported in legislation—as ‘separatist’, frequently invoking a discourse of 
racial privilege (McCreanor, 2005). To be sure the robust official role for Mäori 
culture in New Zealand is widely accepted, but the notion of “control by 
minority” to some “implies advantages and special treatment for Maori and 
invites comparison with the archetypal evil of apartheid” (McCreanor, 2005, p. 
58). Such “politics of recognition” (Taylor, 1992) are also seen to be at odds with 
(Pakeha) New Zealand’s image of itself as a difference-blind democracy (Barclay, 
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2005). The continuing tension over biculturalism in part reflects an inability on 
the part of Pakeha to acknowledge that the significance of Maori culture lies not 
only in “its uniqueness, but its primacy” (Rata, 2005,p. 274), in its position as 
indigenous. Admitting to what Rata (2005, p. 274) has called the “first arrival 
status” of Maori carries with it the implication of a “priority status”, affording 
Maori collective rights “not on the basis of need or disadvantage, nor even on the 
grounds of compensation, but on the basis of ‘ancestral occupation” (Fleras, 2000, 
p. 129). Pakeha have thus been forced not only to accept the significance of a 
previously obscured history, but to concede that “the conventional explanations 
of their dominance with which they grew up were fundamentally flawed and 
that the legitimacy of their political, economic, and social domination is now 
contested” (Spickard, 2004, p. 235). 
If the Maori Renaissance has disrupted “the congruence of the state with 
the dominant cultural group”, as Paul Spoonley (2003, p. 64) suggests, then 
alongside such developments the momentum for a “counter revolutionary” 
backlash also appears to building (Walker, 1990; see also Pearson, 2000, 2005). As 
Cosgrove and Bruce (2005) note, Pakeha responses have included “anger and 
refusal to acknowledge the validity of Maori demands, along with assertions that 
there is no Maori culture worth preserving and no ‘real’ Maori for whom to 
preserve it” (see also Smith, 1999). Nowhere was this more stark than in the 
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infamous Orewa Speech of Opposition leader Don Brash which I examined in the 
previous chapter (Brash, 2004). Recounting the effect of Brash’s speech, Wendy 
Larner suggests that 
almost overnight, practices that were taken for granted in many 
settings…began to be openly questioned…newspapers and talk back 
radio were flooded with the complaints of those…who felt they could 
now publicly attack the politics of biculturalism and accuse the 
government of racial favoritism (Larner, 2005, p. 133). 
 
What was also apparent from the speech and its aftermath was that it had 
implications not just for local understandings of biculturalism. It can instead be 
situated within a more general “politics of rejection” identified by Spoonley 
(2005, p. 107), and which “articulates and encourages a fear of non-Europeans, 
thereby ensuring that racial politics define many contemporary political 
debates.” Brash’s speech is typical of Pakeha calls to “[reject] ‘race-based’ policies 
in favour of a modified ‘one-nation’ approach”, with this alternative national 
narrative directed as much toward Maori as “the multiculturalism of a much 
more diverse immigration policy” (Spoonley, 2005, pp. 107, 108). The National 
Party’s “one standard of citizenship for all” (The Dominion Post, 2002, p. A7), with 
its emphasis on one-ness, reflects a “nostalgic desire for national homogeneity” 
(Ang, p. 2001, 96) clearly at odds with both biculturalism and multiculturalism. 
This is not to suggest that there has been any explicit “desire for a return to 
monocultural harmony” (Ang, 2001, p. 97). Instead Brash and his ilk attempted 
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to paint the Labour government as “out of step with ‘mainstream’ New Zealand 
and beholden to a range of minority interests” (Geddis, 2006, p. 810). In contrast, 
Brash promised “a government of mainstream New Zealanders, for mainstream 
New Zealanders” (quoted in Watkin 2005, 14), while his deputy Gerry Brownlee 
similarly proclaimed the National Party a “mainstream political party” which 
“share[s] the values of mainstream New Zealanders.” What can’t be overlooked 
is that the ‘mainstream’ to which Brash and company were appealing was, as 
Watkin (2005) points out, “unsurprisingly, provincial, Pakeha and male.” For 
Brash too, the indigene and the (non-European) immigrant become one, the 
‘other’, ‘outside’ rather than ‘inside’ New Zealand society. The present-day 
‘mainstream’ emphasizes “Anglo-conformity” (McLemore and Romo, 2004), 
ethnicizing Maori and non-English migrants, constructing them as members of 
‘ethnic groups’ vis-à-vis the unmarked Pakeha ‘cultural core’ (Forrest and Dunn, 
2006). This is typical of the way Pakeha have historically controlled the major 
institutions of New Zealand society and, consequently, “been able to appropriate 
the social and cultural ‘mainstream’ and make white understandings and 
practices normative” (Forrest and Dunn, 2006). Pakeha hegemony has been 
predicated upon the normalization or “universalization” (Gabriel, 1998, p. 12) of 
whiteness. Echoing Doane’s description of the United States, it can be argued 
that, when combined with existing domination, this normalization “enables 
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‘whiteness’ to be cast—but not named—as the larger society, the cultural 
mainstream, and the nation.” Pakeha/white interests can thus masquerade as 
those of ‘the mainstream’ or the nation as a whole. 
We could, of course, dismiss Brash and others as embodied moments of 
blatant right-wing populism, outside the bounds of normal, everyday, 
‘respectable’ New Zealand politics. Yet, Pakeha are prone to cycles of xenophobic 
backlash—against the ‘Chinese’ in the 1860s (Murphy, 2003), through the ‘anti-
Dallie’ legislation in the 1890s (Božic´-Vrbančic, 2005), to more recent 
discrimination against ‘Pacific Islanders’ (Spoonley, 1992, 2002), to today’s 
growing hostility toward ‘Asian immigrants’ (Ip, 2003). To be clear, I am not 
suggesting here that this backlash always manifests itself in such extreme forms 
of racism nor the anti-immigrant feeling to be necessarily a significant strand in 
contemporary, national popular consciousness. What is more important is the 
way the anti-immigration and anti-minority stance of these groups has 
influenced ‘mainstream’ parties and politicians to adopt racist viewpoints on 
many issues. Par for the course in Western neo-liberal democracies, the left have 
attacked more inflammatory racial comments while at the same time 
progressively moving to tighten entry procedures for immigrants and seeking to 
undermine customary indigenous rights. Thus, the self-described “centre-left”, 
“socially liberal” Labour government raised the English-language requirement 
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after Peters’ sustained attacks on immigration policy gained favor in 2002, and, 
under similar political pressure, introduced legislation that extinguished Maori 
customary rights to the foreshore and seabed in 2003 (Young, 2003). As 
elsewhere, in New Zealand, policing the limits of national inclusiveness is the 
preserve of middle-of-the-road politicians as much as it is of the radical right. 
There is too a strong continuity in the way ‘race’ remains an effective marker of 
the acceptable boundaries of New Zealand culture and identity—‘mainstream’ 
interests—operationalized as ‘national’ interests—correlate overwhelmingly to 
those of Pakeha versus ‘minority’ interests that are “so ‘out of the mainstream’ 
that they are no longer ‘in the national interest’” (Ang, 2001, p. 110). 
The roots of this type of particularist, exclusionary, and highly racialized, 
national cultural politics are obviously multiple and varied, and cannot be 
reduced to simple accusations of lingering, “differentialist racism”, or ‘fear of the 
other’ (Taguieff, 1990). To be sure, we cannot dismiss what present events say 
about symbolic or modern racism: the strong possibility that “New Zealanders 
are far less racially tolerant than their surface attitudes would lead an outside 
observer to believe” (Liu and Mills, 2006, p. 91). As political scientist Raymond 
Miller explains in reference to the public support for Brash’s proposal to remove 
‘racial distinctions’ from government services: “There’s this veneer of cohesion in 
New Zealand and there are things we don’t want to talk about until a populist 
 155 
politician…comes along and starts saying things, and some people respond, ‘My 
God, he’s brave enough to say it. He’s right, it’s us versus them.’ It exploits 
feelings that are there but haven’t been articulated” (quoted in Watkin, 2005). 
What I want to suggest, however, is that the recent racial malaise is about more 
than “old bigotries and old hangovers” (Bonilla-Silva, 2002, p. 190). It has a 
contextual specificity. 
And, it is in this context that rugby has become a kind of battleground for 
Pakeha “who regard themselves in racial and cultural terms to be defending  
their space against change and transformation” (Hesse et al, 1992, p. 173). As 
Cosgrove and Bruce (2005, p. 341) have argued, the societal changes which I 
sketch out above have “resonated strongly in the sports realm” because of sports 
“key role” in New Zealand in articulating whiteness to national identity. There is 
a growing sense that Pakeha are losing control over their ability to define “who 
alone is afforded the will to define who should and should not inhabit the nation 
space” (Ahmed, 2005). The high visibility of Pacific rugby players has no doubt 
had a powerful and symbolic effect in challenging common-sense racisms that 
suggest that people of color “do not quite fully belong to the nation” (Carrington 
and McDonald, 2001, p. 3). 
We therefore need to heed Bonilla-Silva’s explication of contemporary 
racialization as having its basis in “Whites’ defense of their racial privilege” 
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(Bonilla-Silva, 2002, p. 191). “Racism in modern society,” Cashmore (1987) 
accords, “typically arises in defence of the established order of things against 
perceived challenges…and in this sense, it can be seen as logical response” (p. 2). 
Certainly, the growing sense of anxiety among many ‘ordinary’ New Zealanders 
is suggestive of an ontological insecurity, an unwillingness of Pakeha to 
relinquish their role of ‘speaking for’ New Zealanders. Immigration combined 
with new ideas about minority rights offer new forms of identity, 
(bi/multi)culturalism for instance, that wear away at old myths about ethnic and 
cultural homogeneity. The white-flight-panic discourse can therefore be read as 
part of the discursive politics of Pakeha backlash, albeit within a guise fit for 
public consumption, in a way that appears non-racial. As a communication 
tactic, white flight is a discourse of plausible deniability in which statements 
about minorities can be defended against accusations of racism. In the terms of 
Liu and Mills (2006), white flight is “couched in language wherein it is plausible 
that an alternative besides racism is motivating the speaker’s criticism.” It is 
constructed in such a way that the speaker can convincingly disavow any racist 
intent (Reeves, 1983; Van Dijk, 1993). In this approach, Pacific peoples are not 
directly criticized at all; but are only indirectly “referred to within the context of 
the well-being of the nation or majority” (Liu and Mills, 2006). Ostensibly 
motivated by the protection of the young white males, the proponents of white-
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flight panic instead deploy a nationalist discourse that affirms and celebrates the 
values and well-being of the Pakeha majority. 
The Wimp Factor: Of White Men and Rugby 
In precis, to this point I have suggested some Pakeha are growing anxious 
at the perceived erosion of their power and privilege, and that this anxiety 
reveals itself in the symbolic realm of rugby. But it should be noted that white 
flight panics are merely a matter of ‘race.’ Historical imaginings of whiteness are 
also centered on the pre-eminence masculinity (see Lopez, 2005). We cannot 
ignore that white flight is white male flight. The battle to protect rugby is the 
battle to protect white masculinity. The discussion of whiteness must therefore be 
located in the specific context of dominant forms of masculinity. While both and 
women are implicated in white privilege, the normative dominant, subject 
position in New Zealand rugby—as in New Zealand society—is the white male. 
Thus, as much as white flight is a ‘crisis of whiteness’, it is a ‘crisis of white 
masculinity’ (Robinson, 2000). At the same time as the previously invisible social, 
cultural, and economic privileges of Pakeha (men) in New Zealand have been 
exposed (precipitating unease), similar conjunctural forces are manifest into 
relation to patriarchal power. The social institutions which formerly revered men 
and reproduced their social privilege have been deteriorating at the same time as 
calls to improve minority rights have become heightened. In the case of race, 
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anxiety has been turned into a tale of victimization: in the midst of spreading 
cultural diversity, some Pakeha have attempted to reposition themselves as 
underprivileged. In the case of Pakeha men they have positioned themselves 
doubly-marginalized-by race and by gender. What is at stake in the battle over 
white flight is the power to define the terms of the normative; it is a narrative 
about the rise of identity politics and the parallel decentering of white 
masculinity. 
To understand Pakeha masculinity, we have to locate Pakeha men’s lives 
historically. As the first country to grant women the vote in 1893 one could 
certainly be forgiven for thinking that New Zealanders possess a certain 
disposition toward social progressivism. Certainly the predominant national 
discourse has always tended toward a progressive liberalism, to imply “an open 
space of equality that is transparent and just” (Barclay, 2005, p. 121). And, 
women winning the vote, as a symbol “of the advanced state of the nation”, has 
been rightly described “as a foundational event in the construction of [New 
Zealand’s] national identity” (Dalziel, 2000, p. 88). However, to suggest 1893 as a 
watershed would be deny to the historicity of gender relations in New Zealand 
and the way in which past cultural models continue to structure meaning and 
action. “New Zealand is,” as James and Saville-Smith (1989) put it, a decidedly 
“gendered culture.” Male-female relationships in New Zealand are still what 
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might be politely called ‘traditional,’ with males dominating most positions of 
authority and status. Ideologies of masculinity also dominate gender relations in 
New Zealand. As Giles and Curreen (2007) note, in New Zealand masculinity 
“underpin[s] behavioral expectations for both men and women…The rhetoric of 
many New Zealand men includes fundamental assumptions of male authority, 
entitlement to power, and dominance over women” (p. 372). In this vein, Jackie 
True has noted how “the outside projection of ‘real man’ masculine values of 
war, sports, heroism, and mateship has been constitutive of New Zealand’s 
nationalism and national identity” (True, 1996, p. 114). 
The origins of male dominance in New Zealand are generally traced to 
nineteenth-century, early-colonial development. Gender myths and stereotypes 
forged in colonial conditions have been particularly recalcitrant. To some, to 
even emigrate to New Zealand in the first place “was to throw off effeminate 
chains and become a man” (Phillips, 1987, p. 4). Once on the frontier men were 
confronted by a sexual imbalance, which historian Jock Phillips argues to have 
provided “the demographic basis for a rich male culture, fertile soil for the 
growth of all-male institutions” (1997, p. 9). It is hardly surprising that the 
nationalist narratives of this early-colonial period were therefore most “likely to 
recount the experience of male ‘mateship’ or the ‘man alone’ experience on gold-
fields, farming blocks, and new settlements” (True, 1996, p. 114). Beyond sheer 
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exclusivity or isolation, the very nature of work also engendered certain 
expectations about male behavior. The settler-pioneer became something of a 
revered figure, praised for his “rugged individualism” and for his ability to 
“slave for long hours at back-breaking toil” (Phillips, 1997, p. 15). True (1996) 
argues this image of the frontier man, in his continual struggle against nature, 
helped to naturalize the social construction of gender in New Zealand; 
native/natural masculinity on the frontier provided the stark contrast to the 
cultured or artificial. 
Into the early twentieth-century women’s work would continue to become 
“identifiably different from that of males” (Simms, 2001, p. 19). Women worked 
in different industries and struggled for equality in the labor movement. Men 
may have been no longer have ‘alone’ in the colony, yet they nonetheless 
maintained their dominance via the growing polarity between home and family 
and business and factory. To be sure, the Second World War would later raise “a 
barrage of questions about the role of women in New Zealand society” 
(Montgomerie, 2001, p. 9). Women’s labour outside the home was, for perhaps 
the first time, a necessity rather than an anomaly, and women moved into 
employment roles in both the government and private sector which “challenged 
the time-honoured notion that a woman’s was in the home” (Montgomerie, 2001, 
p. 9). However, the consequences of war-time change were largely short-lived, 
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and as Montogomerie (2001) has shown, rather than being a threat to the social 
order, the war failed to mark a lasting shift in gender roles in New Zealand. 
Certainly, there seem sufficient grounds to support Gould’s (1982) contention 
that even into the 1980s, “of all the advanced capitalist countries, New Zealand 
had kept its women most rigidly bound to house and to children” (p. 93). 
Women had made some gains. Equal pay had been introduced in the public 
sector in 1960 with the passing of the Government Service Equal Pay Act. The 
private sector adopted a similar measure in the Equal Pay Act 1972. Conservative 
enforcement and a lack of monitoring meant neither, though, delivered full equal 
pay to women (O’Regan, 2000). 
Their effectiveness was further weakened by the neo-liberal programs of 
the mid-1980s. The great “New Zealand Experiment” (see Kelsey, 1993), as it 
came to known, of 1984 had an undoubtedly adverse affect on women (Hyman, 
1999). Market regulations were largely dismantled, and emphasis moved toward 
individualism and diversity and away from equal employment opportunity 
programs. These new neo-liberal programs also undermined many of the earlier 
gains of New Zealand’s feminist movement. The emergence of second-wave 
feminism during the early-1970s established gender as an increasingly important 
base for social organization. New neoliberal policies, however, promoted the 
privatization of state functions and drastic cuts to social welfare as a means of 
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making the poor and unemployed more self-sufficient, less dependent upon the 
state. The shortcomings of these arguments have been well-noted by Kingfisher 
(2002) in her analysis of the “The Global Feminization of Poverty.” In particular, she 
points out that neoliberalism is based on a conception of the individual that is 
not universal, but historically and culturally constructed, and profoundly 
gendered. The “‘individual’ of liberal theory” she points out, “is not a generic 
individual, but a specifically male individual, whose independent individuality 
is predicated on women's dependence and subservience” (p. 24). 
While initially waged work was the preserve of men, the growth of 
women in the labour-force did not necessarily eradicate preexisting gender 
divisions given the segregated nature of employment. Because women’s jobs 
continued to involve supposedly “female attributes”, the position of women in 
the work force may have actually “serve[d] to reinforce the ideology of 
domesticity rather than to undermine traditional divisions of labour within the 
family” (Peake, 1994, p. 16). In privileging labour and economic activity, my 
reading of gender relations in New Zealand to this point is obviously a very 
structural one. Yet, the sustained pressure on women to uphold their domestic 
responsibilities via the engendering of labour cannot wholly explain their 
absence from national-public space. To be sure, as True (1996) contends, “any 
move away from domesticity” through work has traditionally been seen to 
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undermine “feminine identity and power in national space” (p. 117). However, 
as much as the workplace was socially and spatially separated from the 
household, the ‘private’ realm of women was equally segregated from other key 
elements of New Zealand’s (public) male culture. 
Gender roles were nowhere more prominent than in times of war. “All 
wars”, as Kimmel (1996) has noted, “are meditations on masculinity” (p. 72), but 
in New Zealand war has particular salience given its centrality to the emergence 
of New Zealand’s very nationhood. Sinclair (1986), for instance, has remarked 
that war was the first sphere in which New Zealanders became “aware of 
differences between men from Great Britain and from several colonies. They 
came to consider their identity self-consciously” (p. 125). Thus, war has been a 
key site in which the nation has been en-gendered as male. Phillips (1997) has 
noted how military prowess has been “a central element of the white New 
Zealand male identity” since the days of the Boer War (p. 152). Of the gendering 
of war in general, while it obvious that the fighters were usually all male, as 
traditionally masculine enterprises wars “tend to institutionalize certain 
hegemonic ideals of masculinity, distinguishing ‘more manly’ from ‘less manly’” 
(Adams and Coltrane, 2005, p. 239). In like fashion, in New Zealand war became 
the ‘acid test’ of Pakeha masculinity; it was the ultimate trial of manhood 
(Phillips, 1987, 1989). Like the frontier it was also a space devoid of women. As a 
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consequence, war provided a space for the reanimation of mateship and the 
codes of male camaraderie. And, within this “community of old mates old values 
resurfaced” (Phillips, 1987, p. 182). Swearing, drinking, gambling, fighting, and 
other time-worn elements of New Zealand’s male culture began to reappear and 
carried over once men returned from the field. 
These masculine imperatives were further excited by popular writers such 
as Denis Glover, John Mulgan, and Frank Sargeson, all of whom linked national 
identity to the soldier and the masculinism of war (Jensen, 1996). The ‘Man 
Alone’ trope enjoyed particular pride of place. Indeed, as a cultural myth the 
figure of the Man Alone has come to dominate “New Zealand’s unconscious self-
image” over the past century (Schafer, 1998, p. 61). In brief, the Man Alone is 
New Zealand’s version of Hemingway’s ‘tough guy’ idiom. Born in New 
Zealand literature during the colonial and late-colonial periods, the Man Alone 
was something of a “synthesis of Daniel Boone and Paul Bunyan” (Schafer, 1998, 
p. 62), a man “attached to the indigenous myth of the heroic struggle to 
transform wild New Zealand into a pastoral paradise” (Jones, 1990, p. 298). The 
figure is somewhat malleable, though, and has always been conjuncturally-
specific. For instance, in the Depression-era 1930s he became a figure of social 
critique, a way of debunking “New Zealand’s falsely optimistic Myth of 
Progress”, the idea among early settlers that “everything was going to get better 
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and better in New Zealand” (Benson, 1996). The term Man Alone was actually 
coined around this time, referring to the central protagonist of John Mulgan’s 
1939 novel, an itinerant drifter and loner, known only as ‘Johnson.’ Johnson as 
Schafer (1998) describes him “cannot find a wife and home, cannot imagine a 
marriage, a partnership beyond work, because the self-protective shield, the 
armor of his masculine codes is not flexible, will not stretch to cover a social 
bond beyond the job, the task at hand” (p. 63). Today’s New Zealanders would 
probably call Johnson ‘staunch,’ a type of “dour, stifling, provincial masculinity, 
inherited from the hard bastards who colonised this country” (Hume, 2007). 
And, though some 70 years have passed since Mulgan’s Man Alone, staunch still 
“set[s] the tone” for many males in New Zealand (Hume, 2007). 
Mulgan’s chauvinistic view of the New Zealand male was, and is, by no 
means an isolated figure. The Man Alone also featured prominently in the works 
of Frank Sargeson (described in the Who’s Who of Twentieth Century Novelists as 
New Zealand’s “leading New Zealand fiction writer with an international 
audience” [Woods, 2001, p. 302]), A. P. Gaskell, and later writers such as Robin 
Hyde and John A. Lee. If anything, Mulgan’s Man Alone was to “initiate a trend, 
if not a ‘genre’, in modern New Zealand fiction” (Harris, 2000). The works of 
Barry Crump provide examples of some of the more recent versions. “A Good 
Keen Man”, the title of his best-selling 1960 debut is a phrase now cemented in 
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the New Zealand vernacular, an allusion to men who like to think of themselves 
as “incredibly tough physically, shockingly crude in their language and 
behavior, fond of their yarning [story-telling] and boozing, but terrified and 
contemptuous of urban society and appalling misogynic” (Phillips, 1987, p. 266). 
In Wild Pork and Watercress (1986) Crump also popularized the “buddy variant” 
(Scahfer, 1998, p. 71) of the Man Alone, a literary kind which had an obvious 
identification with mateship, close male friendship, male culture and their 
accompanying ambivalence towards women. It is not insignificant to note that 
Crump himself was to became a cultural icon (to the extent of featuring on a 
postage stamp), a “national emblem of the bush hunter, backblock farmer, 
always-ready adventurer” (Schafer, 1998, p. 71). 
If work, drinking, literature, and war have laid the maps of what it means 
to be a ‘man’ in New Zealand, there remains one more prerequisite of manhood. 
To play sport; “or at least display a strong interest in it” (Jensen, 1996, p. 20). As 
feminist author and activist Sandra Coney has commented: 
New Zealand has been a called ‘a man’s country’ and nowhere has this 
been more true than in sport. Sporting contest has been a male proving 
ground, sport a source of national identity and pride. Traditionally, the 
nation’s heroes have won their colours either on the battlefield or the 
sports field (Coney, 1993, p. 238). 
 
In his autobiography, the late historian Michael King writes similarly of how 
“the college motto, ‘Take courage: be a man’, was presented to us as something 
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to be proved only on the field of sport” (King, 1999). Historically, sport in New 
Zealand has been a predominantly male enterprise (Thompson, 2003). While 
women on the frontier were often involved in physical activity (through sheer 
necessity), sport remained a “highly valued male terrain”, and, as in other areas 
of colonial life, were often restricted in such endeavours by family and church 
(Thompson, 2003, p. 253). Adair, Nauright and Phillips (1996) have also 
suggested that in New Zealand, as in other parts of the British empire, 
“organized sport developed as an essentially male reaction to fears of 
‘feminization’” during the late-1800s (see also Messner, 1992). Created by men 
for men, sports became “one of the last bastions of a separate, identifiably male 
world” (Messner, 1996, p. 81). It was, in other words, unmistakably a masculine 
space. 
More than any other sport rugby exemplifies this homosocial world. In 
New Zealand rugby is synonymous with men. It is decidedly a man’s game. 
Phillips (1987) has provided perhaps the most comprehensive overview of the 
links between rugby and masculinity in New Zealand (see also Phillips, 1984, 
1996). In a chapter titled “The Hard Man: Rugby and Formation of Character”, he 
describes how rugby provided a means to keep alive the “muscular virtues of the 
pioneer heritage.” (p. 86). As in other settler colonies (see Mangan, 1981), rugby 
was also championed as necessary training for the manly New Zealand 
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gentleman. As the game became codified, and consequently more orderly, rugby 
provided an answer to the growing anxieties about the effeminacy of urban men 
(but did so within respectable boundaries). As Gray (1983) describes it, rugby 
was seen as ideal for instilling manliness, developing physical strength, and 
“providing a suitable channel for (male) adolescent energies” (p. 29). Beyond its 
moral lessons, however, the adoption of the game in public schools and colleges 
reflected a desire to ‘build character’; a term, in New Zealand, largely 
synonymous with ‘manliness.’ Rugby, in Park’s (2000, p. 448) words, was “about 
suppressing emotions, overcoming pain, taking terrible risks and taking them 
like a man.” In combining the values of “strength, courage, and mateship” rugby 
came to embody “much of the ideal New Zealand male character” (Park, 2000). 
High schools throughout the country consequently made rugby 
compulsory, becoming “a core experience of the school curriculum for young 
New Zealand males” (Phillips, 1987, p. 107). If the “boy of character had to take it 
like a man” (p. 105), then rugby turned the boy into a man; it tested his ability to 
both withstand and inflict pain and cemented the equation between masculinity 
and physical toughness. The costs of rugby’s rise to pre-eminence in New 
Zealand schools were, of course, high—for both men and women. Boys were 
taught to conform, to repress their feelings; they were systematically discouraged 
from displaying emotion or recognizing emotional contact (Crawford, 1985). 
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And, even if rugby did offer boys and men with a degree of physical or 
emotional intimacy—when there were few opportunities for them elsewhere—
the sport was largely homophobic and frequently misogynic (Park, 2000; Pringle, 
2001, 2005, 2007). 
Throughout the course of the twentieth-century, rugby also helped to 
shape a distinctly ‘New Zealand’ national identity. Already by the late-1800s 
rugby had come to be seen as emblematic of the national character. Whereas in 
the United Kingdom rugby had been a largely upper-class game, in New 
Zealand it became a symbol of its (puportedly) egalitarian society. Indeed, it is 
“the bottom-up nature of rugby organization” that is frequently “singled out as a 
major feature of its popularity: the kind of social organization which New 
Zealanders valued most highly” (Park, 2000, p. 448; see also Crawford, 1985; 
Fougere, 1989). As James and Saville-Smith (1989, p. 41) write, in New Zealand 
rugby “fostered strong feelings of community and egalitarianism among men of 
differing social and economic positions.” In essence, the egalitarian practices of 
rugby “accorded well…with the ideal of an egalitarian society, a hallmark of 
national ideology then and for many decades thereafter” (Park, 2000, p. 448). 
New Zealand’s international successes on the rugby field came to be seen as 
proof of the superiority of this ‘classless’ social model. They also came to 
epitomize New Zealand’s emergence as an independent nation; victory was a 
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statement of colonial vitality. A number of authors have pointed to rugby as a 
significant factor in the emergence of the New Zealand nation from around 1890 
onwards (Crawford, 1985, 1986; Phillips, 1984, 1996; Sinclair, 1986). Famed New 
Zealand historian, Keith Sinclair, for instance, calls the New Zealand’s 1905 test 
match with Wales “The Gallipoli of New Zealand sport,” referring to the match 
as a “major episode in the mythology of New Zealandism” (Sinclair, 1986, p. 
147). Even by the late 1800s, however, there was an evolution of a second 
generation of New Zealanders that began to “express feelings of self-respect and 
growing national pride” via their passion for rugby (Crawford, 1985, p. 84). 
As rugby came to form a tight embrace with New Zealand identity, it 
suggested the nation as decidedly masculine. As much as rugby was a test of the 
athletic ability of the colony, it was a test of its manhood, of its virility. The 
popular belief in the early-1900s was that “frontier egalitarianism and the 
physicality of outdoor life required to tame the land and secure a 
livelihood…produced a New Zealand male ‘type’ superior to its apparently 
sedentary urban counterpart in Britain” (Ryan, 2004; emphasis added). The 
frontier model of nationalism—of pragmatic, physical industry—turned on the 
discourse of “masculine homosociality, male autonomy and independence from 
the feminizing influences of domesticity” (Bannister, 2005). New Zealand is, of 
course, by no means unique in this regard. It is not only here that masculinity 
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and nationalism articulate well with one another. As Cynthia Enloe observes 
more generally, “nationalism has typically sprung from masculinized memory, 
masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope” (Enloe, 1990, p.45). Nagel 
(2005) concurs that in nationalist movements and conflicts, “women are relegated 
to minor, often symbolic roles…the real actors are men who are defending their 
freedom, their honor, their homeland, and their women” (p. 400). Here in New 
Zealand, it is the ‘Kiwi bloke’ who has most-clearly come to embody what it 
means to be a New Zealander. As Cosgrove and Bruce (2005) argue, the bloke—
“a working-class, tough, pragmatic, sporty, ‘matey’, anti-intellectual type” 
(Bannister, 2006, p. xii)—has “come to define the nation and the national 
character” (p. 340). Phillips likewise observes that 
In New Zealand the male stereotype, rather than the female, has been 
unusually influential upon the lives of both women and men—it has 
become identified with the process of national identification. There can be 
few nations which have so single-mindedly defined themselves through 
male heroes. The national icons…have all been male. In the public 
perception they ‘personify’ the New Zealander…In this sense New 
Zealand has been oppressively ‘a man’s country’ (1987, p. vii). 
 
The national archetype, as Phillips describes it, is male, heterosexual, aggressive, 
stoic, physically strong and skilled, and a good (homosocial) mate. Today, the 
connection between white masculinity and national identity remains so strong 
that Cooper (1999) contends that New Zealanders equate “masculinity with New 
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Zealandness and New Zealandness with masculinity…The heroic…is written in 
the masculine” (p. 97). 
Summing up the image well, Coney (1993) describes how the ideal New 
Zealand man for much of the past century was therefore 
Muscled, sinewy and tough; not effete, weak and bookish. They would be 
practical men; doers not thinkers. They expressed their culture not in 
theatres, galleries or pomp, but on the rugby field, in the backblocks , in 
the great outdoors. It was a culture of the body, rather than the mind 
(1993, p. 23). 
 
Alternative masculinities have, and do, of course, exist. To think otherwise 
would be a failure to distinguish between the different experiences of groups of 
men. However, it could be argued that there nonetheless exists a current ‘gender 
order’, or ‘patterning’, of gender relations which is structured by a dominant or 
‘hegemonic’ form of masculinity (Connell, 1995). Following Connell and 
Messerschmidt (2005) it important to stress that this form of hegemonic 
masculinity is not “normal in the statistical sense” as “only a minority of men 
might enact it” (p. 832). At the same time, though, it is “certainly normative”, 
embodying “the currently most honored way of being a man” (p. 832). Thus, 
though ‘multiple masculinities’ may co-exist, some masculinities are privileged 
over others. As Connell (2000) explains it, the hegemonic form 
need not be the most common form of masculinity, let alone the most 
comfortable. Indeed many men live in a state of some tension with, or 
distance from, the hegemonic masculinity of their culture or 
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community…[yet] there are relations of hierarchy, for some masculinities 
are dominant while others are subordinated or marginalized (pp. 10-11). 
 
Frequently, the “most honored or desired” (p. 10) of these patterns of 
masculine conduct are embodied in the lives of individuals. For men, “hegemony 
often involves the creation of models of masculinity which are…fantasy figures” 
(Connell, 1987, p. 184). These ‘figures’ function as hegemonic devices which 
perpetuate a gender hierarchy and valorize the dominant masculine qualities 
they represent. Though the qualities of these figures may actually be possessed 
by few, they become the ‘ideals’, “and in this way groups perceived to be lacking 
the admired traits are subordinated or marginalized” (Ferguson, 2004, p. 83). 
This means that hegemonic masculinity generally involves a large measure of 
consent or complicity in that “the public face of hegemonic masculinity is not 
necessarily what powerful men are, but what sustains their power and what 
large numbers of men are motivated to support…Few men are Bogarts or 
Stallones, many collaborate in sustaining those images” (Connell, 1987, p. 185). 
Put differently, “what most men support is not necessarily what they are”, and 
what most men aspire to be is naturalized in the form of the hero, a figure often 
“remote from the lives of the unheroic majority” (Donaldson, 1993, p. 646). To be 
“culturally exalted”, then, the pattern of masculinity “must have exemplars who 
are celebrated as heroes” (Donaldson, 1993, p. ). If the aforementioned hard-
bitten, hyper-masculine Kiwi bloke—an iconic construct endlessly recycled in 
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popular culture—is an example in more general form, then this “exemplary 
version of hegemonic masculinity” (Connell, 1987) finds specificity in the All 
Blacks. 
Jock Phillips writes of how the All Blacks have long 
served to personify and also reinforce the value system of New Zealand 
men. Even men and boys who managed to avoid playing the game, often 
came to identify with the All Blacks and experience triumphs and 
disasters in a vicarious way. The All Blacks provided by far the most 
significant role model for males in twentieth century New Zealand; and 
they came to be accepted throughout the society (by some women as well 
as men) as the purest manifestation of what a New Zealander was 
(Phillips, 1987, pp. 108-109). 
 
He goes on to trace the rise of the All Blacks to such a status to the 1905 All Black 
tour of the United Kingdom. It was the 1905 tour he argues that “created idols of 
the All Blacks and turned them into formal representatives of the nation’s 
manhood” (p. 109). Sinclair and others have made similar contentions. The team 
ostensibly validated beliefs in the pioneer traditions of masculinity, with the All 
Blacks becoming something of an antidote to anxieties about urbanization, 
“providing a reassuring response to the late-19th-century ‘crisis of masculinity’” 
(Park, 2000). Future international tours and successes further entrenched the 
status of the All Blacks begun in 1905. And, as Phillips has elsewhere noted “it 
was to take another 70 years, until the South African tour of 1981, before rugby’s 
status came to be questioned” (Phillips, 1996, p. 88). 
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The All Black is thus the totemic figure of Pakeha masculinity. They are 
emblematic of, and crafted, from what Berlant (1997), following Lacan, calls “the 
National Symbolic” that “coordinates political affect” in New Zealand life and 
privileges whiteness and masculinity in the imaging of New Zealand national 
identity. That is, they are “traditional icons” that “provide an alphabet for a 
collective consciousness or national subjectivity; through the National Symbolic 
the historical nation aspires to achieve the inevitability or status of natural law, a 
birthright” (Berlant, 1997, p. 20). While the image of New Zealand as a nation of 
tough, strong, protective white men has been vigorously contested since the 
1970s, the All Blacks symbolically link New Zealand’s identity to an imagined 
past in which it was less complicated to be a Pakeha man. They consequently 
become increasingly important in a time in which (white) male power has been 
questioned and masculinity problematized. 
The perceived flight of young white men from rugby threatens to decenter 
the white male body as the marker of national identification, in doing so 
undermining white male privilege. However, and somewhat paradoxically, the 
announcement of a crisis of white masculinity embedded in white flight 
discourse actually serves to recenter white masculinity precisely by highlighting 
its very decentering (Robinson, 2000). To do so, the white-flight discourse works 
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through what Robinson (2000) describes as “the logics of victimization” (p. 12). 
As she explains: 
In order for white masculinity to negotiate its position within the field of 
identity politics, white men must claim a symbolic disenfranchisement, 
must compete with various others for cultural authority bestowed upon 
the authentically disempowered and wounded (p. 12). 
 
The strategies through which this is accomplished are not necessarily 
deliberative but, as Robinson notes, neither are they “entirely innocent” (p. 12). 
Either way they must be read as an attempt to mask and disavow the privileges 
of being white and male in New Zealand society. 
Robinson goes on to argue that white masculinity most fully represents 
itself as victimized by “inhabiting a wounded body”, by drawing on “not only 
the persuasive force of corporeal pain but also on an identity politics of the 
dominant” (p. 6). The body, she maintains, acts as a substitute for the political, 
and the individual for the social and institutional. In similar fashion, the young 
white rugby player provides a figure around which to build a victimized 
identity. His body is framed as (literally) under threat, metaphorically wounded 
and disadvantaged by a historically marginalized subject. Angst thus takes a 
bodily form. 
This humiliation of adolescent masculinity then becomes a prelude to the 
emasculation of Pakeha men. Not being ‘permitted’ to play rugby, is to not be 
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allowed to become a ‘real’ man. In New Zealand, rugby is very much a 
“masculinizing practice” (Pringle, 2007). As Miranda Devine describes it, 
You can never understand rugby unless you’ve watched it played by six-
year olds on cold winter mornings on hard suburban football grounds…It 
is how they [i.e., boys] learn to overcome fear and pain. It is how they learn 
to be noble, for the good of the team, to voluntarily subsume raw 
individual ambition and submit to the rules of the game. It is how they 
learn to be men. 
 
A striking example of how not being able to play rugby affects the masculinity of 
New Zealand men and boys is provided in Julie Park’s study of 80 New Zealand 
males who suffered from haemophilia (Park, 2000). “Not being able to play 
[rugby]”, she writes, “may seem a rather trivial restriction compared with the 
other problems which people with haemophilia confront, but it is not” (p. 444). 
“The inability to play rugby was the single most pervasive idiom of distress for 
men with haemophilia” (p. 446). Park quotes one teenage haemophiliac, for 
instance, as saying of being unable to play rugby to his mother “I’d rather have 
my legs cut off so people could see it” (quoted in Park, 2000, p. 446). As Park 
writes, “he wanted it to be obvious that he could not, rather than would not, play 
rugby” (p. 446). Park concludes of rugby that it indicates that a boy is definitely 
not a girl, definitely “not a queer or a poofter,”9 and rugby stands for a 
hegemonic masculinity which is recognized by educators as having negative 
                                                          
9 The New Zealand ‘poofter’ is a variant of the British ‘poof’, a derogatory and usually offensive 
term for a ‘homosexual male.’ 
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effects on many New Zealand boys. Nonetheless, its hegemony continues” (p. 
450). 
Not playing rugby is therefore “viewed as akin to failing to be manly” 
(Pringle, 2007, p. 361), to flunk the test of (hegemonic) masculinity. This is 
especially true of boys who choose to play soccer. As an example, sociologist 
Toni Bruce (2007) says of her male students who played soccer that they had to 
“negotiate their sense of masculinity because they were not taken seriously 
because they choose not to play rugby.” Richard Pringle, who has interviewed 
men about rugby in a series of articles, concurs that being a ‘Kiwi male’ is still 
linked strongly to playing rugby (Pringle, 2005, 2007). Of the centrality of rugby 
in shaping dominant understandings of masculinity, Pringle writes that he had 
“some idea that it was changing because there were more boys playing soccer, 
but the [boys] I talked to, even at co-ed schools, said that the soccer boys in the 
first XI were still not as respected as being in the first XV.” Pringle’s observations 
are germane in that the white flight narrative frequently invokes soccer as 
evidence of changing (read, feminine) attitudes among white boys. Recounting 
the shift Romanos remarks on how things have changed since his days in high 
school: 
In my first year at St Patrick’s College in 1970, we fielded 19 rugby teams 
and five soccer teams. Thirty years later, there were eight rugby teams and 
six soccer teams…First XV players were the school heroes and were 
generally prefects. By contrast, the soccer team was like some sort of 
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mysterious religious cult. Hardly anyone of us knew who was on the 
team, and no-one really cared…soccer was a minor game at St Pat’s, a 
traditional boys school were rugby ruled (Romanos, 2002). 
 
Romanos goes on to suggest soccer as rugby’s “greatest threat”, precipitating a 
“crisis” in New Zealand schools. Presumably this is because soccer is diluting 
rugby’s once bottomless talent pool. More likely, however, it is indicative of the 
uneasiness of Pakeha men over any feminization of the body politic. 
It would be fair to say that rugby’s association with hegemonic 
masculinity and national identity has had long-term effects on soccer in New 
Zealand. Soccer has only ever enjoyed a minority status, and men who played 
“were collectively labelled ‘wimps’, ‘sissies’ and ‘girls’ on the basis of the belief 
that to be a man was to be a rugby player” (Cox and Thompson, 2004, p. 207). In 
Keane’s (2001) view, soccer in New Zealand has very much been “the direct male 
opposite of rugby union and therefore known in New Zealand sporting culture 
as the game for ‘poofters’, ‘girls’, or ‘blouses’”10 (p. 51). “From the perspective of 
the New Zealand public”, he argues, when contrasted with rugby, “soccer was a 
less brutal alternative, especially for children” (p. 58). In many ways the 
perceived threat of soccer among rugby devotees is something of a redux of 
rugby’s fall from grace following the Springbok Tour of 1981. With rugby’s 
image as the ‘national game’ tarnished in the wake of the tour, soccer, and the 
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1982 World Cup-qualifying All Whites team in particular, briefly assumed the 
status as the country’s most popular sport. That it failed to gain any momentum 
after 1982, however, is perhaps indicative of rugby’s hold on the New Zealand 
masculine psyche. 
In addition, today’s turn to soccer is less about disillusioned men turning 
away from rugby. Rather, emasculated boys being pushed. White flight is not just 
about boys who are “shitting themselves” at the prospect facing a Polynesian 
opponent. Young Pakeha are not only subjugated by their own fears, but also 
those of others, and in particular their parents. Parents is perhaps the wrong 
word here though. More specifically, it is mothers. Mothers certainly get the most 
of the blame for the drift of white boys away from rugby. Matheson (2001), for 
instance, singles out mothers as being particularly gripped by anxiety when it 
comes the prospect of their boys facing “oversized Polynesian players.” 
Similarly, according to the coach of the New Zealand under-21 side, Bryce 
Woodward, it is mothers who “sow the seeds of doubt and then a lot of kids pick 
up on that and are encouraged to change codes. It’s hurting rugby, and it annoys 
me because I think the environment has been created where kids who might play 
and love rugby as pushed quite vigorously towards soccer.” For critics, mothers 
appear as a danger to a boy’s emerging masculinity. White flight can hence be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 A pejorative reference to a male homosexual, gay man, blouse is an idiom meaning “ineffectual 
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read as the panic of white men, a fear that boys are being made effeminate by 
their mothers. As Kimmel has written, historically and developmentally, 
masculinity has been defined as the flight from women, the repudiation of 
femininity. Masculinity, in his words, can be seen as “defined as the distance 
between the boy and his mother, between himself and being seen as a ‘Mama’s 
boy’ or a sissy” (Kimmel, 2000, p. 76). Chodorow has similarly written of how 
boys often come to define masculinity “in largely negative terms, as that which is 
not feminine or involved with women.” 
There is thus another “femiphobic” (Ducat, 2004) impulse on display 
within the white flight narrative—the urge to suppress the purported dominance 
of women. Concurrent with the (perceived) feminization of New Zealand society 
is the (perceived) “decline of patriarchy” (Ehrenreich, 1995). The formidable 
social changes in masculine values which such a shift produces lead to decided 
anxieties about gender. On these lines, white flight can be framed as a loss of 
familial power; a tale of the slowly vanishing paternal authority of white men 
over females and younger males. For instance, in an article in Time magazine, 
Williams (2001) argues that, given “white players at all levels at all levels can’t 
match the Polynesians’ size and strength”, Pakeha “mothers” are placing their 
sons in “gentler” sports, and, in particular, soccer (p. 16; emphasis added). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
or weak, someone failing to show masculine strength or determination.” 
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Indeed, the former head of New Zealand Soccer, Bill MacGowan feels too that 
“mothers have been great friends to soccer.” Within the white flight imaginary 
both boys and men are the victims. Pakeha men express a desire to ‘save’ boys 
from a perceived emasculation by women at the same time as regarding 
themselves as threatened by the power of women. As one coach recounts: 
I have mates whose kids play soccer. I can’t believe it. When I ask why, 
they invariably say it’s their wives. It’s because of the politically correct 
world we live in. The fathers can’t speak up any more (quoted in 
Romanos, 2002, p. 178). 
 
Pakeha fathers are thus seen as worried about their sons becoming ‘mama’s 
boys’, what Ducat (2004) describes as a boy “seen as embedded in a shamefully 
close and dependent relationship with his mother, one that imperils his 
masculinity and invites the derision of others” (p. 26). 
The fear of white flight must therefore also be understood as a fear of 
being feminized. As much as the presence of the Polynesian Other (as a bodily 
entity) disrupts the identity of the body politic, white flight has a gendered 
subtext. The ‘crisis’ of white flight from rugby has as much to do with Pakeha 
men lamenting a loss of power over women. While external factors may appear 
to be that which is most threatening, the actual threat many Pakeha men are 
experiencing may in fact be an internal one: the sense that they are losing their 
power, that they, and the next generation, may no longer be ‘real’ men. There can 
be few nations other than New Zealand “which have so single-mindedly defined 
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themselves through male heroes” (Phillips, 1987, p. vii). But if the centrality and 
pre-eminence of the (Pakeha) male has been taken for granted, then it is now 
being publicly challenged. Already disoriented by having ‘their’ space 
interrupted by the Polynesian Other, the white male is also losing his hold over 
the ability to define the national space as masculine. Nagel (2003) has rightly 
pointed out that modern forms of masculinity emerged in tandem with modern 
nationalism. In New Zealand rugby has only reinforced this association of white 
masculinity with the nation. But, if there are brown bodies where white bodies 
are expected to be, where can white men go to play out their anxious efforts to 
prove and defend their manhood? If the inscription of whiteness underwrites 
whatever it means to be a New Zealander, and if this whiteness extends into 
moral qualities of masculinity, and if rugby is where these truths are performed, 
where do white men go to recoup their losses? 
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CHAPTER 3 
Modern Warriors: Polynesian Bodies Past and Present 
 
At the heart of Pakeha concerns about white flight examined in the previous 
chapter is fear: about Pacific Islanders emerging in spaces previously occupied 
by white men; about the sissification (Bederman, 1995) of the next generation; 
and, ultimately, about the erosion of white male power. What we cannot 
overlook, though, is that in the white flight panic this fear has an object. That 
object is the Polynesian body. In the Polynesian body generalized anxiety is 
condensed into something which is identifiable. Thus, fear does something: it re-
establishes distance between bodies whose differences are fixed and read off the 
surface. That is, racial and ethnic difference is foregrounded via the modality of 
the body. Size, for instance, is a particular ‘problem.’ In the words of one 
concerned coach, the size disparity is something that “the authorities must 
address” (Lane, 2006). Tacitly, within such statements the white body is taken as 
normative (Mills, 1998). To borrow from Radika Mohanram it could be said that 
the Polynesian body only comes into being because “it is perceived as being out 
of place, either from its environment or its national boundaries” (Mohanram, 
1999, p. xii). The Polynesian body ‘naturally’ doesn’t belong on a New Zealand 
 185 
rugby field. This discursive tactic is typical of the way stereotypes operate 
through a strategy of ‘splitting’ which “divides the normal and the acceptable 
from the abnormal and the unacceptable” (Hall, 1997, p. 258). That Polynesian 
boys are assumed to ‘different’—i.e., not ‘normal’—serves to maintain the social 
and symbolic order, setting up a “symbolic frontier” between insiders and 
outsiders, between Us and Them (Hall, 1997). In this power/knowledge game the 
Polynesian body is read as ‘truth’ of absolute otherness. 
What is apparent is the way this discourse works simply by way of 
making race meaningful, by constructing the Polynesian body as problematic. 
The question I wish to ask in this chapter, though, is how did the Polynesian 
body become a ‘problem’ in the first place? That is, why has the Polynesian body 
come figuratively to hold the projections of Pakeha fear? To me white flight 
exists within a racialized circuit of white paranoia that echoes pre-colonial and 
colonial representations of Polynesian primitive physicality. In the eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-centuries the Polynesian body became the focus of specific 
representations which, when put into practice, formed the basis of its own 
authority, legitimacy, and control. From the outset racial differences were 
constructed through the body of the other: the very ‘nakedness’ of Polynesian 
men taken “as a sign that the ‘wild men’ [Europeans] encountered were not only 
uncivilized, but at an early stage of human evolution” (Creed and Hoorn, 2002, 
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p. 50). And, such constructions cannot be separated from colonial agendas. That 
the Polynesian body was ‘savage’ and ‘uncultured’ was in line with the logic of 
colonialism as a ‘civilizing’ influence for, as Frantz Fanon has argued, at the heart 
of empire is the “dehumanization of the native.” Echoing Fanon’s insistence that 
colonial domination is not just physical or military but deeply cultural and 
psychological, Said writes similarly of the making of empire: 
At the heart of European culture during the many decades of imperial 
expansion lay an undeterred and unrelenting Eurocentrism. This 
accumulated experiences, territories, peoples, histories; it studied them, it 
classified them, it verified them, and…above all, it subordinated them by 
banishing their identities, except as a lower order of being, from the 
culture and indeed the very idea of white Christian Europe. This cultural 
process has to be seen as a vital, informing, and invigorating counterpoint 
to the economic and political machinery at the material center of 
imperialism (Said, 1985). 
 
It should be said, however, that these discourses are not a thing of the past. Over 
the course of the next two centuries Polynesian bodies have become enmeshed in 
a network of totalizing stereotypes which waver between the exotic and the 
barbaric—what Terry Goldie describes as “the two poles of attraction and 
repulsion, temptation by the dusky maiden and fear of the demonic violence of 
the fiendish warrior” (1989, p. 15). The Polynesian body has essentially 
functioned as a privileged trope of white fear and desire, at once revered for 
being closer to nature and feared because to be so was to be part of the world of 
the bestial. 
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Below I begin by examining how these representations eventuated before 
turning to how they “linger on” (as the Samoan writer Albert Wendt puts it 
([1995, p. 28]) in contemporary representations of Pacific peoples. What follows is 
a critical-historical analysis in which I recount the genesis of ‘common-sense’ 
understandings of the Polynesian body that ‘anthropologize’ and ‘naturalize’ 
Polynesian physicality. I then show how these “parts of the past” are “still 
operative in the present” (Niranjana 1992, p. 37)—in this case, within the sport of 
rugby. My premise is that it is important to engage the historicity of the concept 
of Polynesian body politics for what it reveals about deeply embedded 
xenophobic tendencies that are recycled in the popular representation of 
contemporary rugby. These fictional and scientific discourses have long given 
rise to the framing of Pacific peoples as Others, by and large confining them to 
the realm of the physical, whether in sport or in other forms of ‘labor’. Rugby has 
done little to dispel this divisive construction. Seldom are Pacific players 
described in terms of their savvy or enterprise with so much instead being made 
of a ‘Pacific Island style of play’: an ‘unorthodox’ approach to the game that 
gives preference to ‘running rugby,’ ‘hard hits,’ ‘flair’ and the ‘unpredictable.’ 
All, of course, are seen as innate as opposed to acquired talents, for the 
hegemonic discourse pays no heed to the successes of Polynesian peoples in any 
terms other than ‘natural ability.’ 
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In the final section I link this fetishized Pacific[/brown] ontology to some 
of the nefarious neo-liberal discourses I explored in Chapter 1. Reworking 
Carrington’s (2001/2002) description of the “spectacle of the black body”, I 
contend that the allure of the brown body has “not only served to obscure the 
real conditions that many [Pacific] people face, but simultaneously diminished 
the space for progressive politics itself” (p. 104). There are echoes too of Paul 
Gilroy’s anxieties about a ‘biopolitics’ of contemporary black culture, which is, he 
observes, obsessed with the body and its purely physical attributes. Such 
biopolitics, he argues, “terminates any conception of the mind/body dualism and 
ends the modernist aspiration towards racial uplift” that once was at the heart of 
black cultures (Gilroy, 2000). In similar fashion, the prominence afforded Pacific 
men in rugby is equally double-edged: on the one hand it represents an 
acceptance of Polynesian success; but, on the other, it is highly limiting, 
confining the intentions, actions, and potential of Pacific people to the materiality 
of their bodies, and reinstating the brutal legacies of empire. 
‘Scripting’ the Polynesian Body 
Before I begin, I would just like to offer a few comments on the 
relationships between and the social construction of the body and ‘race.’ First, an 
enormous amount of scholarship has traced the interconnections between racism 
and the body, showing how the body has been central to the construction of the 
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concept of race. It is not my intention to revisit this literature here (see instead 
Jackson, 2006). However, it is perhaps important to highlight that my readings 
herein take the body as socially understood, with the body treated as a discursive 
text. This is in keeping with how the body in social theory has come to been seen 
less as biologically given and fixed than as both culturally and historically 
specific. The body is no longer considered ‘natural’ or as trans(/a)historical, but 
rather as “a site where regimes of discourse and power inscribe themselves, a 
nodal point or nexus for relations of juridical and productive power” (Butler, 
1989, p. 601). Within this broad literature, bodily identities are viewed as 
“inextricable from discourse” (Oates and Durham, 2004, p. 305; see Bordo, 1993; 
Butler, 1990, 1993; Foucault, 1978, 1980). Through language, image, narrative 
structure, and other forms of discursive practice, the body is ‘produced’ and 
human activity actively organized (Smart, 1983). This is not to suggest that the 
body necessarily lacks ‘physicality’ (that is, an ‘organic’ dimension), that biology 
is separate to the social, but rather that the body “emerges with the social” 
(Evers, 2006, p. 233). The body is not ontologically distinct from the process of 
construction, yet “closer analysis of the way in which individuals and groups 
manage their bodies, either as sets of social practices or system of signs, or the 
ways in which states coerce bodies and insert them into relations of power, 
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leaves little doubt that the body is a socially constructed phenomenon” (Booth 
and Nauright, 2003). Put differently, in Butler’s (1990) terms: 
there is an ‘outside’ to what is constructed by discourse, but this is not an 
absolute ‘outside’, an ontological thereness that exceeds or counters the 
boundaries of discourse; as a constitutive ‘outside’, it is that which can 
only be thought in relation to that discourse, at and as its most tenuous 
borders. (p. 8). 
 
While we often (mis)take the body as a ‘natural’ phenomenon (or, as prior 
to discourse), asserting it to be culturally-constructed also means taking it as 
contingent, learned, and historically malleable. The meanings or attributes the 
body acquires are, according to Butler (1989, p. 601), “in fact culturally 
constituted and variable.” As a consequence, and though it may sound 
tautological, the body can be taken as a kind of embodied history. On one level 
this means we can ‘read’ or ‘interpret’ the body in much the same way as any 
historical ‘text.’ Indeed, until recently, the bulk of research within the sociology 
of the body has concerned representational issues, examining what Turner (1994, 
p. viii) describes as “the symbolic significance of the body as a metaphor of social 
relationships.” Research in this regard has been heavily influenced by the work 
of Michel Foucault, who (arguably [see, Dudrick, 2005]), shifted the focus away 
from bodies per se to the discourses which shape and give bodies meaning. In his 
seminal essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault positions the physical 
body as a “virtual text” (Adair, 2001, p. 453), labeling the body as an “inscribed 
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surface of events that are traced by language and dissolved by ideas.” In this, 
Foucault points toward “a body that is given form through semiotic systems and 
written on by discourse” (Adair, 2001, p. 453). Foucault elsewhere points to 
representational aspects, variously describing bodies as “foundations where 
language leaves its traces” and “the writing pad[s] of the sovereign and the law.” 
Whereas the body was once thought of as a predetermined, biological fact, 
Foucault instead gives call to think of and critique the body as it is invested with 
meaning, to consider, in particular, the way dimensions of social difference, such 
as class, race and gender, are (as Foucault puts it) ‘inscribed’ on the body. Given 
impetus from Foucault, the wealth of recent theorizing on the body is devoted to 
this idea of the body as written on and through discourse (Schildkrout, 2004). 
Following Foucault there have been multiple, varied, and often 
conflicting, definitions and interpretations of what ‘inscription’ and ‘body’ 
actually mean. Generally though, Foucault’s suggestion that the body is “a text 
upon which social reality is inscribed” (Schildkrout, 2004, p. 319) is taken in a 
more metaphorical than literal sense, particularly within poststructuralist 
scholarship (for an exception, see Fleming, 2001). In explaining this distinction, 
Brush (1998, p. 28) notes how inscription as a metaphor “is not superficial 
(despite the fact that [inscription] may be read on the surface of the body).” 
Foucault, she argues, is instead saying something stronger: that “the constitution 
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of the body rests in its inscription; the body becomes the text which is written 
upon it and from which it is indistinguishable” (p. 22). As Grosz (1994, p. 142) 
explains it, the different procedures of cultural inscription “do not simply adorn 
or add to a body that is basically given through biology; they help constitute the 
very biological organization of the subject.” If the body is—metaphorically—a 
site of inscription to various degrees for various theorists, then it is in the sense 
that the body “has a determinate form only by being socially inscribed” (Grosz, 
1987, p. 2). 
These bodily inscriptions serve their most significant purpose in placing 
the body within a cultural matrix. At the moment at which the body enters 
culture it becomes implicated in the play of power. Certain identifiable 
‘characteristics’ relate directly to power dynamics; as Grosz (1990) puts it, 
“power produces the body as a determinate type, with particular features, skills, 
and attributes” (p. 149). In particular, power deploys discourses on and over 
bodies to constitute them as particular bodies (normal/abnormal, superior/inferior 
etc); or, to follow from above, bodies are inscribed in diverse, and often 
contradictory, ways. Otherness therefore emerges from the positioning, 
interpreting, and conferring of meaning upon bodies. So, in this case, race may 
appear as an attribute yet it is only when inscribed by discourse that the body’s 
specific meaning is determined. Obviously, the idea of race was initially founded 
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upon visible bodily differences, and we have come to regard these forms of 
observed difference as significant. That it has long since been discovered that 
there is no biological basis for distinguishing among human groups along the 
lines of race means that what is critical is understanding how and why these 
differences have come to matter; how have these “bodily schemas”, to borrow 
from Fanon, become established and how are they reproduced? 
What is most salient in this regard is to acknowledge that ‘race’ “cannot be 
abstracted from the social and political environment within which it is defined 
and lived” (Johnston, 2001, p. 72). Races, as Paul Gilroy notes, are not “simply 
expressions of either biological or cultural sameness. They are imagined—
socially and politically constructed” (1993, p. 20). The meanings associated with 
inscribed bodies “are conditioned by the particular discursive formations in 
operation” (Tyner, 2004, p. 113). We need, therefore, to contextualize the act of 
racialization, “the process through which groups come to be designated as 
different, and on that basis are subjected to differential and unequal treatment” 
(Dei and Kempf, 2006, p. 9). Race has to be considered as a product of the 
meanings attributed to physical appearance at particular points in time. As Miles 
(1993) writes, 
The visibility of somatic characteristics is not inherent in the 
characteristics themselves, but arise from a process of signification by 
which meaning is attributed to certain of them. In other words, visibility is 
socially constructed in a wider set of structural constraints (p. 87). 
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What is perhaps most relevant to our understanding of the Polynesian 
body is the operation of colonialism, the practices by which bodies are brought 
under colonial control, and the forms of inscription through which such power 
relations are established. The colonized body has been governed and controlled 
through various physical and discursive disciplinary strategies and the native 
body “bears the imprint of the colonial gaze, its myths and its lies” (see also 
Pierce and Rao, 2006). The cataloguing or differentiation of bodies was, I argue, 
critical to the colonial project simply because of the importance given to the body 
as a marker of character. The physical was conflated with the moral and the 
intellectual. Such things as dress, dancing, sexuality and nakedness were taken to 
indicate not only immorality but as a distinctive sign of ‘primitivism.’ In the 
process the colonized body was targeted for reform. By colonial intervention the 
colonized body could be freed “from the power of irrational impulses and his 
dependence on the world and nature” (Weber, 1978, pp. 118-119). But this first 
required the Polynesian body to cast as a kind of child-like savage, “a pliable 
state suitable for remodelling, ready ‘raw material’ for the civilizing process” 
(Eves, 1996, p. 101). Producing the savage was therefore a necessary strategy for 
continual occupation and exploitation by colonists. And, through setting in place 
the purportedly bestial nature of Polynesian native it could defer its overt aim. 
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I wish to now turn to making a closer examination of how these colonial 
inscriptions were produced before then turning to how the brutal legacies of 
empire, and the iconography of the savage body, continue to circulate in 
contemporary physical culture. What I explore below reveals how the 
politicizing and scripting of the Polynesian body has been a common thread of 
European life since at least the seventeenth century. My guiding question here is 
inherently genealogical in asking how the Polynesian subject has been formed. It 
is also genealogical in the sense of challenging the metaphysics of essence. In 
Foucault’s terms, I am not looking for the source of meaning in some 
transcendental subject, but attempting to provide an account of “the constitution 
of the subject within a historical framework.” This genealogy is admittedly 
selective, with a particular emphasis on the notion of ‘Noble Savagery’; hence, 
there are obvious omissions (in particular, those historical images of… 
exoticized, ‘Dusky maiden’). Others have done more justice to these issues than I 
could do here (see Keown, 2005; O’Brien, 2006). Nonetheless, within the critical-
historical analysis which follows we can at least begin to contextualize the 
beginnings of Polynesian racial representation and the politics which accompany 
it. 
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Savages Noble and Ignoble: Natural Bodies, Island Lives 
The Natural (Bodily) Splendor of the Pacific 
If Edward Said had been writing of the Pacific as opposed to the Orient he 
might have concluded that what we delineate as ‘the Pacific’ has been produced, 
politically, socially, ideologically, and militarily, by ‘Westerners.’ Indeed, 
Polynesia has been—and still is—defined pace ‘the West.’ If the West was 
advanced, developed, and industrial, then Polynesia, from its earliest conception 
in European minds, was its opposite, some sort of lost earthly paradise inhabited 
by non-white, primitives who were variously “child-like, intuitive and 
spontaneous” (Kuper, 1988) and/or wild, untamable, savages (Stocking, 1987). 
For Europeans in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries the Pacific was a 
kind of remote frontier, waiting to be ‘discovered.’ If they were living under the 
grey skies of the northern hemisphere, somewhere in the distant, tropical south 
was an antipodal idyll far-removed from the fast pace of urban life. When the 
earliest French and English voyages arrived, already soaked in “a very long 
imaginative tradition” (Howe, 2000, p. 13), they only confirmed the discovery of 
this heretofore imagined paradise. Their writings seldom strayed from images of 
the islands as lands of “sweet airs, glorious abundance of flora and fauna, 
running fresh water, riches, and human inhabitants living in a natural 
innocence” (Howe, 2000, p. 15). These explorers would be followed by travelers, 
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both fictional and ‘anthropological’, who continued to portray a world alienated 
from European experiences and values. Literature from Melville’s Typee to 
Stevenson’s Treasure Island, London’s South Sea Tales to Michener’s Tales of the 
South Pacific only supplemented images of the islands as carefree, romantic and 
adventurous. Art too afforded its European audiences with a vision of exotic 
people in exotic landscapes; Gauguin being probably the most famous exponent. 
All of these discursive narratives rested on a kind of primordialist image 
of the South Pacific: the place and its people were distinguished by a kind of 
“timelessness which refuse[d] to evolve towards the modern world” (Connell, 
1996). As Nordstrom (1991/92) notes, the clichés consistently presented the 
people of the Pacific as “primitive types inhabiting an unchanging Eden that did 
not participate in the Western world of technology, progress and time” (p. 15). 
One of the long-standing conventions in this regard was to see the Pacific in 
allegorical terms, as a set-in-amber reminder of the European past. Inserted into 
the history of modern primitivism, Pacific culture was thus likened to that of 
ancient Greece, a parallel through which to come to know the manners and 
customs of the ancient world (Smith, 1985). This was hardly surprising given 
sustained contact with Polynesia in the second half of the eighteenth century 
coincided with an Enlightenment fascination with the classical past. As O’Brien 
(2006) argues, “Late eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century colonization in the 
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Pacific was steeped in classical preoccupations, allusions, and ways of 
imagining…The Enlightenment voyagers came to the Pacific schooled in classical 
art, science, and literature. Much of what they rendered and described resonated 
with this classical education” (pp. 38, 39; see also Smith, 1985, 1992). A recurrent 
feature of eighteenth-century European was the drawing of comparisons 
between Pacific Islanders and “ancient Greeks and Romans and their pantheon 
of gods and goddesses” (Fischer, 2002, p. 110). In this way, the Pacific was 
imbued with contemporary meanings to render it comprehensible, the classical 
parallel allowing European outsiders “to accept what was otherwise a wholly 
inscrutable human experience” (p. 110). 
The much mythologized voyages to Tahiti in the 1760s are case in point. 
Louis-Antoine de Bougainville’s accounts of Tahiti, which colored later thinking 
about other parts of the Pacific, were heavily influenced by a classical education 
which “predisposed him to perceive the Tahitians in terms of the classic Greeks, 
and his ensuing rendering of his and his crew’s experiences on Tahiti is replete 
with Arcadian imagery” (Bolyanatz, 2004, p. 6). As Bolyanatz continues, 
Bougainville’s descriptions of the Pacific were swayed by his affection with these 
colorful analogies: “In many respects, he could only see the Tahitians in such 
terms, which means he could only represent them in such terms” (p. 6). It is 
worth noting that the French were not alone in this regard. Bernard Smith, for 
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instance, has noted of elsewhere in the Pacific during the time “that varied 
bundle of mental luggage drawn from classical precedent that Europeans 
brought to their perception and interpretation of Pacific peoples and Pacific 
things” (1992, p. 213). The English explorer, James Cook, was another obvious 
example. He and his crew frequently saw in the Pacific that which “supported 
the well-tested norms of classicism” (Smith, 1992, p. 219). The analogy, or 
memory of Greece, is perhaps most apparent in visions of the Pacific as a kind of 
Arcadia; Paradise was a trope that very much dominated early Pacific discourse. 
Both Bougainville and Cook, as “sons of the Enlightenment”, were fascinated by 
the prospect of people existing elsewhere “whose lives were uncorrupted by 
civilization and unencumbered by toil” (Fischer, 2002, p. 109). Cook wrote, for 
instance, of people living “in a tranquility which is not disturbed by the 
inequality of condition”, while Bougainville was even more explicit in his use of 
classical similes: Tahiti, he wrote, was the “New Cythera [in Greek myth, the isle 
of the celestial Aphrodite]…I thought I was walking in the Garden of Eden” 
(both cited in Fischer, 2002, p. 109). Likewise, the naturalist on Cook’s first 
voyage to Tahiti, Joseph Banks, declared the islands to be the “truest picture of 
Arcadia” (cited in Brown, 1988, p. 12). To be sure, such views were by no means 
universal, yet it was this romantic image of the Pacific that “would come to 
predominate in Europe” (Hall, 1998, p. 143). 
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The wealth of ‘primitive’ cultures suddenly revealed to the world by the 
likes of Cook and Bougainville would lay the groundwork for anthropologists 
who came to see these “valuable specimens of the earlier stages of human 
development” (Howe, 2000, p. 41). The ‘Golden Age’ motif would also heavily 
their work (Levin, 1969). Yet for anthropologists this wasn’t just a model of what 
was, but what could be. The fascination with nature, heroic simplicity and fervent 
landscapes spoke to the dissatisfaction with Europe’s own social and cultural 
systems. The Pacific was, as Cowell notes, not only one of Europe’s others, “but a 
seemingly better and more perfect other” (1998, p. 139). Perhaps the most 
prominent proponent of primitivism as an ideal for human association was the 
Swiss/French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Something of 
pessimist about modern society, Rousseau shared with Enlightenment 
philosophers a belief in the corrupting influence of civilization and a faith in the 
existence of a ‘natural state’ of society. In brief, Rousseau believed that ‘man’ was 
good when in the state of nature, but corrupted by society: as he famously wrote 
“Man is born free and is everywhere in chains.” Descriptions of the Pacific were 
thus implicitly a critique of European civilization, or, at the very least, in 
juxtaposing modernity with the state of nature, they provided for scholars like 
Rousseau a way of “decentr[ing] and estrang[ing] the social order of [the] time 
by questioning its doxa, its unexamined assumptions, opinions and norms” 
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(Kurasawa, 2004). Though Rousseau himself may have viewed Pacific societies 
as somewhere removed from the original state of nature (Knellwolf, 2004), 
others, influenced by the idealism and romanticism of his writings, were wont to 
take the Pacific as an ideal society, “unspoiled by the ravages of civilization” 
(Knellwolf, 2004). It should be stressed here, that the emphasis in these 
eighteenth-century travelers tales was not so much the ‘ideal society’ per se, but, 
rather “the man [sic] who inhabits the ideal state” (Cro, 1990, p. 89). Rousseau’s 
appeal to the natural state came via his ‘natural man’, what would later become 
the ‘Noble Savage.’11 
Working in the shadow of Rousseau the Noble Savage became a rhetorical 
construction through which anthropologists could “write about their 
contemporary political and social conditions” (Ellingson, 2001p. 37). The Noble 
Savage was, firstly, understood as an individual uncorrupted by civilization. The 
Savage, in Ellingson’s (2001) terms, was “opposed to civilized man, his simple 
                                                          
11 I am not suggesting here that Rousseau coined the concept (see Ellingson, 2001), but, instead, 
that his early political writings gave impetus to the “cult of primitivism” which the Noble Savage 
personified (Knellwolf, ). Indeed, romantic fictions about the noble savage, and the drive towards 
primitivism, are far older than Rousseau (see Barzun, 2000), “the belief in the actual or possible 
existence of people living virtuously, happily and simply” being “one of the great continuities of 
European history” (Campbell, ). Rousseau, too, would probably have denied the actual existence 
of the Noble Savage. He was after all a political philosopher, not an anthropologist, and the 
Noble Savage for Rousseau was more of an abstract “‘tabula rasa,’ uncorrupted by (decadent) 
European culture.” The significance of Rousseau, then, is not so much whether the Noble Savage 
was his invention, but that he helped popularize the term, and, perhaps more significantly, 
however others appropriated (some may say, bastardized) his work, in Rousseau the Noble 
Savage “acquired sociological status” (Hall, 1997, p. 218). What is more important are the ideas 
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virtues to our complicated vices.” Such an idea was readily apparent in 
Rousseau’s writings. For instance, in the opening sentence of Emile (which, 
interestingly, has as its subtitle “de l’Éducation”, or, “Concerning Education”) 
Rousseau writes: “Everything is good in leaving the hands of the creator of 
things; everything degenerates in the hands of man.” Rousseau’s writings were 
also a spur to the Cult of Nature so en vogue among Renaissance thinkers (Currie, 
1994). And, the Noble Savage was the very embodiment of these ideas; in theory 
the Noble Savage was closer to nature and all its inherent goodness. Similarly, 
for Rousseau, man in the state of nature was “placed by nature at an equal 
distance from the stupidity of brutes and the fatal enlightenment of civilized 
man” (Rousseau, 1755, cited in Ellingson, 2001, p. 82). The savage—though he 
may never called him ‘noble’—for Rousseau was a critique of society, its laws 
and customs. Given the Enlightenment’s predilection for cultural self-criticism 
this is perhaps hardly surprising; the Noble Savage, free from civilization’s 
corrupting influences offered a counterpoint to civilized decadence. As Steeves 
(1973) notes, the savage represented a return to nature, a cardinal tenet of the 
romantic age—a primitive stage of existence from which the world has declined” 
(p. ). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Noble Savage represented and the influence they had, and certainly Rousseau undoubtedly 
gave these ideas weight. 
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What is perhaps most germane to the critical-history of the Polynesian 
body is the central part played by nature in the way Europeans conceived 
difference. This “discourse of naturalism” (Marles, 1996), which Rousseau 
popularized, is key to understanding European “imaging and imagining” 
(Smith, 1992, p. 1) of the peoples of the Pacific during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The savage, “the symbol of freedom and simplicity” 
(Steeves, 1973, p. ) was a convenient metonym for writers, poets and artists of the 
day. Such works were “hugely popular” during the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth-centuries (Sayre, 1997, p. 189). The increasing popularity and 
availability of voyage accounts from the ‘New World’ also contributed to a Noble 
Savage renaissance, and ‘travel-ethnographic’ literature informed the political 
and social writing of intellectuals—including Rousseau himself. Reports of 
explorers in America and the—then so-called—‘South Seas’, according to the 
famed critic Hoxie N. Fairchild, made the Noble Savage “a popular and social 
fad” (Fairchild, 1928). In some instances, the vision was made manifest. The 
visits to Europe of ‘natives’ meant the Savage could sometimes be seen ‘in-the-
flesh’ and substance was lent to the myth. Interestingly, the best-known Noble 
Savage of the day, Omai, was a ‘Polynesian’ from Raiatea (in the Society Islands, 
west of Tahiti) who returned to Britain with Cook in 1773. There, he become 
something of a celebrity, “the darling of English society.” (Kahn, 2003), was 
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discussed by scientists and philosophers, and was written about in everything 
from poetry to pornography. This then was the context. The (re)discovery of 
Polynesia happened at precisely the time when enthusiasm for the Noble Savage 
had reached its peak (Campbell, 1996). And, the resurrection of the neo-classical 
stereotype would have, in O’Brien’s (2006) words, “a profound impact upon 
representation of the Pacific” (p. 40). As Campbell (1996) also writes, in the 
Pacific, the myth of the Noble Savage has “had a lasting—and deeply 
misleading—influence” on the ways some Europeans saw non-Europeans then, 
and today. 
To return to the pertinence of naturalism, and to the association between 
the natural and the physical. I have already argued that during the 
Enlightenment there were dissident voices (Rousseau foremost among them) 
who “questioned the rational and mechanical foundations of Western 
‘civilization’” (Marshall, 1996, p. 235), that resonance of this critique led to a 
growing interest in primitivism, and that it, in turn, nurtured a fascination with 
the Pacific and its Noble Savages. One of the more notable features of this chain 
of discourse was the frequent contrast between the “vigorous and healthy 
savages in the state of nature and modern man in the ‘civilized’ world” 
(Marshall, 1996, p. 241). In particular, to society’s critics, men [sic] had become 
alienated from their physical condition. As Rousseau himself wrote: “The body 
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of a savage man being the only instrument he understands, he uses it for various 
purposes, of which ours, for want of practice are incapable.” Following the 
traditional Cartesian dualism of body and mind, it could be said that the natural 
world, typified by the Pacific, was a physical world—and, of course, vice versa. 
And, this relation to the physical environment depended on the constitution of 
the physical body. Or, to put it differently, the primitive offered an alternative 
model of social organization which was rooted in the body (Edmond, 1997; 
Keown, 2005; O’Brien, 2006). 
It is important to stress how European romantic ideas were projected onto 
Polynesian bodies. In the “ersatz exotic, erotic prelapsarian Eden” (Pearson, 
2006) of the Pacific, the body became a way of conferring the native-nature 
coupling. The body was, in essence, a link to nature. As one exponent of the 
study of primitives claimed, Pacific peoples “offered the best opportunity for 
European scientists to ‘penetrate nature and determine its laws’” (quoted in 
O’Brien, 2006, p. 167). What is notable too is the way in which the narratives and 
perceptions of Europeans came to be embedded in Polynesian bodies. With 
increasing frequency after the 1770s, “what could be seen was paramount, and 
what Europeans were looking at above all else were bodies” (Cummings, 2003). 
As Cummings (2003) notes, by Cook’s third voyage, “visual records increasingly 
focused on the bodies of islanders.” It could be said that the Polynesian body 
 206 
came metonymically to stand for all that was healthy, natural, leisured, beautiful, 
and (sexually) alluring about the Pacific itself. In Teaiwa’s (1999) terms, we could 
go further in suggesting that the Polynesian body is given the privilege of 
representing the Pacific as a whole. 
Undoubtedly, it was the female body that attracted the most attention 
from Europeans (Edmond, 1997; O’Brien, 2006). Yet the allure of the Noble 
Savage myth ensured attention was also paid to male physiques. If Polynesian 
women were described in terms of the physical attractiveness, then the bodies of 
men were almost equally as admired among early European visitors to the 
Pacific. One missionary of the learly-1800s, for instance, described Polynesian 
men as “amongst the finest specimens of the human family…the form of 
many…exhibits all that is perfect in proportion, and exquisite in symmetry.” 
Hokowhitu (2004) shows that such comments are by no means isolated nor 
atypical. “Many European travelers,” he writes, “romanticized the savage Other 
as part of a natural physical world” (2004, p. 268). Whether male or female the 
Polynesian body was valorized because of its purported connection to nature. 
The native body was a focal point of European fantasy about what Vanessa 
Smith labels a Polynesian “post-lapsarian paradise” (Buckton, 2007, p. 20). The 
Polynesian body was the very diagram of the ‘anti-modern.’ On one hand this 
proximity to nature was something to be praised, a marker of virility and health. 
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In particular, the natural, Polynesian man supposedly possessed superior health 
and physical strength. He is raw—“come from the hands of nature” in 
Rousseau’s terms—his body evolved to fit his environment. “Nature,” wrote 
Rousseau, “treats them precisely as the law of Sparta treated the children of 
citizens; it makes strong and robust those with good constitutions and lets all the 
others perish.” The Polynesian man seemed the very prototype of this mythical 
savage. As Bougainville observed in 1772, “I never saw men better made, and 
whose limbs were more proportionate: in order to paint Hercules or a Mars, one 
could nowhere find such beautiful models.” Elsewhere in the Pacific Cook wrote 
of how “the natives…are a strong raw boned well made active people rather 
above than under the common size especially of men” (quoted in Beaglehole, 
1968, p. 278). James Erskine remarked similarly of Samoan men that they were “a 
remarkably fine-looking set of people, and among them were several above sic 
feet high with Herculean proportions.” 
From Noble to Ignoble: Rethinking Primitivism and the Colonial Agenda 
As much as Europeans revered all that was reputedly ‘instinctive,’ ‘innate’ 
and ‘essential’ about the man living in nature, it is important to note that “this 
figure is riddled with ambivalence” (Moscovici, 2001, p. 197). As Moscovici 
(2001, p. 197) notes of Western representations of ‘savage’ cultures, the 
“supposed moral innocence” of the Noble Savage is praised at the same time as 
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his barbarism is feared. The Noble Savage was a contradictory myth: on the one 
hand embodying the positive virtues of simplicity, beauty, and freedom; on the 
other, suspect because of the animalistic instincts that motivate him. One is 
reminded of Homi Bhabha’s reading of colonial discourse which “emphasizes 
the psychic ambivalence, the fear and fascination, that informs the ‘Manchaean 
delirium’ of classical regimes of racial representation” (Bhabha, 1983). The 
Polynesian man was gifted with strength, courage, and pride, but was still, by 
European standards, an animal; violent and emotional. Thus, as much European 
curiosity for the exotic peoples of the Pacific was “respectful or prurient”, it was 
also “highly ambivalent” (Knellwolf, 2004). Torgovnick (1990) insightfully 
identifies this ambivalence as “the two major stories about primitives” inherited 
from the Enlightenment and carried forward into the age of imperial exploration 
and expansion: “primitive peoples as the idealized noble savage, something to be 
emulated”; and, “primitive peoples as dangerous and irrational, something to be 
feared” (p. 159). She writes of the image of the primitive as existing “in a 
cherished series of dichotomies; by turns gentle, in tune with nature, paradisal, 
ideal—or violent, in need of control…noble savages or cannibals” (Torgovnick, 
1990, p. 3). Bernard Smith’s study, European Vision and the South Pacific, 
germanely traces this split in the Polynesian context, charting “the transition 
from the European concept of the noble savage to its opposing concept, the 
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ignoble savage” (p. 123; see also Campbell, 1980). He emphasizes how the “soft 
primitivism” that initially ennobled Tahitians, for instance, came to be contested 
and “by the last decade of the eighteenth century [was] largely displaced by 
evangelical views, that deplored promiscuity, cannibalism and infanticide, and 
stressed what was base and deceitful in native temperament” (Thomas, 1994, p. 
99). Noble savages, then, were “prone to become less noble” (Campbell, 1996). 
In the Pacific both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ primitivism “competed for the savant’s 
attention”—from contact through colonialism to the present. Tropes in the 
European imaginary of soft primitivism (childlike, libidinous, free, and natural) 
competed with a hard primitivism that suggested the native to be as much 
violent, dangerous, irrational, and out of control (Desmond, 1997). We can 
consider this hard/soft primitivism binary as “another dimension of an 
attraction/repulsion complex which is manifested in other forms in Pacific 
history”: 
the desire of beachcombers to live in the islands, and their desire to get 
away again; in the loving way missionaries sought to redeem their people, 
and in their private remarks about depravity, degeneration, and ‘vile 
people’; in the desire of administrators to preserve, and their compulsion 
to eradicate indiscriminately many aspects of indigenous culture. 
 
This dichotomy was(/is) by no means a contradiction, as both “poles were 
produced, and nurtured, and flourished within the same cultural matrix.” They 
belong, in Hall’s terms, to the same “discursive formation.” As Knellwolf (2004) 
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argues, “the yearning for an original, unspoiled state of existence had as a dark 
underside a fascination with the brutality of an animalistic existence. Two 
contrasts to civilization were hence invoked—the lost golden age, or childhood, 
of mankind and the crude mindlessness of the animal.” Or, as Hall again puts it, 
“everything Europeans represented as attractive and enticing about the natives 
could also be used to represent the exact opposite: Their barbarous and depraved 
character” (1996, p. 213). 
Without wishing to deny the continuing presence of the soft noble savage 
trope, the ‘shift’ to representing Pacific Islanders in ignoble terms echoed 
changes in the European political climate during the 1800s. In particular, 
imperial expansion came to be justified by way of ‘civilizing’ or taming ‘native’ 
populations. Attitudes to Polynesia were merely typical of the way European 
and Euro-American discourses of primitivism are “infinitely malleable, and 
respond to the sociopolitical needs of the societies that produce them, not to 
those they purport to describe” (Desmond, 1996; see also, Torgovnick, 1990). 
First, the change must be mapped to the rise of science. Empirical research was at 
the heart of modern science, spurring the collection of data, the examination, 
description and arrangement of man and nature into categories according to 
scientific principles. Travel to far-off lands unsurprisingly underwent a process 
of scientization, linked to the new philosophy of science or what Sorlin describes 
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as “the empirical knowledge program” (Sorlin, 2004). As (Smedley, 2002, p. 161) 
demonstrate, late-eighteenth-century ‘science’ “grew in large part out of 
widening interest in and curiosity about the different kinds of human beings.” In 
this case, the Pacific was “an ideal locus for science” for it “provided a rich 
diversity that could be mined for knowledge”, while Europe’s colonial 
aspirations offered the “infamous ‘elbow room’ for an unhindered pursuit of 
science” (Prakash, 2007). The Pacific and its people thus became part of the 
scientific ‘project’, the ‘native’ became an object of scientific discourse. 
As a consequence earlier conceptions of the Pacific that idealized or 
classicized Pacific populations were slowly “eclipsed by scientific concerns with 
accuracy and with physiological, botanical and zoological detail” (p. 103). The 
rise of taxonomy, nomenclature, and ‘pure’ systems of classification came to play 
a “major and important role” in defining peoples of the Pacific and the 
relationships among them. In particular, such classifications obviously lent 
themselves to hierarchical structuring. Under the influence of scientists such as 
Linnaeus, humans were to be placed in a taxonomic order of nature with other 
animals. This set the terms for early scientific and anthropological inquiry in the 
Pacific. And, more often that not, these classificatory schemes “were invested 
with essentialist and universalized ‘biomoral’ assumptions concerning the 
natural history of human variation.” That is, classification had clear evaluative 
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judgements built into it that affirmed the superiority of certain Europeans over 
others. As Segal (2006, p. 539) explains, science painted the people of the Pacific 
as ‘primitive’: 
arrested in terms of evolution, inferior in terms of a European hierarchy of 
races, trapped in an environment which resisted the successful impact of 
European civilization, imprisoned by savage heredity, superstitious as 
opposed to religious or intellectual, and politically enslaved by the 
despotism and cynicism of the ‘pre-social’ state rather than enjoying the 
benefits of liberal democracy. 
 
But, for scientists, it was not only a case of studying those closer to nature. So 
conceived, the progressive or sequential development of man also produced a 
search for a ‘lowest type.’ Science in its exploratory zeal gave birth to a kind of 
contest to “discover, or to appropriate the authority for representing the world’s 
worst people” (Ellingson, 2001, p. 127), to find the ‘lowest’, ‘most savage’, 
‘wildest’, or ‘least evolved’ forms of humanity. This, as Ellingson (2001) points 
out, meant the link between nobility and savagery became increasingly 
untenable. The race to the bottom was antithetic to any idealization of the native. 
Thus, the savage takes an ignoble turn. In the new, less romantic discourse, the 
primitive became “naked, unpredictably violent and uncultured” (Connell, 
1996). Qualities that had earlier set the image of the Noble Savage, such as 
‘proud’ aggression, were now re-evaluated to signify instead cruelty and 
beastliness. 
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It should not be overlooked that the new, negative valence of the savage 
trope was as much political as scientific. Numerous scholars have demonstrated 
the ways in which science was or came to be an instrument in the service of 
empire, how it was an agent of cultural imperialism (for example see Drayton, 
2000; Harrison, 2005; Mardirosian, 1987; Osborne, 2005; Pyenson, 1993, Vlahakis, 
2006). As Ellingson (2001) explains in the case of the Noble Savage, the turn to 
the ignoble 
created a point of polarity that enabled manipulative control of any 
subject to which it was attached in the system of colonial politics…[and] 
greater negativity called for increasingly severe corrective action against 
the designated offenders (pp. 217-218). 
 
In the Pacific scientists frequently couched their work in as a kind of 
‘interventionism.’ That the native was ‘abnormal’ gave science its justification 
and vindication: abnormality necessitated correction, an “intervention to hasten 
the process of natural selection” (Bhabha, 1994). The ascent of hard primitivism 
in the Pacific thus cannot be divorced from the colonial agenda of the time. As 
much as scientific expansion was predicated and legitimated “by a set of symbols 
that placed cultures European humans above wild natures, other animals, and 
‘beastlike savages’” (Merchant, 2002), colonialism too had “to construe the 
colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin in 
order to justify conquest” (Bhabha 1994, p. 70). In fact, scientific and colonial 
knowledge worked hand-in-hand. As Sorlin (2002) notes, the history of scientific 
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travel “abounds with evidence of envoys of European powers that were able to 
combine the goals of science with those of empire expansion and economic 
exploitation.” Imperialists could call upon the work of scientists in defense of the 
subjugation of ‘inferior races’, while science reaped the benefits of the colonies’ 
resources. 
Whereas the Noble Savage was a “more complex imperial device”, the 
ignoble savage thus “provided an overt rationale for imperial and exploitative 
activities” (O’Brien, 2006, p. 172). Savages, no longer noble, were now seen as 
“degenerate offshoots of the human race” who could not be civilized without the 
services of the colonizer. The first step of colonialism was to make the native 
‘more savage’, so to engage the project of civilizing them. The next was to 
encourage ideas of progress and civilization which relied on the discursive 
demise of the Noble Savage in favor of its ignoble counterpart(/point). As much 
as the Noble Savage had earlier provided a critique of eighteenth-century society, 
a “new theory of the development of society” was embodied in the ignoble 
savage (Meek, 1976, p. 2). In order to recognize and represent itself “as the 
summit of human history” (Hall, 1996, p. 221), a form of gold standard against 
which other societies could be measured, Western Europe had to find its 
degraded, ‘lower’ stage. Indigenous identities had to be subordinated to that of 
the white European missionary/scientist. The resulting picture was embodied in 
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the figure of the ignoble savage, “the lowest rung on the ladder of humanity” 
(Bullard, 2000, p. 32; see also Smith, 1992). The dramatic ‘failure’ of early 
missionary endeavors in the Pacific, and the perceived obstinacy of the natives, 
had already ended European sympathy to the Noble Savage in many quarters. 
Moreover, the idealized Pacific primitive seemed less defensible in wake of the 
death and disappearance of the navigator Defresne, the disappearance of De 
Lange and La Pérouse, and, most famously, the death of Cook in Tahiti in 1779. 
As Connell (2003, p. 559) notes, after a brief heyday in the late eighteenth 
century, the Noble Savage soon gave way to the ignoble savage—“naked, 
unpredictably violent and uncultured—and a new rather less romantic discourse 
of the ‘primitive savage.’” With the “dramatic decline in the representation of 
islanders as ‘noble savages’” (Sivasundaram, 2005) scientists and missionaries 
were able to reposition themselves as “agents of pacification among peoples 
depicted as wretched, bloodthirsty, and cannibalistic.” 
It should be noted that this negative rhetoric was not so much a discovery 
of type, but a recurrence or reversion of character. The noble and ignoble were 
always in tension, or “fractured” as Anoop Nayak (2005) puts it. That is to say 
the stereotype of the Polynesian “noble savage had always contained within it its 
mirror opposite, the ignoble savage” (Lindenbaum, 2005). On one hand this 
meant the noble or barbarous/ignoble notions of the savage could be reassigned 
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as needed by the requirements of the colonists. On the other, however, the fusion 
of sociability and ferocity was a source of anxiety and ambivalence. The savage, 
whether noble or ignoble, was haunted by the specter of violence or the potential 
for revolt. As much as the Noble Savage possessed natural virtues, was more 
peaceful and selfless than his Western counterparts, he was also the latent savage 
beast. It is hardly surprising therefore that the increasingly negative depiction of 
Pacific islanders resorted to “rhetorical images of bestiality” (Ellingson, 2001, p. 
126). Science had already established an evolutionary continuity between 
humans and animals and in descending the ladder of evolution to the ignoble 
savage, scientific minds had found its “animalistic origins.” Similarly, for 
Europeans, to be noble was to be peaceful, and thus their recourse to descriptions 
of ‘animal violence’ among natives. Though perhaps a more diffuse mechanism 
of the naturalization I describe above, Shohat and Stam (1994) argue that this 
process of ‘animalization’ was nonetheless a key colonialist trope. Put simply, in 
yoking the native to the animal European superiority and dominance could be 
asserted. Fanon, of course, has famously spoken of such an ‘animalizing trope’, 
“the discursive figure by which the colonizing imaginary rendered the colonized 
beastlike and animalistic” (Shohat and Stam, 2003, p. 19). In The Wretched of the 
Earth, for instance, Fanon writes that 
Colonialism dehumanises the native, or to speak plainly it turns him into 
an animal. In fact, the terms the settler uses when he mentions the native 
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are zoological terms. He speaks of the yellow man’s reptilian motions, of 
the stink of the native quarter, of breeding swarms, of foulness, of spawn, 
of gesticulations. When the settler seeks to describe the native filly in exact 
terms he constantly refers to the bestiary. 
 
Derrida has also written extensively on “the question of the animal,” and, in 
particular, the phenomenological criteria for distinguishing humans from 
animals (see esp. Derrida, 1974, 2004). While Derrida himself believed that 
humans and animals cannot be substantially separated (in his terms, there is no 
“delimitation between man and animal”), it is perhaps appropriate here to note 
Derrida’s descriptions of how animality has traditionally functioned “as the 
imaginary other out of and against which humanity is constituted” (Oliver, 2006, 
p. 116). He notes, in particular, how, as Judeo-Christian thought came into 
dominance, the concept of ‘the animal’ came into use as an absolute other, and 
that this linguistic separation was taken as emblematic of the psychic divide 
between civility and the dark, mysterious, animal that resides inside us. He also 
points us to how animalistic allusions sustain the myth of the barbaric, wild 
other, in its “philosophical fixity.” “Animal language—and animality in 
general,” he writes in Of Grammatology, 
represents here the still living myth of fixity, of symbolic incapacity, of 
nonsupplementarity. If we consider the concept of animality not in its 
content of understanding or misunderstanding but in its specific function, 
we shall see that it must locate a moment of life which knows nothing of 




We can bridge this notion back to Homi Bhabha who has noted also of the 
reliance of colonial discourse upon such essentialisms, what he labels “the binary 
oppositions and fixities of imperial ideology” (Bhabha, 1994). 
Alongside animalism, the eighteenth-century primitive was also twinned 
to the child, the two having, in Campbell’s (1980) words, “practically 
interchangeable imagery and sentimentality” (p. 53). As Ashcroft (2000) makes 
clear, “child and primitive man [were] explicitly linked.” Rousseau, for instance, 
saw childhood as the stage of life when man most closely approximates the state 
of nature. In Rousseau, “the unspoiled child and the natural man come together 
as interchangeable and mutually supportive concepts” (Ashcroft, 2000, p. 188). 
Children, in Rousseau’s conviction, “live like animals.” If we return to the case of 
the Pacific, it can be argued that talk of the childlike qualities of the (primitive) 
peoples of the Pacific mirrored the unquestioned hierarchical structures of race 
and power in imperial Europe. The popular racial theories of the day frequently 
alluded to the lack of intellectual capability among the “childlike races of the 
[Pacific] Empire” (p. 186). Dumoutier, for instance, concluded that Marquesans, 
in short, “are big children”; a term already used by Lesson for Tahitians (Staum, 
2000). Cook similarly wrote of Polynesians that 
they may appear to some to be the most wretched people upon Earth, but 
in reality they are far more happy than we Europeans; being wholly 
unacquainted not only with the superfluous but the necessary 
 219 
conveniencies so much sought after in Europe, they are happy in not 
knowing the use of them. 
 
To be childish was, of course, to lack intelligence. That childhood and 
primitivism developed interchangeably only reinforced perceptions about the 
limited mental faculties of Polynesian men. The “child analogy”, as Cairns (1965) 
labels it, was a suggestion that Polynesians were distinguished by their 
“immaturity, lack of responsibility and inability to properly order one’s own 
affairs” (p. 143). “Apparently trapped in the childhood of the human species”, in 
the peoples of the Pacific their “intelligence was enslaved to instinct. (Staum, 
2000, pp. 223, 232). As the French physician and would-be cultural 
anthropologist Charles Letourneau put it bluntly: “of all the savage races none 
are more childish than the Polynesians. Their thoughtlessness and their light-
headedness are extraordinary. It is impossible to fix their attention upon 
anything for two minutes.” 
A further corollary of this discourse of the savage-child was that “the 
child is somehow more natural” (Murray, 2006, p. 811). In line with Romantic 
primitivism, because he was a child, the Polynesian, as I have argued above, was 
perceived as closer to nature (Dawson, 2005). To align Polynesians to nature was 
to not only cast their difference as closer to the animal and child, but also to 
elevate the mind over the body. What purportedly set Europeans apart was their 
rationality, and the Polynesian body was used to orientate and ground the 
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modernity of (so-called) civilized society; physicality acted as the opposite side, 
or Other, that illuminated European intellect and rationality. The influence of 
Cartesian dualism was particularly significant in underpinning this conviction. 
Cartesian dualism is, famously, premised on the belief that the material body is 
distinct from that which inhabits and motivates it, that the body and mind are 
exclusive. It is this mind/body opposition, argues St Louis, that “implicitly 
provides the conceptual basis for the racial distinction between intellectual 
reason and physical passions” (2005, p. 116). Pertinent to the understanding of 
race, Descartes concluded that the “great divide” between humans and animals 
was the conscious soul, that thinking or reflection is the defining essence of 
‘humanness. He famously wrote that “The greatest of all prejudices we have 
retained form our infancy is that of believing that beasts think”. Hence, for 
Descartes, “reason separates human from beast.” According to these recalcitrant 
dichotomies of nature/culture, self/other, and mind/body, Polynesians were 
relegated and confined to a secondary status. 
In his now classic “Genealogy of Modern Racism”, Cornell West argues that 
from its advent Cartesian dualism has transformed the “structure of modern 
discourse” on race (see West, 1982). Certainly, it directly informed the “codifying 
and institutionalizing of both the scientific and popular perceptions of the 
human race” during the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries (Eze, 
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1997, p. 5). As St Louis notes, “the analytical distinction between mind and 
body” directly informed “the speculative racial taxonomies of the human species 
that understood and explained physical, moral and intellectual characteristics as 
hereditary racial attributes” (2005, p. 117). The mind-body split was especially 
critical to the Social Darwinists’ view of race. They took Darwin’s concept of 
‘fitness’ (in terms of individual, differential reproduction, or number of 
offspring) and re-framed it as a matter of moral superiority or physical and 
intellectual superiority (Ratcliffe, 2004). For Social Darwinists, fitness was less 
about the number of progeny left behind than “conventional notions of the 
desirable and valuable” (Jones, 1980, p. 8). In doing so, they gave particular 
weight to the idea that intellectual ability and physical strength were antithetic 
traits. Speaking of the “distinction between the mind and the body, and its racial 
character,” St Louis (2005) notes how, in the Origin of Species, Darwin draws on 
the “‘law of compensation or balancement of growth’…to observe the 
development of organisms by natural selection” (p. 118). For Darwin, he 
explains, “natural selection reduces and eradicates parts of an organism that 
become superfluous to its operation and concentrates on allocating nutrients 
where they are most needed” (p. 119). Darwin himself may have rejected it, but, 
inspired by this line of reasoning, what emerged among his contemporaries was 
a kind of “zero-sum proposition” that assumed “an inverse relationship between 
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mind and muscle” a kind of “muscle/mind tradeoff” (Hoberman, 1992, p. 43). 
Citing The Descent of Man, Hoberman (1997) explains how 
Darwin had compared the respective advantages of a powerful physique 
and gentler social qualities for human survival and concluded that ‘an 
animal possessing great size, strength, and ferocity’ would have probably 
failed to develop the ‘higher mental qualities required for civilized life(p. 
209). 
 
To be sure, such a relationship was by no means unanimously accepted by 
Darwin’s contemporaries. However, we could argue that it was typical of a more 
widespread Cartesianist framework that distinguished between the intellectual 
and the physical—and which prioritized mind over body—that was critical to the 
project of colonialism in the Pacific. The popular stress on animality/physicality 
in depictions of the Pacific ignored, if not negated, the mental capacities of Pacific 
peoples. In reducing Pacific people to their physical being, Europeans implied 
that they were essentially less advanced in evolution, the flip-side of European 
intellectual development and reason. The difference between intelligent and 
unintelligent helped to legitimate colonial endeavors through the logic that the 
‘superior’ necessarily dominates the ‘inferior.’ To hold the colonial other in a 
position of mental abjection or stunted intellect was to justify the paternal actions 
of imperialism: insuring the intellectual inferiority of other ‘races’ “morally 
justif[ied] colonial rule as a benevolent gesture towards people supposedly 
lacking…[the] intelligence and resourcefulness to run their own country (Dimeo, 
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2002, p. 72). And, one of the ways this was achieved was through a discourse of 
hyper-physicality that drew on the “racial taxonomies that contrast the primal 
physicality and sensuality of [Polynesian] bodies, and their infantile minds, with 
the cultured sociability of white Europeans” (St Louis, p. 85). As Hokowhitu 
(2003b) concludes, “The embodiment of people of colour as physical beings, as 
opposed to intellectual and self-actualised beings, was initiated in the grand 
colonising era of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” (p. 25). 
From Savages to Athletes: Rugby and (Neo)colonial Discourse 
 
I don’t think there is such a thing as a born soccer player 
- Pele 
 
Colonial Encounters, Western Racism, and the Sporting Body 
What we have, then, is the basis for understanding how, in the Pacific, the 
placement of civilization and the intellectual above the primitive and the 
physical thereby tacitly reinforced the production of uneven social relationships 
while articulating the physical with race. The relation of Pacific peoples to 
primitivism was especially significant in its power to ascribe the ‘European’ and 
the ‘Polynesian’ to given positions within a human hierarchy. What is also 
apparent is the way the concepts of ethnicity and race came to be treated as 
unproblematic categories of difference. The subordinate status was written onto 
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the Polynesian body itself. If to be primitive was to be lesser it is was also to be 
natural, to be closer to nature; and in this natural state the body rules 
predominant. To rework Fanon (1967), the Polynesian is their body; they are 
circumscribed as inferior prior to any gesture because to be other was to be 
natural, to be physical. This process of representing Otherness as marked in and 
on the body “is not peculiar to the colonial period and will not disappear with it” 
(Edmond, 1997, p. 21). In particular, the “racially ascribed paradigm where one is 
either physically capable or cognitively endowed” (St Louis, 2005) has important 
repercussions for our modern understandings or ‘race’ and its relation to sport 
performance. As St Louis (2005) warns of the zero-sum discourse it “is not 
simply a historical anomaly of philosophical and scientific knowledge but 
demonstrates particular racialized narratives that have mutated within our 
contemporary cultural vocabulary.” What I therefore now wish to consider is 
how colonial pathologies are manifest within and disseminated through popular 
understandings of sport, and rugby in particular. 
Before doing so I wish to point out that many of my arguments are 
informed by, and borrow from, an established literature examining the 
discourses endemic to ‘minorities’ on the sports field generally. My premise is 
that whether African American or Samoan, Black British of Tongan, such athletes 
share a historical lineage of physical, physiological and psychological 
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stereotypes: the use of animalistic similes in describing black/brown athletes; the 
perception that black/brown athletic success owes itself to ‘innate’ physical 
ability; this belief having the corollary that White male athletes are intellectually 
superior and have a better work ethic than do black/brown athletes; the 
articulation of black/brown athletes to discourses of ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ deviance, 
crime and/or sexual promiscuity; and, the buttressing of all of these stereotypes 
via a good black[/brown]-bad black[/brown] binary. This catalogue of 
uninformed stereotypes is united in the way black[/brown]ness becomes 
synonymous with ‘nature.’ Firstly, in the sense of being ‘naturally born to’ (run, 
jump, tackle… etc). Secondly, it its implicit allusions to ‘primitivism’ or being 
‘closer to nature’ (for instance, being childlike, spontaneous, intuitive, or 
‘untamable’). This is achieved firstly via the body. There is a long tradition in 
social and popular thought of seeing the body as neutral, as ontologically stable. 
The body is, in many ways, a “totemic object” of nature and the natural (Green, 
1984). That black[/brown] athletic performance is frequently described via 
recourse to the body has the effect of placing such performances within the ‘state 
of nature.’ Popular understandings of sport abet this equation of 
black[/brown]/Nature[/natural]. The consequence is that black[/brown] sporting 
masculinity is overdetermined from the outside as both physical and natural. The 
 226 
net effect, is that the racialized—what could be termed, imputed otherness—of 
athletic ability is seen as so natural that it requires no comment at all (Hall, 1997). 
As examples of parallel works, Brendan Hokowhitu has published several 
papers that trace the “genealogical construction of Maori as inherently physical” 
(2004, p. 261). He does so through frequent recourse to analogies between tane 
(Maori men) and African American men. Along similar lines, Farah Palmer 
argues that the uptake of sport by Maori served to fulfil the stereotype that Maori 
are a ‘physical’ race. She suggests the perception of Maori as ‘natural’ athletes to 
be more generally embedded within “dominant race ideologies that attribute the 
success (or failure) of ethnic minority athletes to innate and instinctive 
attributes” (Palmer, 2007, p. 311). Finally, Te’evale (2001) makes a similar case for 
Pacific peoples. The success of Pacific athletes, he argues, are more often than not 
explained in terms of genetic and biological disposition. Echoing John 
Hoberman’s notion of a “sports fixation” among African Americans (Hoberman, 
1997), Te’evale argues such myths risk becoming part of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: there is a danger, he claims, that young Pacific peoples fail to think of 
possibilities for social mobility beyond the world of sport. 
The extent to which these authors’ works are steeped in the broader 
literature on African American athletes is, I argue, wholly understandable. North 
America is very much the ‘home’ of scholarship on race and sport, in much the 
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same way as the sociology of sport generally. The literature has a longer history 
and a more extensive corpus. The body of work on Polynesians and racialized 
athleticism is, by comparison, both young and yet to be developed. But, the 
degree of influence is not solely the consequence of practicality or expedience. 
We can, I suggest, justify the mapping of the existing literature onto the Pacific 
context if we consider the case of Polynesians and African Americans to be not 
merely analogous, but homologous. I make this distinction as a reference to 
roots, to the difference between simple similarity and shared origins. Borrowing 
from a phrase from Said (1985), it is my contention that the discourse of the 
‘sporting other’ in both North America and New Zealand are part of the same 
“family of ideas” through which difference is constructed: that is, they draw 
from the same “archive.” 
In making such claims, I am, of course, drawing here not only from Said, 
but also Stuart Hall’s famed notion of ‘the West and the Rest’ (see Hall, 1996) and 
Balibar and Wallerstein’s (1991) claim as to the existence of “world-systemic 
racialization.” While we cannot necessarily collapse these arguments, I see them 
as compatible in as much as they view all racisms (ideologies accompanying 
racial structurations) as historically linked to the history and consequences of 
colonial encounters. The expansion of Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries was predicated on the development of an idea of ‘the West’ that 
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assumed Europe as “the most advanced type of society on earth, European man 
(sic) the pinnacle of achievement” (Hall, 1996, p. 187). But the West’s sense of 
itself as ‘higher’ was not merely an internal process, being formed as well 
through Europe’s sense of difference from other worlds, by “how it came to 
represent itself in relation to these ‘others’” (Hall, 1997, p. 188). It was, in brief, a 
distinction between Western superiority and non-Western inferiority (Said, 
1985). This in turn formed the basis of dominating the New World, a justification 
for annexing and exploiting their peoples and resources. Linking the idea to 
Wallerstein’s (1974) world-systems theory, Bonilla-Silva explains that the notion 
of the West “facilitated racializing the inhabitants of the core as superior and 
those of the periphery (the ‘others’) as inferior and as filling a subservient role in 
the world-system’s division of labor” (Bonilla-Silva, 1999, p. 902; see also Chapter 
4). 
And, this Western discourse was(/is) by no means endemic to Europeans. 
The West, as Hall points out, is “a historical, not a geographical construct” (1996, 
p. 186) with no simple meaning, no easy partitions on a map. The West, as he 
puts it, is “not only in Europe.” It is instead a reference to a type of society, to a 
level of development that plays on binary oppositions—between 
developed/underdeveloped, civilized/barbarian, rational/instinctive and 
human/subhuman. Such a discourse has been, according to Bonilla-Silva (2000) 
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“an essential component in the structuration of various kinds of social relations 
of domination and subordination between ‘Western’ and non-Western peoples, 
between Whites and non-Whites in the world-system” (p. 192). Thus, while I 
agree with Hall’s (1980) claim that there are a plurality of racisms in the ‘Western 
world’, it is fair to speak of the racial ideology of Western nations as being 
“unified by its common historical ideological root” (Bonilla-Silva, 2000, p. 194). 
Although it exists in transformed or reworked forms, I thus concur with 
Hall’s (1996) contention that the West and the Rest discourse continues to inflect 
the “languages of racial inferiority and ethnic superiority which still operate so 
powerfully across the globe today” (p. 225). But I take this further in presuming 
that “the racism peculiar to all Western nations today exhibits a common 
macroracial discourse” (Bonilla-Silva, 2000, p. 194). There are, patently, extensive 
differences that must be borne in mind, and neither the West nor the Rest should 
be considered unified or homogenous. Yet while the multiplicity of local and 
national racisms cannot be reduced to a uniform Western racial hegemony, 
“neither can they be separated from ‘Western cultural influence’”(Harrison, 1995, 
p. 50). Binding ‘Western’ nations, I argue, is a system of representation that 
shares common discursive strategies that collapse differences into stereotypes 
that ‘split’ (Hall, 1996) the West from the Rest, ‘us’ from ‘them’, and civilized 
from uncivilized. 
 230 
Of particular note is the way in which colonial subjects were represented 
in ways intended to justify colonial relations of domination and exploitation. 
Between North America and the South Pacific it is possible, I argue, to trace a 
coherence of both stereotypes and effects that result from the implicit 
assumption of the West as the primary referent in understanding difference. In a 
similar fashion, sport in the Pacific, as in North America, draws on generalized 
ideas about the non-Western other. Sport, as a symbolic space, in both instances 
draws on long-established motifs in Western imperial culture, invoking 
strikingly similar stereotypes: the biologizing of black/brown performance, plays 
on black/brown animalism and/or primitivism, the and persistence of 
white/black[/brown], mind/body dualisms. The discursive boundaries within 
which both the black and the brown athletic subject are framed bear an uncanny 
resemblance because they operate according to the same conceptual scheme 
through which they are ‘fixed’ and reliably known. The athletic Other, whether 
brown or black, to borrow from Carrington (2001/2002, p. 91) remains deeply 
inscribed into the psychic imaginary of the West.” 
 
Island Magic: The Neo-Savage Hits the Rugby Field 
 
Polynesians are blessed with big, powerful frames and, if you can imagine 
a coconut falling from a tree onto your head, that’s what it feels like when 




In what follows I trace some of the continuities of the past racial ideologies 
as they are articulated within aspects of contemporary media culture. An 
obvious starting point is to return briefly to white flight and the panic over the 
brown athletic body. As I have suggested in Chapter 2, we can begin to see the 
biologizing/naturalizing of race and performance in rugby at a very young age. 
Put simply, in schoolboy grades Polynesian boys are said to be dominating 
because of a genetic advantage—their size. As Romanos (2002) puts it, “you do 
not need to be a scientist to know that an eight-year-old, 12-year-old or 15-year-
old Polynesian boy will almost inevitably be much bigger than a white boy the 
same age. He has an inherent genetic advantage” (p. 171). Similarly, dismissing 
the “dedicated schools of politically correct thought that insist that we are all the 
same”, Laidlaw (1999) contends that weight limits are needed in age-grade rugby 
because Polynesian boys “quite obviously mature physically much earlier than 
those of European origin” (p. 182). Concurring on their size, one ‘development 
officer’ suggests that Polynesian boys possess other ‘gifts’ as well: “Genetically, 
the Pacific Islanders and Maori kids are built to be very good footballers,” he 
says. “They’re big, fit, have tremendous hand-eye coordination and they have 
big hands that allow them to grip the ball” (quoted in Lane, 2006). The 
achievements of Polynesian boys are therefore framed as lacking moral integrity 
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because, in contrast to Pakeha boys whose achievements are attributed to 
endeavor, they are successful only because of their innate physical attributes. 
Criticisms of the 21-year-old Samoan-born centre Isaia Toeava are testament to 
this type of racialist thinking about Polynesian accomplishment. After missing 
two try-scoring opportunities against South Africa in 2006, the widespread 
presumption was that Toeava had been “exposed” (Springboks take aim, 2007) by 
the demands of international rugby (Kayes, 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Paul, 2006). A 
star in the junior grades (because of his genetic gifts?), Toeava had apparently 
been ‘found out’ when his size was no longer a factor. “There is a sense” writes 
Kayes (2006), “that he is a player who might have been sensational in the age 
grades, but [is unable] to find his feet with the All Blacks” (p. C14). 
The widespread presumption that Polynesian boys are natural sportsmen 
has numerous repercussions. First and foremost is a worrying trend identified by 
Hokowhitu (2004) and Tristram (2002): the channeling of Polynesian boys into 
high school ‘sports academies.’ Most of these academies were set up in the wake 
of the “marketization of New Zealand schools” (Woodfield and Gunby, 2003) 
and are of dubious academic merit. As Hokowhitu alleges, “many of these so-
called ‘academies’ were initiated by individual high schools to relocate ‘trouble’ 
students out of mainstream classes, for the sole benefit of ‘academic’ students” 
(2004, p. 273). For Hokowhitu these academies merely act as “contemporary 
 233 
educational conduits for Mäori and Polynesian boys into a world where making 
it as a sports star is the only available option.” They are viewed, he contends, “as 
educational sites that ‘suit’ the ‘natural practicality’ of Mäori and Polynesian 
boys, and as places where they can be groomed for professional sporting careers” 
(p. 273). 
This also raises the difficult question of what one local journalist has 
dubbed ‘The Jonah Factor.’ Of Tongan parentage, Jonah Lomu made his All 
Black debut at 18 and went on to become perhaps “the best known rugby player 
on the planet” (Lewis, 2006, p. 70). At the height of his career Lomu became 
rugby’s highest-paid player and secured contracts with global sponsors such as 
adidas and McDonald’s. Romanos (2002) argues that Lomu’s success begat his 
status as a role model for many Polynesian boys who have come to see “excelling 
at rugby as a way forward” (p. 180). In a scenario he sees as “comparable to the 
lure [for “black boys” (p. 180)] of professional sports like boxing and basketball 
in the United States”, Romanos contends that Polynesian boys “see a player like 
Lomu, a talented teenaged rugby player with no more than normal 
qualifications, now earning millions of dollars a year to play sport and wonder 
why that can’t be them” (p. 182). A near-identical argument is made by 
Matheson (2001). “The young Polynesian” he suggests, “has become conscious of 
the fact that professional rugby can offer young Pacific Islanders and their 
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families hope of a better lifestyle…[it] is reminiscent of the way young black 
Americans got themselves out of the ghetto” (p. 24). Racial essentialism is, of 
course, at the root of such commentaries. This is most apparent in Romanos’ 
suggestion that: “A strong, athletic Pacific Island of Maori boy will find he is able 
to totally dominate junior rugby players his age. Why not try to turn that 
situation to his advantage by seeking to play rugby professionally?” (p. 182). 
Genetic (physical) superiority is thus assumed; players such as Lomu merely 
become an instantiation of a spurious discourse that reveals itself as ‘truth’ to 
Polynesian boys, who then seemingly follow blindly in Lomu’s footsteps. 
While wishing to problematize the longstanding notions of essential 
difference which these commentators draw on, there is perhaps some salience in 
the comparisons they draw to sport in the United States. What interests me is not 
so much whether or not Polynesian boys actually do see sport as avenue for 
mobility but rather the potential power of this ‘get-out-of-the-ghetto’ discourse 
(Sandell, 1995). As analyses in the US context suggest, the media frame sport, 
and the possibility of a professional sports career for African Americans (and 
African American boys in particular), as an escape from poverty and a means to 
circumvent racial discrimination in many other occupations. Hence, as symbols 
of the ‘American Dream,’ successful black athletes suggest that African 
Americans can, and regularly do, achieve both economic success and upward 
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social mobility (Andrews, 1996; Hoberman, 1997; McDonald and Andrews, 
2001). The implication is that those who don’t can be explained by individual 
moral inferiority as opposed to structural or systematic racism or racial 
prejudice. In displacing social and structural factors, and in emphasizing the 
efforts and achievements of individual black athletes, the media imply that 
poverty is a result of “individual shortcoming” (Baker, 2000, p. 227), and 
“reinforce the view that the failure of the black underclass is their own” (Wilson, 
1997, p. 185). Black athletic success stories thus falsely suggest sport to be a 
viable space for African-American social and economic advancement, and 
provide African Americans—and African American men in particular—with a 
“stereotypical representational politics that denies and even disavows the 
complexities of their cultural situation and the pluralistic nature of the subject 
positions they currently inhabit” (Lafrance and Rail, 2001, p. 41). Hence, 
although black athletes often seek “status, respect, empowerment and upward 
mobility through athletic careers” (Dworkin and Messner, 1999, pp. 4-5) as a 
means of circumventing racial and class barriers, doing so within the venue of 
sports may actually reproduce racism and justify a system of racial inequality. 
Loto et al (2006) suggest a similar discourse has possibly emerged in New 
Zealand with regard to rugby and young Polynesian males. In their analysis of 
Pacific peoples in the New Zealand press they suggest sport to be one of the few 
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social spaces in which positive portrayals of Pacific peoples are manifest. 
However, they contend that these “more positive images” appear to reflect what 
Cottle (2000) describes as the “enlightened racism” of television characterizations 
of minority groups. According to Loto et al, 
the focus is on successful individuals but coverage omits mention of 
structural inequalities and exclusionary practices that prevent more 
success. In the context of the tendency for print news to focus largely on 
problems, positive cases can function merely to reinforce the perception 
that Pacific people have only themselves to blame for not measuring up or 
taking advantage of their opportunities (Loto et al, 2006). 
 
Moreover, stories about Pacific achievement in rugby tended to “present over-
romanticized accounts of the level of understanding and integration between 
team members or the opportunities that sport provides for Pacific men.” Such 
views are backed up in Hokowhitu’s (2003b) examination of the racialized bodies 
of Polynesian athletes. For Hokowhitu, 
the image of the successful athlete of colour is absolutely important to this 
imagined democratic state and the reproduction of power, for revolutions 
can be kept at bay by constant reifications of hopeless dreams. 
Furthermore, sport stardom does not offer a particularly effective means 
for social mobility; focusing on the person of colour as predestined for 
physical feats denies him or her other avenues which are far more likely to 
offer improved social and political status (p. 31). 
 
In a similar vein, Hokowhitu has elsewhere (2004a,b) contended that the 
problem has been compounded by the recruiting tactics of New Zealand high 
schools. Woodfield and Gunby (2003) have shown how, as New Zealand moved 
to marked-based, neo-liberal economic system in the mid-1980s, education was 
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restructured according to the dictates of the market. Like any other business, 
schools were forced to compete with each other for ‘customers’ (i.e., students). 
Within this new model, Hokowhitu contends, successful sports teams, and 
especially rugby teams, have become one of the “chief marketing tools” for many 
New Zealand high schools: 
Top boys schools employ talent scouts to strengthen their premier rugby 
teams in the hope of bolstering their schools’ image and reputation 
through success in sports. Not surprisingly, they often target large Mäori 
and Polynesian boys…[and] the mainstream discourse recognizes this 
phenomenon as an acceptable alternative to providing Polynesian boys 
with an education system that caters to their academic needs (2004b, p. 
273). 
 
The concern for Hokowhitu is not just that mainstream New Zealand has come 
to accept the stereotype that Polynesians are mere sportspeople. 
“Unfortunately,” he writes, “Mäori and other Polynesians also recognize sports 
as one of the few areas in which their boys can succeed in a larger system 
contrived to elicit their immanent failure” (2004b, p. 274). Macpherson, Spoonley, 
and Anae (2001) have similarly observed the dangers of the “double-edged 
sword” that is the success of Polynesian athletes such as Lomu and more recently 
Tana Umaga or Jerry Collins. They argue that these “exceptional individuals” 
(Loto et al, 2006, p. 112) have 
set the stage for what sociologists call a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 
arguments of academic and other commentators who explain Pacific 
athletes’ success in terms of biological and genetic predispositions, may 
persuade Pacific people to confine themselves to those sports in which 
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they are supposed to enjoy some ‘natural’ advantage. As more people 
enter these codes and are successful, the ‘truth’ of the arguments is 
‘demonstrated’ (pp. 158-159). 
 
While others such as Te’evale (2001) are similarly concerned about the 
potential for the notion that sport is a means of social mobility to take root in the 
Pacific community—“that Pacific people, and particularly young Pacific Island 
youth, also come to believe it” (p. 222)—there is a danger in over-extending this 
argument. First, education and religion have historically been more important 
driving forces in Pacific peoples lives. Indeed, the education of future 
generations was, and is, a primary motivation for migration to New Zealand 
from throughout the Pacific. And second, although there is some evidence 
pointing in this direction in the case young Maori (Palmer, 2000), we currently 
lack any compelling evidence as to whether physicality is actually taken as an 
inherent sign of limitation among Pacific boys. Critics should thus approach the 
argument with due caution given that it runs the risk of substantiating those of 
Pakeha critics who take as given that sport is more important to most Polynesian 
men, including the highly educated, than to their white counterparts. This is not, 
however, to deny the potential efficacy of this discourse. Discourses are ways of 
producing knowledge that serve to sustain existing social relationships. 
Stereotypes of Polynesian athletic superiority reign virtually uncontested in the 
New Zealand media (Hokowhitu, 2003a, b; MacLean, 2005). These 
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representations circulate through culture and reproduce themselves as sites for 
the interpellation of individuals into repressive, and highly racialized, 
subjectivities. The natural Polynesian athlete, veiled in a biological epistemology, 
has the capacity to function as a named location or identifying category through 
which Pacific peoples come to know themselves and their placement within 
dominant society. That is, these cultural discourses are not hermetic or pure; they 
are linked to wider social forms and power and because they provide the basis in 
and through which individuals make sense of the world, they have ideological 
effects. To borrow from Stuart Hall, the meanings embedded in representations 
“are not only ‘in the head.’ They organize and regulate social practices, influence 
our conduct and consequently have, real, practical effects” (1997, p. 3). The 
media’s focus on Polynesian men as athletes, and the disproportionate coverage 
given to Polynesian athletic achievement, certainly obscures the diversity of 
everyday successes by Pacific men (Anae, 2004; Misa, 2006). And, the blithe 
celebration of ‘rags-to-riches’ tales such as Lomu’s, in implying that sport is one 
of the few potential routes of upward mobility for Polynesian youth, also “works 
negatively to position Pacific Islanders as ‘exotic others’ who perform creatively 
on the rugby field, in the arts, or during cultural festivals” (Loto et al, 2006). At 
the very least the economic successes of high-profile Pacific athletes may give 
 240 
Polynesian youths a false sense of the very limited career prospects of 
professional sport. 
There is also decided merit in the contention that Polynesian participation 
in, and dominance of, certain sports can confirm ideas about the ‘natural’ 
physical talents of Pacific peoples (Hokowhitu, 2004a; Te’vale, 2001). In 
obscuring the differentiating effects of exclusion, rugby has become a prominent 
arena of social life in which the idea that Polynesian men are biologically 
different—in a meaningful way—is encouraged. Already we have seen how the 
growing success of Polynesian boys in junior rugby is frequently reduced to their 
precocious physical development and the way this is taken as common sense: as 
one Wellington high-school coach puts it, “There is no doubting that Polynesians, 
especially, mature early. They are often wonderful physical specimens” (emphasis 
added). This pernicious discourse carries through into explanations of 
Polynesian success in the senior ranks. Perhaps the most explicit example is an 
article published in New Zealand Fitness magazine titled “Lomu and the 
Polynesian Power Packs.” Noting the “enormous impact” of Polynesians on New 
Zealand sport, the author (interestingly herself of Samoan-Maori descent) sets 
out to “uncover” the basis of “Polynesian people’s obvious assets: natural 
muscularity, hand to eye co-ordination and sense of rhythm” (Leilua, 1996; 
emphasis added). Most of the article is based on the “scientific evidence” of 
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Otago University anatomy professor Phillip Houghton, whose research was later 
published as the book People of the Great Ocean: Aspects of Human Biology of the 
Early Pacific (Houghton, 1996). In brief, Houghton traces the roots of Polynesian 
sporting success to the inheritance of body types from “early Polynesian 
navigators.” As Leilua explains it, “Houghton’s theory is that their [Polynesians’] 
muscle comes from their ancestors enduring extremely cold temperatures while 
exploring and settling the Pacific Islands hundreds of years ago.” Houghton 
suggests that the type of muscle fibre—‘fast twitch’ (i.e., those muscles 
“particularly suitable for sprinting”—is explained by a similar case of evolution 
pressure: “Their demand was for a muscle fibre type to keep them warm and act 
as a heat engine and type two, fast twitch was ideal for this.” Suppressing more 
likely social constraints, Houghton then goes on to attribute the “recent 
phenomenon of Polynesian prowess in sports” to “the fact that, previously, 
Polynesians weren’t reaching their genetic potential because of their lifestyle” 
(emphasis added). He uses Lomu as an example. Because Lomu has “been an 
active sportsman since school, and because he’s also become more disciplined 
about his eating and exercise regime with the All Blacks, this has propelled him 
forward toward his genetic potential.” 
Again, it is perhaps useful to segue into discussing the importance of 
biology to the myth of natural Polynesian athleticism via parallels to black 
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athletes. Well documented (for review, see Grainger, Newman, and Andrews, 
2006), the ‘myth of the natural black athlete’ works to circumscribe the efforts of 
those who would use athletics as a means to enter the social and cultural 
mainstream by reducing these successes to biology. One of the more (in)famous 
examples is the claim by Entine (2000) that “elite black athletes have a 
phenotypic advantage—a distinctive skeletal system and musculature, metabolic 
structures, and other characteristics forged over tens of thousands of years of 
evolution” (p. 18). Echoing Houghton above, Entine, while not wholly dismissing 
socio-economic environment, cultural modeling, communal norms, or familial 
expectations, privileges genetics as the basis for black athletic success. Without 
wishing to step into the polarizing debate over the (un)realities of racial science, 
am I less interested in the veracity of Entine’s argument than the way it serves as 
a model for how ‘scientific’ representations of the natural athlete myth continue 
to act as a diversionary rhetorical strategy. First, by appealing to science, Entine 
and his ilk are able to attack social constructionist arguments that question the 
efficacy of genetic racial difference while “plausibly denying” (Liu and Mills, 
2006) any racist intent. That is, by suggesting black athletic performance to be 
biologically-driven the debate can be rationalized as non-racial (Bonilla-Silva, 
2006). Further it allows any criticism to be inverted into a discourse on the 
stifling effects of ‘political correctness’ on ‘objective science’—witness 
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Houghton’s comments above. And, second, the reduction of sporting ability and 
performance to racial genotypes has the effect of “tilt[ing] the debate towards 
biological forms of explanation” (St Louis, 2005). While not outrightly dismissing 
social, cultural, economic, and historical influences as a means to explain racial 
sporting performance, they can be subordinated to the basic notion of intrinsic 
biological differences. What we can therefore take away from discussions of the 
relationship between race, sport, and the black body is the way the appeal to 
science is able to mutate the preoccupation with difference into an apparently 
palatable form and how, as St Louis notes, the way 
objective scientific analyses of the racial distribution of athletic ability 
depend on the continual reification of racial biological heredity within a 
social and cultural hierarchy that is analogous with the standard ideas 
expressed in the longer tradition of racial science (St Louis, 2005). 
 
Keeping these insights close at hand, we can begin to examine what 
Donna Haraway (2000) has dubbed the contemporary “pseudo-objectivity” of 
“genetic fetishism” within the context of New Zealand rugby. In addition to 
Houghton’s thesis above, biology makes its way into several recent 
commentaries on Polynesian sporting performance. We can start with the 
comments from Laidlaw and Romanos above. Yet these comments are merely 
indicative rather than exhaustive. For instance, we see several examples in the 
Brown Factor documentary I discussed in Chapter 2 and in a similar 60 Minutes 
feature which appeared a year earlier. Both take on the guise of popular science 
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to discuss the social phenomenon of sports, and both reinforce common-sense 
ideas about innate racial-biological differences. As is the case in these 
documentaries, all too often the science is made all the more dubious—if it 
wasn’t already—by the sources of (so-called) evidence—athletic trainers and ex-
players. Jim Blair, the All Black fitness trainer, for example, is quoted as saying in 
a piece on “the growing dominance of Pasifika players” (Paul, 2007) that 
significant numbers of Pacific Islanders possess fast-twitch muscle which 
makes them genetically predisposed towards building mass around the 
critical joints and being quick over short distances. It is an explosive game 
and the Islands produce huge numbers of explosive athletes. 
 
A ‘rugby trainer’ for the Auckland team makes an all but identical claim in his 
suggestion that 
The Polynesian is basically mesomorphic, tending to be big-boned, 
muscular, of average height, wide shoulders, thin waist. They have a 
higher proportion of fast twitch muscle fibre which is the source of their 
explosive style and the reason they are fast over short distances and the 
reason you don’t see Polynesian marathon runners (cited in Hyde, 1993, p. 
69). 
 
Regardless of the speaker the appeal to science is important here. By making 
claims to scientific ‘truth’ public attention is deflected away from the whole 
question of Polynesian achievement in sport. Belief in the value-neutrality of 
science secures unconditional public support for ‘facts’ which appear to 
transcend the material conditions of Polynesian lives. Arguably, the myth 
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becomes more effective because its speakers are able to exploit the public’s belief 
in the putative objectivity of science (Machamer and Wolters, 2004). 
These pseudo-scientific distortions are also significant because of the way 
in which they are frequently assimilated into common-sense discourse. With 
specific regard to scientific accounts of the racialized athletic ability of 
Polynesians, Te’evale (2001) has noted how the “popular media absorb these 
[scientific] theories quickly and turn these hypotheses into truisms.” One rugby 
writer, for instance, suggests “Fijians have such an aptitude and flair for playing 
on the wing” because they have more of “what physiology experts describe as 
‘fast twitch fibres’” (Knight, 2007). Many similar stereotype-confirming incidents 
of Polynesian sporting ability have been incorporated into common rugby lore. 
Perhaps the most popular rhetorical technique is the recurrent allusion to 
Polynesians players as ‘gifted.’ Surveying the New Zealand press over the past 
three years we find a rich number of examples. For instance: Ma’a Nonu is 
variously described as “naturally gifted” (Paul, 2006, p. 67) and a “sublime natural 
talent” (Campbell, 2005, p. 21); Viliame Waqaseduadua is a “God-given talent”, a 
“natural athlete” (Knight, 2006, p. 66); according to All Blacks assistant coach, 
Isaia Toeva has “all the physical gifts” (Paul, 2006); Rodney So’oialo is “an 
instinctive player” (Johnstone, 2006, p. 17); and, Sitiveni Sivivatu is cited by 
Laidlaw (2006) as “another classic example of a completely instinctive, 
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undisciplined firecracker of a player”; His team-mate Josevata Rokocoko is 
similarly praised for his “sinuous talents.” “Just where all that leg power and 
electrifying acceleration come from only a physiologist really knows” he 
concludes (p. 28). These are, of course, merely a sampling. Nevertheless, and 
without any direct appeals to science, they clearly demonstrate how a cultural 
stereotype can be made to look like a natural difference. 
One of the corollaries of the myth of athleticism is its implication that 
Pakeha athletes are “disadvantaged relative to [Polynesian] athletes, who are 
seen as having superior physiology” (Davis and Harris, 1998, p. 158). In 
particular, what the myth connotes is that whereas Polynesian players are born, 
Pakeha players are made. Hokowhitu, for instance, identifies how “in contrast to 
Päkehä sportsmen, whose achievements are attributed to human endeavor, 
Mäori men are said to achieve through innate physical attributes” (2004, pp. 271-
272). Again, we see obvious parallels to the North American context. There, an 
analogous stereotype reinforces the assumption that white athletes are more 
hardworking than black athletes. As Bruce (2004) notes, the suggestion that 
white athletes are more hardworking has the effect of devaluing the work of 
black athletes, implying that they are lazy while further naturalizing black 
athletic skill as being biologically-based. This line of reasoning is certainly patent 
in New Zealand rugby. Consider, for instance, former All Black Grant Fox’s 
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suggestion that “Polynesian players were naturally superior to us in talent, but a 
lot of them aren’t there now because they didn’t have the discipline…They 
lacked the right kind of mental attitude. They’d just turn up and play” (quoted in 
Hyde, 1993, p. 67). This is by no means a new stereotype. The Fijian-born winger 
Bernie Fraser’s frequent non-selection for Wellington during the mid-1970s was 
widely attributed to coach Ray Dellabarca’s lack of appreciation for Fraser’s 
“casual attitude to discipline.” 
One of the more famous instances is the case of the Samoan-born winger 
Va’aiga Tuigamala. He was infamously dubbed ‘Mr. Beep’ after finishing last 
among 90 All Blacks trialists undertaking a ‘Beep Test’ to measure cardiovascular 
fitness. The result was put down to Tuigamala’s ‘low key’ approach to training. 
According to his biographer, for Tuigamala, “low key, read doin’ nuthin’ until 
the season got serious” (Howitt, 1993, p. 118). Neazor (1999) describes Tuigamala 
in a similar fashion, claiming he had a penchant “for not doing the hard yards at 
training” (p. 215), and that it was “not an unknown occurrence” for Tuigamala to 
“allow the training to slip” (p. 214). Interestingly, Jonah Lomu’s feats at the 1995 
World Cup—now played ad nauseam on a near-weekly basis—almost didn’t 
happen after he was left out of early-season All Black games. The most 
frequently postulated reasons were his fitness and lack of defensive nous. As The 
New Zealand Rugby Almanack described it, “Lomu appeared to lack a willingness 
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to totally involve himself in a game and maintain concentration for 80 minutes. 
There was never any doubts about his ability but there were many about his 
mental application and casual defensive work” (1996, p. 16). Like Tuigamala a 
few years earlier, Lomu was also publicly chided when he failed selectors’ fitness 
tests at a summer training camp prior to the World Cup. Finally, a more recent, 
and certainly more colorful, example was the All Black assistant coach Steve 
Hansen’s description of Jerry Collins’ training habits: “You’ve heard the saying 
train like Tarzan, play like Jane. Well he trains like Jane and plays like Tarzan. 
He’s not a guy who sets the world alight at training” (TV3 News, Thursday June 
8, 2007). 
If science underpins these (spurious) appeals to the genetic, or gifted, 
basis of athletic performance, it has the added bonus of appearing non-racist 
through recourse to racial differences as opposed to racist assertions of superiority 
and inferiority. Yet if we consider this ‘hard work’ versus ‘natural talent’ 
discourse more closely it has an implicit hierarchy: it is a discourse of capacity 
and deficiency. In particular, while the Polynesian may be the better athlete, the 
Pakeha is the better thinker. Though it is seldom stated as such natural 
athleticism is also a matter of intellect, of the capacity in this case for ‘rugby 
nous.’ Intelligence first takes the guise of what Fox calls ‘mental attitude’ above. 
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His comments are virtually reiterated by Auckland club rugby coach Dale 
Atken’s suggestion that 
the Polynesian boys are athletically explosive and that’s paralleled [by] 
their concentration as well. When you make the comparison with the 
white guys, well they are 80-minute toilers. They are the workers (quoted 
in Matheson, 2001, p. 32). 
 
As a further example broadcaster Murray Deaker, when asked of his opinion on 
the pitfalls of the browning of rugby, is quoted as saying: 
I think it is fantastic that we have this wonderfully athletic group of 
people [Polynesians] that can help us develop our sport…But I also want 
the hard, tough white farmer to be a part of my All Black side…[The type 
of player who is] there for 80 minutes in a ruthless uncompromising way 
(quoted in Matheson, 2001, p. 32). 
 
Finally, the familiar saying that the exception proves the rule contains a good 
deal of wisdom in the case of Hinton’s (2005) description of Fijian-born winger 
Sitiveni Sivivatu: 
What is it they say? Great players are born, not made. Certainly in rugby 
it’s a fact that some of the island boys are exactly the keenest of trainers. 
Heck, they’re the first to admit it. They love the 80 minutes of explosive 
outpouring that constitutes a match. It’s the other six days a week they 
sometimes find hard work. And Smith had no reason to imagine Sivivatu 
would be any exception…Smith had no inkling he had anything different 
than the norm on his hands. Wonderful talent, sure…But he would have 
to be ridden hard to prepare adequately for the cauldron of test rugby at 
the very highest level. At least that’s what his coaches thought…Sivivatu 
may be a genius in terms of pure rugby talent but he has a work ethic, too 
(p. 36). 
 
It is striking how much these comments play on the (tired) cultural 
stereotype that Pacific people are lazy and have a disregard for time (see Blea, 
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2003). More recently manifest in the popular perception that Pacific peoples 
operate ‘on Island time’, this stereotype in fact has a long, ingrained history 
beginning with colonial and missionary descriptions of Islanders as “ignorant, 
lazy, and childish” (Gegeo, 2000, p. 76). Interestingly, in his famed portrait of The 
Colonizer and the Colonized, Albert Memmi suggests the “often-cited trait of 
laziness” seems to enjoy “unanimous approval of colonizers” the world over 
(2000, p. 205). Apropos of Polynesian rugby players, Memmi writes that 
the accusation has nothing to do with an objective notation…By his 
accusation the colonizer establishes the colonized as being lazy. He 
decides that laziness is constitutional in the very nature of the colonized. It 
becomes obvious that the colonized, whatever he may undertake, 
whatever zeal he may apply, could never be anything but lazy (p. 207). 
 
Islander indolence, the stereotype of being “incurably lazy” (Kanahele, 1986), is 
thus another prime example of how a colonial trope is persistently embedded in 
the present. 
As suggested, it is not only a matter of mental attitude, but mental capacity 
which supposedly explains the differences between Pacific and non-Pacific 
peoples’ abilities on a rugby field. A lackadaisical attitude merely dovetails into 
the popular shibboleth that Pacific peoples lack application and are “difficult to 
coach in more strategic elements of the game” (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005, p. 214). 
The idea that Pacific players are short on tactical thinking is based on the 
widespread assumption that they either have little time for it, or, are simply 
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incapable of controlled, methodical play. The former is very much seen as a 
difference in rugby philosophy. Strategy, safety and efficiency are presupposed 
as anathema to Pacific players. Instead, they favor a brazen inventiveness that 
privileges display; they possess what is more popularly known as ‘Pacific flair.’ 
Positing a thesis as to why Fiji has been so successful at the abbreviated seven-a-
side version of rugby (while underachieving in the full-blown game), Chris 
Laidlaw’s comments on Fijian sides are indicative of such professed truisms: 
The Fijian game was built around dexterity, an eye for a sudden gap and 
the ‘hail Mary’ pass which might or might not have come off. The Fijian 
sevens team prospered on the back of this inventiveness but the 15-a-side 
game languished as more and more positional specialization became 
necessary (Laidlaw, 2006, p. 28). 
 
The supposed inability, or unwillingness, of Pacific peoples to play ‘structured’ 
rugby is again a trope grounded in history. In an immediate sense, Neazor (1990) 
provides the example of the popular image of ‘Pacific Island’ players who began 
to emerge in New Zealand rugby during the 1970s. He recounts how New 
Zealand rugby at the time was “all about forward domination, patterns, few risks 
and winning” (p. 162). Pacific Islanders, in contrast, were said to play with a 
particular ‘style’ at odds with this ordered approach. Not surprisingly, given the 
tendency among Pakeha to make unfounded associations between Pacific 
Islanders and Maori (Ross, 1994), these stereotypes mirrored those of Maori 
rugby during the same period. In his examination of Maori rugby in New 
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Zealand, Malcolm MacLean (2005) notes that while All Black rugby through the 
1970s and 1980s was criticized for being “dull, staid and rigidly controlled” (p. 
14), it found its counter in a “traditional style” of Maori rugby, that was 
“somehow freer than regular, All Black rugby” (p. 12). 
For Pacific Islanders similar descriptions coalesce in the notion of flair 
(Te’evale, 2001). Flair embodies notions of unpredictability, innovation and 
unorthodoxy (Schaaf, 2003). For instance, in a press conference prior to the 
Pacific Islanders inaugural game against Australia, Wallabies coach Eddie Jones 
expressed his confidence that the game would be a 
real spectacle [because] The Islanders generally play with a lot of flair and 
natural talent. They like to throw the ball around and run it from 
anywhere, which usually makes for a fast, free-flowing match…The great 
strength of Pacific Island rugby is that it is visually exciting and full of 
passion and open play (Island debut against Australia, 2004). 
 
Winning for Pacific Islanders is thus allegedly secondary to ‘having a go’, to 
running with the ball, to spontaneity. As former All Black Frank Brunce once put 
it, “the brown guy, he likes the free-flowing game, he likes to roam in the wide 
open spaces” (quoted in Kayes, 2002, p. 1). The (purported) flair of Pacific 
peoples is viewed with ambivalence among rugby writers and the public 
(though never actually challenged). Some such as Paul (2007) see it as a boon, the 
“Pacific influence” bringing “pace, power, [and] flair” to the “happy melting 
pot” of New Zealand rugby. Others are more circumspect in their suggestion 
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that there will always be a need for the more methodical (read, intelligent) 
‘Pakeha style.’ This is borne out in the ambiguous suggestion of Laidlaw (1999) 
that, while the “view that Pacific Islanders are not thinkers on the field and that 
too many of them in a team means a dumbing-down of tactical acumen isn’t a 
very persuasive argument”, it is nonetheless 
a factor in some teams because, on balance, Maori and Pacific Islanders 
tend to be more instinctive than measured in their approach and every 
team at the top level needs someone who can plot and plan, adjust and 
adapt. There will always be a place for a Grant Fox [a former Pakeha All 
Black] and that is what is so appealing about rugby (p. 183). 
 
The exemplary illustration of this type of thinking is the Auckland rugby team. 
As already noted, Auckland is widely touted as the “largest Polynesian city in 
the world” (Immigration New Zealand, 2008), and unsurprisingly, its teams 
through the years have including a large number of Pacific peoples. Though 
Auckland has won the National Provincial Championship (NPC) a record sixteen 
times, it has frequently been chided for fielding “too many Polynesians” (Gray, 
2004). For instance, after winning the NPC is 2003, Auckland began 2004 with 
several heavy losses. As they sat near the bottom of points table, one rugby 
writer was moved to ask “What’s wrong with Auckland?” (Gray, 2004). Replying to 
his own question, he proffered the high quotient of Pacific players, the coaching 
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staff (notably all of Pacific-descent), and too many “flash-Harry players”12. In a 
similar vein, Leggat suggested that while “some of the broken-field running 
[was] outstanding…when they needed to tighten up, to play percentages, there 
was reluctance” (p. D4). Seemingly with Auckland in mind, Tea Ropati in an 
article titled “Island Magic” (Ropati, 2006) sums up this course of reasoning: 
The superlatives are endless when it comes to commentary about 
[“Polynesian”] athletes. However, there are also an endless number of 
detractors who make assumptions about natural physical strength and 
superior skill being diluted by lack of discipline and ability to concentrate 
(p. 20). 
 
As an aside, it is perhaps worth noting that Auckland went on to win the NPC 
the following year—with the same coaching staff and largely the same playing 
personnel. The current side, of which nearly two-thirds have Pacific ancestry, is 
also the reigning NPC champion. 
We can situate many of the criticisms against Pacific players in the history 
of their emergence onto the New Zealand rugby scene in the 1970s and 80s. At 
this time, the emphasis in the New Zealand game was on results and control—
typified by the dour All Black sides of the period (MacLean, 2005). That Pacific 
peoples ostensibly lacked the ability to play patterned rugby was more or less 
“the ultimate crime in New Zealand rugby of the time” (Teaiwa and Mallon, 
2005, p. 214). Borrowing from MacLean (2005), it could easily be said that there is 
                                                          
12 Flash Harry is a British slang reference to “a self-confident, vulgar person” (Rees, 2002; for its 
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something of “colonialist subtext” to such presentments of the ‘Polynesian 
game.’ Just as he puts it of Maori, that Pacific peoples were viewed as free-spirits 
on the rugby field had the effect of perpetuating the view that their “happy-go-
lucky relationship with the world determines their performance” (p. 12). Such 
stereotypes are also very much in keeping with “continuing Anglo-European 
claims that the people of Oceania are premodern, primitive” (Wood, 2003, p. 
355). For instance, despite the fact that rugby had been played in the Islands 
since at least the late 1800s, Pacific players were widely thought to have a 
childlike naïveté when it came to the finer points of the game. Neazor’s account 
of one all-‘Samoan’ team is typical of such paternalistic depictions: 
It took a bit of getting used to local conditions. The wearing of boots was 
not familiar to the players—they were used to playing in bare feet, 
strapped with bandages. Only the referee’s insistence they be properly 
shod saw them don accepted rugby footwear. They had no uniforms. 
They struggled with the cold. They did have plenty of skill and 
enthusiasm, enjoyed running with the ball and the physical aspects of the 
game (1999, p. 161). 
 
As suggested earlier, fictional and social scientific—particularly, anthropological 
(White and Tengen, 2001)—discourses have long infantilized the Pacific region 
(Taouma, 2004). Hardly surprisingly, early migrants were viewed through the 
same lens. The worn cliché that Pacific Island society was somehow less—or 
un—civilized, that Pacific Islanders were carefree ‘children of nature’ (see 
                                                                                                                                                                             
origins see Rees’ Cassell’s Dictionary of Word and Phrases). 
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Campbell, 1980; Edmond, 1997), no doubt influenced popular perceptions of 
Pacific players as lacking in rugby nous. 
Interestingly, commitment, or a lack thereof, has also been cited as a 
reason for the relative lack of participation by Pacific Island players within New 
Zealand cricket13. The traditional line of thinking, as sociologist Greg Ryan 
describes it, was that “Pacific people who played cricket at school turned to 
softball or rugby or away from sport thereafter as they did not wish to spend the 
time in training” (Ryan, 2007, p. 81). Sometimes in rugby, though, it was seen not 
as a matter of choice, but make-up. Simply put, it was not just a case of Pacific 
Islanders not wanting to play structured rugby, it was that they couldn’t. In his 
discussion of the pitfalls of sporting ‘success’ for Pacific peoples, Tasileta 
Te’evale explains how focusing on achievement in sport fed the “popular theory” 
that Polynesians did not have “the mental faculties and discipline required to 
succeed in other more serious areas of life” (Te’evale, 2001, p. 222). Despite the 
emergence of players such as Michael Jones, Graeme Bachop and Walter Little in 
the 1990s and Tana Umaga or Rodney So’oailo more recently—all players 
widely-regarded for their on-field intelligence—the assumption that Polynesians 
have “no ability to concentrate or understand game plans” (Ropati, 2006, p. 20) 
remains one of “biggest myths in New Zealand sport” (Smith, 2005). 
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Players and coaches are among those who promulgate this myth—and 
sometimes even Pacific players themselves seem to have accepted the stereotype. 
Again, Tuigamala is an illustrative case. His early success was touted as the effect 
of his natural ‘physical advantages’, as opposed to learned skill. This is certainly 
intimated in a former coach’s recollection of his first meeting with Tuigamala: 
“We broke into groups and discussed tactics. I gave Inga [Tuigamala] a 
hypothetical situation and asked him where he would stand. ‘I wouldn’t have a 
clue,’ he replied. ‘No one’s ever told me to stand anywhere. I just like to get the 
ball and run!’” (quoted in Howitt, 1993, p. 29). Dubbed both ‘the Beast’ and ‘the 
Big Black Bus’ by the media in his later career with the All Blacks, he was often 
used as an impact or set-up player, running directly at defenses rather than 
around them. 
Although he is more specifically discussing the “athletic black body”, 
when Ben Carrington’s notes how black athletes are “invariably described” as 
lacking “cognitive capabilities—unlike their white peers,” he could just as easily 
be discussing Pacific players like Tuigamala. Certainly, as Anthony Hubbard 
points out, “pundits still sometimes claim that Pacific players lack strategic sense 
or can’t stand much pressure” (Hubbard, 2006). This intelligence myth is 
compounded by the under-representation of Pacific peoples in positions of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 Most (in)famously by former international captain, now broadcaster, Martin Crowe (see Crowe 
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authority, a fact observed by well-known local radio host Martin Devlin when 
asked about rugby’s Pacific “success stories.” “It’s a tough subject to get around 
when you consider the hierarchies” he is quoted as saying. “The coaches, the 
management, the administration; they’re all white faces and they are continuing 
to be white faces. You’re allowed to play but you’re not allowed to run the game. 
I mean how does that work?” (The browning of Kiwi sport, 2004, p. 5). On a related 
line is the way the accomplishments of Pacific players are frequently put down to 
the guidance or skill of a white coach or white authority figure. Again, this 
echoes research on portrayals of African American athletes in the United States, 
wherein images of successful Black athletes are all too often “mitigated and 
undercut by the overwhelming predominance of white images… [particularly] 
individuals in positions of authority” (Wonsek, 1992, p. 454). This not only places 
the black players “in a secondary and entertainment role”, but may also “serve to 
reassure the White majority that its dominance is not really being threatened” 
(Wonsek, 1992, p. 454; see also see Andrews 1996; Robbins, 1997; Thomas, 1996). 
The most obvious example in New Zealand rugby is the case of current 
All Black coach Graham Henry. Henry was coach of the famed Kelston Boys 
High School First XV during the 1980s and 90s when the school “emerged as a 
rugby powerhouse, dominating the Auckland Secondary Schools scene, then at 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sorry for Maori cricket claims, 2003). 
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national and international level” (Burnes, 2004, p. 22). The success of teams 
during his tenure has been largely attributed to the Pacific talent drawn from 
Auckland’s western suburbs as well as Henry’s ability to “press the right buttons 
for many of these Pacific players” (Burnes, 2004, p. 23). His later successes with 
the Auckland Colts, Bs and Auckland A are explained in similar terms. One 
writer, praising “The Henry Touch”, suggests Henry has “been able to get the best 
out of [the] raw ability and flair [of Pacific players] and harness it to the team 
structure within the very best of New Zealand sides” (Burnes, 2004, p. 23). He 
goes on to compliment Henry’s supposed ability to approach Pacific players in a 
different manner, particularly as compared to palagi. The rationale, as Henry 
himself explains it, is that “what motivates Pacific Islanders is quite often 
different to what motivates a Pakeha boy. They are brought up differently” 
(quoted in Burnes, 2004, p. 24; cf. Shaaf, 2003). After the 3-0 whitewash of the 
British and Irish Lions in 2005, followed by the Grand Slam tour of the Home 
Unions, Henry was voted the IRB’s Coach of the Year. Explaining the All Blacks’ 
“annus mirablis” British reporter Brendan Gallagher puts their success down to 
Henry’s ability to “realise and fully incorporate the massive rugby talent of New 
Zealand’s ‘island’ [sic] community and, it has to be said, those who started their 
playing careers on the islands themselves” (p. D5). He goes on: 
nobody has a clearer understanding of the islanders rugby-playing 
potential and mentality…He was brought up, taught and lives in that 
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multi-racial community and sees diverse types as strength, not a 
weakness. He has a sure touch in assessing their ability and rather than 
trying to change and water down their exuberance and physicality, he has 
allowed them to express themselves fully (p. D5). 
 
In this passage Gallagher reaffirms those stereotypes already mentioned: 
physicality, flair (in this case “exuberance”), and a different “mentality.” The 
essentialisms are obvious. First, in affirming that Pacific peoples are “different,” 
he presents presumed cultural practices as fixed features. Seemingly innocuous, 
this discourse of cultural difference masks “the repressed history of racism that 
haunts and permeates it” (Gagnon, 2000, p. 130). Second, the image of Pacific 
players as innately physical, as lacking the capacity to play ‘traditional’, 
structured, disciplined rugby, is plain in Gallagher’s choice of language. ‘Diverse 
types’, ‘mentality’, and the notion of ‘exuberance’, for instance, reek of 
primitivism, framing as they do Pacific players as “childlike, intuitive, 
spontaneous” (Kuper, 1988)—which Henry has, wisely, not ‘watered down’—as 
well as physical; they are ‘modern primitives’ (Torgovnick, 199) of “strong backs 
and weak minds” (Pickering, 2001, p. 124). 
If the spectacle of Polynesian bodies triumphant in rituals of masculine 
competition reinforces the fixed idea that Pacific men are “all brawn and no 
brains” (Carrington, 2001), this racialized polarity is therefore also heavily 
dependent on white paternalism—embodied in a figure like Henry. The 
Polynesian athlete in essence becomes a kind of raw talent to be honed by white 
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guile. A good example is the objectification of Toeava. Pitched from relative 
obscurity into the All Blacks at 18, Toeava was immediately dubbed by the press 
as a “special project” of the All Blacks coaches (Kayes, 2007, p. 7). Since making 
his debut he has been dogged by the tag that he has “all the physical skills”, but 
is prone to lapses in concentration, that he is, in short, “enigmatic” (Kayes, 2007, 
p. D1). The coaches, however, have countered that Toeava has “unlimited 
potential”, and is a “calculated development move” (quoted in Hinton, 2007, p. 
31). The media have subsequently caught on to this discourse, portraying Toeava 
as something of an object to be manipulated. In a two-page article in the Weekend 
Herald, for instance, the author begins by describing Toeava as a player who 
seems “as if he born to fulfil no other purpose [than play rugby]” (Paul, 2006, p. 
68). Noting how rugby has changed in recent years he suggests that “superstars 
can no longer be plucked off the peg. Instead they have to find raw materials and 
fashion them into a product that excites” (emphasis added). In this vein, Toeava 
for the author becomes a testament to the All Black coaches’ “faith in their own 
ability…[to] polish Toeava into a world sensation” (p. 68; emphasis added). 
Notably, Toeava is only the latest in a long line of players of Pacific heritage to be 
described in such terms. There are, for example, strong echoes of the career of 
Lomu in Toeava. Both are young Pacific peoples who made their debuts at the 
age of 18. Both have become known more for their physical talent as opposed to 
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acumen. We could say also that both are or became physical ‘specimens’ in the 
literal sense of being typed and circumscribed. This is what I mean by my 
allusion to objectification. Typical of binary thinking, both players are 
constructed in terms of their oppositional difference. They become objects to be 
shaped and controlled. It is in this way a modern repetition of colonial 
culture/nature opposites: the Polynesian other is denied subjectivity—that is, 
objectified—while the known (white) self is separated from the known object 
(Richards, 1980). 
Further contributing to this objectification of the Polynesian body is the 
underlying inversion and juxtaposition of cultured whiteness with Polynesian 
bodily primitivism. Indeed, much of what I have discussed to this point has its 
basis in the critique of the distinction between (Polynesian) instinctive 
corporeality and the expansive (white) mind. The issue here resonates with 
primitivism/civilization dichotomy outlined in the first sections of this chapter. 
In particular, it returns us to barbarism and the myth of the savage. As a 
reminder, the ideal, while extolling the virtues of the primitive, played on a 
binary which posited Oceanic men as the antithesis of their Western 
counterparts. Modern, productive intellectualism contrasted a “primitive people 
who represented a return to a more simple, natural lifestyle” (Green, 2002, p. 
222). Polynesians were, in essence, closer to the state of nature (Steinmetz, 2004, 
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p. 255)—the corollary being that they were inherently physical beings. In the 
contemporary (sporting) context this is manifest in the widely-circulating 
preconception that Polynesians embody “a natural ease and athleticism that was 
not far removed from the supposedly primitive, animalistic world of the pre-
European period” (Ryan, 2007, p. 74). Whilst this may seem to be a reiteration of 
ideas already visited, it moves us further into the connection between the natural 
body and animalism. In racializing the mind/body distinction ,colonial science 
and its antecedents recast alternative behavioral patterns as an indication of 
cognitive faculty (St Louis, 2005). Civilized reason was separated from the 
passions of the body, rationality from pre-rational primitivism. Notably, the 
latter was linked—both implicitly and explicitly—to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century discourse of the soulless animal (Hokowhitu, 2004a). 
An embedded tendency of colonial discourse, animal metaphors have 
frequently been redistributed and recycled in the world of contemporary sport. 
As Carrington (2001) has noted with regard to the black athlete, the sports media 
in particular “have played a central role in biologising black performance via 
their constant use of animalistic similes to describe black athletes” (p. 94). This 
colonial discourse certainly has contemporary resonance in framing Polynesian 
masculinity. Already we have seen how Va’ainga Tuigamala was labeled ‘The 
Beast.’ Lynne Star has noted how his team-mate, Michael Jones, was described 
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on more than one occasion as a “black panther” (Star, 1992). In fact, there are 
several comparable references in Jones’ official biography, Iceman (McConnell, 
1993). For instance, a former team-mate recalls of playing with Jones: “We used 
to talk about this panther-like guy advancing, arms out, hands like graceful claws 
that were so lethal, pouncing on the first-five and then bustling him aside to get to 
the second-five” (p. 53; emphasis added). Comparing Jones to Waka Nathan—a 
player in fact known by his nickname ‘The Black Panther’—Fred Allen, the 
former All Black coach, cites “The same panther-like movements. A tremendous 
anticipation, that also reminded me of Waka. They both have that natural fluid 
motion, but are so lethal with it” (p 54; emphasis added). When not been called a 
“freak” (most famously by the English captain Will Carling), Jonah Lomu was 
also repeatedly described via animal comparisons. In a recent reflection piece 
following Lomu’s retirement, for instance, reporter Paul Lewis explains how 
“around the world spectators marvelled at the power of the man. It was rugby 
majesty in the same way there is a sense of majesty when a lion brings down a 
wildebeest—he was a terrible, compulsive sight in full flight” (2006, p. 71). 
Similarly, after the 1995 World Cup, Britain’s Observer labeled Lomu “a beast”, 
Australia’s Telegraph “a stalking lion”, and the English defense coach, Phil 
Larder, simply called him “an animal.” Again, this is just a sampling of the way 
reporters and announcers are fond of making comparisons of Polynesian athletes 
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with animals. The underlying implication, of course, is that Polynesian players 
are not ‘true’ athletes, they are instead “animals of natural ability” (Lees, 1995, p. 
245). 
If notions of Polynesian athleticism are coded through plays on animalism 
(a coding, it should be said, in which performance dominates [Carrington, 2001]), 
Polynesians can also be brought closer to nature through their purported 
‘savagery.’ As already discussed, savagery in the (neo)colonial context has a 
double(d) meaning. First, in the sense of remaining ‘different,’ set apart by a 
connection to nature. But, second, as the noble savage was transformed into its 
ignoble counter (as colonialism sought its justification), ‘savagery’, which had 
been closer in meaning to ‘primitive’ than ‘barbaric’, came to insinuate violence 
and inhumanity (Bullard, 2000; Ellingson, 2001). These new, violent savages were 
“a people whose treacherous attacks could never be predicted or fathomed” 
(Page, 2000). Further to laziness and lack of leadership, intellect, and discipline—
attributes embodied by, and implied in, presuppositions of natural athleticism—
the media also replay, at the connotative level, the myth of the violent Pacific 
savage. This stereotype was established early in New Zealand rugby. In the 
1960s and 70s a common objection to Pacific Island immigration (among 
‘mainstream’/white New Zealanders at least) was that Pacific Islanders were 
responsible for increasing crime (Mitchell, 2003). For instance, Andrew Trlin, in a 
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1972 study of Aucklanders’ attitudes to Western Samoan immigrants, found that 
83 percent agreed or somewhat agreed that Western Samoans had a reputation 
for bad behaviour (Trlin, 1972). By the mid-1970s the populist politician Robert 
Muldoon—who, only weeks later, would become Prime Minister on an anti-
immigration ticket—claimed in a newspaper column that he had the support of 
the “vast majority of New Zealanders” in calling for “criminal Islanders” to be 
sent home. If, as the stereotype went, Pacific Islanders had a tendency toward 
violence, criminal behavior, and immorality (Mitchell, 2003; Ross, 1992; 
Spoonley, 1990), these conceptions then spilled onto the rugby field. Echoing 
early ideas about Maori (see Hokowhitu, 2004; Star, 1992), Pacific players were 
dogged by the perception that they were savage, emotionally impulsive, 
aggressive, and violent. As historian Paul Neazor describes it in the 1970s: 
There were suspicions about players from the islands back then. For quite 
a while it was automatically assumed each tackle would come in hard, at 
neck level. Some [Pacific Islanders] became highly excited during matches 
and did silly things. There had been one or two spectacular punch-ups, 
involving both players and spectators, which had received bad newspaper 
publicity (1999, p. 162). 
 
Neazor’s language here is itself loaded, yet he rightly identifies the racialization 
of Pacific players at the time. Just as Pacific peoples were elsewhere defined as 
“problems in terms of the ‘normal’ functioning of New Zealand society” 
(Spoonley and Trlin, 2004), the dominant view of the “Pacific island style of 
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play” (Robson, 2006, p. 12) was that it ran counter to what “New Zealand rugby 
was all about” (Neazor, 1999, p. 162). 
Pacific players subsequently continue to be stigmatized as “savage, 
emotionally impulsive, aggressive, and violent” (Hokowhitu 2002, p. 266). Press 
coverage is quick to single out the ‘Pacific Islanders’ or ‘Pacific Island 
immigrants’ involved in any objectionable on-field acts. Neazor (1999) has noted 
how Polynesians have had to “not only be as well disciplined” as other players, 
but have also “to be seen to be immaculate in all areas of performance” (p. 163). 
To see why we need to consider that wider violence and crime in New Zealand 
has been shown by a number of scholars to be decidedly racialized (Loto et al, 
2006; Mayeda et al, 2001). This is especially true with regard to youth violence 
and gang affiliation. The media has popularized the suggestion that Pacific 
children live in “chambers of unrelenting violence”, that “broken bones [are] the 
norm because [Pacific Island] parents were bashing their kids” (Perese, ?, p. 1; 
see also Stünzner, 2005). Tapu Misa has likewise noted the way images of 
Polynesian men are “overshadowed by this one-dimensional image” (Misa, 
2006). One infamous example of both the persistence and acceptance of these 
stereotypes occurred in May 2000 when then Prime Minister Jenny Shipley 
delivered a speech in parliament warning “decent New Zealanders” of Pacific 
Islanderss “climbing into your back windows” (quoted in Teaiwa and Mallon, 
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2005, p. 211). The representation of athletes in the media commonly reflects and 
reinforces this more general portrayal of Polynesian men as deviant, unruly, 
violent, and animalistic in popular cinema, television, literature, and the print 
media. In this way Polynesian athletes become context, text, and subtext, as a 
case study of the larger dynamics of racialized stereotyping. 
One of the more obvious ways in which ‘racial’ violence infects and affects 
the coverage of Polynesian athletes again relates to style of play. While explicit 
allusions to Polynesian players as violent are now (generally) avoided, there are 
clear racialized meanings in the supposed penchant among Polynesians for 
‘physical play.’ Like that of natural physicality, this myth has also achieved 
something of the level of common-sense ‘truth.’ As Deaker (1999) states matter-
of-factly, “the Polynesian boys…love the physical side of the game, particularly 
the big hits and crunching tackles” (p. 162). Another memorable example is the 
media descriptions of the All Blacks’ first test against Samoa in 1993; the majority 
of these views summed up in Howitt’s (1993) description of the game as “a 
tough, physical encounter. Indeed, it was branded the ‘battle of the Bandage’ 
with so many players requiring first aid treatment for cuts and bruises, among 
them Inga [Tuigamala], who was trampled by giant winger Lolani Koko” (p. 
159). Elsewhere he similarly describes how the Samoans “play with hard, 
physical aggression. Indeed, they are recognised as the hardest-tackling rugby 
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players in the world, and any side which takes on Manu Samoa knows its 
physiotherapist will be working overtime afterwards soothing the cuts and 
bruises” (p. 111). While such statements can perhaps be read as (faint) praise, it is 
an ambiguous stereotype. On one level it accords with the ‘hard man’ trope 
which has been central to rugby and the formation of masculine character in 
New Zealand (Phillips, 1987). In the 1950s and 1960s, in particular, the most 
celebrated (Pakeha) All Blacks were players like Colin Meads and Fergie 
McCormick, both of whom personified “the most physical and aggressive 
elements of masculinity” (Phillips, 1987, p. 121). Yet for Polynesians it is 
something of a split discourse: it is ambivalent because, for Polynesian athletes, 
to be ‘aggressive’ is to also be prone to what Carrington (2001) describes as 
“‘wild’ moments when they supposedly lack the cognitive capabilities—unlike 
their white peers—to have ‘composure’ at critical moments” (p. 94). Put simply, 
Polynesians are framed as more likely than white players to cross the line 
between ‘tough’ and ‘rough’ play. 
A good example, is the inaugural tour of the Pacific Islanders rugby side. 
In their opening game in Australia the Pacific Islanders lost by 15 points to the 
Wallabies but the home side came out of the game with injuries to star players 
Joe Roff, George Gregan and Clyde Rathbone. This led Australian coach Eddie 
Jones to criticize the manner in which the Pacific Islanders played, particularly in 
 270 
regards to their tackling. “I don’t expect players’ heads to be attacked,” Jones 
said. “That’s what they did…I don’t know if it was a game of rugby tonight. I’ve 
got nothing to say about them” (quoted in Growden, 2004). The game against 
New Zealand a week later was described in one headline as a “Bruising Pacific 
win for [the] All Blacks” (Budge, 2004). In the text, the article goes on to suggest 
that the All Blacks were “pleased to get through the match without any apparent 
injury problems.” Sour comments were also on display after an earlier game 
against Fiji. In the post-match press conference the All Blacks’ coach, John 
Mitchell, labeled Fiji’s tackling as “questionable”, while All Black captain Reuben 
Thorne complained of “repeated offside infringements and late hits.” Such 
claims are typical of how those singled out as ‘aggressive players’ are 
increasingly more likely Polynesian. Frequently it is an issue of ‘temperament’—
another polite allusion to the intellectual inferiority discourse outlined above. 
Perhaps the best illustration is the Samoan-born All Black Jerry Collins. 
Sometimes labeled as a liability after receiving several suspension for high 
tackles (Johnstone, 2006), Collins has been variously dubbed “scary Jerry” (Ford, 
2006, p. B2), “The Intimidator”, “enfant terrible” (Paul, 2006), and a “thug” 
(Welham, 2006, p. E1). Seldom is it ever mentioned that Collins attented high 
school on a mathematics scholarship and currently attends Victoria University. 
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Off the field, the connection between athletes and crime also cannot be 
comprehended outside the paradigm of race. The media interest in criminality 
among Polynesian athletes parallels the ideology which naturalizes Polynesian 
men as criminals in a number of New Zealand institutions. That is, the 
connection between athletes and crime is informed by the larger discursive 
framework of racialized body politics. While currently there is no research which 
explores this criminal-athlete discourse, a number of recent high-profile incidents 
demonstrate the connection between the frame of athlete-as-criminal and the 
wider discourse of Polynesian criminality (see Bingham, 2006; Robson, 2006; 
Watson, 2007). In cases involving Pacific peoples rather minor infractions were 
turned “into moral dramas…of national import” (King and Springwood, 2001, p. 
116). By contrast, those involving Pakeha All Blacks were largely downplayed. 
For instance, after Fijian-born winger Sitiveni Sivivatu admitted to slapping his 
wife during an argument, the story led both major television evening news 
bulletins and was front-page on all of the country’s major daily newspapers the 
following morning. For many, the incident raised the specter of intimate partner 
violence and affirmed the popular belief that family violence is considered 
‘normal’ or acceptable in Pacific cultures (Paterson et al, 2007). Conversely, when 
Troy Flavell was charged with assaulting an Auckland bar patron and Norm 
Maxwell—both players are Pakeha—with assaulting a bar doorman (see All Black 
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forward to appear in court, 2005), their cases were made light of as minor incidents 
which had more to do with their drinking than their race. Revolving as it does 
around racial stereotyping, this coupling of Polynesian athletes and crime is 
significant in the way it is linked to wider fears about Polynesian violence: the 
construction of Polynesian athletes as criminals, in essence, provides ‘evidence’ 
as to the criminal nature of all Polynesian men. 
Finally, it perhaps worth commenting on how these ‘moral panics’ can be 
connected to the forms of ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ racism I have discussed above. In 
particular, the way in which the interplay between race and criminality become 
naturalized. Though more directly commenting on African American athletes, 
Andrews’ (2000) description of new racism is salient here. As he explains it: 
The new cultural racism was prefigured on the virulent assumption that 
these innately physical males would be misbehaving were it not for the 
involvement of their natural physical attributed in the disciplinary mores 
and stringencies imposed by the dominant (sporting) culture. According 
to the spurious logic, within sporting activity African American males 
have found salvation (if only temporary…) from themselves (p. 182). 
 
Such arguments seem equally applicable in the case of Polynesians in New 
Zealand sport. For instance, Lomu has made frequent references to the “cauldron 
of violence” that would have been his life without rugby (Dye, 2004). Similarly, 
as violence among ‘Polynesian gangs’ grabbed headlines when father of three 
Faafetai Lafolua was killed during an alleged ‘turf war’ in 2005 (see Welham, 
2006), the local press featured several stories of Pacific athletes brought up 
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around violence and poverty. In one, titled “Sport Gave Joe Way Out of Wild Life”, 
Joe Galuvao is posed as a shining example of someone who “rose from being a 
south Auckland street thug to a millionaire star” (Reid, 2005, p. 7). “I have the 
same background to a lot of these kids” he is quoted as saying. “I’m just lucky I 
had sport to fall back on and [the] people involved believed in me” (p. 7). He 
goes on to suggest that “at the end of the day it is up to the kids to make the right 
choices” (p. 7). In a similar feature, the All Black winger Josevata Rokocoko also 
testifies to how “it’s easy to drift away at school. I had friends at the local rugby 
club who directed me through…It could have been a whole different story for 
me otherwise” (quoted in No Gangs for Stars, 2005, p. 7). The circulation of these 
types of high-profile success stories are notable in the way in which they 
obfuscate the deleterious effects of structural racism and late twentieth-century 
capitalism (Leonard, 2006). As is only too obvious in the comments by Galuvao 
(“at the end of the day it’s up to the kids”), it further condemns those struggling 
in the Pacific community for lacking the personal resolution that is required to 
achieve in New Zealand society. What is also apparent is the way in which, while 
contemporary New Zealand culture may be dominated by a fascination with the 
assumed superior physicality of the Polynesian male body, it simultaneously has 
the capacity to provoke fear because of the ever-present threat it poses. Thus, the 
Polynesian body is always in need of containment and control. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Pacific Nomads or the New Labour Mercenaries?: ‘Samoan’ Athletes, Neocolonialism, 
and the Rugby World-System 
 
In a recent article in the Journal of Sport and Social Issues, Joseph Maguire suggests 
research into sport labor migration to be “in its relative infancy” (Maguire, 2004, 
p. 477). Such a comment may seem somewhat surprising coming from a scholar 
who has been concerned with the issue for over a decade, and given sports 
geographers took interest in the migratory flows of athletes as far back as the 
1980s (Bale, 1984). Nevertheless, Maguire is wholly correct in his contention that 
“much more work needs to be done, both at a conceptual level and with regard 
to empirical inquiry” (p. 477). This is especially true concerning research on sport 
labor migration to, from, and within the South Pacific. This is somewhat 
surprising given the extent of what could be called the ‘Pacific sporting 
diaspora.’ Small in number by comparison to, say, the migration of African 
footballers to Europe (see Bale, 2004; Darby, 2000, 2002, 2006; Darby et al, 2007), 
the migration of athletes from the Pacific Islands is nonetheless not only far-
flung, but worthy of mention in cultural and economic terms. If one were to 
include sporting ‘nomads’ (Maguire and Bale, 1994) from Australia and New 
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Zealand even more so. The significance of player migration becomes even more 
apparent if comparative scale is taken into account. Populations in the Pacific 
Islands are more likely to range in the tens-of-thousands than millions yet they 
well and truly ‘punch above their weight’ when it comes to the field(s) of 
international sport. Players who trace their roots to Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji, for 
instance, are remaking the sports of rugby and rugby league in Australia and 
New Zealand (Robson, 2006), and increasingly ply their trades in places much 
further afield like England and France. Elsewhere, in the United States Pacific 
Islanders are heavily overrepresented in the National Football League and 
Division-I college football, with the influence of American Samoa in particular 
being likened to that of the Dominican Republic in baseball (Garber, 2002). 
The “talent pipelines” (Falcous and Maguire, 2005, p. 141) emanating in 
the Pacific are yet, however, to receive any sustained scholarly analysis. To be 
fair, the popular media have afforded the subject some attention. Accusing New 
Zealanders of ‘poaching’ talent from the Pacific is a favorite of the British press, 
and while the reportage is often less than balanced they have—albeit indirectly—
raised the very pertinent issue of just what problems player migration poses for 
Pacific Island teams like Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. Similarly, and again in the 
United States, the flow of footballers from American Samoa and Hawaii to the 
mainland U.S. has been the focus of a popular documentary (Spear and 
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Pennington, 2005) and made the occasional appearance within the mainstream 
press—in no instance, however, have the potential cultural and economic pitfalls 
of this unidirectional migration been seriously questioned. Even if we stretch ‘the 
Pacific Islands’ to encompass Australia and New Zealand, athletic talent 
migration has been given scant academic attention within the sociology of sport; 
the one exception being the work of Camilla Obel on the migration of rugby 
union players and coaches from, and to, New Zealand14 (see Obel, 2001; Obel and 
Austrin, 2005). There is a developing literature on sports labour migration among 
Pacific-rim countries, and especially those centred in Japan (for example, see 
Chiba, 2001, 2004; Takahashi and Horne, 2004, 2006), but absorbing the Pacific 
Islands into the ‘Asia-Pacific’ further marginalizes Pacific Islanders—the people 
with whom the Pacific was initially identified. Doing so is also to risk furthering 
the rhetoric of international organizations (such as the United Nations) that has, 
vis-à-vis the so-called ‘Asia-Pacific region’, seen the Pacific Islands effectively 
subsumed by Asia (Hau’ofa, 1998; Keown, 2005). The aim of this ‘Asia Pacific 
ideology’ is to bring into alignment “economic and political forces that in and of 
themselves do not point to a common regional structure” (Dirlik, 1998, p. 16). 
Similarly, for whatever productive dialogues there may be between ‘Pacific 
                                                          
14 Admittedly, we could add the work of Romanos (2002) and Howitt and Haworth (1999), and, 
in the case of Australia, Hall (2000), though these are largely descriptive, in either a polemic 
(Romanos) or journalistic (Howitt and Haworth, Hall) sense. 
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Island studies’ and ‘Asia-Pacific studies’, the history and experiences of Pacific 
Islanders cannot be understood merely as an adjunct of Asia (Diaz, 2004). 
Though I am somewhat apprehensive about using such a term (given the 
extant tendency to view all Pacific Islanders as ‘Polynesian’), this chapter—
indeed, like this dissertation—is primarily concerned with the islands of 
‘Polynesia’, and Samoa in particular. To these I wish to add both New Zealand 
and United States, insofar as the they constitute a triangulated scape/circuit in 
the social, cultural and political experiences of what Vincente M. Diaz labels 
“Diasporic Natives” (2004, p. 186)15. My allusion to a scape/circuit here is a 
conscious attempt to underscore how talent migration is not necessarily a 
singular nor unidirectional process. With regard to rugby and the Pacific Islands, 
talent migration is generally framed as troublesome, the process seen as 
benefiting the ‘importer’ (in this case, New Zealand) at the expense of the 
‘exporter’ (Tonga, Fiji, Samoa). Yet, the matter is more than simply a Pacific 
‘brawn drain’ (Bale, 1991). Certainly, as I have already suggested, “hegemonic 
[rugby] powers” such as New Zealand or Australia, “exploit other [Pacific] 
nations” in their search for talent (Maguire, 2004, p. 477), but such a geo-
economic hierarchy must be considered as fluid rather than fixed. In the first 
                                                          
15 Epeli Hau’ofa, and Teresia Teaiwa (among others) have argued to replace the term “Pacific” 
with “Oceania.”The contend that the term “Oceania” best captures a seafaring heritage that 
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instance, Pacific rugby players do not adhere easily to the regime of some long-
established migratory order. Most difficult to ignore are the ongoing dislocations 
between ‘home’, citizenship and identity. There has never been a necessary 
coincidence between family, state and capital accumulation for Pacific people, 
and athletic migrants are no different in that regard. They shuttle back and forth 
between multiple sites of business and family—the sojourn is never singular. I 
argue in this chapter, then, that, to understand the lives and significances of 
Pacific athletes, ‘migration’ must be imagined beyond linear and clearly defined 
experiences of subordination and exploitation. Theirs are multispatial and 
fragmented lives. 
Secondly, I wish to consider how mobility asks questions of ‘the nation’s’ 
demands for singular loyalty. It creates a disharmony in the scheme of national 
space, and challenges too the imagery articulated with the nation. I examine 
these emergent affective attachments and new legal definitions of ‘citizenship’ 
through debates about national player eligibility, professional player labour 
markets, and rugby nomadism. One the one hand, I consider how the Pacific’s 
rugby nomads offer a politically and theoretically appealing prospect in the way 
they unsettle concepts such as nationhood, citizenship, immigration and ethnic 
identity. This is not to say that the significance of national borders has 
                                                                                                                                                                             
wields the potential to disrupt the insularity and essentialisms attached to the term “Pacific” 
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diminished, but to suggest instead that they offer a potentially more ‘flexible’ 
(Ong, 1999) understanding of national citizenship. On these lines, I also maintain 
that the brawn drain has increasingly given way to a process of ‘brawn 
circulation.’ Labour migration in this sense is not simply a matter of uprooting 
and restaking. The much more mobile world of rugby is rife with multiple and 
complex trajectories and returns. 
In the second half of the chapter, however, I also consider the dangers of 
over-extending this discourse of nomadism. There is a particular risk of 
committing what could be called a metonymic fallacy. Pacific rugby players are, 
to borrow from Pels (2000), “privileged nomads” and thus by no means 
representative. As Mitchell (1997) reminds us, it is still unclear that “everyday 
transnationals” are necessarily empowered by their dislocations and 
transgressions. The experience of and access to transnationalism also remains 
differentiated, with sometimes sharp distinctions setting apart cosmopolitan 
exiles and mass immigrants or refugees. In addition, we need to recognize that, 
even among the high-flying rugby elite, migration is by no means impedance-
free. Obviously, the increasing mobility of rugby professionals stands in stark 
contrast to tightening strictures on other forms of migration (Mahmoun, 2001), 
but recent literature also demonstrates how even the highly-skilled “do not live 
                                                                                                                                                                             
without, as Teresia has theorized, “losing the Native” altogether. 
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in a ‘frictionless world’” (Willis et al., 2002, p. 506). The migration trajectories of 
highly skilled migrants, like those of lower-skilled migrants, are mediated by 
regulations of state power, market operations, and wider schemes of ethnic and 
racial differentiation (Ong, 1999). Rugby’s powers-that-be have in like fashion 
not only sought to nurture but regulate mobility. Thus, I also investigate how 
Pacific rugby players are subject to forms of governmentality within the 
arrangements and organizations of both the state and transnational networks. 
Sport Labour Migration Research: Players on the Move, Nations Under Threat? 
The international migration of athletes is by no means a new 
phenomenon, and we subsequently need to take into account the historical depth 
of migration viewed in longue durée. Certainly, in giving weight to the historical 
context in which to situate contemporary athletic migration, we need to consider 
at least the rise of a global sporting system (Maguire, 1999). While we have all 
but come to accept the global nature of today’s sporting infrastructure (from 
governing bodies, leagues, tournaments, to teams and individual athletes), sports 
in their pre-modern form were more likely to be localized pastimes, lacking in 
any broader coherence and influence. During the nineteenth-century, however, 
the development from local variation to international standardization 
“fundamentally transformed sport” (Van Bottenburg, 2001, p. 2). Essentially, the 
diffusion of a relatively few proto-modern sport forms has steadily replaced a 
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disparate array of localized sporting practices. Several different lines of influence 
are behind this shift, and are laid out clearly in works such as Bale (2003), 
Guttmann (1978) and (1996), Maguire (1999), and Van Bottenburg (2001). What is 
interesting to note from the these analyses, however, is the part played by, what 
could be called, ‘athletic mobilities.’ ‘Travel’, in its various forms (people, objects, 
images and information [Urry, 2000]) is seen not only a result of the global 
sporting system, but an active constituent of these interconnected practices and 
institutions. 
On a fundamental level, migration has had a significant impact on the 
establishment and diffusion of modern sport forms. Imperialism, in tandem with 
the emergence of industrialism during the late 1800s, had the effect of spreading 
sports like football, rugby, and cricket along the channels of economy and 
empire. As Van Bottenburg (2001) explains, initially “English and later other 
Western sailors, merchants, employees, and administrative officials took sports 
to all parts of the world” (p. 6). Soldiers, teachers and missionaries also 
introduced many outside Europe and the United States to ‘Western’ sports. 
There were, of course, differing rates of adoption (according to factors such as 
local tradition [see Bale, 2003]), yet these groups undoubtedly served as catalysts 
for the “metamorphosis from sportlike pastimes into standardized and 
internationally recognized sports” (Van Bottenburg, 2001, p. 2). Though 
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ultimately it was the rise of Western hegemony generally, and the 
standardization, regulation, and codification of sport—what Norbert Elias (1986) 
famously coined the “sportization of pastimes”—specifically, that account for the 
globalization of modern sport, these early sojourners were crucial to laying the 
groundwork for the contemporary movement of athletic labour. Modern 
sporting forms may have had their roots in the West, but it is the very hegemony 
of Western sport forms that explains why we are now seeing a migration of 
athletic labour in the reverse direction(s). The multi-nationalization of player 
personnel in the sports leagues of Europe and North America is very much a 
case of “‘them’ being here because we were once there” (Gilroy, 2005). 
Mobility has been crucial to the development of sport in other ways. The 
rapid population growth in the urban industrial ‘core’ states around the late 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was fuelled by migrant labourers. The 
burgeoning, yet highly concentrated, urban populace provided the context for 
the professionalization of sport: on one hand, elites popularized (and 
rationalized) sports as a means of regulating popular physical culture, fostering 
discipline, and, hence, boosting industrial production, all ultimately leading to 
the codification and standardization of sport—two key elements aiding the 
diffusion of sporting forms (Miller and McHoul, 1998); on the other, and in more 
prosaic terms, a large, and by comparison compact, population provided the 
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willing clientele for the wannabe sporting entrepreneur (Guttmann, 1978). Again, 
the history of professionalization is discussed in greater detail elsewhere (see 
esp. Elias and Dunning, 1986) and certainly migration is but one factor. Yet 
mobility, in all its guises, was crucial to the reworking of local sporting 
traditions. Coming back to the organizational development sport, as Obel and 
Austrin (2005, p. 174)—citing the seminal work of Elias (1986)—argue, “teams 
traveling to play against other teams in geographically distant locations provoke 
the need for the establishment of uniform rules and autonomous administrative 
arrangements.” As they elaborate, because teams were “traveling from one place 
to another, it was necessary to ensure uniformity of the game…the collective 
travel of teams between places promotes…rationalization of the rules of the 
game” (p. 174). 
If player mobility has been critical to the development of modern, ‘global’ 
sport, and remains an established feature of sport in the global village, its 
frequency and extent have grown in recent decades. This is no surprise given 
that modern sport has been shaped by the same unfolding globalization 
processes that have radically altered other areas of cultural and economic life. 
The growing complexity of these migrations is reflected in fact that new patterns 
have emerged which no longer neatly fit the uni-directional ‘from-and-to’ 
models, nor the categories of ‘host’ or ‘migrants.’ This mobility is also accelerated. 
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Critics may be right in suggesting that the age of mobility is nothing new (Favell, 
2001; Jordan and Düvell, 2003), yet globalization has generated qualitatively 
different patterns of migration, in terms of not only geographical reach and 
character, but also speed and frequency. These sojourns are also characterized by 
their pervasiveness and their impermanence. We can talk, then, of increases in 
magnitude and pace. There are far more ‘players’, and they move back and 
forward at greater velocity. 
If the movement of “sports workers” (Sayers and Edwards, 2004) across 
international boundaries has become one of the more notable characteristics of 
contemporary global sport, then, for various reasons it has also become one of 
the more contentious. Once largely demarcated along national boundary lines 
(the odd sport migrant being the exception that proved the homespun rule), the 
multinational composition of playing rosters has become a defining feature of 
many nationally-based professional sport leagues and teams. In some cases these 
“border crossers” (Maguire and Stead, 1998) have been incorporated, if not 
exploited, by leagues as part of their efforts to broaden their regional or national 
bases. A growing number of leagues have recognized the value of ‘foreign’ 
players in creating an international ‘brand.’ In many cases the proliferation of a 
class of globally-mobile athletic migrants has led to a re-structuring and/or re-
evaluation of local sport cultures in both ‘host’ and ‘donor’ settings. For instance, 
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the multinationalization of NBA player personnel—during the 2004–5 season, 
the NBA featured 77 ‘international’ players drawn from 34 different nations—has 
transformed the manner in which the league presents itself to the global market 
(Andrews, 2003). Whereas the initial globalizing of the NBA centred on selling 
the league as an explicitly American entertainment product, with high profile 
players (mostly African American) being used as the embodiments of what it 
meant to be ‘American’, prompted by the emergence of players such as Tony 
Parker (France), Dirk Nowitzki (Germany) and Pau Gasol (Spain), the league 
began marketing itself differently to those who follow their local NBA heroes 
from afar (Fisher, 2003). The NBA spectacle now exists and operates in numerous 
national locations at one and the same time, albeit customized—through media 
and commercial relationships with locally-based broadcasters and sponsors—
according to the player-oriented interests and expectations of local audiences. In 
this way, the NBA has moved from being an exclusively externalized form of 
‘glocal’ strategizing (the selling of the NBA through its explicit Americanness) to 
one that, in specific settings, additionally engages internalized forms of ‘glocal’ 
strategizing (the mobilization of local affinity for specific NBA players) 
(Robertson, 2005). 
Other leagues have followed a similar path. Since 1994, Major League 
Baseball (MLB) has offered Spanish language broadcasts as part of their effort to 
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cater to fans in Central and South America and the Caribbean who wish to tune 
in to watch their home-grown heroes. The new crop of talent from Asia has 
prompted the league to do the same for fans in places such as Japan and South 
Korea. In some cases teams are even signing players from Asia (Japan in 
particular) in the hope of luring more players, and thus fans, from the region (for 
example, see Charlton, 2007). Major League Soccer (MLS) also signs international 
players as part of their efforts to attract foreign fans (as well as attain a degree of 
international credibility). MLS Commissioner Don Garber, for instance, has 
asserted that the success of the league depends on courting the “ethnic fan” both 
home and abroad. Of other leagues in North America: in 2002, 25 percent of 
players in the WNBA were born outside the United States, with 23 different 
nations being represented (Miller et al, 2003); the National Hockey League (NHL) 
sports players from places like Russia, Sweden, Finland, and Slovakia, and in 
2006, 13 of the league’s 30 clubs were captained by foreign-born players; there 
were 80 foreign-born players, from countries as disparate as Ghana and Ukraine, 
in NFL training camps last year. In 2004 the League also introduced the NFL 
International Development Practice Squad Program; and, in NASCAR—“once a 
bastion for Southern-based drivers” (Coble, 2008)—Dario Franchitti, Jacques 
Villeneuve and Patrick Carpentier will all be in the running for rookie-of-the-
year honors in this year’s Sprint Cup Series. Finally, even the (ostensibly) 
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amateur NCAA is also in on the act. While college coaches in many sports have 
been recruiting internationally for decades, the proportion of foreign players in 
many Division I sports has doubled since the beginning of the decade. In tennis, 
30 percent of the male players were from outside the United States in 2005-6, as 
were 23 percent of male ice-hockey players, 14 percent of female golfers, 13 
percent of all skiers, and 10 percent of male soccer players. Numbers are also 
growing fast in basketball, gymnastics, swimming, and track (Wilson and 
Wolverton, 2008). Some teams are even made up entirely of foreign players (see, 
for example, Wilson, 2008). 
Players, though, are not just coming to North America. It is important to 
stress that player movements are multi-directional. For instance, in basketball not 
only do elite foreign players migrate from lesser leagues to the NBA and its 
feeder and developmental leagues, American players lacking the ability to play 
professionally in the USA have the opportunity, depending on their talent level, 
to make the reverse journey (Maguire, 1994). A similar phenomena is found in 
baseball and hockey. Japan has been a popular destination for North American 
baseball players since Don Newcombe became the first MLB player to sign and 
play with a Japanese team in 1962. Meanwhile Canadian “blade runners” have 
found homes in hockey leagues across Europe and Japan (Maguire, 1996). This 
too is to ignore the more ‘nomadic’ of sports on the global circuit. Tennis and 
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golf, for example, have constantly-shifting ‘workplaces’ which give rise to 
transitory, interweaving migration patterns among their athletes. 
And, of course, North America is not the only sporting ‘hub.’ The global 
dimensions and routes of athletic migration, for instance, are nowhere more 
apparent than in the sport of soccer. Undoubtedly, it is also the sport which has 
received the most sustained critical attention in the sociology of sport 
(Bromberger, 1994; Darby, Akindes, and Kirwin, 2007; Duke,1994; Lanfranchi, 
1994; Magee and Sugden, 2002; Maguire and Pearton, 2000a, 2000b; Maguire and 
Stead, 1998, 2002; Moorhouse, 1999; Stead and Maguire, 1998a, 1998b, 2000a, 
2000b). This is perhaps hardly surprising given that soccer is, without question, 
the most popular team game in the world. It is played in more than 100 countries 
and has approximately 1.5 million teams and 200 million active players 
worldwide (Morgan and Summers, 2005). Soccer’s governing body, FIFA, also 
promulgates a decidedly internationalist mission. This has led to “growing ties 
and relationships between soccer’s national associations, international 
confederations and the world body” (Darby, 2006, p. 162) and a prodigious 
growth of the “football business” (Conn, 1997). Many of these developments can 
be located within the same processes of globalization that have radically 
reshaped global sports culture over the course of the last century (including 
developments in technology, communications, transportation, and finance). Of 
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particular salience is the way new technological and organization innovations 
have “compressed (Harvey, 1989) the time taken to communicate and travel 
across large distances. The distances between places and people have been 
dramatically reduced. Unsurprisingly, this has led to a sharp growth in the 
organized export of sport workers. Older internal or regional migration networks 
are also now scaling up and going global. 
This globalization has not always been seamless. In part there has been a 
historic power shift from national sporting organizations to evolving systems of 
regional and global governance. Yet sports laborers are by no means a 
“deterritorialized resource” (Ong, 1999, p. 15). As Darby (2006, p. 162) notes, the 
global sport labor market is “underpinned by the complex and, at times, 
fractious nature of the processes on which international socio-economic and 
political relations have been conducted.” This raises a number of pertinent 
issues. Firstly, labor rights. Labor rights are heavily contingent upon variously 
situated legal and political institutions. Some have argued that these rights now 
originate in international organizations like the UN or EU (e.g., Baubock, 1994). 
However, labor rights by and large still derive from the laws and institutions of 
the state. These two levels frequently come in conflict, seen, for instance, when 
the capacity of the state to control immigration is constrained by the wider 
regional or global laws and institutions. At the very least labor rights vary 
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markedly cross-nationally and over time. The rights enjoyed by sport migrants 
likewise vary considerably depending on the sport or country or region. So, for 
example, athletes in individual sports generally enjoy a greater level of flexibility 
and mobility than those playing a team sport, while athletes in the EU are 
relatively freer in their labor than their counterparts in North America where 
employment rights are generally more restrictive (Maguire and Pearton, 2000a). 
The movement of athletic talent across national borders also raises 
questions about the impact on both host and donor countries. In some case the 
influx of offshore talent can engender hostility. As Maguire and Pearton (2000a, 
p. 180) point out with regard to European football, local labor unions “have 
sought to protect indigenous players by arguing for quota and qualification 
thresholds to be applied to potential migrants.” They note how this concern 
frequently extends to the development of national teams when “the presence of 
overseas players denies indigenous players access to elite teams and could thus 
lead to personal and national under-development” (p. 180; see also Maguire and 
Stead, 2005). Some such as the former AC Milan owner Silvio Berlusconi take the 
opposite tack arguing that there should be no restrictions on sport migration. For 
Berlusconi “the concept of the national team will gradually become less and less 
important. It is the clubs with which the fans associate.” King (2006) concurs that 
then new dominance of world football’s pre-eminent clubs is “necessitating a 
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transformation of the national teams…as the transnational regime becomes more 
established, club football, concentrated at the biggest clubs, will become 
relatively more important in relation to the international game than it has in the 
past” (pp. 246-247). In a similar vein, Maguire (2000) suggests that in soccer the 
international form of the game is “less important than the club form…it has often 
been more important and more prestigious to play for Manchester United or 
Liverpool than for England or Wales.” There is obviously some danger in 
overextending these arguments given that national identity politics continue to 
underpin soccer’s largest events such as the African Nations, European, and 
World Cups (Maguire and Pearton, 2000a). Further, Rowe (2003) suggests that 
“clubs still retain a ‘national’ brand irrespective of the composition of their 
playing and coaching staff and of their shareholder register, and their players are 
still expected to return to ‘home base’ in their respective continents for peak 
international sports tournaments like the World Cup” (p. 286). 
The debate does, however, raise interesting questions about national 
identity and identity politics, particularly those relating to allegiance and self-
identity (Maguire et al, 2002). Maguire et al raise the possibility that for some 
athletes national teams are “‘flags of convenience’ to ensure they are able to 
display their talents to a worldwide audience on a global stage” (2002, p. 38). 
Some commentators have been cynical about athletes who adopt to play for 
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another country when motivated either by money or fame. Describing the 
situation in Britain’s Independent newspaper, Corrigan (1995) writes: 
If your country doesn’t need you, find one that does. This is the slogan of 
the age for the ambitious and nationally mobile sportsman. Patriotism 
may well be, as Johnson alleged, the last refuge of the scoundrel, but it is 
the first casualty of the shrewd professional who wants to add an extra 
dimension to his earning capacity. 
 
Questions over “flexible attitudes toward nationality” (Polley, 2004, p. 25) have 
been a particularly prominent theme in English county cricket (Maguire and 
Stead, 1996, 2005). Under present regulations, each county is entitled to register 
two overseas players. The consequence is that a number of players, clubs, and 
agents have sought to utilize British ancestry or residence in order to gain 
eligibility for ‘overseas’ players, thus avoiding being counted under the quota. 
For some this is cause for concern. As the BBC noted in 2001, “the alarming 
number of players born in South Africa and Australia currently on the county 
circuit has raised fears that home-grown youngsters are being denied 
opportunities.” Player motives have also been questioned, highlighted by the 
case of the English-born cricketer Andrews Symonds who has subsequently gone 
on to play international cricket for Australia. Symonds now plays as an overseas 
player for the English county side Kent, but many were angered by the fact that 
he had previously declared his eligibility for England in order to play as a non-
overseas player for Gloucestershire. 
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In some instances critics have also questioned whether players who 
become eligible to play for a country by way of ancestry or residence show the 
same level of commitment to their adopted country (Gilroy, 1991). This is 
especially true when such a player in turn competes against his or her 
‘homeland.’ In a particularly provocative example, in 1995 the magazine Wisden 
Cricket Monthly published an article titled “Is it in the blood?” by Robert 
Henderson which questioned the commitment of foreign born players to English 
cricket (Henderson, 1995). The cricketers’ associations condemned the article 
while two players of Caribbean descent, Phillip DeFreitas and Devon Malcolm, 
filed defamation suits (see Marqusee, 2001). Pertinent to the present analysis is 
the case of players of Pacific Island heritage who play for the All Blacks. A 
favorite shibboleth of some media pundits is that these players do not play with 
the same intensity or commitment when they face Fiji, Tonga, or Samoa. In his 
autobiography the Samoan-born All Black Vai’inga Tuigamala recounts how he 
was approached by a coach prior to the All Blacks first test against Samoa in 1993 
who asked Tuigamala whether he was even capable of playing in the match 
(Tuigamala, 1993). In both of these cases suspicion as to the depth of their 
commitment can be traced to their ‘ethnic’ background, provoking interesting 
questions about the links between cultural traits, patterns of behavior, and 
‘legitimate’ citizenship. In this way sport can be seen as something of 
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battleground over debates of national identity, of who does/doesn’t belong as a 
member of the nation. As Houlihan (1997) observes, controversy about the place 
of sport migrants in national sides “keep questions of citizenship and national 
identity at the forefront of public debate and provide a surrogate for debates 
about immigration policy and the granting or refusal of refugee status” (p. 122). 
It is likely that much of the discomfort over national eligibility stems from 
migration’s potential to erode the historical relationship between sport and 
national identity. As David Rowe (2003) has noted, there are few sports that have 
not—“either voluntarily or under duress—been aligned with some conception of 
nation” (p. 285). Hardly surprisingly, the prospect of athletes changing their 
national affiliations (especially as fortunes change) “is viewed by many to be at 
odds with all that international sport is taken to represent” (McCutcheon, 2000, 
p. 129). Yet more and more athletes qualify to represent more than one country 
and are able to choose their ‘sporting nationality’. The potential exists for athletes 
to also represent more than one country, or ‘switch’ their allegiance. These 
multiple or shifting nationalities disclose ambiguities and conflicts in terms of 
both nation and identity raising the difficult question about what it means to be a 
‘New Zealander’ (or British, or American, or so on). The sporting migrant, both 
embodied and imagined, condenses our concerns with ethnicity, space, time, and 
the politics of belonging (Westwood and Phizacklea, 2000). In particular, it 
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challenges the assumed congruence between citizenship and national identity. 
The origins and growth of liberal democratic citizenship have historically been 
closely aligned to the idea of legal membership of a polity or state (Torpey, 2000). 
In particular, citizenship was defined as the connection between the individual 
and the state, in as much as citizenship defined the state. However, as Hall et al 
(1998) have observed, “in the contemporary political and policy arena, much of 
the rhetoric of citizenship is about citizenship as an identity” (p. 309). 
One of the difficulties in this regard is the tendency to conflate citizenship 
and national identity. That is, the state is frequently conflated with the nation, 
just as citizenship with nationality (Oommen, 1997). Noting such a tendency, 
Delanty (p. 160) argues that “the dominant understanding of citizenship in 
modern times has…been shaped by conceptions of nationality”. The 
consequence is that debates about citizenship often turn into debates about 
nationhood, about what it means and what it ought to mean to belong to a 
nation-state (Brubaker, 1990). One of the central themes is to ask whether taking 
out citizenship should entail membership in both the state and the nation. This 
duality is recognized by Hammar (1990) who argues that, 
Even if citizenship in a legal sense implies membership of the state, it is 
often viewed to be just as much membership of a nation, especially in 
states where nation and state largely coincide…the two forms of 
membership are often mixed up and it sees to be very hard to distinguish 
them from each other. As the claim of most nation states is that there is a 
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congruence between state and nation, membership in one is taken to mean 
membership in the other as well (p. 37). 
 
Within such a model “there is no clear distinction between citizenship and 
national patriotism: the citizen is transformed into the patriot” (Delanty, 2000, p. 
161). 
Migration thus challenges the traditional and restrictive idea of political 
belonging in that it has become increasingly difficult to define citizenship on the 
basis of nationality—and, of course, vice versa. But a tension is created because, 
as Andrews and Cole (2002, p. 123) argue, despite the current “global moment” 
the “‘nation’ remains a virulent force in everyday lived experience.” As Smith 
(1999) asserts with specific regard to migration, 
The expansion of transnational migration has resulted in outbursts of 
entrenched, essentialist nationalism in both sending and receiving locales. 
In receiving cities and states, movements aimed at recuperating and 
reifying a mythical national identity are expanding as a way to eliminate 
the penetration of alien ‘others’ (p. 11). 
 
Some of the hostility against, or at least uneasiness about, sporting migrants can 
be read as embedded in resistance to the ubiquitous discourse about the ‘global 
cultural economy.’ It represents a (perhaps) less extreme form of the increasingly 
restrictive immigration policies enacted in many affluent Western states 
(including New Zealand [see Ward and Lin, 2005]) in recent years (Hampshire, 
2005). We need to recognize also the would-be hegemonic narrative in which 
place of birth and ‘authenticity’ are still accorded great social significance in 
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defining one’s nationality. In both the debate about and practice of citizenship, 
“the assumption seems to be that one’s original nationality is more binding and 
deeply felt and thus less problematic than one’s subsequently acquired 
nationality” (Shuck, 2002, p. 72). This leads alternative models such as dual, 
multiple, or flexible nationalities to be viewed in purely utilitarian terms; the 
greater the level of transnationalism in an individual’s life, the greater the 
ambivalence, divergence, and perhaps contrariety with the nation. To take up 
‘citizenship,’ then, is to not only have to negotiate the structures of state power, 
but also “new frameworks of social status and organization, with their 
concomitant cultural ideals and values” (p. 108). And, since borders are used to 
make difference, those who cross them potentially threaten to undermine and 
subvert the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As David Rowe (2003) usefully 
concludes, the “structural importance” of the nation therefore “persists despite 
the increasing circulation of sportspeople around the globe as part of the new 
international division of cultural labour.” 
The migration of sport laborers therefore raises questions about 
involvement in ‘home’ and ‘host’ societies and about what it means to cross 
borders or transgress boundaries. Some are uneasy at the fact that belonging and 
citizenship have become increasingly contingent. Neither now necessarily follow 
“a unidirectional, linear progression from nonbelonging to full belonging in a 
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nation-state over time” (p. 26). On the contrary, citizenship and belonging no 
longer obey the conventional understanding of migration as singular and 
implying a severing of ties with the ‘place of origin’ (Lie, 2001). It would 
therefore be wrong to assume a unidimensionality of athletic labour migrancy. 
As Maguire (2004) observes, “there are various iterations of, and motivations for, 
the sport migrant experience the variations of which depend on the sporting 
migrant’s range of movement, length of stay in any one given place, and level of 
remuneration” (p. ?; see also Bale and Sang, 1994; Magee and Sugden, 2002; 
Maguire 2004; Maguire and Stead, 1998). Most obviously, sports migrants, like 
migrants generally are no longer simply leaving a ‘place of origin’ for a ‘place of 
destination’, but are instead moving ‘back-and-forward.’ As a consequence, 
migration needs also to be conceived in new ways. The traditional, or ‘true’, image 
of migrants has long been synonymous with settling into a routine, in a 
particular locale—a kind of arrival-after-departure. The migrant was different to 
the temporary ‘visitor.’ The expectation that followed was, unlike the visitor, the 
migrant would gradually adopt a new national identity and transfer their 
allegiance to their new ‘home.’ Today such distinctions or ideas are not so easy to 
make or to hold. Such theories obviously cannot account for cases of ‘multiple 
crossings.’ Neither can they account for what could be termed ‘inter-periphery 
moves’, migration on the edges, as opposed to towards, the ‘core.’ These are only 
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two of the issues which have provoked the search for new paradigms with which 
to understand migration in the global climate. An important issue in this regard 
is not only how people move, but why. 
Traditionally, one of two general models has been adopted. First, a 
voluntarist push–pull model. According to this model, the primary motive to 
move is economic. As Papastergiadis (2000) explains, migration is seen as being 
“caused by twin and counterbalancing forces: people are ‘pushed out’ of 
stagnant rural peasant economies, and ‘pulled’ up towards industrial urban 
centres. This ‘push–pull’ model tended to see migration as being caused by the 
individual calculation of economic opportunity” (p. 30). Migration, though, is not 
always so logical in its paths it follows. Cultural factors—history, colonial ties, 
existing communities, familial ties, for instance—are also at play. The alternative 
to the push-pull model is what Papastergiadis (2000) calls the “structuralist 
centre–periphery model.” In this case capitalism as the driving force. Informed 
by Marxism, the centre-periphery model takes migration as “a link between 
industrial capitalist economies, which are at the center of the global economic 
system, and the traditional subsistence economies, which are at the periphery of 
the system” (The Unsettled Relationship, p. 67). The periphery is therefore 
dependent on the center for employment, while the center taps the periphery for 
cheap (and dispensable) labor. While this model has been rightly criticized for 
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over-emphasizing national over class inequalities as well as for failing to explore 
the creative, and potentially transformative, role of culture at the periphery, I 
nonetheless wish explore its relevance below. For now it is perhaps enough note 
that, at least taken in its most vulgar form, the centre-periphery model is guilty 
of subsuming agency to the structure of international capitalism. 
What is clear is that migration cannot be wholly explained in terms of 
rational choice nor structural determinism. This does not, however, mean that 
migration is a reflection of individual wish or preference. Instead, as Block (2005) 
argues, migration is perhaps best conceived as a series of overlapping systems 
working at three levels: macro, micro and meso: 
At the macro level, there is a consideration of the kinds of global forces 
discussed by the globalization theorists cited above: global politics, global 
markets, global ideologies, global media and so on. All of these macro-
level factors impact on the flow of individuals between and among 
countries. At the micro level, the human element is introduced in the form 
of individual values and expectations such as the desire to improve one’s 
standard of living or gain political autonomy. The meso level refers to the 
various networks that intercede between the macro and micro levels. 
These networks include social ties (be these family or occupational), 
symbolic ties (belonging to a particular ethnic, national, political or 
religious group) and transactional ties (e.g. reciprocity, solidarity, access 
to resources) (pp. 12-13). 
 
If we want to explain why people migrate analysis must therefore combine 
structural and external factors with situational ones that accounts for not only the 
roles of individuals but the formal and informal social networks that link them 
across space and time. 
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Moving into the sport-related literature, Maguire (1999) seems to be 
making a similar case for looking at political, economic, and social linkages at the 
micro, through meso, through macro level in his contention that the political, 
cultural, economic, and geographic issues and pressures that structure migrant 
lives, “interweave in a fashion where no one ‘factor’ dominates” (p. 104). As he 
states, “the motivation of [sporting] migrants cannot be reduced to any one 
cause” (p. 104). Throughout his career Maguire has been sensitive to the issue of 
connecting the experiential dimensions of sports labor migration to wider 
sociological issues. Much of his research is based on empirical evidence gathered 
through interviews with basketball players, cricketers, footballers, rugby players, 
and officials. From this primary data he has a developed a series of typologies of 
the sporting migrant. While these typologies have been critiqued by Magee and 
Sugden (2002) for being overly exclusive, they nevertheless are useful in the way 
they attempt to place ethnographic description “on a wider conceptual canvas” 
(Maguire, 1999, p. 104). And, if nothing else, they alert us to a number of the 
enabling and constraining factors that influence the decisions of the migrant 
athlete. 
Maguire has proposed several iterations of these typologies, in both single 
and co-authored works (Maguire, 1996, 1999; Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield, and 
Bradley, 2002). The differences, though, are negligible, and the same general 
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categories are retained in each instance. Thus, for consistency, I have chosen to 
quote below from Maguire (1999). The typologies are as follows. First, ‘pioneers.’ 
These are migrants who “possess a passion and zeal in promoting the virtues of 
‘their’ sport” (p. 105). As he writes elsewhere, “their words and actions can be 
seen as a form of proselytizing by which they seek to convert the natives to their 
body habitus and sport culture” (1996, p. 338). Second are ‘settlers,’ “who not 
only bring their sports with them but are sports migrants who subsequently stay 
and settle in the city where they ply their labour (1999, p. 105). They are 
characterized by the fact that they choose to stay within one team, or in one 
place, for a sustained period of time. A third type of migrants can be called 
‘mercenaries’, whom Maguire dubs “hired guns” (Maguire, 1993). He describes 
them as “motivated more by short-term gains” with “little or no attachment to 
the local, no sense of place in relation to the space where the currently reside or 
do their body work” (p. 105). These are players who, above all else, are 
motivated by financial reward. ‘Nomads’ differ, in contrast, by the fact that they 
seek a “cosmopolitan engagement with migration”, to be “a stranger in a foreign 
metropolitan culture” (pp. 105, 106). Of this category he cites the former 
Manchester United footballer Eric Cantona and one time Chelsea star Ruud 
Gullit. He also suggests surfers, snowboarders and other ‘extreme sport’ 
enthusiasts as motivated by a similar desire “to explore the experience of 
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difference and diversity” (p. 106). His final typology is that of the ‘returnee’ for 
whom “the lure of ‘home soil’ can prove too strong” (p. 106). 
Three of these six categories are paralleled in the work of Magee and 
Sugden (2002). Dropping the pioneer and returnee, they instead add the 
‘ambitionist,’ ‘exile,’ and ‘expelled’ migrant. In short, the ambitionist is variously: 
the athlete with a strong desire to achieve a “professional…career (anywhere)” 
(p. 431); the desire to play or compete in a particular place; or, the desire to play 
in a better quality league or against higher-quality competition. The exile is 
someone who, “for [sport]-related, personal, or political reasons…opts to leave 
his country of origin to play abroad” (p. 432). Finally, the expelled is “a player 
who is, in effect, forced to migrate” due to public, media, or official pressure in 
their ‘home’ countries (p. 433). Like Maguire, Magee and Sugden stress that these 
typologies are flexible, not mutually exclusive, and frequently overlap. Neither 
are they fixed, with players often fitting into two or more of the categories, or 
slipping in and out according to the stage of their careers. Like Maguire, Magee 
and Sugden are thus awake to the limitations of typologies. Given that they are 
intended to help make sense of, or impose order on, a wealth of detailed 
information, any typology is forced to strike a difficult balance between 
simplicity and complexity. Hence, they may not do sufficient justice to the 
phenomenon under study. They can also: distort reality or set up ‘ideal type’ 
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models that differ from the real world in significant aspects; be treated as ends in 
themselves, rather than a means to an end; or, may be “descriptive rather than 
explanatory or predictive” (Bailey, 1994, p. 34). 
This last point perhaps provides an apt segue for what I wish to discuss 
below. In particular, I am not concerned here with the consistency nor accuracy 
of the typologies the authors above propose. Nor am I interested in the 
explanatory significance of the distinctions they make. Instead I wish to use them 
as a “symptom of a beginning”—albeit to use this term in a different sense to that 
of Maguire and Stead (2005, p. 66). These typologies provide a degree of 
conceptual clarity and are useful tools of description, but unlike Maguire and 
Magee and Sugden I am not so much interested in the question of why players 
move, but a more general set of issues that their movement brings to light. I am 
thinking in particular here of both the identity politics which I refer to above and 
to issues of power and control in South Pacific, and indeed world, rugby. 
Germane to rugby in the Pacific Islands are questions about athletic labor 
migration and ‘de-skilling’, that of underdevelopment and/or dependent 
development, the rights of players, and the (cultural) politics about how one’s 
‘nationality’ is determined. I wish to now take up these issues before then 
attempting to provide a more general theory about how the migration of Pacific 
rugby players can best be understood. 
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“Last One on the Plane Turn Off the Lights”: New Zealand Rugby Joins the 
Global (Labour) Game 
In recent years there has been a large, and increasing, number of sports- 
men and women who have left New Zealand to take up professional sporting 
careers. Golfers such as Phil Tautaurangi and Michael Campbell have joined the 
golfing circuits of North America and Europe. Soccer player Ryan Nelsen has 
carved a successful professional career, first in the US, and more recently in 
England. Daniel Vettori (Warwickshire), Craig Spearman and Hamish Marshall 
(Gloucestershire), Andre Adams (Essex), Stephen Fleming (Nottinghamshire), 
and Scott Styris (Middlesex) are among the foreign-born players in English 
county cricket. With an America’s Cup win in 1995, and two defenses in 2000 
and 2003, New Zealand sailors have also been highly sought after; culminating 
with the infamous ‘defection’ of Russell Coutts, Brad Butterworth and six other 
Team New Zealand crew members to the Swiss syndicate Alinghi in 2003. The 
latter of these names aside, most of these migrants have been a source of pride 
for most New Zealanders, a counter to local insecurities about the relative 
weakness of domestic leagues and competition. Because the athletes concerned 
have generally left only to further their careers, these flows have been perceived 
to be to the betterment of New Zealand sport. When it comes to rugby, though, 
the ‘brawn drain’ (Bale, 1994) has become cause for concern. 
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The list of New Zealand rugby players who have headed overseas since in 
the past five years is long, and getting longer. Some 30 All Blacks or senior Super 
14 players headed overseas in 2007. Eighteen of these 30 departing ‘expats,’ were 
All Blacks. What has been most troubling for many New Zealand rugby fans is 
not so much the quantity of these players, but the quality. In the past, players 
that headed overseas were generally considered to be in their ‘twilight years.’ 
Many of the recent departures, however, have been young and at the peak of 
their careers. As one reporter described it prior to the World Cup: 
Just a few years ago, when a rugby player left New Zealand it was 
because he realised his chances of representing the All Blacks were shot. 
Dodgy knees, one shoulder reconstruction too many or a lack of faith by 
the national selectors often persuaded him to head overseas to wring 
every last dollar out of his body. Times have changed. Now, highly 
decorated All Blacks are not bothering to wait till their form starts to slide. 
They are leaving in their prime (Knowler, 2007, p. 2). 
 
Others too have observed the phenomenon. “There is nothing new in All Blacks 
playing in the northern hemisphere,” writes Paul Lewis in the New Zealand 
Listener. “[Only] this time it’s different. This time, they are going…as players at 
the height of their powers, not as fading stars looking for a final payday.” Even 
the IRB Chairman, Syd Millar, is concerned. “We’ve got to be very careful we 
don’t upset the balance so they are no longer major countries competing at the 
top” he recently stated. 
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Certainly, as the exodus of top All Blacks and Super 14 players to 
European clubs “turns from a trickle into a flood”, the national game is, as one 
headline recently put it, “feeling the pain” (Hinton and Ford, 2008). At the top-
level, player depth is certainly facing a test, exacerbated by the fact that only 
players contracted to the NZRU are eligible for All Blacks selection. Millar 
suggests the combined impact of the signings could be to “decimate” the All 
Blacks and New Zealand rugby (Foreign influx alarms rugby chief, 2007). And, it is 
not just the All Blacks who face questions over player quality and experience. 
Lower tiers are also effected. The player exodus is also “a worry for the Super 14 
and provincial coaches” (Knowler, 2007, p. 3). The raison d’etre of the Super 14 is 
“to generate enough media sponsorship income for the southern hemisphere 
rugby unions to pay elite players to stay with the local game and thus ensure the 
game’s continued viability and success” (Obel and Austrin, 2005, p. 183). In 
recent years, largely because of perceived decline in playing standards, crowd 
numbers for the Super 14 have been in decline. The five New Zealand franchises 
recently agreed in a statement that the “present competition is not financially 
viable and has reached a state where improvements are needed immediately” 
(quoted in Knight, 2007). The drop in fan interest is even more precipitous at the 
tier below the Super 14, the Air New Zealand Cup. Provincial unions described 
the crowd numbers during last year’s competition as “woeful”, calling 
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attendances at playoff games “a disgrace for the premier provincial competition 
in the world” (quoted in Knight, 2007). The financial effect of all this, allied to the 
growing perception that the Super 14 is no longer the pre-eminent club-based 
competition that it was, is obviously making player retention even more difficult. 
Departures also seem to likely to increase if a rumored ‘global season’, bring the 
northern and southern hemisphere together, is introduced, or a proposed Super 
14 franchise based in the United States comes to fruition. 
The globally mobile athlete is, of course, nothing new in professional 
sport, nor even rugby itself. But for Kiwis the issue is particularly pressing. In 
New Zealand “the spectre of our top players leaving our salary-capped 
competitions to play for vast sums in Europe” (Cumming and Masters, 2007) is 
seen as a threat to not only the All Black ‘brand’, but the national identity itself. 
These anxieties can therefore be linked to the current discourse on the ‘demise’ of 
New Zealand rugby discussed in Chapter 2. Whereas young Polynesians are 
taking over the game from below, European and Japanese leagues are taking 
players from the top. This hasn’t been a great concern in the past, largely because 
of the depth of New Zealand rugby. A deep and well-developed playing 
structure has largely meant any player that left could be easily replaced by a 
talented youngster coming up through the production-line. Many of these 
younger, ‘second tier’ players, though, are also heading abroad. It is little wonder 
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given that New Zealand rugby cannot match the money on offer from European 
clubs. A top All Black is widely-believed to earn around NZ$400,000 a year 
before endorsements (Paul, 2008). Prop Carl Hayman’s recent deal with English 
club Newcastle on the other hand is worth a reported NZ$1 million annually. 
The situation is compounded by the relatively weak New Zealand dollar: the 
Euro is worth close to two New Zealand dollars, while the pound is worth over 
two-and-a-half. In addition, the NZRU, who pays player salaries under a central-
contracting system, recorded a NZ$15 million loss in 2007, following on from a 
loss of almost NZ$5 million in 2006 (Paul, 2007). What reserves it does have are 
earmarked for the 2011 World Cup to be staged in New Zealand, so there few 
funds available for retaining even the best players.  
The potential for player mobility is thus the milieu of higher salaries as 
well as the context for crisis and doubt. Put simply, the view is that if the NZRU 
fails to come up with the money, players look overseas, the quality of the game 
declines, fans turn away, and sponsors, in turn, go with them (Hope, 2002). 
Rugby’s traditionalists have long-decried the external loss of players and the 
threat mobility poses to the New Zealand game. In 2000, for instance, the editor 
of New Zealand Rugby World, John Matheson, blamed player losses to overseas 
clubs for the All Blacks’ shock loss to France at the 1999 World Cup. “Rugby’s 
player drain is an insidious blight on our game,” he wrote. “We are losing talent 
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hand over fist and the hole is getting bigger and blacker” . Romanos (2002) also 
bemoans that “over the past ten or fifteen years, thousands of good 
players…have headed overseas.”  Mobility for these critics is not something to be 
celebrated. It simply undermines the integrity of the national—‘our’—game. Part 
of the mystic of the New Zealand game is the consistency of the All Blacks and 
the country’s reputation for churning out world-class players with regularity (the 
latter evident in the extent of New Zealand’s ‘rugby diaspora’ [see Obel and 
Austrin, 2005]). Player mobility is seen as an endangerment to New Zealand’s 
position at the top of a world rugby hierarchy. 
“Island Raiding”?: Poaching, Pinching, Piracy, and the Predicament of Samoan 
Rugby 
The supposed turmoil into which New Zealand rugby has purportedly 
been thrown is more than a little ironic given that New Zealand has more 
frequently been a beneficiary of imported talent. As of 2007, seventy-six players 
selected for the All Blacks in the past 115 years have been born overseas. While 
they have come from places as far-flung as Scotland and India, the vast majority 
have come from the Pacific Islands. Including Samoa, American Samoa, Fiji, and 
Tonga, 30 All Blacks have been born in the Pacific Islands. Of these 13 were or 
have been born in Samoa. Unsurprisingly, there has been a long-standing debate 
as to whether the NZRU “have plundered the Pacific playing stocks while 
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offering little in return” (New era dawning in Pacific, 2006, p. 4). The accusation is a 
particular favorite of the British press. For instance, after the All Blacks Grand 
Slam-winning tour of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 2005, Brendan 
Gallagher was wont to put their success down to “Island raiding” (Gallagher, 
2005). Others similarly felt the All Blacks’ playing depth owed itself entirely to 
the “pseudo-Kiwis” (Laidlaw, 2005, p. 2) “snatched” (Morgan, 2005, p. 20) from 
New Zealand’s Pacific neighbours Tonga, Samoa, and Fiji (see for example, 
Butler, 2005; Salmon, 2005; Slot, 2005). The All Blacks may have had “a 
formidable squad,” perhaps “the richest and deepest pool of talent the game has 
ever known” (Butler, 2005, p. 12), but, so the general tenor went, it was only 
achieved via a “morally bereft recruitment policy” (Paul, 2005), by “cherry-
picking the best of [New Zealand’s] Pacific Island cousins” (Slot, 2005, p. 73). 
Truth be told such allegations are not completely new (they have long 
been de rigueur among the UK rugby media) nor exclusive to Northern 
Hemisphere journalists (there is a similar critical inclination among the 
Australian media for instance [see for example, Morgan, 2005; Reilly, 2003; 
Zavos, 2005]). Neither too is the accusation that New Zealand is guilty of the 
“blatant poaching of Island talent” (Rees, 2005) wholly without credence: rugby 
scouts are a familiar sight in the Islands, with one former administrator so 
moved as to describe Pacific rugby as “like a supermarket” (quoted in Slot, 2005). 
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On a certain level, there is a veracity to the “chorus from the north bemoaning 
New Zealand’s supposed pillaging of South Seas rugby talent” (MacGibbon, 
2007). The make-up of the All Blacks, whether they have an unfair advantage by 
way of New Zealand being as one scribe put it, “the nearest country of any 
commercial strength to the most remarkable rugby nursery in the world, bar 
none” (Jones, 2007), is, however, of lesser importance than the causes, 
consequences, and possible legacies of this process. There are wider issues 
beyond fairness and the balance of power within world rugby. In particular, we 
can draw distinct analogies between neocolonialism and rugby migration, with 
rugby’s traditional powers contributing, in varying degrees, to the neocolonial 
impoverishment and exploitation of Pacific rugby. That is, the issue far exceeds 
New Zealand’s Island “piracy” (Butler, 2005), with this being only one story in 
the ‘dependent underdevelopment’ (Frank, 1969) of Pacific rugby. 
A useful place to begin to consider the impact of migration on the so-
called ‘development’ of rugby in Samoa is the pioneering work of John Bale 
(Bale, 1989, 1991; Bale and Maguire, 1994; Bale and Sang, 1996). Locating sport 
and leisure practices within a broader global framework, Bale notes how 
countries once considered marginal to the “global system” have come to play an 
ever-more central role through their involvement in sport. Of particular 
relevance is the evolution of what Bale describes as the “global athletic system.” 
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Migration plays an important part of this evolution in that, with increasing 
frequency around the 1960s athletes began to move across national boundaries 
not only to play, but to train (Bale, 1991). Bale argues that as a consequence “the 
major organizations involved in the international dimensions of athletics were 
not state agencies”, but organizations such as the International Amateur Athletic 
Federation (IAAF) and the International Olympic Committee (Bale, 1994, p.74). 
New forms of travel and communication only exacerbated the trend. Noting the 
significance of the entrenchment of international sports federations Bale has 
elsewhere noted how they were emblematic of the way in which “the sports 
system, like the economic system, had become a global system…What 
differences did exist in sport increasingly came to result, not from local 
idiosyncrasies in the nature of sport-like activities, but from national differences 
in sports ideology” (2002, p. 45). Bale’s emphasis on the word system here is an 
intended stress on the fact that, though a collection of discrete elements, each 
“are linked in such a away that no one element is altogether independent of all 
other elements” (1991, p. 7). Secondly, in noting the decline of local sporting 
“idiosyncrasies”, Bale draws out attention to the fact that “irrespective of global 
location, and in order for the global sports system to function, particular sports, 
at a basis level, must be the same the world over” (1991, p. 7). I have summarized 
(with David L. Andrews) that this does not necessarily mean sport should be 
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taken as a virulent agent of global cultural homogenization (see Andrews and 
Grainger, 2008). However, insofar as there is a global sports system whose 
organisations “transcend political boundaries and permit international 
cooperation” (Bale, 1991, p. 8), then there are grounds for the international 
movement and migration of athletic labor. 
The changing composition in international teams is a good indicator of the 
increasing impact of labour migration in recent decades. For instance, Samoa’s 
emergence onto the world rugby stage has been predicated upon the ability of its 
players to ply their trades outside this small island nation. The most recent 
Samoan lineup at the Rugby World Cup featured only 6 Samoan-based players 
out of a squad of 34. The rest play in either the Europe-wide Heineken Cup, the 
Super 14, or other smaller competitions in Europe and Japan. Fourteen members 
of the Samoan squad were also born not in Samoa, but New Zealand. The only 
team with more foreign born players in their squad was Italy who had 15. The 
‘development’ of rugby in Samoa therefore requires consideration of the wider 
global system. To what extent, for instance, has the migration of talent actually 
contributed to Samoa’s reputation as the so-called “most remarkable rugby 
nursery in the world, bar none”? (Jones, 2007). Or, is the fact that more than 80% 
of the Samoan national team are currently playing outside Samoa, evidence of 
the growing underdevelopment of local sporting resources? 
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It may be useful to consider exactly what I mean here by development. As 
regards athletics, on one level development can be taken to mean a high level of 
“athletic output” in relation to a global per capita level (Bale and Sang, 1994, p. 
207). In this case the question is to what degree a nation ‘produces’ athletic talent. 
On the other hand, development could also refer to the progress or growth of 
Samoan rugby and the local Samoan economy. Thus, migration to leagues in 
New Zealand, Australia, or Europe may help to improve the level and abilities of 
young Samoan players. The national team is further boosted when young 
Samoan players sign for overseas-based clubs; it is somewhat of a truism in 
Samoan rugby circles that their advance on the world stage has been largely 
contingent on the apparently more efficient, organized, and professional 
approach that the Island’s players experience while playing overseas (Gregory, 
2004). Given the important role of remittances in the Samoan economy 
(remittances have exceeded exports since the mid-1970s) it seems likely too that 
the salaries of overseas-based players provide a boost to the Samoan economy 
(Bedford, 2000). As the secretary of the Samoan Rugby Football Union (SRFU), 
Harry Schuster, contends, “rugby skills are seen as a ticket out of a subsistence 
lifestyle for players and their relatives and the player is not just earning money 
for himself but is taking it for the whole family” (quoted in Gregory, 2004).  
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Before moving on, it is perhaps important to discuss the political economy 
of Samoan rugby in a little more detail. First and foremost we need to consider 
the history of Samoan relations with New Zealand. In many ways, Samoa’s 
relationship with New Zealand has underpinned the economic development of 
Samoa since the 1960s. Though New Zealand’s relationship with Samoa is 
actually much older, the mass migration of Samoans to New Zealand began 
during this period of rapid industrial and economic development. Migrants were 
initially attracted by economic opportunities including higher wages, a greater 
range of consumer goods, superior medical services, and a higher quality of 
education (generally at no cost). It was also especially attractive for many 
Samoans given that, in comparison to Japan, Australia, and the USA, New 
Zealand had few restrictions on entry for Pacific Island migrants (Spoonley, 
1981). Eventually, as Pacific communities in New Zealand matured economic 
motives became secondary to social factors such as chain migration through an 
established network of family members, relatives, and friends (Lucas and Meyer, 
1994). 
The New Zealand government policy at this time generally saw the Pacific 
Islands, including Samoa, as a source of unskilled workers as opposed to the 
skilled workers it sought from the United Kingdom and northern Europe. 
Temporary migration from the Pacific, in particular, was promoted. Temporary 
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workers were perceived to more highly motivated, and had the added bonus for 
employers of not requiring service pay or holidays (Brosnan, Rea and Wilson, 
1995). Indeed, “from the perspective of capital, the more temporary the 
immigrants, the more focused they are on short term money and large 
remittances, and consequently the more pliable, eager and exploitable 
workforce” (Gibson, 1983, p. 39). Demand for immigrants remained high during 
the 1960s and by 1970 labor shortages were acute, especially in the 
manufacturing sector (Krishnan et al, 1994, p. 13). However, the impact of the so-
called ‘OPEC Crisis’ was as severe in New Zealand as many other countries. 
High unemployment and worsening terms of trade led the government to 
greatly restrict immigration. As the economic downturn bit, ‘Pacific Islanders’ 
were frequently singled out as scapegoats, becoming targets of blame for rises in 
crime, inflation, housing shortages and unemployment (see Mitchell, 2003; Ross, 
1992; see also Chapter 1). 
Fuelling the resentment was the regular association of Pacific peoples with 
‘overstayers’, or what Spoonley, Bedford and Macpherson (2003, p. 32) describe 
as “someone who stays on in New Zealand after they are legally required to have 
left.” The link offered a “pseudo-legal justification” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 273) for 
public hostility toward Pacific people, and also provided “an excuse for the 
police and immigration authorities to harass these newly resident communities” 
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(Spoonley, Bedford and Macpherson, 2003, p. 32). The latter reached its nadir 
with the infamous police ‘dawn raids’ of Pacific peoples’ homes in the 1970s. As 
Worner (1986) notes, while these raids were not new “the scale and single-
mindedness of the project was, indicating both a sense of desperation on the part 
of the government and the impotence of the existing immigration system” 
(Worner, 1986, pp. 8–9). Despite the fact that Pacific Islanders made up only a 
minority of all migrants to New Zealand during the 1970s (Ross, 1992; Spoonley, 
1990), that they were “more visible” (Krishnan, Schaeffel and Warren, 1994, p. 
78) than those from the United Kingdom and Australia thus meant Pacific 
peoples were more likely to suffer from the anti-immigration backlash. Such 
discrimination was, of course, also steeped in a discourse of nationalism. Much 
in accord with New Zealand history (see Greif, 1995; Pearson, 2001; Phillips, 
2007), “racial and ethnic criteria were explicitly used as yardsticks to measure 
physical and cultural distance from the majority and gauge potentiality for 
assimilation into the state and nation” (Pearson, 2005, p. 27). In this case, (white) 
European workers were viewed as assimilable, whereas Pacific Islanders were 
less likely to be absorbed into the social body. Irrespective of citizenship or 
residency status, as Mitchell (2003, p. 139) argues, “there was an implicit 
assumption of what a New Zealander was and that Pacific Islanders in New 
Zealand collectively fell outside of this definition.” 
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How Pacific migrants were perceived vis-à-vis their European 
counterparts also differed in one further, and fundamental, way. Unlike the 
British in particular, Pacific Island migrants were seldom considered settlers, and 
were instead seen largely as ‘guestworkers’ or ‘sojourners,’ as a temporary 
source of labour who would “return home eventually” (Dunstall, 1981, p. 403). 
Many of those who originally arrived from the Islands in the 1950s and 60s had 
indeed anticipated returning in time to their Island ‘homes’, but by the 1970s 
they were “increasingly committed to the distinctive society which they were 
building for themselves, their children and grandchildren in Aotearoa” 
(Macpherson, Spoonley and Anae, 2001, p. 12). Despite the fact that most Pacific 
migrants had settled, married and started to form more permanent settlements, 
the image thus persisted that Pacific peoples were nevertheless “not New 
Zealanders” (Anae, 2006): not only did they look ‘different,’ but their legal status 
granted them citizenship in name only, for they seldom enjoyed the political, 
social and economic benefits of ‘real’ New Zealanders. 
By the 1990s Pacific populations, once comprised largely of new migrants, 
had matured into second and third generation communities (Spoonley, 
Macpherson, and Pearson, 2004). It subsequently became increasingly difficult—
not to mention inappropriate—to talk of New Zealand’s ‘Pacific Islanders’ as 
‘immigrants’ (Bedford and Lamer, 1992). Today, too, growth in New Zealand’s 
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Pacific communities is largely internal as opposed to owing to migration (SNZ, 
2007). In a strictly legal and political sense, then, the vast majority of Pacific 
peoples in New Zealand can be considered New Zealand ‘citizens.’ However, as 
Paul Gilroy (1991) reminds us, there is more to ‘citizenship’ than a passport (see 
also Pearson, 2005). The degree to which Pacific people have been integrated into 
New Zealand society at the ideo-cultural level, for instance, belies the national 
statistics that show “Pacific people are the most unemployable, most 
uneducated, poorest, most likely to be criminals, most state-dependent (even 
more so than Maori), most unwanted sector of the New Zealand population” 
(Anae, 2004, p. 94; see also MINIPAC, 2007). Not only are Pacific people socially 
marginalized. Something of the social stigma that comes with once being 
‘undesirable’ immigrants clearly persists in discourse. Though they are clearly ‘at 
home’ in New Zealand, no longer ‘out there’ in the Pacific, one of the identifiable 
and recurring themes of dominant “Pakeha discourse” (McCreanor, 2005) is 
continued allusions to Pacific peoples as ‘foreign’, as the ‘Other. References to 
Pacific people as ‘overstayers’, ‘coconuts’, ‘bungas’ or ‘FOBs’ (‘fresh off the boat’) 
may now be a lesser feature of the “New Zealand vernacular”, yet as Loto et al 
(2006) have found, “the legacy of a domineering relationship between the Palagi 
[Pakeha/white] majority group and Pacific minorities that is captured by such 
derogatory terms is still evident in public forums such as the media.” To these 
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‘public forums’, and in a country where it is “a central element of national 
culture and identity” (Macpherson, Spoonley, and Anae, 2001, p. 158), we should 
also add the sport of rugby. 
Regardless of the attitudes of Pakeha New Zealanders the Samoan 
community has “evolved from one that was essentially seen as transient and 
temporarily opportunistic, the result of ‘circulation’, to a community that was 
willing to lay down more roots in order to create and sustain a diasporic 
population” (Gough, 2006). This is not to deny the way in which mobility 
remains central to the endurance of Samoan culture. There are also strong 
incentives for Samoans to migrate. These go beyond the purely economic with 
chain migration, in particular, continuing to be a major driver. In addition, a 
special quota scheme was established by agreement between the governments of 
Samoa and New Zealand in 1970. Under the scheme, up to 1100 Samoan citizens 
may be granted residence each year (Voigt-Graf, 2006). Explaining the reasons 
for such concessionary migration policies, Appleyard and Stahl (1995) contend 
that the New Zealand government was motivated by the belief that 
by alleviating demographic pressures it would improve opportunities for 
economic development which would be further assisted by remittances 
sent home by [Samoan] migrants working in New Zealand. Remittances, it 
was believed, would maintain and perhaps improve living standards and 




This view has particular pertinence to Samoa given that, like other nearby micro-
states, it is frequently characterized as a MIRAB society (Bertram and Watters, 
1985). According to the MIRAB model “Migration leads to remittances, and the 
other principle income source Aid, has contributed to the establishment of 
government Bureaucracy” (Connell, 1995, p. 264). In Samoa, migration has 
become of enormous social and political, as well as economic, importance. While 
the Samoan government has been more circumspect, the majority of individual 
Samoans also view migration favorably (Muliaina, 2003). A lot of this is due to 
the fact that remittances in Samoa are not just about financial standing but social 
status and are important to the processes of cultural reciprocation. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Samoan government has made few attempts 
to intervene in what is for all intents and purposes a laissez-faire labour structure. 
The issue is further complicated by the fact that the effects of the out-migration 
of labor are not entirely clear (Voigt-Graf, 2006; Wickramasekera, 2003). 
Questions as to whether increased mobility reflects a ‘drain’ on developing 
countries or whether labour movement should be completely left to market 
forces or if intervention is required remain outstanding. It is well established that 
remittances constitute an important part of the Samoan economy: between 1997 
and 2007 remittances accounted for more than 20% of Samoa’s Gross Domestic 
Produce (GDP). Recent income and GNP growth in Samoa has also been 
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relatively weak and job growth lags behind the number of entrants into the 
workforce (Chand, 2006). Most scholars, however, have argued that labor 
migration does little to solve Samoa’s development dilemmas (Papademetriou 
and Martin, 1991). The theory is that recruitment, returns, and remittances will 
provoke economic development, in turn creating an economic situation in which 
emigration becomes unnecessary (Martin, 1991, p. 28). However, labour 
movement schemes are presently largely unmanaged and as a consequence the 
social impact of migration in Samoa has been largely negative (Voigt-Graf, 2006). 
The same could arguably be said of Samoan rugby. Possibly influenced by 
Manu Samoa’s success at the 1991 World Cup, when the team made up of mainly 
New Zealand-based players beat Wales en route to the quarterfinals, even 
Samoa’s national coaches were initially prepared to accept, and even encourage, 
their best players to move overseas to gain experience. The strongest proponents 
of the migration of rugby talent from Samoa, though, have generally been from 
Australia, New Zealand or Europe. While recognizing that playing numbers in 
Samoa have been depleted, they generally see it as having a positive impact: 
international competitions such as the Heineken Cup or Super 14 are seen to be 
more efficient, organized and professional, and hence young Samoans are 
thought to be gaining experience which they eventually pass back to compatriots 
back home. As NZRU chief executive Steve Tew recently stated, while there is a 
 324 
long-standing debate about whether New Zealand has plundered Pacific playing 
stocks (while offering little in return), “It’s also a two way bridge. There are at 
least 40 players who have progressed through our system and our A-grade 
group who have gone on to represent Samoa alone, let alone adding the Fijians 
and Tongans” (quoted in New era dawning, 2006, p. 4). The 1991 World Cup side 
could again be seen as giving weight to such an impression. That history-making 
team featured players such as Pat Lam, Peter Fatialofa, Frank Bunce, and 
Stephen Bachop, all of whom played their rugby in New Zealand. Experience has 
also been brought back to the Islands through coaches. Now Samoan coach Lam 
is a good example. A one-time All Black himself, Lam came up through the 
coaching ranks with the Auckland provincial union and later the Auckland Blues 
Super 14 franchise. 
The Pacific Island Unions themselves have argued more frequently, 
however, that rather than contributing to the development of Pacific rugby, the 
migration of elite playing talent is contributing to the underdevelopment of the 
game in the region. According to both members of the Samoan Rugby Football 
Union (SRFU) and the Samoan media, the standard of play, crowd attendance, 
gate receipts and media interest have all declined as a result of the player exodus 
occurring at both the schoolboy and elite level. Alan Grey, a former player and 
coach for Samoa, suggests the problems are considerable. In his words, he is 
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“very concerned about Manu Samoa’s future.” Lance Polu, editor of the weekly 
newspaper Le Samoa, sees “the All Blacks benefiting at Samoa’s 
expense…Samoan players have no option but to take up offers from overseas. 
Rugby has deteriorated so much here, so if they want money and opportunities 
they have to go.” Certainly, schoolboy rugby has been eviscerated in recent 
years. The former Manu Samoa coach Michael Jones estimates that, enticed by 
education scholarships or other, less licit incentives, Samoa loses approximately 
100 of its top schoolboys to New Zealand each year (ref). Similarly, Logan (2006) 
sees “pillaging from the islands” as an accurate description of the situation given 
“the number of scholarships offered to promising Samoan players” (p. 16). It is 
perhaps important to note that these scholarships are nothing new. Pacific 
players have been coming to New Zealand expressly for rugby for the better part 
of 30 years. As an example Scots College near Wellington has been recruiting 
players from Fiji since the mid-1980s. Keith Laws, the principal of Scots College 
at the time, notes that “Scots had traditionally been rugby minnows, and the 
recruitment scheme made such a difference that we began to be a real rugby 
power” (quoted in Romanos, 2002, p. 230). Kelston Boys High School in 
Auckland has enjoyed a similar relationship with Samoa over the same period 
(see ). 
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The Samoan Minister of Sport, Fiame Naomi Mata’afa accurately notes, 
however, that “recruitment is starting earlier and earlier” (quoted in Gregory, 
2004). It is also more crowded. John Boe, the former Manu Samoa coach, 
describes Samoa as “a really active market.” “There are scouts up there all the 
time. The islands are really on the slide, the player pool is drying up” (quoted in 
Slot, 2005). Rees (2005) concurs in his description of scouts and recruiting as “the 
biggest threat to Pacific rugby.” “Disguised as scholarships,” he continues, “this 
blatant poaching of island talent has depleted the player bases of the Samoan 
union more than anything else.” Prominent Pacific-based journalist Michael Field 
has gone as far as comparing the recruitment of Samoan schoolboys to the 
practice of ‘blackbirding.’ Blackbirding was the euphemism given to the slave-
trading that occurred in the Pacific from the mid-1800s through to the early-
1900s16. According to one study, blackbirding, “the practice of luring Melanesians 
and Polynesians to toil for next to nothing was called”, involved upwards of 
60,000 people between 1863 and 1904 (Horne, 2007, p. 2). As Field describes the 
comparison: 
Blackbirders used to slip into harbours and lagoons with promises of good 
things over the horizon. Men like Bully Hayes or the more anonymous 
Peruvian captains would lure people aboard ships, seize them and sail 
them off into a life of slavery. These days the techniques are different, but 
                                                          
16 The term ‘blackbirding’ was said to derive from the custom of opportunistic navigators and 
raiders dressing entirely in black going as the went ashore at night to snatch unsuspecting 
victims (Horne, 2007). 
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the outcome is the same: white men are grabbing Pacific Islanders, not for 
the sugar cane fields of Queensland, or the mines of Peru, but for the 
rugby grounds of the old colonialists. 
 
The Australian Rugby Union chief executive John O’Neill uses similarly emotive 
terms in his recent reference to the “systematic raping” of Pacific Islands rugby 
(O’Neill: Stop “raping” islands, 2003). Countries such as Samoa, he argues, “face 
eradication from the global game unless the richer countries agree to help them 
out and stop poaching their best players” (O’Neill, 2003). 
“The Samoans didn’t even get lunch money”: Labour Migration and the 
Underdevelopment of Samoan Rugby 
While the language is emotive, both O’Neill and Field accurately identify 
a definite imbalance of power in South Pacific rugby. Looking at sport migration 
more generally, the migration situation is considerably more exploitative in cases 
where the balance, in economic and political as much as sporting terms, between 
the donor and host countries is more unequal (Maguire, 1999). This is frequently 
the case where developed nations mine developing or under-developed nations 
for their athletic talent, with little or no interest in the sporting and, more 
importantly, the social and economic consequences of such actions. Indeed, in 
football this problem is so significant that in December 2003, FIFA President 
Sepp Blatter, not renowned for his political incisiveness, made the following 
statement in a column that appeared in the Financial Times: 
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I find it unhealthy, if not despicable, for rich clubs to send scouts shopping 
in Africa, South America and Asia to ‘buy’ the most promising players 
there…This leaves those who trained them in their early years with 
nothing but cash for their trouble…Dignity and integrity tend to fall by 
the wayside in what has become a glorified body market…Europe’s 
leading clubs conduct themselves increasingly as neo-colonialists who 
don't give a damn about heritage and culture, but engage in social and 
economic rape by robbing the developing world of its best players (quoted 
in Anon, 2003). 
 
While the ‘host’ European football clubs—and, for that matter, Major League 
Baseball teams (Arbena, 1994; Klein, 1991) and National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) sport programmes (Bale and Sang, 1996)—benefit from this 
form of corporeal neo-colonialism in their ability to draw from a larger talent 
pool, and even market their sporting products to local diasporic communities, 
the situation in the donor countries is less positive. The exploitation of athletic 
talent by sporting institutions from the ‘developed’ world hinders the growth of 
national communities in sporting, social and economic terms. In the first 
instance, such drains on athletic talent lead to the ‘de-skilling’ of the sport in the 
donor countries (Maguire et al, 2002) leads to “a sense of loss, a feeling that the 
home country is being robbed of its own human and recreational resources” 
(Arbena, 1994, p. 103). Moreover, among many individuals and families within 
donor countries, such sporting neo-colonialism creates a sense of unrealistic 
opportunity through professional sport, and an ultimately unfulfilled 
dependency on the host nation, which, when magnified across the local 
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populace, can seriously impinge upon social and economic development in the 
local setting. In this way, the broader economic relations and inequities between 
the ‘West and the Rest’ (Hall 1992) are replicated within the sporting context. 
The relatively recent professionalization of rugby exacerbates the 
problems faced by Samoan rugby. In fact, it could readily be argued that the 
most problematic issue for Samoans is that, once they leave, there is usually 
nothing the Samoan union can do to ensure younger players return to represent 
the Samoan national side. Jones says of young players moving to New Zealand, 
that “once in the New Zealand system, it’s hard to lure them back, especially 
when they weigh up the dream to play for the All Blacks—and earn good money 
while doing so—or play for Manu Samoa for love” (quoted in Logan, 2006, p. 16). 
The rugby infrastructure in Samoa is certainly far from ‘developed.’ More 
importantly, as one British scribe dryly observed “the islanders may be talent-
rich, but [they are] cash-poor, [they] have no economic muscle.” In the world of 
professional sport this is something of an understatement. As evidence, consider 
the following example. According to most reports, the International Rugby Board 
(IRB) made an estimated $175 million profit from the 2003 Rugby World Cup. 
The hosts, Australia, banked nearly $70 from the same event. New Zealand, 
losers in the semi-final, still had a good year as well with the New Zealand 
Rugby Union (NZRU) posting a near-$10 million profit. Samoa, though, was an 
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altogether different story. Its commercial arm, Manu Samoa Rugby Ltd (MSRL), 
announced that it had spent its entire budget on getting Samoa to the World Cup 
and now faced the embarrassing prospect of putting the team up for sale. At this 
year’s World Cup it was a similar story for rugby’s haves and have-nots. The All 
Blacks’ campaign was estimated to have cost around NZ$50 million. The coach, 
Graham Henry, was afforded the luxury of being able to withdraw 22 of New 
Zealand’s best players from club competitions prior to the tournament, placing 
them instead on a ‘reconditioning program.’ The players flew to France first-
class, took charters to games in Scotland and Wales, stayed at a luxury hotel in 
Marseille’s most salubrious suburb, and got to enjoy the beaches of Corsica 
during a stop-over en route. This is not to mention the near four-and-a-half 
tonnes of excess baggage the team traveled with. Samoa, on the other hand, 
arrived in Paris a week prior to kick-off to find they didn’t even have the money 
to pay their players’ expenses. They were saved only when residents from Haute 
de Seine volunteered to take care of them, taking players to restaurants, paying 
for their drinks, and arranging post-training outings to the city’s famous 
landmarks. “It was good to be able to show our guests at this World Cup that the 
spirit remains in rugby” remarked one local. 
Though it seems an extraordinary episode for a national sporting side, 
Samoa’s experience in France was hardly atypical for teams from the Pacific. 
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Money is the most obvious root. Take 2005, the year I started writing this 
dissertation. The Fijian Rugby Union (FRU) was about F$4 million short of its 
budget, even after a six-figure injection from the Fijian government. Tonga, 
A$300,000 in the red, was forced to take out a A$150,000 bank loan after 
exhausting its annual budget on World Cup qualifiers and participation in IRB 
World Sevens Series. And, things were not much better in Samoa where the 
secretary of the SRFU described the organization as “barely in the black.” The 
IRB has ostensibly been sympathetic to the issue. They recently endorsed a £30 
million fund, drawn from World Cup profits, with most of the money going to 
the so-called ‘tier two’ nations such as Canada, Japan and the Pacific Islands. The 
IRB has also bankrolled two new Pacific-based tournaments: the Pacific Rugby 
Cup (PRC), a cross-border league between the Pacific Unions, with two teams 
based in each country; and, the Pacific Rim Six Nations which includes the three 
Pacific national sides, Japan and ‘A’ sides from Australia and New Zealand. All 
well and good. That is, until you consider the wider, more pressing, problems 
facing Pacific rugby. 
First, the IRB grants were intended to fund the set-up of ‘high-
performance units’ (“be it coaching or administrative assistance”) and 
‘infrastructure’ (“player identification programmes and specialist staffing”). As 
Pacific-based reporter Tuifa’asisina Peter Rees notes, for Unions such as Tonga, 
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“paying off…debts was the more immediate priority” (Rees, 2005, p. 18). Second, 
the grants do little to address an enormous power gap in the IRB. Consider that: 
of the twenty teams that played in the 2007 World Cup, eight were non-voting 
members of the IRB; while 95 unions are affiliated with the IRB, only 13 of them 
have voting powers on the IRB Council; the eight founding unions of the IRB 
have two votes each on this Council; and, that while Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa 
attend the Council’s meetings, they do so only as observers. “It has become a 
pretty exclusive lot,” Pacific Islanders Rugby Alliance (PIRA) chief executive 
Charlie Charters suggests, “and the sad thing is, there’s no sign of this changing” 
(quoted in Pareti, 2005). The arch, high-handedness of the IRB apropos of the 
Pacific was also apparent in the glaring omission of any Pacific representatives 
on the ‘special committee’ appointed to investigate the plight of Pacific rugby. 
Third, the two new competitions belie the fact that teams from the Pacific 
have been continually denied the opportunity to join either the Super 14 or Tri 
Nations by SANZAR (the joint organization of the South African, New Zealand, 
and Australian Rugby Unions). Most in the Pacific believe this to be the superior 
option for strengthening rugby in the Pacific. According to former Samoan coach 
Jones “Our [Samoa’s] best opportunity to develop was probably missed when 
the SANZAR unions expanded to Super 14 and left us out…Being out of these 
financially lucrative tournaments means the Island unions’ survival is a battle in 
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itself” (quoted in Logan and Rees, 2006, p. 14). This is on top of the fact that as 
the SANZAR competitions have expanded, fewer opportunities become 
available for Pacific nations to play top-level rugby as the ‘test-window’ narrows. 
It seems somewhat spurious, then, that the IRB’s chair, Syd Millar, has 
said of their recent investments that they will make “a real difference for the Tier 
2 Unions in terms of increasing their competitiveness”, and “ensur[ing] that 
more Unions can challenge for and potentially win the Rugby World Cup.” To be 
fair, that Fiji and Tonga both made the second round of this year’s World Cup 
would seem to provide some support for such a contention. However, any 
benefit that may have been accrued from the IRB’s so-called “Strategic Plan” was 
surely undercut by the World Cup draw. The new competitions already 
mentioned, along with the ‘North America 4’ championship were purportedly 
developed with the “express purpose” of preparing the countries involved for 
the 2007 World Cup. Yet as English (2007) observes, “having shelled out serious 
coin in trying to get them up to speed and thereby sparing them the 100-point 
shellackings we have seen all too often in previous World Cups, the IRB then 
abandoned them.” Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa all had demanding four-day 
turnarounds at the tournament. In stark contrast, a team like New Zealand had a 
seven-day gap between their first and second games and eight days before 
playing their third. Millar has been candid on World Cup draws, admitting that 
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games were scheduled to deliberately benefit the “bigger nations”: “We have to 
generate money for rugby in general and, of course, TV requires top matches at 
certain times so we have to be aware of that. The format and structure of the 
tournament sometimes has to reflect that”(quoted in Pareti, 2004). Yet recent 
rumblings from the IRB further contradict Millar’s claims that the IRB is 
“committed to developing the Game.” Plans are afoot to cut the World Cup 
tournament to 16 teams, with a second level tournament for so-called 
“minnows.” The IRB’s argument is that new format could increase World Cup 
revenue, with the money eventually put back into the growth of the sport 
worldwide. “Traditionalists will want the so-called minnows in the tournament,” 
claimed IRB head of communications Greg Thomas, “but we also understand 
how important the World Cup is and that it continues to drive us commercially. 
That will ensure that we have money to give to the likes of Georgia, Fiji, Tonga, 
Madagascar, Ukraine, Ghana, Senegal and wherever else.” Already, Fiji, Samoa 
and Tonga have struggled to attract games against top opponents because they 
are not seen as “commercially viable” (Logan and Rees, 2006, p. 16) (remarkably, 
the All Blacks have played only 11 Test matches against Fiji, Samoa and Tonga 
combined). For some teams, their only chance to play against tier-one opposition 
is every four years at the World Cup, and if these new plans come to fruition 
even this will disappear. 
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I do not wish to debate the relative merits of the IRB’s top-down economic 
policies (other than to suggest them as being indicative of the IRB’s long-
practiced paternalism). Further, it could be argued that the IRB is only 
responding logically according to the dictates of modern, corporate sport (for 
which the “cardinal objective” has become the delivery of “entertaining products 
designed to maximise profit margins” [Andrews, 1999, p. ]). What I am merely 
pointing to here is the decided imbalance of power in world rugby as well as the 
(corporate) double-speak of the IRB as concerns rugby in the Pacific. There is a 
sustained pattern of the IRB’s ‘core’ Unions blocking any proposals that may 
undermine their hegemony. Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa, for instance, have all 
expressed interest in becoming a voting member of the IRB, but nothing has 
eventuated—nor looks likely to in the near future. In the words of Charters, 
when it comes to the place of Pacific nations in the IRB, “you speak only when 
you are spoken to” (quoted in Pareti, 2004). It may seem more difficult to 
denounce the IRB’s cash injection into the three Pacific Unions as well as the new 
championships the world body has put in place. The result though is hardly 
growing parity, but further division. Driven by economic imperatives, world 
rugby is increasingly turning into a series of segregated, graded ‘circuits.’ 
However much the IRB’s stated goal “to improve the competitiveness of rugby 
worldwide”, the opportunities for nations like Fiji, Samoa and Tonga to play 
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against higher tier nations is rapidly declining: a protracted Super 14 cuts into 
the international calendar, while there is little interest in letting a Pacific nation 
into the Tri Nations. 
Perhaps the most problematic issue for Samoan rugby is that there is 
usually nothing the Samoan union can do to ensure younger players return to 
represent the national side. Money, as Jones alludes to above, is obviously a 
factor here too. Match payments are a telling example. Samoan players were 
once rumored to be being paid £12-a-day when on tour. Conversely, at the 2007 
Rugby World Cup, members of the All Blacks were paid NZ$7500 per week and 
were eligible for a $100,000 bonus; $35,000 for winning a semifinal, and $65,000 if 
New Zealand won the tournament. This is not just a disparity between national 
sides. Since rugby went professional in 1995 there have been a growing number 
of ‘club versus country’ disputes. The problem for the Samoan national team is 
that, when it comes to picking a side for international test matches, players are 
now frequently opting to “remain with overseas club sides for financial reasons” 
(IRB admits club problem, 2003)—something that further dilutes an already 
weakened Manu Samoa talent pool. While the IRB has recently instigated a series 
of measures designed to ensure “that every country is able to select their best 
team, that they are not forced to leave players behind because those players may 
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be threatened with the loss of their contract”17 (ARU wants to stop club pressure, 
2003), the measures seem to have had little effect. Most notably, though clubs in 
member unions of the IRB are “duty bound” to release players for the World 
Cup they are not obliged to carry on paying them. The result is that 
internationals from some of the poorer Pacific unions “feel trapped between 
taking a pay cut or playing in the World Cup” (Raiwalui rejects Fiji appeal, 2003). 
For instance, at the 2003 World Cup, Samoa, Fiji, and Georgia, who could not 
afford to make up the difference in lost wages, “[were] hit by players opting to 
stay with their clubs rather than play in Australia” 18 (IRB should pay players, 
2003). Hardest hit were Samoa who lost key forwards Trevor Leota and Henry 
Tuilagi. The rationale for Leota, who pulled out of the World Cup in order to 
continue playing for English Premiership side Wasps, was simple: 
I worked out that I would lose more than $NZ70,270 in earnings if I went 
to Australia [to play in the World Cup]…All the Samoan players get is 
$NZ561 a week when the competition starts and that did not begin to 
compare with what Wasps pay me. I had to think of my wife and kids, 
and they will always come first (quoted in Raiwalui rejects Fiji appeal, 2003). 
 
He suggested the problem could be easily remedied by the IRB spending some of 
the World Cup’s projected $NZ269 million profit on the players: 
                                                          
17 For instance, fining or sanctioning any club who either refuse to release a player, or field a 
player who opts to stay with the club when named in an international side. 
18 In addition, in order to circumvent the IRB regulations noted above, some players choose to 
“retire” from international rugby in order stay with their club sides without punishment to either 
the player or the club—a course of action which further weakens the available talent pool for 
Pacific Island representative teams. 
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The IRB talk about whoever goes to the World Cup not losing out on 
wages but they are all talk but no action. I’ve not seen anything at all from 
them…It would be nice if the IRB could help unions like Samoa field their 
strongest sides. The danger is that come the next World Cup some 
countries decide not to take part because they cannot afford to (quoted in 
Is rugby going global?, 2003). 
 
The issue of club/money over country has been a particularly pertinent, 
and increasingly common, one for Samoan players who have chosen to take up 
contracts in New Zealand (often forsaking more lucrative offers in Europe, for 
the added assurance of extended family networks (or aiga) in New Zealand)19. 
Yet though New Zealand rugby has without doubt benefited from Samoan talent 
at both the domestic (the strengthening of club and provincial rugby) and 
international level (a number of current and former All Blacks made their test 
debuts for Samoa prior to the new IRB eligibility regulations), they seem hesitant 
about giving anything back to Samoan rugby20. Most notably, New Zealand 
provinces have done little to ameliorate the “cash or country dilemma” (Is rugby 
going global?, 2003). Samoa has often been unable to call on the talent of New 
Zealand-based players because they are locked into contracts that give provinces 
                                                          
19 Commenting on the Leota’s case, Samoan coach John Boe remarked: “We’ve [Samoa] lost about 
four or five players from Britain but to be honest the situation is far worse in New 
Zealand…Almost all of our players play in New Zealand but have to sign contracts saying they 
won’t play for us” (NZ in middle of country row, 2003). 
20 Another example of the way in which New Zealand rugby, and the NZRU in particular, has 
gained much but given little in return, is the fact that, though it would doubtless be a sellout, the 
All Blacks have never played in Apia. Conversely, Samoa is a regular opponent for early season 
games against the All Blacks in New Zealand (where the NZRU keeps the profits from ticket sales). 
Notably, a number of international teams have played in Samoa while on tour in the South 
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first call on their services—something which goes against the intent, if not always 
the letter, of IRB laws. According to Michael Jones: “Some players are contracted 
in New Zealand and clauses in their contracts claim they cannot represent 
Samoa”21 (quoted in Jones hits NZRFU, 2003). He points to Waikato fullback Loki 
Crichton as a prime example of the problems facing Samoan rugby. According to 
one report Crichton has a “specific clause in his contract which prevents him 
playing international rugby” (IRB admits club problem, 2003). Jones asserted, 
Crichton “wants to play. He wants to play for the Manu [Manu Samoa], but we 
were actually stopped from having him…We asked to have him [for the World 
Cup] but they [Waikato] said no, he had to play NPC [National Provincial 
Championship] rugby” (quoted in Iceman, 2003). 
New Zealand clubs are not the only culprits. Given the strength of the 
Euro and English Pound relative to the New Zealand dollar, a growing number 
of young Samoans are choosing to play rugby in more lucrative European 
competitions. Traditionally, Europe hasn’t been a major destination for Samoan 
players, given the relatively small size of their Pacific Islands communities; and, 
family as much as money has long-been a deciding factor when Samoans weigh 
up their migration choices (Bedford, 2000; Macpherson, 1997). However, two-
                                                                                                                                                                             
Pacific. For instance, Ireland played a warm-up game for the most recent World Cup in Apia 
(tickets, as they would be for a game against the All Blacks, were at a premium). 
21 Jones has gone as far as calling the NZRU policies “shameful” (Jones hits NZRFU, 2003). 
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thirds of the most recent Manu Samoa squad now play professional rugby in 
Great Britain or France. In both of these countries club versus country disputes 
are already well-established. The issue stems from the fact that, as club 
competitions have “internationalized” (Greenfield and Osborn, 2001), in the 
Northern Hemisphere clubs have become economically and politically stronger 
in relation to their respective governing bodies. The result, as Hayward (1999) 
sees it, is that “the major clubs believe more and more that the world’s top 
players belong to them and them alone.” Ostensibly, the Samoan team is 
protected by Articles 9.1 and 9.2 of the IRB’s “regulations of the Game” which 
state that 
(a) A [national] Union has first and last call upon the availability of a 
Player for selection and appearances for a National Representative 
Team or National Squad of that Union and all attendances associated 
therewith, including training sessions. 
 
And, 
(b) No Union, Association, Rugby Body or Club whether by contract or 
otherwise may inhibit, prevent or render unavailable any player from 
selection, attendance and appearance in a National Representative Team 
or National Squad, including training sessions, and any Player must be 
released upon request by his Union. 
 
The reality, however, is that the rule has only ever been loosely enforced—
particularly with regard to Samoan players. For instance, the Samoan coach, Pat 
Lam, suggested that he had to fight “tooth and nail” (quoted in European clubs 
pressured Islanders players, 2006) to get European clubs to release players for the 
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Pacific Islanders recent tour of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. Lam is quoted as 
saying that “a lot of pressure was put on some of the boys to pull out of the tour, 
especially from English clubs and some French ones” (quoted in Singh, 2006). As 
a consequence, Samoa went into three tests undermanned—and under-prepared 
when a warm-up game against the English club side Harlequins had to be 
canceled because English clubs would not release their players (Edwards, 2006). 
In addition, to avoid eligibility problems, some top-flight Samoan players have 
‘retired’ from the international game (by declaring themselves unavailable for 
international selection) after having to choose between playing for their club or 
representing their country (Island unions hope for better deal, 2004). 
For Samoa the unwillingness of both Australasian and European clubs to 
release their players was recently highlighted by the revised start date Pacific Six 
Nations tournament between Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Japan, Australia A, and the 
Junior All Blacks. With the IRB pulling the start forward to May 19, the Six 
Nations now clashes with the Super 14 and European club games. While 
supposedly part of the IRB’s attempts to “increasing the competitiveness of the 
game” in the Pacific (Thomas, 2006, p. 24) the first two rounds of the Six Nations 
fall outside the IRB ‘test window’ (the period during which a club must release 
their players for national selection). Considered to be “critical preparation time of 
the World Cup” (Paul, 2007), the tournament started without its best players. 
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Further, some players suggested that British clubs threatened Samoan players 
with severe financial penalties, or their contracts terminated, if they chose to play 
for their country ahead of their club (Paul, 2007). This is, though, by no means an 
isolated instance (see ). In many cases it also difficult to prove, making IRB rules 
largely irrelevant. As the former Chair of the Pacific Islands Rugby Alliance 
(PIRA) contends, 
The International Rugby Board has a role as the custodian of the world 
game, and there are rules and regulations which apply not just to the 
national unions, but to the clubs and therefore to all of the officials within 
each national union’s jurisdiction. The problem that we face is that a lot of 
the pressure that’s put on the players is done specifically to avoid a paper 
trail. It’s a discussion with a coach outside a dressing room, or after 
practice on a Friday night. It’s like a sort of police gang trying to beat up 
somebody and leave no bruises for the follow-up investigation. There is a 
particular style in which this can be done, in which the pressure can be 
exerted, but not in a way in which there’s any sort of forensic evidence 
that we can put up to the International Rugby Board. And that’s the 
frustration. We take the opinion that some things you can see with your 
eyes, and some things we can see with your heart, and in this particular 
case, to have so many players opting out of the Rugby World Cup, it’s 
inconceivable that it was anything other than pressure exerted by the 
clubs on the players (ABC National Radio, 2003). 
 
John Boe, recalls similarly of coaching Samoa in 2003 that four English-based 
players withdrew from the national team “because of club contracts,” with the 
“biggest dilemma” being New Zealand 
where most of [Samoa’s] players are unavailable because they know if 
they play for Manu Samoa they won’t get a Super 12 contract. You can’t 
blame them of course, because they need to get the Super 12 contracts to 
get the money to feed their families. So they are put in a very difficult 
situation (ABC National Radio, 2003). 
 343 
 
Samoa’s access to top players has been further hampered by recent 
changes to the IRB’s national eligibility laws. The issue of the impact of these 
laws on Samoan players has long been a talking point in World Rugby. 
However, rules which now bar players from representing more than one country 
in their careers become particularly troublesome in and around the quadrennial 
cycle of the World Cup. In 2003, Samoa’s then assistant coach, Michael Jones22, 
frequently used press conferences at the World Cup as an “opportunity to 
highlight the very real issues that [Samoa] are facing” (quoted in Iceman highlights 
Pacific plight, 2003). At one press conference prior to Samoa’s Pool C game 
against England, Jones suggested that IRB regulations regarding nationality 
“stack up against Pacific Islanders,” and that as a consequence nations like 
Samoa are “struggling to survive” (Iceman highlights Pacific plight, 2003). To 
understand the basis of Jones’ argument, it is perhaps important to take a brief 
moment here to ground the debate in some historical context. Though it 
doubtlessly oversimplifies the issue, in simple terms, the IRB introduced tough 
new eligibility regulations in 2000 which now mean a player can only represent 
one country at international level: 
A Player who has played for the senior fifteen-a-side National 
Representative Team or the next senior fifteen-a-side National 
                                                          
22 Interestingly, Jones is commonly described as one of the greats of New Zealand rugby, as one 
journalist puts it, an “All Blacks legend” (see Jones hits NZRFU, 2003). 
 344 
Representative Team or the senior National Representative Sevens Team 
of a Union is not eligible to play for the senior fifteen-a-side National 
Representative Team or the next senior fifteen-a-side National 
Representative Team or the senior National Representative Sevens Team 
of another Union (Section 8.2 from the IRB’s Regulation 8: Eligibility to Play 
for National Representative Teams). 
 
While the code was only amended in the wake of the ‘Grannygate Affair’ 
surrounding former All Black Shane Howarth’s (in)eligibility to play for his 
adopted country of Wales (see Hewett, 2000)23, it has actually had the effect of 
“impacting negatively on weaker rugby nations such as the Pacific Islands” 
(Former All Blacks challenge IRB, 2002), rather than stronger nations such as New 
Zealand, or those in the British Isles. Given the unique nature of the relationship 
between Samoa and New Zealand (and the emigrant flows therein), as well as 
the long history of player exchanges between both countries, it is perhaps hardly 
surprising that Samoa has been especially affected. As Souster (2001) has argued: 
While laudatory in intent, [Regulation 8.2] has hamstrung the likes of 
Samoa, many of whose talented players head to New Zealand at an early 
age to chase the All Black dream and the Kiwi dollar…When their dreams 
collapse they find themselves in international limbo for the rest of their 
careers. Players who might have played only ten minutes for the New 
Zealand Sevens side but who will never become regulars are effectively 
stymied. [There are players] whom Samoa would welcome back with 
open arms, who want to play, and who would strengthen their hand 
immeasurably. 
 
                                                          
23 While a player is permitted to play for a nation in which one of their grandparents were born, 
Howarth, as well fellow New Zealander Brett Sinkinson, were both found to playing for Wales 
under pretenses which were tenuous at best. Though a player may still represent the country of a 
grandparent’s birth his eligibility is now subject to Regulation 8. 2 listed above. 
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As Souster alludes to, the regulation’s primary consequence has been to slash the 
pool of players available to Samoa. As Jones has elsewhere noted: 
There are Samoan players who could play a vital role for us but because 
they’ve played 30 minutes in a New Zealand jersey, even if it’s New 
Zealand A or even a sevens team, we can’t touch them…These guys are 
left floundering, playing provincial rugby for the rest of their lives when 
they could be playing in a World Cup for Samoa, the ultimate (quoted in 
Woollard, 2001). 
 
Paul (2004) concludes that though “for years, New Zealand rugby officials have 
talked a great game about helping Pacific island rugby…the reality is…that they 
have tended to steal the best bits, then chuck the islanders the scraps” (Paul, 
2004). 
The NZRU has further contributed to the “marginalization” (Jones hits 
NZRFU, 2003) of Samoan rugby by purposefully holding young Samoan players 
in the New Zealand system. In the first instance, the unwritten rule in New 
Zealand is that anyone seeking a Super 14—the preeminent professional 
competition in the Southern Hemisphere—contract must first commit to the All 
Blacks24. The NZRU’s justification is that having too many players ineligible to 
play for New Zealand “will limit selection choices for the All Blacks…which is 
the NZRU’s number one priority” (Logan, 2006, p. 16). However, there has been 
a growing number of cases which are testament to Michael Jones’ claim that “the 
                                                          
24 The same rule holds in Australia, where players must declare their eligibility for Australia’s 
national side, the Wallabies. 
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NZRFU deliberately selected Samoan players to represent a sevens team, or the 
New Zealand A team [the next-senior fifteen-a-side team below the All Blacks], 
thus disqualifying them from ever representing their country of origin” (Jones 
hits NZRFU, 2003). Many in Samoan administrators believe one reason why the 
All Blacks and New Zealand age-group selectors pick so many Samoan players is 
to ensure they are eligible to play for the All Blacks (see Gregory, 2004; Hewett, 
2005). Yet while this may increase the playing depth in New Zealand, it has left 
Samoa to watch the All Blacks “use and then discard players who would be good 
enough for the Test team but who cannot play for [Samoa] because of the one 
country law” (Island unions hope for better deal, 2004). Dylan Mika, Alama Ieremia, 
Andrew Blowers, and Ofisa Tonu’u are just a few of the many recent examples. 
While these players appealed to the IRB on the grounds that “they have a special 
case that has to include consideration of the historical and economic relationship 
that exists between Samoa and New Zealand” (Souster, 2002), there case was 
dismissed. A recent proposal that the eligibility rules be relaxed so players who 
represent ‘Tier 1’ nations (such as New Zealand) could back to play for ‘Tier 2’ 
nations such as Samoa was also rejected at a recent IRB Full Council meeting 
(IRB, 2005). 
Adding to the frustration of Samoan rugby officials is the inconsistent 
manner in which the IRB has enforced eligibility rules. Perhaps the most famous 
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case was that of ‘Australian’ half-back Steve Devine. In 2003 Devine was selected 
for the All Blacks’ end-of-year tour to Britain. However, while on tour Devine’s 
previous links to the Australian national sevens team surfaced. The NZRU 
rushed through a request to the IRB to have Devine cleared to represent the All 
Blacks on the basis that at the time Devine played for Australia “[sevens] did not 
have the sort of international standing it does now.” The IRB agreed, and Devine 
went on the play 10 test matches for the All Blacks before being dropped in 2003. 
Referring to the Devine case, Romanos (2003) notes how it opens the IRB to 
charges of favoritism “when it so willingly bends its rules to accommodate a 
powerful rugby country such as New Zealand.”  
Theorizing Rugby’s ‘Muscle Trade’: Samoans and the Sporting World-System 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, then, that the relationship between 
rugby’s ‘first world’ and ‘third world’ soccer nations is lopsided and nowhere is 
this more apparent that in the migration of Samoan rugby players. The ‘trading 
partners’ in this relationship are far from equal, with Samoa, like other nations in 
the Pacific Islands, obviously ‘dependent’ on those in rugby’s core. Arguably too, 
despite the IRB’s statements to the contrary, world rugby is set-up in such a way 
as to only contribute to the underdevelopment of Pacific rugby. This 
‘underdevelopment’ of Samoa rugby is not, it should be noted, an endogenous 
process. We need to be cognizant of the external determinants of 
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underdevelopment and locate these migrations within an analytical framework 
that articulates with critical global conditions. How then can we think about the 
migration of Pacific rugby players throughout the South Pacific and beyond? 
What structures these labour flows? And, how can we make sense of the 
migration processes I have described above? 
First, it important to remember what Maguire et al (2002) describe as the 
“residual impact of colonial links” (p. 34). The export of Pacific Island rugby 
labour cannot be described as a recent phenomenon in light of Samoa’s colonial 
ties in the Pacific. It is hardly surprising that New Zealand and Australia have 
been the most popular destination of rugby’s Pacific migrants. Similar to the 
exploitation of unskilled workers during the 1950s and 60s, athletic talent 
migration could be read as an extension of a form of neo-liberal capitalism which 
proclaims fairness and opportunity for all while attempting to ‘manage’ 
migration according to the dictates of those in power. We cannot ignore either 
the idea of a ‘metropolitan New Zealand’ persisting beyond the colonial era. 
Stuart Hall has captured the ongoing weight of colonialism on the process of 
migration in his description of the post-War influx of people from the British 
Commonwealth into Great Britain. He notes how Jamaicans knew British culture 
intimately as a result of their colonial education and that they had always sensed 
London to be a place to which they would eventually travel: 
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As they hauled down the flag, the former colonized peoples got on the 
banana boat and sailed right to London…they had always said that this 
was really home, that the streets were paved with gold, and, bloody hell, 
the people from the margins decided to check out whether that was so or 
not (Hall, 1997). 
 
Like Jamaica’s migrants to Britain, many Samoan rugby players see New 
Zealand, and Auckland in particular, as the “land of milk and h(m)oney” (Anae, 
2004, p. 96; see also Wall, 2007). They are further attracted by the prospect of 
playing in leagues where there are likely to be fewer cultural and linguistic 
barriers or in places where there are large pre-existing Samoan and/or Island 
communities. Therefore New Zealand is the beneficiary of Pacific talent not 
merely because of money. Historical and colonial links are significant factors in 
the migrations of Samoan players inasmuch as they play an important 
determining in the destination of these players. 
On a more conceptual level we could also say that more generally these 
immigration flows take place within a broader ‘global system.’ There is certainly 
evidence to suggest that these migrations are facilitated by “the organizational 
and technical infrastructure of the global economy” (Sassen, 2007, p. 151)—in 
particular, the emergence of a global market for athletic labour. Player migration 
from Samoa, like any other sport, must be seen as “bound up in a complex 
political economy that is itself embedded in a series of power struggles 
characterizing the global sports system” (Maguire et al, 2002, p. 32). Following 
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the work of Paul Darby (Darby, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2006), one way we can think 
about how these migration flows are conditioned by broader politico-economic 
dynamics is through the world-systems analysis of Immanuel Wallerstein. 
Wallerstein’s ideas have been adapted to the study of athletic migration by a 
number of scholars in the sociology of sport (see Darby. Bale 2004; Darby 2000, 
2002, 2005a, 2006, 2007; Lanfranchi and Taylor, 2001; Magee and Sugden, 2002; 
Poli 2002, 2005, 2006). In brief, world-system theory emerged in the mid-to-late-
1970s, notably in the writings of Wallerstein, André Gunder Frank, and Samir 
Amin, as a response to ‘dualistic’—modern/traditional—notions “which 
informed most of the development theory of the period following World War II” 
(Worsley, ?. p. 298). As opposed to distinct economic sectors, modern/traditional, 
world-system theorists argued that both were merely parts of a wider whole, a 
kind of global, or ‘world’, capitalist economic system. The basic premise of world 
systems theory was that no nation in the world could be seen in isolation. 
Economies were tied by way of the fact that individual countries or groups of 
countries were part of a single unit. Ties between countries are multiple, but 
primacy is given to economic connections through world markets in goods, 
capital, and labour. Of course, these were not equal partnerships. The global 
system is stratified, or, in Wallerstein’s words, ‘tiered’, wherein “some countries 
 351 
are able to use their advantage to create and maintain wealth, whereas 
disadvantaged countries remain poor” (Andersen and Taylor, 2008, p. 254). 
Wallerstein explains this hierarchy by sorting nations into three areas, or 
zones, with their core, semi-periphery, and periphery status based on the nature 
of their relationship (their degree of development or incorporation) to the 
expanding capitalist system. According to Wallerstein, “These zones, 
distinguished by their different economic functions within the world-economic 
division of labor…structure the assemblage of productive processes that 
constitute the capitalist world-economy” (). The division of labour was not 
merely just a functional division, but also “a relationship of exploitation” 
(Worsley, 301). The core regions that are, or become, economically diversified, 
rich and autonomous, “can enforce unequal exchange relations favourable to 
themselves; they appropriate surplus value from the periphery” (Harrison, 1988, 
p. 71). These rich, power, industrialized countries of the core control the system. 
Conversely, the countries at the periphery are poor, not industrialized, and 
largely agricultural. They are “subject to direct intervention and manipulation by 
the core” and are dependent on the export of labour and low-wage products 
(Watson, 2004, p. 13). Semi-peripheral countries which “are at the middle level of 
income and partly industrialized, extract profits from the peripheral countries 
and pass the profits on to the core countries” (Andersen and Taylor, 2008, p. 254). 
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To these we could also add the ‘external arena.’ This included much of Asia and 
Africa, and existed as a kind of separate world-economy. Gradually these areas 
became incorporated into the periphery as colonial, and more recently 
transnational corporate, expansion took place. As Darby points out, “this has 
been achieved through the core nations’ capacity to organize world trade to favor 
their economic interests” (p. 243). Essentially, states in the advanced industrial 
core areas could expand into external arenas without competing directly with 
other industrializing areas, thus enlarging the periphery. 
World systems theory provides a useful starting point for understanding 
the growth in international labor migration, both within sport, and more 
generally. In simple terms, the international division of labor means that the 
need for cheap labor in some industrial and developing nations draws workers 
from poorer parts of the globe” (Andersen and Thomas, 2008, p. 255). In world 
systems theory capitalism tends to expand outward from the core. As market 
penetration occurs 
labour in non-capitalist countries gets displaced, population gets 
mobilized and international migration becomes fuelled by an ever 
increasing spatial, economic and social polarization of the globalizing 
market economy (Geyer, 2002, p. 23). 
 
Migration, in sum, originates in the social, economic, political and cultural 
transformations that accompany the “penetration of capitalist markets into non-
market or premarket societies” (Wallerstein, ). In essence, the main feature of the 
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world system is, as Berberoglu (2005) explains, “the transfer of surplus from the 
periphery to the core of the system.” In this way migration cannot be attributed 
solely to economic factors, but rather, the driving force of migration is the actions 
carried out capitalists and states who seek “to take advantage of land, materials, 
labor, and consumer markets in peripheral countries” (). Within world-systems 
analysis emphasis is placed in the exploitative nature of the relationships 
between sending and receiving countries in international migration and, in 
particular, differences between wage rates and employment. Wallerstein 
describes the movement between the periphery and the core as being an 
“unequal exchange”—something made possible by the domination of peripheral 
states by those at the core. Unequal exchange is “enforced by strong states on 
weak ones, by core states on peripheral areas. Thus capitalism involves not only 
appropriation of surplus value by an owner from a labor, but an appropriation of 
surplus of the whole-world-economy by core areas” (Wallerstein, ). 
It should be noted that world-systems analysis has come under heavy 
criticism. In particular, some critics have suggested that it does not take account 
for changes in the positions of countries in the world system. On one hand, some 
countries are no longer as powerful, or as ‘central’, as they once were. England is 
perhaps the most obvious example but we could also include nations such as 
Holland, Italy and France. On the other, Evans (1995), for instance, has argued 
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that “the structure of the global division of labor offers opportunities, enabling 
developing nations to transform themselves and change their positions in the 
global economy” (Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 18). On a 
similar line, Firebaugh suggests that foreign investment seems to stimulate 
growth, to improve national welfare, and benefit the masses and not just the 
elites (Firebaugh, 1992). Thus, for some critics, the world economic system “does 
not always work to the detriment of the peripheral countries and to the benefit of 
the core countries” (Andersen and Thomas, 2008, p. 256). 
With more specific regard to the migration process, critics have suggested 
that while world-systems analysis provides a framework to understand the 
conditions by which migration begins, it does not address the question as to how 
it is sustained. In this vein, world-systems analysis has been criticized for being 
too structural, in particular discounting the role of politics and the state in social 
and economic change (Brettell and Hollifield, ). More generally, it could be said 
that most criticisms of the world-system model “concern its overly global, 
detached from the reality on the ground and, thus, much too simplified 
explanatory approach to the international movement of people” (Morawska, ). 
Thuno (Internal and International Migration), for instance, is critical of the way 
in which world-systems analysis “suggests that only macro-level analysis of the 
capitalist world market structure can explain international migration.” Ulin 
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(2004) also suggests that world systems theory “glosses over subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity.” “To grasp the complexities of peoples on the move and the 
ever-shifting terrain of local and transnational identities,” he argues, “it is 
necessary to focus on engaged human subjects” (2004, p. 160). Other critics have 
asked where too are the ‘meso-level’ institutions? (Faist, in International 
Migration, Immobility and Development). Social networks, private institutions 
and voluntary organizations mediate and assist the migration process. As they 
become known or ‘institutionalized’, they accumulate a degree of social capital in 
the eyes of aspiring migrants, becoming a node through which migrations are 
channeled or mapped. As Faist () explains, once ‘pioneer’ migrants have moved 
abroad, “relatives, friends, and acquaintances can draw upon social capital and 
process of ‘chain migration’ develop.” What both of these types of criticisms 
share is a concern with the level of analysis, highlighting that many causal 
explanations for migration that may operate simultaneously. 
I share Andersen and Thomas’ view that, despite these criticisms, “world 
systems theory has provided a powerful tool for understanding global 
inequality” (2008, p. 256). In particular, it provides a conceptual language 
through which to describe the relationship between donor and recipient 
countries. The essence of Wallerstein’s argument, the notion of a core-periphery 
impetus, seems especially germane. Certainly, since rugby went professional in 
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1995 a ‘world system’ of sorts has been developing: the ‘core’ states (England, 
France, Australia, New Zealand, and, perhaps, South Africa) set the rules for—
and derive wealth from—the flows of athletic labor. The Pacific Islands, by 
contrast, can generally be categorized as peripheral. It would also be fair to 
suggest that the peripheral nations of the Pacific are deeply entangled in an 
unequal, arguably dependent, relationship with the core countries. Recent 
decisions by the IRB imply that, like Wallerstein’s core areas of the world 
economy, rugby’s core similarly organize the trade in athletic labour to favor 
their own interests. Critics in Samoa argue that the outflow of players is 
impoverishing or “de-skilling” (Jarvie and Maguire, 1994) the Samoan game (ref) 
and that the core nations dictate the terms of this trade, setting the rules of trade, 
and providing no compensation to Samoan rugby. 
As Paul Darby has noted, it is difficult to assess the impact of sports 
migration on donor countries (Darby, 2001). This certainly appears to be apropos 
of Samoan rugby. Some have argued that talent migration has contributed to the 
development of Pacific rugby (refs). There are some indications that this could be 
the case. Samoa’s national side has undoubtedly benefited from its players 
choosing to play in professional competitions off-shore than in amateur 
competitions at home. But this view of the impact of labour migration is strongly 
contested in Samoa. Local pundits seem to be in agreement that out-migration 
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has seriously deskilled the local game and undermined the development of 
Pacific Islands rugby. One witness to the growth of player recruitment in Samoa 
suggests that scouts for teams from Australia and New Zealand “have very little 
interest in the player’s future. They’re just looking for the buck. I wouldn’t say 
it’s an epidemic, but yes, the islands have been raped and pillaged, agents have 
come in and thrown players to the four corners, regardless of the huge social 
adjustment necessary” (quoted in Slot, 2005). 
In addition, while rugby certainly provides a (small) number of Samoan 
boys with the opportunity to further their education, they seldom return to 
Samoa, choosing instead to declare themselves eligible for the country in which 
they ply their trade (Gregory, 2004; Slot, 2005). As the Samoan-based journalist 
Peter Rees suggests, Island unions such as Samoa have become “no more than 
feeders for the Wallabies and All Blacks, a production line guaranteed to keep 
them strong” (Rees, 2005). There is cause to wonder too about the inflexibility of 
the IRB’s eligibility laws when, given deeply-involved history with New 
Zealand, Samoa would seem to provide an exceptional case. Arguably, relaxing 
these laws for players from Samoa would do more for the strength of Samoan 
rugby than their current strategy of cash-injections. Beyond mere economics it 
would lead to greater parity in world rugby. As Kayes (2004) notes, currently 
“the sad fact for rugby is that no team outside the top six [sides]…has a realistic 
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hope of winning anything meaningful.” While the IRB has recently implemented 
what it calls an “unprecedented three-year global strategic investment 
programme aimed at driving the competitiveness of the global game” (IRB, 
2008), one wonders whether nations such as Samoa may improve even quicker if 
they were accorded greater flexibility in choosing qualified players. While Samoa 
are currently 12th on the IRB’s world rankings, it is interesting to ask, as does the 
British rugby-writer Stephen Jones (2007), “Just how great would Samoa be if 
they had ever been allowed to choose all their eligible players?…they could well 
by now, tiny islands or not, have become world champions.” 
While it therefore possible to interpret the migration of rugby players 
from Samoa as contributing to both the development and under-development of 
the Samoan game, the loss of Samoan players can “clearly be interpreted as an 
extension of broader neo-imperialist exploitation of the developing world by the 
developed world” (Darby, Akindes, and Kirwin, 2007, p. 157). The fact that New 
Zealand remains the most popular destination of Samoan migrant rugby players 
also says much about the strength of the link between migration in rugby and the 
broader socio-economic impact of colonialism. Despite the fact that Samoa 
gained independence in 1962 the exodus of Samoan players continues to follow a 
pattern which, at a superficial level, appears to have its roots in imperialists 
connections. There is also some license to suggest that Samoan talent migration 
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to New Zealand can be interpreted as a form of ‘cultural imperialism’ 
(Tomlinson, 2001). New Zealand’s exploitation of labour power and material 
resources is clear. But New Zealand rugby could also be charged with producing 
a malign cultural effect. In particular, there appears to be a growing devaluation 
of Samoan rugby. Competing for New Zealand, or now even a professional club 
side, has increasingly become more important that representing one’s own 
country. Even the SRFU Chairman has suggested that Samoa can now only hope 
to get New Zealand’s “discards” given that the All Blacks, as opposed to Samoa, 
has become the ultimate goal of most Samoan players (). For instance, in a recent 
piece on the difficulties facing Samoan rugby, New Zealand Herald quotes one 
New Zealand-bound schoolboy player as admitting to the fact that, “of course”, 
he would rather play for the All Blacks than Manu Samoa. As Rees (2005) 
suggests, increasingly “to aspiring young rugby players in the Pacific Islands, the 
lure of fame and fortune located right on their doorstep can be overwhelming.” 
Many young Samoans also appear to be being exploited, being seen as a 
source of labor rather than human beings, and subjected to forms of 
discrimination. Here it is possible to posit an analogy between rugby’s migration 
system and the economic system in the South Pacific. Like the easily expendable 
(/returnable) immigrants who came to New Zealand to fill the industrial work 
demands of the 1950s and 60s, Samoan rugby players have seemingly become 
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New Zealand’s new labor mercenaries. We can draw here on what Maguire and 
Bale (1994) see as the ancillary trading in sporting bodies: with the athletic labor 
of the peripheries being “the equivalent of the cash crops which they sell in other 
sectors of the world economy” (p. 16). In many ways the analogy is constructive. 
Arguably, in the context of sports labor migration, the athlete is reduced to a 
body, the body to a commodity: and, as such, the athlete becomes dehumanized, 
quantifiable, absorbed into the world of markets of productive exchange 
(Maguire, 1999; Maguire and Bale, 1994). This ‘commodification’ of the body can 
be seen to have added significance in relation to the bodies of ‘Others.’ As I have 
argued in Chapter 2, and as Carrington (2001) notes, historically, “one of the 
central components to the emasculating discourses of white racism” (p. 107) has 
been the dehumanization of the Other body (see also Gilroy, 2000; Hall, 1997; 
Mercer, 1989; St Louis, 2005). Carrington’s analysis of the black athletic body 
seems equally applicable to the Polynesian body when he notes how “forms of 
bio-political governance of the (black) population during the eras preceding de-
colonisation, that sought to supervise, regulate and discipline black bodies 
through various repressive mechanisms” (p. 106) find their contemporary 
parallel in the commodification, and subsequent regulation, of the black athletic 
migrant. In a similar fashion, a long tradition of reducing racial Otherness to the 
body, to the physical (Gilroy, 2000; Hall, 1997), arguably provides the context 
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within which the exploitation of Samoan (rugby) labor can be understood. In 
rugby, as elsewhere, the Samoan body is a source of physical labor, a commodity 
to be bought and sold to the highest, or most prestigious, bidder. While the 
movements of (sporting) capital may provide new strategies of, and possibilities 
for, immigrant mobility, these logics and practices are produced within 
particular structures of meaning about race, gender, class, nationality, and social 
power: regimes of rights and administration may not necessarily follow political 
borders, yet, there is nonetheless a distinct racial and class stratification inherent 
in global systems of production, exchange, and governance. As Carrington (2001) 
has suggested, “the commodification of the black [Samoan?] athletic body is in 
many ways the cultural logic of post/colonial [rugby?] racism” (p. 109). 
There is also a symbolic significance of the Samoan body in this 
transnational, sporting ethno-racial order. As Stuart Hall notes, the meanings 
embedded within cultural representations organize and regulate social practices, 
and consequently provide sites for the interpellation of individuals into specific 
gendered, classed, and racialized subjectivities (Hall, 1997a). Thus, just as 
political-economic structures govern and discipline the flows of Samoan athletic 
bodies, the cultural representation of these bodies “operate[s] to sustain specific 
power relationships between groups and therefore influence lived cultures” 
(Hall, 1997a). If representation is a site for the construction and constitution of 
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identities, collective and individual, then of specific relevance to the social 
identities of Samoans is the way in which Western culture has long traded in 
images of Polynesian Otherness (again, see Chapter 3). Moreover, the 
conspicuous contemporary success of Samoans in cultural arenas such as music, 
television, the arts, and sport may arguably play into the stereotypes of imperial 
encounter—a ‘Pacifica exotica’ of the friendly savage, the native entertainer, the 
physically gifted athlete(/body). Critical analysis of such conventional conceptions 
of Polynesian-ness is crucial given that “we can understand stereotyping as an 
effect of power—as a discursive strategy that attempts to establish particular 
subject positions as fixed…as a way of legitimating social hierarchies and 
inequalities” (Carrington, 2001, p. 92). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Pacific Peoples and the Diasporic Sporting Imaginary 
 
Uplift the standard 2 worldwide, way past local 
- King Kapisi 
 
In October of 2004 the University of Auckland opened its new US$4 million 
Pacific Studies Centre. Its centrepiece, a modern Fale Pasifika, was hailed by one 
reporter as “a working tribute to achievements behind half a century of 
migration from the South Pacific to New Zealand” (Field, 2004). In her opening 
speech, Dr Melani Anae, director of the Centre for Pacific Studies, echoed the 
sentiment: the fale, she said, fulfilled the dreams of “parents and grandparents 
who came to Aotearoa so that their children and their children’s children would 
have a better education.” “My parents, like many other migrants,” she continued, 
“worked on factory floors, but they had dreams for us, their children, that New 
Zealand would be a better place for succeeding generations.” Certainly, the New 
Zealand of 2004 seemed like a ‘better place’ for Pacific people than in years past. 
Whereas, Pacific Islanders in New Zealanders during the 1970s were frequently 
stereotyped as having a proclivity toward “criminal behaviour, drunkenness, 
immorality, fecundity, disease and ghettoism” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 150), such was 
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the change by 2004 that Tongan Publisher Kalafi Moala was so moved as to 
declare it “the year of Pasifika in Aotearoa” (Moala, 2004). As evidence, he cited 
examples from the worlds of hip-hop, opera, television, film and drama, fashion, 
and business. Summing up the year he wrote: “From the entertainment stage to 
the rugby field, from the halls of wisdom to the corridors of business, Pacific 
Islanders have been stamping their mark in the Land of the Long White Cloud.” 
Once accused of being unable or unwilling to integrate (Macpherson, 1996), by 
2004 Pacific people were “making their mark in the mainstream” (Schaer, 2007, p. 
54). 
As I have already argued, this mark in the mainstream is, however, 
decidedly uneven. On the one hand, popular ‘ethnic practices’ such as drama, 
dance and music have been successfully turned into highly visible national 
spectacles. On the other, this success comes with a price. In engaging with the 
nation’s politics of recognition, Pacific people, like other ‘ethnics’, are forced “to 
perform in a way that is recognizable”, to “constantly and repetitively 
demonstrate the already agreed upon markers of their ethnicity” (Gershon, 2007, 
p. ?). As Loto et al (2006) have noted, representations of Pacific people “have 
notoriously been confined to tourist adverts, sports sections or Crimewatch.” The 
success stories also tend to reflect an enrichment discourse whereby Pacific 
people are embraced only “if they conform to Palangi norms, or if their creativity 
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can be assimilated into the dominant culture” (Loto at al, 2006). This celebration 
of particular forms of diversity is also connected to the subtle power of liberalism, 
wherein tolerance is mobilized to manage. The apparently more inclusive 
constructions of ‘the nation’ belie the fact that ‘difference’ becomes 
institutionalized and hierarchized, thus reinforcing Pakeha cultural hegemony. 
Pacific multiculturalism’s focus on culture can also occlude or minimize 
important economic and material questions, ignoring too specific political 
activisms and their histories. ‘Multiculturalism’ as embodied in costumes, 
cooking, and concerts, fails to foreground power and privilege, consumption 
“function[ing] as a substitute for actual social relations or the continuing work of 
desegregation and antiracism” (Gunew, 1997, pp. 25-26; for further discussion 
see Chapter 1). While recognizing the ubiquity of the Pacific diaspora, Pacific 
multiculturalism takes place at a level of abstraction that evades a more 
profound engagement with the possibilities of cultural transformation. 
To this point, then, I have suggested Pacific multiculturalism as 
amounting to little more than a rhetorical reworking of the assimilation game 
that underwrites the processes of European imperialism and colonisation. Via an 
ideological sleight of hand, Pacific multiculturalism regraphs the centre and the 
margins of New Zealand society, representing ethnicity as a supplement to an 
unmarked dominant Pakeha culture. Ostensibly committed to the liberal 
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principles of tolerance, so-called ‘ethnic’ cultures are marginalized as objects of 
tolerance. We could ask, as does David Bennett (1998), “in what sense can a 
minoritized culture be asked to ‘tolerate’ the majority or ‘national’ culture that 
assigns it the marginal status of a minority?” (p. 6). To rework the words of Hage 
(2000), I have suggested that “the popular language of acceptance…reinforces the 
placing of [Pakeha] in the position of power within the discourse of tolerance” 
(1994, p. 23). This is all to say that Pacific multiculturalism grants Pacific people 
subjectivity without granting them agency (Kamboureli, 1998)—hence, my 
question as to whether the All Blacks are in fact the embodiment of a redefined 
ethnic landscape, or merely a multicultural ‘tool’ at the disposal of the dominant 
Pakeha majority. While I lean toward the latter, we cannot, however, wholly 
dismiss the transformative possibilities afforded by the increased visibility of 
Pacific peoples. Rugby, in particular, may offer a site for political contestation. 
Even as Pakeha power is being consolidated in everyday economic and political 
life, rugby offers a symbolic space for Pacific peoples to challenge dominant 
projections of New Zealand culture. In this chapter I suggest that, however much 
rugby remains a ‘white man’s game’, it also constitutes in Avtar Brah’s terms, a 
type of “diaspora-space”, “a point of confluence of economic, political, cultural 
and psychic processes…where multiple subject positions are juxtaposed, 
contested, proclaimed or disavowed” (1996, p. 208). That is, rugby functions as a 
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space through which national, ethnic, and diasporic identities are articulated and 
played out. 
My premise in this chapter borrows from Paul Gilroy’s take on “black 
expressive culture” and the way it functions as a site of investigation, reworking 
and transformation” (Gilroy, 1993). Any analysis of the political dimensions of 
Pacific rugby, as a form of expressive culture, must reckon with the position of 
Pacific athletes within a wider Pacific diaspora. Like those of Gilroy’s “syncretic 
cultures of black Britain”, rugby is a cultural practice that Pacific peoples have 
been able to detach from its origin and use to “found and extend the new 
patterns of metacommunication which give their community substance and 
collective identity” (Gilroy, 1991, p. 217). Players such as Tana Umaga, or Bryan 
Williams, or Michael Jones, for instance, form part of the cultural resources 
through which Pacific peoples express diasporic affiliation. They represent, 
perhaps not equally but still in a significant way, multiple locations, loyalties, 
and identities. As Paul Spoonley writes, “the activities and perceptions of New 
Zealand-born and based Pacific peoples creates new identity positions and 
options for diasporic communities—wherever they are located” (2001, pp. 92-93). 
There exists in Pacific rugby performative elements that lie beyond the official 
discourses of nationalism. Rugby, though it mobilizes national sentiment, as I 
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argue in this chapter, also functions as a “a situational context or space in which 
diasporic agendas and coalition politics are articulated” (Madan, 2000, p. 29). 
Oceans and Islands: Pacific Paradigms 
In the nineteenth-century the Pacific was carved up into what Barclay 
(1978) calls “The Colonial Ocean.” A new world order was established in which 
Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the 
Netherlands laid claim to territories, annexed lands, and put in place colonial 
administrations. Between traders, sailors, missionaries, and settlers, the Pacific 
was transformed from a region “into fragments of empires annexed or 
‘protected’ by powerful European nation-states.” These imperialist maps not 
only described the new colonies: the colonies could also be disciplined through 
the mapping of these “discursive grids of Western power/knowledge” (p. 15). In 
Trinh Minh-ha’s terms, claiming and renaming the Pacific secured for Europeans 
“a position of mastery.” For the Western speaker, the I, “I am in the midst of a 
knowing, acquiring, deploying world—I appropriate, own and demarcate my 
sovereign territory as I advance.” Dividing the Pacific was thus a means of 
control. In particular, the referent of history became not the ocean but the nation 
and this new cartography demanded allegiances which cut across other 
affiliations and networks. As Hau’ofa (1993) notes, “people were confined to 
their tiny spaces, isolated from each other. No longer could they travel freely to 
 369 
do what they had done for centuries” (see also Hau’ofa, 1998). Maps and borders 
took with them many long-running maritime systems of trade and exchange, 
they severed inter-island connections that in some cases had existed for 
centuries. The Pacific came to be defined not by its connections but its insularity: 
they were ‘islands’ not only in the geographic sense, as an objective reality, but 
as a state-of-mind. That is, islands and insularity led to “enclosed thinking” 
(Bongie, 1998). The sense of belonging in the Pacific incorporated this insularity 
and identities became fixed in isolation, insular discourses, and reductionist 
legacies. As Beer contends, and as became apparent in the Pacific, islands bring 
with them “at once the notion of solitude and of a founding population” (p. 32). 
We could say of the Pacific, then, that insularity came to have both a 
topographic and figurative significance. Obviously an island is a space unto 
itself. But as a consequence it becomes “an ideal metaphor for a traditionally 
conceived, unified and unitary identity” (Bongie, 1998, p. 18). Identity is, in 
essence, rendered secure by insularity: ‘islands’ structure certain beliefs about 
national character and destiny. These prevailing notions of the Pacific since 
European ‘discovery’ have painted a picture of a series of islands limited by their 
absolute size and by their isolation  Colonial paradigms have in this way held 
back the construction of a regional identity because they recourse to cleavage and 
division. The apparent insularity of Pacific peoples appears less significant than 
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the connections between people. Yet in recent decades something has been 
changing. Borders are becoming increasingly permeable and loyalties multiple. 
Through waves of migration large numbers of people have left the Islands to 
seek new opportunities in places like New Zealand, Australia and the Unites 
States. These drifts have produced significant migrant communities in the 
metropolitan center. For groups such as Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokalauans 
the numbers resident ‘offshore’ now far exceed those ‘at home.’ In the case of 
Samoans ….were resident in New Zealand, ……in Australia, and another … in 
the United States. Meanwhile, the population of Samoa is estimated to be…. In 
part the “social gravity” (Macpherson and Macpherson, 1999, p. 277) of the 
islands has also shifted to the city. With numbers in cities larger than ‘origin’ 
societies the nature of the relationship between ‘home’ and ‘abroad’ has changed. 
New human and capital resources have been built as new generations have been 
born and raised in new homes. 
To the pessimistic this is cause for concern. The combination of 
remittances and aid inflows from abroad have arguably become so important to 
a number of the smaller islands that they are now MIRAB economies; dependent 
on migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy (Bertram and Watters, 1985). The 
view is that countries in the South Pacific region consequently have limited 
development potential (see Poirine, 1998). For others, however, the cities are just 
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part of the process of what Hau’ofa (1993) calls “world enlargement” (p. 90) As 
Hau’ofa writes, the resources of the Pacific Islands 
are no longer confined to their national boundaries; they are located 
wherever these people are living permanently or otherwise…Islanders 
have broken out of their confinement…They are once again enlarging 
their world, establishing new resources bases and expanded networks for 
circulation (p. 94). 
 
And, circulation is certainly the right word here. While we in the West have 
tended to think of migration as a unilinear process (Lie, 2001), a one-way ticket 
so to speak, the Islands are increasingly built on reciprocity; of goods, of capital, 
of ideas, and of people. Consider Paul Spickard’s portrait of life in the Pacific 
diaspora: 
One family migrates from Samoa to the North Shore of the island of 
Oahu…their son goes to Harvard, works in business and state 
government, runs for Congress, and serves on the Honolulu city council. 
Another family leaves Tonga in the 1970s and establishes outposts in 
Auckland, Sydney, Inglewood, and Salt Lake City. They work in 
construction, small businesses, and tending children. Their second 
generation forms churches and gangs and goes to college. For a quarter 
century they remain in weekly contact with one another by mail, then by 
phone and jumbo jet, and finally by e-mail and the World Wide Web. 
 
New identities have sprung up within these circuits. Islanders are 
increasingly drawing on multiple heritages (Anae, 2004; Nero, 1997; Spoonley, 
2001). These draw as well on external links and movement. This is particularly 
apparent in New Zealand, and especially in Auckland, where New Zealand-born 
Pacific peoples are taking elements of the cultures of ‘home’ and “filtering them 
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through their own experiences and building them into a new distinctive 
identity” (Macpherson, 1998, p. 92). Among younger Pacific peoples one of the 
more popular identities is that of the acronymous ‘PI’ (short for Pacific Islander) 
which plays on the theme of commonality between the islands. Explaining its 
appeal Anae (2001) suggests that PI offers an identification that is “broader and 
less specific” than ‘Samoan’ or ‘Tongan’ or ‘Niuean’ and “a much larger peer 
group” (p. 111). It is important to note, however, that even as they seek to link to 
a higher level identity, Pacific peoples are not necessarily denying their 
connections to a particular place in Polynesia. Rather, various forms of Samoan 
or Tongan or Cook Island identity may be seen as nested within this emerging 
diasporic identity. The result is a complex articulation of coalitional politics 
based on both diasporic nationalism and an affinity with ‘homeland.’ That PI 
oscillates between ethnic and diasporic consciousness is not to overlook that 
choosing PI as identity can be viewed as a political act, a signal of the fact that 
“large, globally connected, migrant communities are shifting away from the 
ethnic and national subjectification into postmodern spaces that are beyond the 
National ideal” (Madan, 2000, p. 34). In Hall’s (1990) terms, PI can be considered 
as a ‘positioning’, a conjunctural or conditional play on identity in which 
different ethnic groups merge and adopt a common identity in specific contexts 
(Gillespie, 1995; Spivak, 1988). 
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Defining (?) Diaspora 
I wish to elaborate further on how these new ways of identifying have 
challenged the forms of traditional sets of relations such as those around 
ethnicity or nation. I also aim to explore the growth of both “‘transnational 
corporations of kin’ and ‘transnational island societies’, which include people 
who have never been out of the home islands and others who have never been in 
them” (Anae, 2001). First, however, I wish to develop a framework within which 
to understand how the political identities and practices of Pacific peoples are 
shaped between and within contexts of both migrant homelands and host 
societies. As the title of this chapter suggests, I have increasingly come to favor 
the notion of ‘diaspora’ as a way of understanding the processes “whereby 
disconnected people can communicate ideas and shared interests, and 
(re)establish relations and identities (real and imagined)” (Carrington, 2000, p. 
265). Diaspora, I argue, is a politically and intellectually useful tool. Unlike the 
nation which boxes us in to Manichean terms of inclusion and exclusion, 
“diaspora makes clear that identities are formed across territorial boundaries and 
that structures of domination—be they cultural, social, political, or economic—
are never simply co-extensive with national borders” (King, 2006, p. 99). I want 
to suggest that the notion of diaspora can also be productively adapted as a 
model to comprehend the lives, travels, migrations and significances of 
 374 
Polynesian athletes. By performing on an international stage that is largely 
unattainable for Pacific peoples in other cultural spheres, their sporting activities 
have acquired a political significance that transcends the sporting arena. In 
particular, the sports arena operates as an important symbolic space through 
which national, ethnic, and diasporic identities are articulated and played out. 
But what exactly is a ‘diaspora’ and what does it mean to be ‘diasporic’? 
Traditionally, the term diaspora has been used to refer to the dispersion of the 
Jews among the gentiles and their belief in an eventual return to the lost 
homeland. In recent cultural theory, however, ‘diaspora’ has been “freed from its 
restriction to Jewish history and experience”, and frequently comes into use as a 
reference to “any processes of dispersion and to relate to countless so-called 
dislocated, de-territorialized communities” (Baumann, 2000, p. 314). In North 
America, it is now “a term of choice to express the links and commonalities 
among groups of African descent throughout the world” (Edwards, 2001, p. 45). 
There have also been extensive historiographies of Armenian (Aghanian, 2007), 
Greek (Clogg, 1999; Kaloudis, 2006), Italian (Gabaccia, 2000), and Irish 
(Bielenberg, 2000) ‘diasporas.’ This is to ignore studies of ‘diasporic’ Kurd, 
Palestinian, Chinese, Tamil, Indian “and many more nationally, culturally or 
religiously constitued communities” (for review see, Cohen 1997, Safran, 1991). 
Such is its influence that, in many ways, diaspora has become, as Phil Cohen 
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observes, “one of the buzz words of the post modern age” (Cohen, 1998, p. 1). 
Certainly the term has enjoyed something of a renaissance when it comes to 
debates around ethnicity, nationality and nationhood, boundaries and identity. 
Indeed, according to Butler (2001), there has been an exponential increase in 
scholarship in ‘diaspora studies’ in recent years. 
The rise of a new ‘diaspora discourse’ (Lie, 1995), though, has not been 
matched by any clear consensus in terminology. “The referent,” writes Fludernik 
(2003), “seems to resist precise definition” (p. xii). Butler too goes on explain that, 
while scholarship flourishes, “we have actually become less clear about what 
defines diasporas and makes them a distinct category” (p. 189). Even Steven 
Vertovec, one of the area’s more prominent scholars, has been moved to note that 
“in a burgeoning body of literature, academics across the humanities and social 
sciences often disagree on contemporary definitions of ‘diaspora,’ its typical 
reference points, characteristic features, limits, and social dynamics.” Simply put, 
we could say the idea of diaspora, as Robin Cohen remarks, “varies greatly” 
(Cohen, 1997). Thus, it is wholly appropriate to begin this section with a caveat: 
while diaspora is a concept widely applied, its definition is the subject of ongoing 
debate. This is not to dismiss the incisive definitions offered by scholars such as 
James Clifford, William Safran or Robin Cohen (Clifford, 1997; Cohen, 1997; 
Safran, 1991). Instead, it is a remark on the very fluidity of the term, embracing as 
 376 
it does anything from the violence of ‘victim’ diasporas to the high-flying worlds 
of cultural and political elites. 
That diaspora is a ‘traveling’ term is, on one hand, cause for concern. 
Some suggest it risks losing its analytic purchase when applied indiscriminately. 
What is unique about ‘diaspora’ when it seems to refer to any number of 
‘deterritorialized identities’? What are its advantages over cognate phenomenon? 
Below I wish to briefly consider how theorists have responded to such concerns, 
giving preference to those works that are mentioned with regularity and/or that 
highlight the recurrent features of the ‘diaspora debate.’ My goal here is not to 
provide a comprehensive survey of the field, but rather to outline what Sudesh 
Mishra (2006) might term “scenes of exemplification…within the larger scene of 
the genre” (p. 173). Wishing to avoid generalizations or impose a false continuity, 
I suggest that attempting to arrive at any defining characteristics or endemic 
attributes is, however, counter-intuitive (and, perhaps even counter-productive). 
Diaporas are precisely that: plural in number and nature. They are complexly 
unique events characterized by contrary and anomalous effects that defy easy 
classification. The nature of diasporic politics (see Laguerre, 2006) is equally 
manifold and case specific. For instance, ‘diaspora’ may variously encompass 
cosmopolitan anti-nationalists or reactionary ethno-nationalists (see Kaldor, 
1996), ‘primordialists’ (for critique, see Falzon, 2003) or those who see in it the 
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evolution of a hybrid, ‘thirdspace’ (Bhabha, 1994). Ironically, then, while some 
profiles ostensibly capture the “full scope, diversity and complexity” of “existing 
diasporas” (Sheffer, 2003, p. 76), such frameworks may in fact not be universal 
enough. As a consequence, my way through this definitional mire is to avoid any 
attempts to ‘pin diaspora down.’ Instead I focus on what animates the dynamics 
of ‘diasporic’ groups. I prefer to see diaspora as defined by disposition as 
opposed character, distinguished by fluid “elective affinities” (Hess, 1999) rather 
than attributes. It is this structure of diasporic dispositions, I argue, that 
“underlies the transmission and reinvention of distinctive cultural forms and 
practices” (Parker, 2000, p. 84) that some see as endemic to diasporic life. 
Though I begin from the premise, then, that “nobody’s diaspora looks 
wholly like their neighbour’s” (Fludernik, 2003, p. xi), there is no lack for 
scholars who have attempted to define the term. One of the earliest, and most 
cited, reviews is William Safran’s “Diasporas in Modern Societies” which appeared 
in the inaugural issue of the journal Diaspora in 1991 (Safran, 1991). In brief, 
Safran considers the defining characteristics of diasporas to be “expatriate 
minority communities” who: (1) are dispersed to two or more locations, from an 
original “center” to at least two “peripheral” locations; (2) maintain, and are 
bound by, a collective mythology of homeland, a “memory” or “vision” of 
origin; (3) are alienated from their hostland (they believe, writes Safran, that 
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“they are not—and perhaps cannot be—fully accepted by their host country”); 
(4) idealize “return”, who believe their ‘ancestral home’ to be a place of eventual 
return; and, (5) and (6) maintain an ongoing relationship with their homeland, 
firstly by way of a commitment to “restoration”, to its independence, safety, and 
prosperity, and, secondly through a group consciousness and solidarity defined 
by this commitment (Safran, 1991, pp. 83-84). In a later review of literature Cohen 
(1998) offers a very similar set of attributes. He sees “an implicit rule of thumb at 
work” in which “the basic assumption” seems be that diaspora refers to: 
a) A large scale physical dispersal of supposedly homogeneous populations 
(viz. the Armenians, the Sikhs) from a single originating point in time and 
space due to some catastrophic event. 
b) Simultaneous or successive re-settlement over long distances at multiple 
and heterogeneous foreign locations in which populations make 
themselves a (temporary or permanent) home from home. 
c) A strong sense of being displaced from ethnic/national territories and a 
desire to return or to claim entitlements to them (Cohen, 1998, p. 5). 
Butler (2001), like Cohen, identifies three features to which most diaspora 
scholars “seem to agree.” Again, dispersal to “a minimum of two destinations.” 
Secondly, a relationship “to an actual or imagined homeland.” And, finally, 
Butler emphasizes the notion of ‘group consciousness’ identified by both Cohen 
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and Safran: “There  must be,” she argues, “self-awareness of the group’s identity. 
Diasporan communities are consciously part of an ethnonational group” (p. 192; 
original emphasis). To these categories, Butler adds temporal-historical 
dimension: “its [diaspora] existence over at least two generations” (p. 192). 
Of these types of ‘working lists’, Safran (2005) rather wisely recognizes 
that no diaspora “conforms completely” (p. 39). Nor could it, argues Clifford 
(1994). As he suggests, “no society can be expected to qualify on all counts, 
throughout its history” (p. 306). Taking this into account, Vertovec (1997) turns 
instead to various typologies, or what he calls “meanings”, of diaspora. Rather 
than identifying an ‘ideal type’, or a range of phenomena that we could call 
‘diasporic’, Vertovec (1997) recognizes three current approaches to diaspora. He 
argues diaspora has been taken variously as: (1) a social form; (2) a type of 
consciousness; and, (3) as a  mode of cultural production (interestingly, these 
mirror the first three conceptual premises he elsewhere identifies of 
transnationalism [see Vertovec, 1999]). In the first instance, Vertovec sees a 
diaspora as a group “characterised by their relationship-despite-dispersal” (p. ?). 
Diasporas are social formations spanning the traditional borders of the ‘nation-
state’, they are “transnational communities in the sense identified by Guarnizo 
and Smith (1998). As Vertovec argues elsewhere, one of the hallmarks of 
diaspora as a social form is the “triadic relationship” (see also Safran, 1991) 
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between: “(a) globally dispersed yet collectively self-identified ethnic groups, (b) 
the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside, and (c) the homeland 
states and contexts whence they or their forebears came” (Vertovec, 1999, p. 449). 
As a type of consciousness, ‘diaspora’ “puts greater emphasis on describing a 
variety of experience, a state of mind and a sense of identity.” Diaspora 
consciousness is akin to Safran’s “ethnocommunal consciousness” (1991, pp. 84-
85), and is marked by acuity to border-spanning, interconnection, and to 
“decentred attachments” (Vertovec, 1999, p. 450). It is a consciousness of “being 
different from surrounding society, and ‘an awareness of multilocality’” (Safran, 
2005, p. 50). Finally, diaspora as a mode of cultural production can be seen, 
argues Vertovec, in the “world-wide flow of cultural objects, images and 
meanings resulting in variegated processes of creolisation, back-and-forth 
transferences, mutual influences, new contestations, negotiations and constant 
transformations” (1997, p. ?). Diaspora in this way involves the production and 
reproduction of transnational, constructed styles and identities which other 
authors have variously described in terms of syncretism (Gilroy, 1993; Stewart, 
1999), creolization (Hannerz, 1987, 1992), bricolage (Hebdige, 1979), cultural 
translation (Hall, 1992), and hybridity (Nederveen Pieterse, 1994). 
Significantly, in his overview Vertovec also identifies the political qualities 
of contemporary diasporas. As he contends: 
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Individual immigrants may be significant actors, or collective associations 
may be powerful pressure groups, in the domestic politics of their host 
countries as well as in the international political arena, usually prompted 
by their interest in the political plight of a country of origin. 
 
Politics are important too for Bruneau (1995). He labels “political diasporas” as 
the third of his typologies of “diasporic organization”—the political dimension 
of diaspora only too obvious in the fact he cites the Palestinian and Tibetan 
‘diasporas’ as exemplars of this category. It should be noted that there is a degree 
of debate about the nature of ‘diasporic politics’ however. On one hand scholars 
such as Stuart Hall, Homi Bhabha, Paul Gilroy and James Clifford see ‘diaspora’ 
as contrary to the hegemonic narratives of ‘ethnicity’, ‘race’, and ‘nation. Others 
such as Mitchell (1997) have questioned whether diasporic politics, in the sense 
used by these scholars, are necessarily anti-essentialist. Mary Kaldor (1996) and 
Makarand Paranjape (2003) are two another examples. Kaldor points to the 
presence of both cosmopolitan anti-nationalists and reactionary ethno-
nationalists within diasporas, while Paranjape refers to the fact that “diasporic 
communities are known, at times, to support the most rapidly violent and 
fanatical of causes” (p. 238). In this school of thought what is critical to diaspora 
is the acknowledgment of both a ‘source’ and ‘target’ country. The diasporic is 
engendered through displacement. That is, to be diasporic is to articulate oneself 
to a collective in which members see themselves as linked through common 
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heritage; it reflects a disinclination to relinquish one’s connection to a 
‘homeland.’ 
It is important therefore to draw a distinction between could be called 
‘ethno-national diasporas’ and diaspora as I wish to use it herein. In brief, the 
term ‘ethno-national diaspora’ is a relatively specific category of social and 
political formation. As used by scholars such as Sheffer (2003) this hyphenated 
term places stress on “the politics of dispersed groups whose members regard 
themselves as being participants in nations that have common ethnic and 
national traits, identities, and affinities” (p. 11). In most those who belong believe 
that they have “a collective history closely connected to a specific 
homeland…and that they owe a degree of loyalty to their nation” (p. 11). The 
identities of members of such groups Sheffer thus describes as based on 
“primordial, instrumental, and mythical/psychological elements” (p. 11). I wish 
to suggest, however, that this autochthonous view of national history is 
problematic; in the least because, as I have argued above, popular national 
identity in the Pacific is only a belated achievement of European colonialism. The 
nation itself is only an eighteenth-century ‘invention.’ ‘Race’ and ‘culture’ are 
equally the products of Western scholarly and popular thought. Most modern 
scholars agree that the cultural boundaries of the Pacific have similarly “always 
been dynamically changing an permeable” (Linnekin, 1997, p. 9). We may be 
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better to think in terms of not ‘Samoans’, ‘Tongans’, ‘Cook Islanders’ and the 
like, but of “People of the sea” (D’Arcy, 1997, p. 74), a community of islands 
connected “in a wider social world of moving items and ideas” (Irwin, 1992, p. 
204). In the words of Lie (2001), national history is not endogenous, and the 
“vision of the homogenous nation dispersing people at the margins 
fundamentally distorts the past and present” (p. 359). We must, as he warns, 
guard against viewing “diasporic outflow” as merely “a dispersal of a marginal 
minority outside of the national borders” (p. 359). 
To paraphrase Zenner (1983), I therefore take diasporic communities to 
have no necessary hinterland; there is no inevitable land ‘left behind.’ Following 
Gilroy (1992, 1993, 1994), I am weary of equating nation with culture, race, and 
ethnicity because in the Pacific people have no necessary origins from which they 
are ‘transmitted’ nor do they have a territorial end. The circulation of ideas, 
politics, commodities, iconographies and peoples of the Pacific are non-linear, 
and as a consequence the “dual territorial schema” of diaspora (Mishra, 2006, p. 
53) seems wholly inadequate. I am also want to suggest that the exponents of this 
dual territorial approach merely repeat what Sudesh Mishra describes as “an 
ideological ploy in representing diasporas as self-marking ethnic minorities 
sundered from a homeland entity and residing in a host territory belonging self-
evidently to a dominant ethno-national entity” (2006, p. 55; original emphasis). 
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Space in the Pacific is perhaps best understood not as an allusion to fixity or 
place but “more in terms of the ex-centric communicative circuitry that has 
enabled dispersed populations to converse, interact and even synchronise 
significant elements of their social and cultural lives” (Gilroy, 1994, p. 211). 
Pacific space so conceived means terms such as Pacific Islander, PI, or Polynesian 
are less ethno-national or ethno-regional categories than political categories 
which reference “common experience…among groups and communities with, in 
fact, very different histories, traditions, and ethnic identities” (Hall, 1988, p. 27). 
Diaspora in this sense is a means of disrupting traditional notions of space and 
belonging, a way of introducing “new intermediate concepts, between the local 
and the global” (Gilroy, 1992, p. 188). I take, therefore, ‘diaspora in a metaphoric, 
rather than ‘literal’ sense. To borrow from Hall (1990), I see diaspora not as a 
reference 
to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to 
some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return…The 
diaspora experience as I intend it here is defined, not by essence or purity, 
but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a 
conception of ‘identity’ which lives with and through, not despite, 
difference; by hybridity. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly 
producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation 
and difference (p. 235). 
 
Hall’s definition of diaspora gives prominence to an anti-essentialist 
notion of identity that privileges journey over arrival and mobility over fixity. It 
puts into tension the notion of national identity as “something pure, self-
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contained and unified” (Procter, 2003, p. 131). The whole concept of Hall’s notion 
of diasporic identity is, as he puts it (Hall, 1994), necessarily a “production” 
always in process as opposed to a fixed essence or origin. Diasporic identity is 
“always constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative and myth” (1994, p. 
395). Hall’s conception of diaspora is also coexistent if not coterminous with 
hybridity in that “both denote an important reconfiguration of ‘ethnic’ 
boundaries and bonds and posit the growth of transnationalism” (Anthias, 2002). 
Diaspora for Hall is a collective space in which hybrid social forms flourish. Or, 
as Boyarin and Boyarin (1993) put it, diasporic cultures survive through mixing. 
A Brown Pacific? 
These cultures also survive by moving. Diaspora is less about here or 
there than about a circuit. This critical shift away from ideas of cultural origins 
and rooted-ness to cultural movement and travel is nowhere better exemplified 
than in the work of Paul Gilroy. Drawing on the ‘rhizomatic’ metaphors of Giles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1998), in the Black Atlantic 
Gilroy proposes diaspora as “a more complex, ecologically sophisticated and 
organic concept of identity than offered by the contending by the contending 
options of genealogy and geography.” For Gilroy, diasporic identities challenge 
the connection between the modern nation-state and identity because it opens up 
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a “historical and experiential rift between the locations of residence and the 
locations of belonging” (2000, p. 124). In his view diaspora 
disrupts the fundamental power of territory to determine identity by 
breaking the simple sequence of explanatory links between place, location 
and consciousness. It destroys the naïve invocations of common memory 
as the basis for particularity by drawing attention to the dynamics of 
commemoration (1997, p. 328). 
 
In The Black Atlantic, Gilroy’s far-reaching critique of ethnic absolutism, he 
foregrounds histories of crossing, migration, exploration, interconnection and 
travel. He is particularly fond of using the images of ships and sea voyages to 
emphasize the “flows, exchanges, and in-between elements” (p. 190) that permit 
us to move beyond “the dogmatic focus on discrete national dynamics” (p. 6). 
Like scholars such as Hall and Kobena Mercer (Mercer, 1994), Gilroy is an 
advocate of reorienting analyses around “hybrid formations, times and 
spaces”—thus turning our gaze to “social networks (rather than “societies”), 
border zones, boundary crossing and global society” (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995, 
p. 63). For Gilroy, diaspora “stands opposed to the distinctively modern 
structures and modes of power orchestrated by the institutional complexity of 
nation-states.” Diasporic reflection, he suggests, acknowledges historically-
produced difference without imputing a hierarchy of value based on racial 
identities; at the same time requiring the necessary reconsideration of global 
cultural formations beyond their mere relation to the national: 
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Identity conceived diasporically resists reification in petrified forms even 
if they are indubitably authentic. The tensions around origin and essence 
that the diaspora brings into view allow us to perceive that identity 
should not be fossilized in keeping with the holy spirit of ethnic 
absolutism. Identity, too becomes a noun of process. Its openness provides 
a timely alternative to the clockwork solidarity based on outmoded 
notions of ‘race’ and disputed ideas of national belonging (Gilroy, 2000, p. 
252). 
 
This notion of identity as a “noun of process” is crucial to the way in which 
Gilroy conceives the relationship between culture, community, and place as 
being beyond geography or territory. For Gilroy, identity, as understood 
diasporically, is based upon shared beliefs and the transnational communication 
(and consumption) of products, practices, and ideas, rather than the specificities 
of national cultural boundaries. Thus, diasporic space “operates between and 
within the outer-national, national, regional and local—occupying all of these 
spaces at once” (Carrington, 2001, p. 265). Gilroy argues therefore that identity 
should be defined 
less through outmoded notions of fixity and place and more in terms of 
the ex-centric communicative circuitry that has enabled dispersed 
populations to converse, interact and even synchronise significant 
elements of their social and cultural lives (1994, p. 211). 
 
Gilroy’s notion of diaspora builds on the ideas of Hall which are discussed 
in brief above. Indeed, they are both explicitly transnational perspectives which 
differ markedly from the classic model of diaspora that is “strongly associated 
with the principles of territory and memory—what James Clifford calls the 
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“centered model” (Clifford, 1994). What emerges for both authors is a 
profoundly ‘intercultural’ culture. The move away from nationalistic and 
essentialist models of cultural production for Gilroy, though, is perhaps best 
exemplified again in the Black Atlantic. The Black Atlantic is in many ways 
Gilroy’s idea of diaspora enacted. In this case, Gilroy argues that it is Black 
identities that cannot be understood in terms of being American, British or West 
Indian; each can only be understood relationally in the context of the Black 
diaspora of the Atlantic. Gilroy has particular misgivings about the 
compartmentalization of black cultural studies into African American, 
Caribbean, Black British or African studies. He contends that “national units are 
not the most appropriate basis for studying this history for the African diaspora’s 
consciousness of itself has been defined in and against constricting national 
boundaries.” What he wishes to highlight is cross-fertilization taking place 
between diverse black cultural elements in the “single and complex” unit of the 
Black Atlantic world. As Lopez-Ropero (2005) explains, identity for members of 
the Black diaspora is about “coming to terms with the routes they have taken in a 
journey whose first leg was the middle passage…[they are] in constant dialogue 
with the imaginary homeland of Africa, their actual European homes, and other 
places such as the Caribbean” (p. 167). 
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Gilroy has been attacked by some scholars for paying too little attention to 
Africa itself. Some have questioned also the utility of the Black Atlantic 
framework given it fails to account for those syncretisms occurring within 
national boundaries (see Clifford, 1994). One of the more trenchant critiques, 
however, is that it leaves little scope for disjunctions and regional differences. As 
Clifford (1994) notes, “it is important to specify that black South America and the 
hybrid Hispanic/black cultures of the Caribbean and Latin America are not, for 
the moment, included in Gilroy’s projections. He writes from a North 
Atlantic/European location” (p. 320). Certainly, Clifford is right to point to the 
dangers of conflating diaspora and its particular history of usage in black 
cultural politics within the Black Atlantic. We should be cautious about using the 
term Black Atlantic to refer to diaspora studies generally (Edwards, 2001). These 
are all valid criticisms but, as Gilroy himself notes, the Black Atlantic is intended 
to be a “provisional” or “heuristic” term of analysis (Gilroy, 1993). Gilroy’s 
allusions to rhizomes is also, I believe, a conscious attempt to highlight that the 
Atlantic is an imaginative space of contestation rather than some type of 
conventional geography. For Gilroy, the Black Atlantic is a formation which 
transcends ethnic and national paradigms, and is in no way moored to those 
intercultural exchanges occurring between, and within, those countries whose 
shores adjoin the eponymous ocean. As …notes, “it is clear from [Gilroy’s] 
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narrative that the emerging ‘politics of transfiguration’ he describes is not the 
monopoly of the black Atlantic even if that remains its most insurgent 
instantiation” (Hitchcock, 1999, p. 102). The Black Atlantic should consequently 
been seen as more generally “a deterritorialised, multiplex, and anti-national 
basis for the affinity or ‘identity of passions’ between diverse black populations” 
(1996, p. 18). The Black Atlantic allows us to conceptualize “versions of solidarity 
that do not need to repress the differences between one ‘essential community 
and others’” (Gilroy, 2000, p. 252). 
While it seemingly intimates a specific territoriality, the concept therefore 
does not deny the efficacy of diasporic identification in expressing unique 
cultural and political agendas; the Black Atlantic is, instead, a metaphor for more 
general “intermediate” spaces within which local political struggle may be 
articulated through affiliation to the wider political struggles of the diasporic 
community(ies). To paraphrase Clifford (1994), the black Atlantic is more than 
just a signifier of Atlantic cultural exchange, of “transnationality and 
movement”, but more broadly describes “political struggles to define the local, as 
distinctive community, in historical contexts of displacement” (p. 308). It is thus a 
metaphor which is relevant to diasporic transcultural identity generally because 
it invites moves: 
into the contested spaces between the local and the global in ways that do 
not privilege the modern nation state and its institutional order over the 
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sub-national and supra-national networks and patterns of power, 
communication and conflict that they work to discipline, regulate and 
govern (Gilroy, 1996, p. 22). 
 
The work, then, that diaspora does within the Black Atlantic is to address the 
“place of betweenness” (to borrow a phrase from Clifford), the “neither/nor 
situation.” In the Black Atlantic diaspora becomes a marker for a cosmopolitan 
hybridity in which identities are constructed from “the debris of historical and 
future possibilities” (Clifford, 1994). It usefulness lies in its ability to link new 
and diversely peopled communities through conditions of migrancy and transit 
rather than modernist exile formations that reproduce colonial binaries. 
Diasporic subjects are always in transit, existing within a ‘travelling culture’, a 
mobile network of affinities. 
I have already made intimations above about the diasporic nature of the 
cultures of Pacific peoples. In the remainder of this section I wish to begin by 
problematizing the Black Atlantic as it pertains to the context of the Pacific; to 
ask how the black Atlantic be can “fitted to, articulated with” (Grossberg, 1997, 
p. 262) the unique set of historical forces and practices that compose the social 
context within which the identity of Pacific peoples is constituted and negotiated. 
In what ways can we talk about a potential ‘Black Pacific’? Gilroy’s Black Atlantic 
is a continent-oriented theory of postcolonialism infused by the enduring 
“memory”—as Gilroy puts it—of Black Atlantic slavery. How relevant is such an 
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‘heuristic’ to a “Sea of Islands” (Hau’ofa, 1993) in which the long and tragic 
history of slavery, though present, has not cast as long a shadow nor had the 
same enduring effects on the contemporary consciousness of its people? Is the 
racism of the Black Atlantic—which so relied on images of Black populations as 
workers or labourers—akin to the South Pacific’s exotic primitivism—something 
that qualitatively differs in its relationship to modernity? What else besides the 
continuity of the experience of slavery or the geographic continuity of the 
Atlantic are inapplicable to the Pacific? 
A useful starting point in beginning to examine these questions is Rod 
Edmond and Vanessa Smith’s introduction to the edited volume Islands in 
History and Representation (Edmond and Smith, 2003). Between ‘Oceania’ and the 
Black Pacific they suggest that there are obvious “points of comparison” (p. 11). 
In particular, what we can take from Gilroy is the way he opposes “a monolithic 
continental father/motherland” (p. 11). In like fashion the Pacific as conceived 
diaporically “offers a myriad of homelands scattered across different island 
groups” (p. 11). There are also parallels in the way in which ‘traditional’ 
cultures—‘Africanisms’ for Gilroy, ‘Pacificisms’ here perhaps—though they 
“have survived into modernity their significance and meaning is irrevocably 
sundered from their origins” (p. 11). Gilroy’s understanding of tradition as “the 
living memory of the changing same” (1993, p. 198) certainly seems to be 
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germane to the Pacific context. For Edmond and Smith there are, however, 
important parts of Gilroy’s argument that are less fitting to studying the Pacific. 
They include the questions of geography and history intimated above and 
especially the “absence of systematic racial slavery and the more voluntary 
nature of its diasporas” (p. 12). Despite these misgivings there are obvious 
parallels between Gilroy’s account of the Black Atlantic and Edmond and Smith’s 
description of the “hybrid worlds” of the Pacific as encompassing both a sense of 
“loss and displacement as well as new geographical and cultural configurations” 
(p. 10) seems to suggest distinct echoes. 
Where Gilroy’s model can most obviously be translated to the Pacific 
context is in the way it brings our attention back to the ocean. For Gilroy the 
ocean is a space of connection and transnational exchange. Similarly, in the 
Pacific identity formation is an ongoing process of travel and exchange across 
oceans. Apropos of the current study, then, is Gilroy’s attack on the bounded 
spatial imagination that is common to thinking about culture. The idea of a fixed 
identity unambiguously belonging to one group—in a ‘contained’ space—is 
replaced by “notions of more fluid identities belonging to particular subject 
positions which can vary in intensity and can be combined in many different 
was, so challenging homologous explanations” (Anderson et al, 2003, p. 7). 
Second, in its emphasis on hybridity, Gilroy’s Black Atlantic must be seen as an 
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imaginative geography of resistance. Diasporas challenge ethnicity and ethnic 
absolutism. Ethnicity is replaced by hybridity, certainty is replaced by critique. A 
diasporic space also transgresses the boundaries of nationalism. Gilroy stresses a 
performative element that exists outside of official discourses of nationalism. Put 
simply, the nation state is subverted by diasporic attachments which construct 
allegiances elsewhere. We could some up this second point by saying that ‘in-
between-ness’ is a productive position. In the space between ‘origin’ and 
‘destination’ new forms of culture emerge, what Ang aptly describes as “hybrid 
cultural forms born out of a productive, creative syncretism” (2001, p. 35). Thus, 
Polynesian, Pacific Islander, PI become open signifiers “invested with resource 
potential, the raw material for the construction of syncretic identities suitable for 
living ‘where you’re at’” (Ang, 2001, p. 35). 
‘Grounding’ the Brown Pacific 
Extending Gilroy’s metaphor I wish to suggest that, for Pacific people, the 
Pacific ocean—as a shifting, mobile space of possibility and interconnection 
between peoples—is a counter force to the rooted territorialities, bounded 
demarcations and sovereignty claims that organise dry land. The Black Pacific, as 
we could call it, is a return to the sea as opposed to islands (Hau’ofa, 1993). 
Ironically, in the Pacific diaspora the Pacific ocean is beginning to resemble the 
way it was before Europeans, when it had no exclusionary laws, fences, or 
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border patrols or imaginary cartographic lines, “but rather points of entry that 
were constantly negotiated and even contested. The sea was open to anyone who 
could navigate a way through” (Hau’ofa, 1993; see also Hau’ofa, 1998). What we 
can take from Gilroy is the Black Atlantic’s most central element: “its rejection of 
classic diasporic center (homeland) and periphery (those longing to return) 
structures in favor of a decentered geography of postnational, multidirectional 
cultural flow” (Feldman, 2006, p. 8). But, where we can actually see indications of 
an emergent ‘Brown Pacific’? It is important here to note that The Black Atlantic 
is a particular type of diaspora whereby Black Britons look across the Atlantic 
and elsewhere in order to appropriate the “raw materials for creative purposes 
which redefine what it means to be black, adapting it to distinctly British 
experiences and meanings” (Gilroy, 1987, p. 154). Interestingly, we even in the 
Pacific we can see direct borrowings from the Black Atlantic itself. I read these as 
examples of the way in which Pacific peoples have entered into a dialogue with 
international critiques of capitalism and oppression while at the same time 
critiquing the structures of racial politics in local and national contexts. 
Arguably, these intellectual and aesthetic appropriations have provided models 
for the struggle against local discrimination and inequality. 
One obvious example is the Polynesian Panthers. Inspired by the Black 
Panther movement in the United States, the Polynesian Panther Party (PPP) was 
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formed by  group of inner city Pacific Island and Maori youth in 1971. As one 
account of the groups history describes it, they were brought together through 
the “shared experience of racism”. The parents of PPP members were generally 
among the first wave of Pacific Island people to migrate to New Zealand in the 
1950s and 1960s, a group which often bore racism and social injustice in silence. 
Galvanized by other global protest movements during the late 1960s and early 
1970s, their children formed the PPP as an attempt “to alleviate the subordinate 
position of Pacific peoples in New Zealand”. The Panthers set up homework 
centres for local children, organised senior citizens’ outings and community food 
programmes, marched against South African apartheid and the Vietnam war, 
and advised Pacific Islanders on legal rights. 
While for many members the movement was an expression of local 
identity issues—particularly the tension between first generation Pacific-New 
Zealanders and their parents and the place of Pacific culture in new urban 
environments—according to one of its founders it was also an identification with 
“the sacrifice and struggle by our American brothers.” However, though their 
political inspiration came from the Black Panther Movement of the US, it is 
important to stress that it was modified to suit local realities. As one member 
recalls, “challenging society and the community attitudes and beliefs in regard to 
the Pacific is what I remember about my time in the PPP.” Notably, the Panthers 
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were also strong supporters of Māori political initatives such as the Bastion Point 
occupation and Waitangi Day protests. One of the PPP’s stated missions was to 
establish a pan-ethnic grouping of both Maori and Pacific Islanders (Polynesian 
Panther Party, 1975: 225-226). In 1972, the PPP worked with Nga Tamatoa (a 
group of young Maori activists) and the Stormtrooper and Headhunter gangs to 
form a “loose Polynesian Front”; and in 1974 the PPP participated in a meeting 
“amongst all Maori and Polynesian progressive organisations to form a united 
front.” In mid-1972, PPP leader Will ‘Ilolahia also toured Australia where he met 
Aboriginal Black Power groups. On his return he announced plans for 
“solidarity and co-operation” between the PPP, Aboriginal groups and black 
power supporters in Papua-New Guinea. 
Sujatha Fernandes has noted how minorities in Cuba have 
“appropriate[d] transnational imaginaries in order to frame local political 
demands and strategies” (2003, p. 575). Similarly, the PPP is an example of the 
ways in young Pacific peoples have sought to (re)articulate global flows of 
African-American culture as a “means for contestation over local discourses of 
power and race” (Fernandes, 2003, p. 576). Evidence of this “diaspora aesthetic” 
(Hall, 1990, p. 236) is also apparent in music; hip hop culture in particular, but 
also in the strong Maori and Polynesian embrace of reggae and soul. Roy Shuker 
argues that this support “is hardly surprising, since these categories…have 
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become virtually synonymous with ‘black music.’” Of reggae, in particular, he 
writes that it 
does not simply describe an experience, but it politicizes it through 
creating symbols for listeners to identify with. Many Maori and 
Polynesian youth are knowledgable about rasta, and familiar with some of 
the metaphors in the music (Babylonm Jah, etc) They regard reggae as 
relevant to the structural location of Maori and Polynesian as a major part 
of New Zealand’s socially dispossed working class (page?). 
 
The local hip-hop scene is similarly characterized by a “sycretic dynamic” 
(Mercer, 1988, p. 57) in which young PI cultural practitioners and critics draw 
upon transnational flows of African-American culture (and diasporic affiliations 
more generally) as part of local cultural politics and practices which strive to 
articulate themselves to wider global political struggles. Of rap’s appeal Shuker 
argues that its adherents are “frequently conscious” of the “politicized nature” of 
a lot of this work. These issues have been explored in far greater detail than I 
could do justice to here by Kirsten Zemke-White (Zemke-White, 2002, 2004). 
Over the purview of her work, perhaps the most salient issue she draws out is 
how Maori and Polynesian youth have been drawn to hip hop because they see 
themselves as being in a similar socio-economic situation. Secondly, she 
identifies how international ‘backyard dialogues’ between global indigenous and 
hip hop communities has been reinforced by hip hop’s ‘localisation’ and 
idiosyncratic Pacific expression. Reflecting Chuck D’s contention that “hip hop 
and rap have opened a space for dialogue between marginalised peoples, from 
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the Pacific to Black America and back again” (Chuck D, 1999), Zemke-White 
observes “that while hip hop expression and culture in Aotearoa has been 
commercially successful and manifests initially as a commodified American 
cultural product, hip hop has also managed to maintain cooperative and 
community-based exchanges and relationships, argued by its local proponents to 
be a means of indigenous interpretation, transformation, and power” (2004, p. 
205). As she likewise writes elsewhere, “it is evident that Pacific people have not 
only embraced and adapted [hip hop] music forms; they are also using them to 
celebrate indigenous and unique Pacific cultures, whether overtly through lyrics 
or merely by personae and images” (Zemke-White, 2002, p. 128). Ironically, a 
genre once criticized “for being a clone of US rap” (Shute, 2004, p. 163) has now 
come to exemplify what Elam and Jackson (2005) have described as a “connective 
cultural aesthetic” that is appropriated and adapted to particular (Pacific) 
circumstances (see also, Mitchell, 2001). 
It is important to note, however, the Pacific diaspora is not defined solely 
by its relation to the expressive cultures of the Black diaspora; it is more about 
“hemispherically displacing” (Maxwell, 2003, p. 44) Gilroy’s metaphor. What is 
central is not the specifics of the cultures themselves but the diasporic imaginary 
which reflects on communal dispersal and the extraterritorial orientation toward 
the Pacific. It is useful perhaps to consider Hall’s two-fold conception or identity 
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here. The first in terms of “one shared culture” held common, an identity that 
searches for images which impose “an imaginary coherence on the experience of 
dispersal and fragmentation” (1990, p. 224). Images of a shared ‘Pacific-ness’ 
provide just such a coherence. His second view of identity explores the condition 
of “constant transformation…[the] names we give to the different ways we are 
positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past” (p. 225). 
What Hall is arguing for is a notion of life and identity as a process rather than a 
fixed and essentialized set of conditions that governs and shapes a way of life. In 
Arjun Appadurai’s view, what this means is that 
the invention of tradition (and of ethnicity, kinship, and other identity-
markers) can become slippery…Culture becomes less what Bourdieu 
would have called a habitus…and more an arena for conscious choice, 
justification, and representation. 
 
What I am suggesting then is that the Black Pacific is characterized by a material 
and imaginative compulsion toward mobility and adaptation that creates the 
conditions for progressive politics that reject narrowly parochial nationalist 
positions. The concept of imaginaries is particularly important because it 
conveys the agency of diaspora subjects who, while being made by state 
and capitalist regimes of truth, can play with different cultural fragments 
in a way that allows them to segue from one discourse to another, 
experiment with alternative forms of identification, shrug in and out of 
indetities, or evade imposed forms of identification (Nonini and Ong, 
1997, p. 26). 
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Going online is the most obvious place to see how the lives of Pacific 
peoples in and beyond the Pacific Islands are (re)articulating a uniquely 
diasporic politics of representation. Obviously, as Tyner and Olaf Kuhlke (2000) 
note, growing telecommunications technology “enables spatially separated 
communities to use increasingly more sophisticated techniques to maintain 
social, economic, and political ties with their homeland.” In this case the sheer 
“geographical fluidity” (p. 128) of the internet means that the information 
exchanged online can incorporate dispersed populations throughout the Pacific. 
Marianne Franklin’s examination of how Internet technologies create new spatial 
linkages in the Pacific is easily the most developed work on this issue (Franklin, , 
2005). She focuses on the internet discussion forums, the Kava Bowl and the 
Kamehameha Roundtable, to explore the “everyday life of postcolonial Pacific 
Island communities and their diasporic populations” living in the United States, 
Australia, and New Zealand. Her particular interest is ‘race’ and ‘culture’ and 
“what these terms (should) mean at any given time, how they relate to extended-
family networks and obligations for Tongan and Samoan communities overseas 
vis-à -vis those ‘back home’ in the Pacific Islands and society at large” (). She 
suggests that in these online discussions new spaces of expression are created 
that challenges “old and new sociocultural and political pressures emanating 
from both their ‘original’ and diasporic cultural contexts. Perhaps even more 
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pertinent is Franklin’s contention that in these discussions “‘race’ (and, by 
implication, ethnicity) and ‘culture’ can be seen to be operating as self-conscious 
tropes for a polyglot and polyvalent ‘identity’ for postcolonial and diasporic 
contexts.” 
Paul Spoonley has also noted how the internet is reconfiguring “Pacific 
ethnicity.” Like Franklin he suggests the web has become an increasingly 
important technology of self-representation. Borrowing Poster’s (1998) notion of 
virtual community, Spoonley (2001) notes how computer-mediated 
communication has “provided new options for maintaining links and 
contributing to new forms of community” in Pacific communities. Interestingly, 
he notes that most of the users of the sites live outside the Pacific Islands 
themselves. Though he is somewhat wary of new technologies given their 
potential to create links that “might erode traditional institutions and beliefs”, he 
ultimately holds that the Internet “may provide the most effective vehicle in the 
long term” (p. 90). A similar conclusion is reached by Howard (2000) in his study 
of the Pacific-based virtual communities of Rotumans (see also Howard, 1999). 
Of the Rotuman community he writes of how, while once it may have been 
“confined to the island of Rotuma, it now transcends national boundaries and 
has become increasingly diffuse” (p. 414). 
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It should be noted that these virtual Pacific communities have not 
necessarily supplanted ‘social’ communities. To be sure the Pacific diaspora is in 
part ‘virtual’ (via interactions involving international calls, faxes, emails, satellite 
TV broadcasting, simultaneous media access through the Internet) but there is 
also a ‘real’ or ‘social’ side to the Black Pacific. It is a concept which engages with 
the imagination—an ‘imagined community’ in Anderson’s terms—as well as 
social interaction. In Laguerre’s (2002) terms, the ‘virtual diaspora’ is merely the 
“cyberexpansion of real diaspora.” He goes even further in suggesting that “no 
virtual diaspora can be sustained without real life diasporas and in this sense, it 
is not a separate entity, but rather a pole of a continuum” (in Transborder Lives). 
This is readily apparent in the Pacific. Movement back and forward and between 
the Islands is a prominent feature of Pacific lives. The “international population 
circulation” in Bedford’s terms, is “a very common process” (p. 117). 
The Brown (Sporting) Pacific 
And, this brings us to athletes. For Pacific audiences the professional 
rugby player embodies a sense of agency which transcends their sporting 
significance. It is perhaps productive here to draw parallels with Ben 
Carrington’s notion of the black sporting Atlantic, a term he adapts from Gilroy 
to serve “as a model to comprehend the lives, travels, migrations, and 
significances of black athletes within the black Atlantic” (Carrington, 2000). He 
 404 
contends that black athletes have formed a central part of black Atlantic 
communities. In particular, Carrington submits that sport within black 
communities has “long been a crucial site for black political mobilisation, at both 
the local level…to the international level” (Carrington, 2000). By way of some 
specific examples Carrington cites how, when exported from their countries of 
origin black Atlantic athletes such as Jesse Owens, Arthur Ashe, Althea Gibson, 
Muhammad Ali, Viv Richards, Pele, Jackie Joyner Kerse, Brian Lara and Ronaldo 
have become important “signifiers of expressive black physicality…form[ing] 
part of the cultural resources of black Britons” (Carrington, 2000). The crux of his 
argument is that diasporic identifications with such transnational sporting stars 
“challenges narrow prescriptive accounts of national identity, and rearticulates 
the elements of the black Atlantic cultural world for a specifically black British 
sensibility.” Without question the context of the black British diaspora is unique 
and it is not my intention to suggest that direct comparisons could or should be 
made with New Zealand. However, in New Zealand, as in Britain, athletes form, 
to rework Gilroy (1987, p. 154), an important part of the raw materials for 
creative purposes which redefine what it means to be Polynesian, adapting them 
to local experiences and meanings. 
It is perhaps important to first point out that sport and other forms of 
physical culture have always occupied a central position in cultures throughout 
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the Pacific. Much of this has to do with the place of the body and its considerable 
symbolic functions for Pacific peoples. In various parts from New Guinea to 
Rapa Nui, practices such as fattening the body, lightening of the skin, tattooing, 
ear elongation, blackening of the teeth, and other forms of bodily modification 
are cultural processes of social value. But the moving body, in particular, has a 
special place in most cultures of the Pacific. Bodily movement frequently 
accompanies dance songs, funeral dirges, songs of praise, and ritual songs. For 
early missionaries the import placed on the body was the source of 
consternation. Indeed, the very deployment of colonial evangelism hinged on the 
coupling of corporeality and character; to instill morality, the body needed to be 
refashioned and controlled (Eves, 1996). Sport was a critical part of this project. 
However, as in so many other cultural contexts, as much as Pacific sporting 
culture was molded ‘from above,’ it also stimulated responses ‘from below’ (St 
Pierre, 1990). In some cases the result was syncretism, an altering of form to suit 
traditional cultural premises. Trobriand cricket and Samoan kirikiti are two of the 
more famous examples (see Haviland, Prins, Walrath, and McBride, 2005). In 
others the sports arena became an important symbolic space of anti-colonial 
struggle, a site of resistance or transgression in which excelling in ‘colonial’ 
games became a means of inverting (at least momentarily) the relations of power 
(Bale, 2000). 
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In increasingly dispersed Pacific communities sport has a similar cultural 
resonance. For Pacific Island migrants in the 1950s and 60s sport was an 
especially important means for fostering social solidarity in new, ‘foreign’ 
contexts. Albert Wendt has shown how, along with religion, sport provided a 
linchpin for tightly-knit migrant enclaves. Often these two arenas overlapped. 
Many Pacific Islands sports teams and clubs grew out of church groups. The pan-
Pacific Protestant church, the Pacific Islands Congregational (PIC) Church, which 
established congregations in Auckland, Tokoroa, Wellington, and Christchurch 
from 1946 on (Anae 1992, 2002), was remarkably influential. A number of teams 
which originated at PIC social gatherings evolved into fully-professional clubs, 
many of which still exist today. In more established communities sport remains 
an important aspect of cultural identity for Pacific peoples (Te’evale, 2001). Like 
other cultural functions and festivals (such as Auckland’s Pasifika Festival), 
sporting events have become traditional rituals of encounter, cultural 
performance, and communal celebration. Auckland’s Vaka Cup Kirikiti 
Tournament, for example, is the largest tournament of its kind drawing teams 
from throughout the Pacific. Such types of tournaments have become a 
significant means for the maintenance and construction of local as well as 
diasporic Pacific communities and for the expression of a distinctly pan-Pacific 
identity. 
 407 
On this latter point, in a piece on “Diasporic Tongans”, Morton (2002) has 
noted how young Pacific peoples’ “increasing identification as Polynesians and 
Islanders”—as opposed to specifically Tongan—has been animated by their 
“positive identification” with “sports stars” of Polynesian background (Morton, 
2002, p. 147). She argues that this “broader identification as Islanders can be 
appealing [for young Pacific peoples], insofar as it greatly expands the scope of 
their affective and symbolic ties” (p. 147). Further, she suggests that 
identification as an Islander can be politically instrumental in that it shows how a 
“complex cultural identity that can be forged in the context of migration and 
postcolonialism can overcome the false dichotomy of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’” 
(p. 148). We could also suggest, following Vasili (1998), that the successes of 
Pacific athletes provide points of “collective confidence and spiritual sustenance” 
(p. 185) within the Pacific diaspora. As Te’evale (2001) points out: 
The international success of a Pacific athlete is often an occasion for 
immense pride and celebration for the Pacific community, pride in the 
achievement against the economic and social odds in New Zealand 
society. Sporting success is perhaps the one domain where Pacific peoples 
find success in Papalagi-dominated society (p. 220). 
 
In the Pacific diaspora sport therefore becomes an important space in which 
diasporic identity is articulated. In essence, athletes become part of performative 
discourses or practices in which ‘Polynesian’ identity is constituted. To rework 
Manu Madan’s analysis of cricket in the Indian diaspora, the significance sport to 
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diasporic Pacific identity is that in “talking sport”, “in articulating allegiances 
and negotiating hybrid space, these subjects actually speak their identity as 
[Polynesians] into existence” (2000, p. 29). Noting how rugby in particular has 
become a “situational context or space in which diasporic agendas and 
coalitional politics are articulated” (Madan, 2000, p. 29), Spoonley (2001) suggests 
how Pacific communities are multiply placed and multiply linked: 
The relationship with the communities of the South Pacific is also being 
altered Those involved in national sports teams such as rugby have 
become increasingly interchangeable, so that individuals might play for 
Samoa or Tonga as well as for New Zealand. The national teams of the 
Pacific states are often made up of New Zealand-based players, either 
those who were born and grew up in New Zealand or those who have 
been recruited from the islands to play sport in a professional capacity. 
Jonah Lomu is not simply an icon for New Zealand and global rugby; he 
is also a symbol and icon of Tongan rugby. Here is one example of a 
transnational community with an individual who represents, perhaps not 
equally but still in a significant way, two locations, two loyalties, and two 
identities. Success within New Zealand and internationally for New 
Zealand also reflects upon and influences the origin Pacific states. The 
activities and perceptions of New Zealand-born and based Pacific peoples 
creates new identity positions and options for diasporic communities—
wherever they are located (pp. 92-93). 
 
As further demonstration of how sporting contexts become spaces 
through which diasporic identity is discursivized and negotiated, consider the 
magazine PolyNation which invites readers “to see what the rest of Pacific 
Islanders and Polynesians are doing around the world!” Published in Las Vegas, 
Nevada, most of its column inches are devoted to the performances of 
Polynesian athletes throughout the Pacific diaspora. Published monthly, 
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PolyNation, in reflecting the doubled meaning of its title (pollination/Poly-nation), 
juxtaposes profiles of rugby and rugby league players in Australia and New 
Zealand with those of star players of Pacific descent in America’s NFL. It also 
makes interesting links to the wider Black diasporic politics I mention above 
with features on Polynesian rap and recording artists, and stories on the place of 
hip-hop within diasporic Pacific culture. By and large, however its primary focus 
is sport. A recent end-of-year issue provides a telling example of its diasporic 
approach to the subject. Spread over a near-dozen pages the magazine salutes 
the “PolyNation All Stars.” Essentially, the feature is just a series of player-in-
action photos accompanied by lists of players, where they are currently playing, 
and their country of birth (and in some cases affiliated village). Among others, it 
lists the “Polynesian and Pacific Island” athletes on active NFL rosters, playing 
NCAA Division I football, and playing professional rugby both in the Super 14 
and in Europe. Between these multiply-situated sporting worlds we can see the 
emergence of what Grewal (1994) calls the “coalitional politics” of identity (p. 
235); a “self-othering” strategy of communalism that Spivak suggests may be 
“viewed as typical of a ‘subaltern’ culture seeking a public platform in a national 
and transnational context” (Spivak, 1988). It also highlights the “historical and 
experiential rift between the place of residence and place of belonging” and how 
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sporting allegiances can disrupt the harmony of people and places as well as “the 
political forms and codes of modern citizenship” (Gilroy, 1997, pp. 329, 331). 
A similarly-themed magazine is Spacifik, produced in Auckland, New 
Zealand. Again, the choice of name itself is interesting in the way it plays on the 
notion of the Pacific as a space of affiliation—what Avtar Brah may have called a 
“diaspora-space”, a space “of confluence of economic, political, cultural, and 
psychic processes…where multiple subject positions are juxtaposed [and] 
proclaimed” (Brah, 1996, p. 208). The magazine is more broad in scope than 
Polynation, covering sport, music, fashion, and politics, as well as tackling “some 
of the problems of Maori and Pacific Islanders in education, health, and living 
standards.” Its approach to “Pacific peoples” is also more broad, explicitly 
incorporating Maori into their definition of ‘Polynesian’ and ‘brown’, 
highlighting their “shared history as a part of Polynesia as the first true maritime 
explorers” and drawing attention to “those ties between Maori and Pacific 
Islanders that were re-established a half century ago in New Zealand.” As an 
indication of its intended audience, each issue opens with a “Pacific Greetings” 
box below the editorial; essentially, ‘hello’ as spoken in Maori, Cook Islands 
Maori, Tahitian, Niuean, Tongan, Samoan, Tuvaluan, Hawaiian, Tokelauan, 
Solomans, and Fijian. The monthly letters to the editor, or “Feedback”, also shows 
the dispersed nature of its readers. Letters in recent issues have come from 
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Auckland, Japan (from a “Maori/Samoan” stationed on a US Naval Base), 
Gloucester (“My husband plays rugby here and we tend to miss what’s going on 
back home” writes its author), New York, and San Diego. Spacifik also has 
monthly columns from reporters in Samoa, Fiji, the Cook Islands, Australia, and 
the United States. To give some idea of the content, its most recent issue features 
pieces on: the Pacific Islands Trade and Investment Commission’s attempts to 
“encourage successful Pacific business people in New Zealand to look at the 
islands for investment”; the contentious debate about new traffic laws in Samoa; 
birthrights in Tahiti; “the increasing number of Maori and Pacific people who 
choose to make Europe and Britain their home”; and a commentary on 
Christianity among Pacific peoples in the United States. And, of course there’s 
sport, with features on: Tonga’s recent rugby success; Karmichael Hunt, “the first 
Cook Islander to represent Australia in rugby league”; the growing influence of 
Pacific peoples on New Zealand volleyball; and, the eligibility debates about the 
New Zealand Maori rugby team. 
Two of the more telling pieces on the place of Pacific athletes within the 
wider Pacific diaspora, though, are the recent profiles on Tana Umaga and 
Dwayne ‘The Rock’ Johnson. Using these two pieces as a starting point I briefly 
wish to examine how these two figures reflect the prominence of athletes within 
the outer-national diasporic identifications of Pacific peoples. In particular, they 
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suggest how images of Pacific athletes travel across and among nations, while 
their significance transcends national borders. It is important to remember that 
Pacific peoples do not have diasporic identities. Instead, a sense of belonging is 
constantly renewed and performed; it is performed or enunciated in discourse at 
particular conjunctural moments. The diasporic sporting celebrity thus becomes 
a significant “nodal point of articulation” (Rojek, p. 16) between the personal and 
the (diasporic) social. For those seeking points of identification with the 
‘Polynesia’, they can re-imagine their sense of belonging through these 
“diasporic [sporting] heroes” (Urry, 2000, p. 155). 
The piece on Johnson covers his “return” to Samoa, the birthplace of his 
mother and grandfather. He had come to Samoa to be bestowed with Matai (or 
‘chiefly’) title of Seiuli. At the ceremony Johnson announced to members of the 
audience that: “I want you to know, from one Samoan to another, that I will 
carry the Samoan tradition fa’a Samoa all around the world with honour and 
pride.” The story goes on to note how Johnson’s visit to Samoa “took precedence 
over the Pacific Forum meeting in the Samoan press—as it did in New Zealand 
where his visit preceded coverage of the Forum on both of the country’s major 
evening news bulletins.” It was also widely rumored that Government Ministers 
and others excused themselves early from Forum functions to slip away to 
events Johnson was attending. And, as further indication of his appeal, The Samoa 
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Observer carried front page stories for seven straight days prior to his arrival. 
Among the headlines: “Finally The Rock Has Come Back To Samoa” and “Rock 
Shock” (the latter, a reference to Johnson reportedly being shocked by the size 
and emotion of his welcome). While Johnson’s background is decidedly polyglot 
he can certainly be located within Pacific consciousness. However problematic, 
he provides an image of an assertive Polynesian masculinity that resonates with 
the hegemonic ideals of the Polynesian male (Tengan, 2002). Secondly, Johnson is 
at once ambiguously hybrid/multiracial (Beltrán, 2005) and distinctly 
‘Polynesian.’ Johnson recently had his family history tattooed in a traditional 
Samoan style (in two eighteen-hour sessions) over his left shoulder and arm, and 
when asked about how close he is to his Polynesian roots he has claimed to be 
“A hundred percent…as you know in the Polynesian islands it’s all about 
family.” Part of Johnson’s appeal therefore stems from the fact that he is 
emblematic of the kind of cultural hybridity that characterizes diasporic 
experience. He is “in but not of the West” (Gilroy, 1993, p. 127). He disrupts the 
fixity of binaries such as self/other, marginal/dominant, and inside/outside that 
generally characterize the imagining of national identities. And to finally 
emphasize the truly unstable/heterogeneous nature of Johnson’s identity, it is 
interesting to note that his next stop after Samoa was a “journey to rediscover his 
roots in New Zealand.” Prior to his arrival there, the New Zealand Sunday News 
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prominently featured a photo of Johnson on its cover proudly sporting an All 
Black jersey. Inside the story quotes Johnson as saying that “I have to support the 
All Blacks. I lived in New Zealand for a little while and I still have some family 
there.” 
As a second example, in a tribute to the now-retired Umaga, the author of 
one piece, Campbell Burns, continually refers to Umaga—though Umaga 
describes himself as a “New Zealander”—as a “Pacific Islander” and to his 
influence on “the Pacific community.” This is not to say that Umaga distances 
himself from such labels. Indeed, the headline in Wellington’s Dominion Post on 
the morning of Umaga’s announcement as All Black captain in 2004 read: “I am a 
Proud Samoan.” Umaga has made other similar public declarations and 
endorsements of his Pacific heritage. His impassioned speech before the IRB’s 
World Cup selection people was said to have won New Zealand the right to host 
the 2011 World Cup because it “evoked his Polynesian roots and what hosting 
rights would mean to players [from the Pacific Islands]” (A husband and a hero, 
2006, p. B4). Typical of identity-construction within diasporic communities, 
Umaga’s specific origins do not necessarily undermine his projection into multi-
locality or transnational connections. He shows how Pacific peoples’ emotional 
and cultural attachments to an imagined community spread beyond national 
boundaries. 
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Take the fact that his naming as All Black captain is frequently cited as a 
moment of recognition not just for Samoan-New Zealanders, but Pacific peoples 
more generally. PolyNation, writes of how after his appointment Umaga “became 
an overnight hero for young Pacific Islanders in New Zealand and many more 
over in Samoa.” Elsewhere, in August of 2005, Umaga told Rugby News that: “I 
know a lot of people who are very proud of having a Samoan captain. It’s meant 
a lot to them and my parents are very proud, they’ve told me the impact it’s had 
on the Samoan community. That’s something I don’t take for granted, and I feel 
where they’re coming from…It’s great if people see a role model.” To verify this 
point, Samoa’s Deputy Prime Minister Misa Telefoni has called Umaga’s 
appointment to the All Black captaincy “The best thing for Samoa this 
century…Everyone in Samoa gets goose bumps when they see Tana Umaga run 
on to the field with the All Blacks.” More generally, in noting the significance of 
the successes of players of Pacific heritage such as Umaga, the former Samoan-
born All Black Eroni Clark contends that “when a young Pacific Islander makes 
it, every Pacific Islander takes notice.” Partly this is to do with the high-esteem 
with which the All Blacks are held in the Islands. As one journalist notes, the All 
Blacks are “a team embraced in [Samoa’s capital] Apia as fervently as the Manu 
Samoa due to the high percentage of Samoans in the New Zealand team.” 
Because of their hybridity, diasporic Pacific peoples can therefore claim an 
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affinity with many communities and nations and different aspects of their 
identity can be prioritized at different times according to situational context. 
They may, for instance, link themselves to the All Blacks at the very same time 
they rework themselves as Polynesian in response to more exclusive (white) 
imaginings of the New Zealand nation. Or, as one headline put it, Umaga can at 
once be “All Black, All Samoan” (Rees, 2005). 
What is also apparent is the way in which locality and ethnicity are no 
longer the necessary basis upon which ideas of Pacific community rely. To be 
sure, Pacific communities are positioned in local contexts (see Macpherson, 
2002), yet as conceptualized as an imagining, it exceeds the national in that there 
is no ‘originary’ point as they are always in perpetual emergence. Grappling with 
divided loyalties and ambivalent longings, diasporic Pacific peoples thus put 
into question issues of ‘belonging,’ ‘identity’, ‘community’, and ‘nation.’ As Paul 
Spoonley (2001) notes, Pacific diasporic communities by their very nature 
contribute to what some interpret as the destabilization of the nation and 
the state. They transcend national boundaries by their activities, and their 
members typically have divided loyalties between their country of 
residence and their ethnic community, or between countries of origin and 
current location. The movement of people and goods across borders, 
especially when those movements are undocumented and part of informal 
networks, confirm the increasing permeability of borders and emphasise 
the significance of multiple loyalties—to place of residence, place and 
culture of origin, to diasporic communities, and to evolving 
identities…These communities, made up of New Zealand-born Pacific 
peoples, are developing new cultural forms and identities which are 
challenging both the origin communities (or ‘homelands’) and cultural 
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traditions, and the institutions and beliefs of the society of residence. They 
are renegotiating the rules of entitlement and belonging, coming as they 
do from a position of multiple loyalties and identities (pp. 84, 95). 
 
To see how life for Pacific peoples is characterised by shifting territorial and 
cultural boundaries, and to see how their ethnic identity has become increasingly 
transient, we need only to look a game between the All Blacks and Samoa at 
North Harbour Stadium in 1999. Playing that day was Umaga and his brother 
Mike. Yet they were facing each other, across the field, Tana representing New 
Zealand, Mike Samoa. Such moments indicate that notions of identity are no 
longer grounded so firmly in ideas of family descent and place of birth, and they 
remind us that any analysis of Pacific communities must, to use the words of 
Gilroy, “reckon with their position within international frameworks” (Gilroy, 
1987, p. 157). As Gilroy may have concluded, “national units” may not be the 
most appropriate basis for studying the Pacific diaspora, for its consciousness of 
itself “has been defined in and against constricting national boundaries” (p. 158). 
 418 
CONCLUSION 
Rugby and the ‘Art’ of Resistance 
 
So much of this dissertation has been concerned with the ‘place’ of Pacific bodies: 
in the national imaginary; on the rugby field; in history; moving from place to 
place; and, as a diasporic resource. Some might say, however, that to study 
‘Pacific’ culture(s) through sport it to risk “trivializing the often brutal legacies of 
empire and the body, even if it does not actively reinstate their conclusions” 
(Featherstone, 2005, p. 66). To rework Chris Barker’s take on studying 
‘postcoloniality’ through sport, perhaps it risks representing Pacific athletes “as 
primarily physical rather than mental beings.” It may also reaffirm the belief that 
hegemonic sporting forms are exclusively male preserves. Writers such as bell 
hooks, Hazel Carby, Paul Gilroy, and more pertinently, Ben Carrington, have 
alerted us too to reducing political agency to the bodies of individual athletes. 
Perhaps, to adapt the words of Carrington (2001), the growth in the visual 
spetacularization of the Polynesian male body precipitates “the diminution of 
politics and the reconfiguration of the subaltern public sphere” (p. 104). Yet, even 
as Carrington would perhaps himself admit, this should not necessarily be taken 
as a suggestion that there is no ‘space’ left for alternative readings of the Pacific 
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body. Any consideration of Pacific body cultures necessarily engages the 
reductionist character of the history of racial representation, but dismissing 
outright the expressive social body has its own political risks. The sporting body 
may be a complex means of engagement, expression and development. Noting 
the complex and often contradictory processes involved in reading the sporting 
body, Mike Marqusee has noted that, 
On sport’s level playing field, it is possible to challenge and overturn the 
dominant hierarchies of nation, race, and class. The reversal may be 
limited and transient, but it is nonetheless real. It is, therefore, wrong to 
see black [equally, Pacific] sporting achievement merely as an index of 
oppression; it is equally an index of creativity and resistance, collective 
and individual (1995, p. 5). 
 
If the body is the strategic target of systems of codification, supervision and 
constraint, the site of what Foucault dubbed “knowledge-power”, the body is 
thus also a site of resistance, “for it exerts a recalcitrance, and always entails the 
possibility of a counter-strategic reinscription, for it is capable of being self-
marked, self-represented in alternative ways” (Grosz, 1990, p. 64). 
Like C. L. R James famous descriptions of cricket in the Caribbean, rugby 
in New Zealand may therefore be a cultural text that works not only with, but 
against other social texts, and the rugby-playing (Pacific) body may be at once 
constitutive and dynamic, a potential instrumental is provoking social change. 
We need to remember too that Pacific participation in rugby is not only a 
physical, but rational act. There is a clear danger in overly-deterministic accounts 
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of the bio-political governance of the brown athletic body in the way they fail to 
make room for the possibility that, as played by Pacific people, rugby’s aesthetics 
enact a stylization of social resistance against colonialism. To twist C.L.R. James’ 
famous description of West Indian cricket, the rugby field in New Zealand is “a 
stage on which selected individuals [play] representative roles which [are] 
charged with social significance” (James, 1993, p. 66). 
As much as rugby can be critiqued as a pedagogical tool of empire or an 
idealized model of liberal democracy (again, see Chapter 1), in this concluding 
chapter I wish to suggest that the homology might also be turned, as it were, 
against itself. Even though I am well aware of the pernicious politics that encircle 
rugby, we cannot write it off as a progressive ideological instrument. In this 
chapter I thus hope to offer a more optimistic reading of Pacific rugby. Echoing 
Said’s (1993) notion of ‘contrapuntalism’, I argue that rugby can be taken as an 
instrument of power, political ideology, and social transformation. Said’s 
concept, which holds discrepant experiences in mutual consideration, offers a 
method of reading the Eurocentrism of rugby to elicit “alternate or new 
narratives” (p. 51) by recognizing the narrative presence of Pacific peoples. As 
much as the athletic brown body is a repository of colonial myth, rugby is a field 
on which to stage “a form of symbolic revenge whose repercussions [resound] 
far beyond its boundaries” (Smith, 2006, p. 103). 
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The Sporting Body: Power and Resistance 
It is well acknowledged in the literature that sport is a key symbolic site 
through which social identity is (re)produced. This is particularly apparent with 
regard to the political significance of national sporting sides. One need only 
think of the infamous ‘Tebbit test’ (see Cameron, 2002; Marqusee, 1994), or 
perhaps its Australian counterpart—with its now notorious question on ‘The 
Don’—to realize how sport is used to mark the boundaries of national identity or 
how it is used as a measure of national loyalty. In New Zealand, rugby certainly 
serves such a function, the All Blacks frequently standing in for a particular 
image of the nation. Traditionally, this image, as I have suggested, has been 
racially-coded as white: the All Black, read New Zealander, is Pakeha. Such an 
image has more recently become increasingly implausible. How can the All 
Blacks stand metonymically as ‘white New Zealander’ when contradicted by the 
sheer corporeal symbolism of Maori and Pacific men? 
We could argue that the All Blacks now represent fraternal possibilities of 
a new, multicultural New Zealand, an emblem of a cohesive, heterogeneous 
people. But, mere presence does not indicate acceptance. Nor does it belie the 
way racial considerations still shade rugby in New Zealand. Race remains 
relevant. In liberal–democratic societies it just takes new forms. ‘New’ (Barker, 
1981; Collins, 2004), ‘symbolic’ (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988), ‘cultural’ 
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(Fanon, 1967), or ‘modern’ (McConahay, 1986) racism is the new modality 
through which racist expressions are articulated. This is a type of racism that has, 
Paul Gilroy writes, “taken a necessary distance from crude ideas of biological 
inferiority and superiority and now seeks to present an imaginary definition of 
the nation as a unified cultural community” (1992, p. 53). The belated recognition 
of the cultural/ethnic other, though, has become an unstinting gaze, a singular 
focus that legitimates their ‘difference’ from the (pakeha) norm. The 
multicultural sports team should not be taken as sign of (genuine) national 
tolerance. Far from a celebration of diversity, the All Blacks could in fact be read 
as a celebration of a White nation fantasy through which pakeha New 
Zealanders enact their capacity to ‘manage’ diversity. This is multiculturalism 
only in as far as it is productive. In Hage’s (2000) terms, we could say that Pacific 
peoples have ‘enriched’ our rugby(/national) culture, but they are not ‘part’ of it: 
their manner of inclusion is regulated, limited according to their value, and 
bound by the strictures of commitment to the nation first-and-foremost. 
This is to sound all rather pessimistic. Indeed, it could well be said that 
this dissertation as a whole paints a rather sad picture of the state of rugby and 
the cultural politics of identity in New Zealand. To be sure, there is a lot to be 
negative about. As I hope I have by now made clear, rugby in New Zealand, like 
David Rowe’s description of sport more generally, has, as an important arena of 
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social life, (sadly) played a crucial role in “the reproduction of various forms of 
social inequality” (Rowe, 1998, p. 242). It is evidence of Sage’s (1990) contention 
that sport is “one of various cultural settings in which the hegemonic structure of 
power and privilege in capitalist societies is continually fortified” (p. 209). As an 
image of what New Zealand’s cultural identity should look like, the All Blacks 
suggest the relatively straightforward sense of belonging of years past has been 
replaced by something more diffuse. A dilution of pakeha-ness, the rise of 
diversity—“Diversity is our new national identity” as one past Governor General 
once put it. Taken on aesthetic, the All Blacks do suggest rugby as one of the most 
positive signs that New Zealand’s national identity has shifted to be more 
inclusive. However, there are clearly complexities of identity to be considered. 
One is reminded in particular of DuBois and ‘double-consciousness’: “One ever 
feels his two-ness” he wrote of the black experience in America. “Two souls, two 
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, 
whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.” The same 
peculiar form of double-consciousness is surely relevant to Pacific peoples in 
New Zealand. To be a ‘Pacific person’ and a ‘New Zealander’ is to not only be 
‘Pacific’ and ‘New Zealander’, but to be, too, and simultaneously, neither simply 
a ‘Pacific person’ nor simply just a ‘New Zealander.’ They belong, but, to borrow 
from Stuart Hall, only in a ‘hyphenated sense.’ 
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These shifts over the meanings of ‘New Zealandness’ also remain 
contingent, partial and temporally specific. To be sure the discourses of ‘race’ 
and nation within sport are not always constructed negatively. Writing of Tana 
Umaga, Anthony Hubbard suggests that the former All Blacks captain has 
“helped to change the face of New Zealand rugby and even New Zealand 
society” (Hubbard, 2006, p. C2). “When a Samoan with dreadlocks got the 
national game’s top job,” he continues, “something clearly was changing in New 
Zealand” (p. C1). Certainly, Umaga has put paid to some prevalent myths about 
Pacific Island rugby players—and his appointment as All Black captain may 
have some potential to destabilize wider socio-cultural stereotypes. The message 
he sends about multiculturalism in New Zealand is also ostensibly a positive 
one. As former Race Relations Conciliator and one time All Black Chris Laidlaw 
puts it, whereas they have traditionally been regarded as misbegotten Kiwis, 
Umaga shows that the Pacific Island community “is now part of mainstream 
New Zealand” (quoted in Hubbard, 2006, p. C1). Against the symbolic power of 
Umaga’s body, however, we cannot overlook the fact that he was a successful 
captain. In his final season he led the All Blacks to a whitewash of the British and 
Irish Lions, retained the Bledisloe Cup, and regained the Tri-Nations trophy. He 
then retired following the All Blacks’ historic Grand Slam against Wales, Ireland, 
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England, Scotland. Had they lost, I am not so sure that Umaga would have been 
viewed in quite the same way. 
For evidence we need only look back one season earlier when New 
Zealand finished last in the Tri-Nations championship. Throughout the series 
Umaga found himself desperate to hold on to his place in the team, let alone 
preserve his captaincy. As one reporter describes it, there was a “furious” (Rees, 
2005, p. 27) public campaign mounted at the time to have Umaga removed and 
replaced as captain by the pakeha flanker Richie McCaw. The All Black failures 
were attributed to an inchoate team (read too many ‘Polynesians’), lacking 
solidity and in need of the ‘hard men’ (read pakeha men) of teams past. Umaga 
was the ‘Polynesian’ leader unable to guide and around which the team had 
failed to congeal. Umaga’s case is perhaps emblematic of Willie Jackson’s—an 
outspoken local political commentator—colorful but astute assessment of the 
duplicity of the rugby-as-social-transformation discourse: 
This is what happens…When the All Blacks start losing, they start 
blaming all the darkies [Maori and Pacific peoples]. Listen to 
talkback…the callers want to know why there aren’t more Canterbury 
farmers in the team. They say things like, ‘We need more Pakeha players 
in the side.’ I can’t believe the crap I hear, but if you listen, you’ll hear 
them blaming the pollywollies [Polynesians]…What’s wrong with these 
people? Have they got amnesia? Think back to the [1995 and 1996 All 
Black] teams. Can’t they remember the teams were stacked with 
pollywollies? That’s what irritates me about the attitude against darkies. 
We will get blamed because the All Blacks are going through a rough 
patch, but at the same time it seems to have been conveniently forgotten 
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that when the All Blacks were winning, the majority of the team were 
Polynesian (quoted in Matheson, 2001). 
 
It is entirely possible that sporting success has led to greater recognition of the 
role played by Pacific peoples in New Zealand society. But, if rugby fosters a 
‘kinship’ between Pacific peoples and other (pakeha) New Zealanders, then this 
kinship is certainly ambivalent (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005). 
This is a recurring theme in New Zealand history. Pakeha New 
Zealanders have been happy to hold aloft the new Pacific Island stars of rugby as 
their own, even if this did not always reflect a more general tolerance of the 
world from which players sprang. As the former Minister of Pacific Island 
Affairs, Taito Phillip Field, observes: 
Yes, we all took pride in what Jonah Lomu and players like him achieved 
at the world level, but then we share the prejudice toward Pacific Island 
communities and areas like Otara and Mangere [suburbs in which nearly 
70% of residents identify themselves as Pacific peoples] where people 
rang Telecom to complain about the fact that their real estate was going to 
be affected by having the same prefix telephone numbers as Otara… [even 
though] it’s these rugby stars who come from places like Otara and 
Mangere (quoted in Macdonald, 1995, p. 121). 
 
In this statement Field rightly identifies the difference between multiculturalism 
in principle and multiculturalism in practice, or in this case between Pacific 
peoples on our rugby fields and in our communities. Sadly, there remains a 
yawning chasm between the two. For Pakeha, their All Black fandom necessitates 
they not only acknowledge, but actively embrace, the Pacific Other. Yet such 
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accommodations are symbolic rather than real. Rugby allows Pakeha audiences 
to recognize themselves as benevolent, ethical subjects, or what Cole and 
Andrews (2001, p. 78) might call “compassionate, informed citizens.” Pakeha 
demonstrate their colourblindness via reverence of Pacific All Blacks, the black 
jersey; the national cultural uniform is purportedly all that matters. Sports are, as 
David J. Leonard (2004) notes, “one of the most powerful discursive spaces in 
which colorblindness is employed and deployed” (p. 287). Though he may be 
discussing the adoration of Black athletes and entertainers in North America, the 
parallels in the New Zealand context are striking. In the same way “love toward 
the Kobes and Denzels demonstrates the supposed insignificance of race”, 
cheering for Tana or watching bro’Town “further legitimizes claims of 
colorblindness” (p. 286). 
Pakeha also embrace Pacific All Blacks as representatives of what all 
Pacific peoples could achieve—the only difference being motivation and desire. 
Their success allows Pakeha to believe that racism has been dealt with, that it is 
consigned to the past. That the All Blacks project “an ethnographic image 
somewhat advanced from the dour verities of yore” (Macdonald, 2005, p. C11) 
provides a defense against accusations of racism, and allows Pakeha to believe. 
However, King et al (2007) alert us to the fact that “the most common expressions 
of White power remain hidden, emerging in what we call veiled White power” 
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(p. 7). In the “post-white” (Hill, 2004, p. 11) moment, racial inequality “is no 
longer fundamentally centered around the formal exclusion of racial minorities”, 
overt racism being abandoned in favour of “a series of practices that are mostly 
covert, informal, and yet institutional” (Bonilla-Silva, 2000, p. 204). One of the 
more salient examples is sport, wherein the increased number and visibility of 
people of color “make it easier to use narratives of sport to advance new racist 
formulations of racial progress while making it increasingly difficult to see the 
operation of White power in this new racism” (King et al, 2007, p. 7). Sport, in 
this case rugby, presents itself as devoid of racism via the hypervisibility of the 
Pacific Other. Pakeha privilege is in this way defended not by exclusion, but “by 
claiming to be for ‘equality’ and ‘fairness’ for everybody in the face of massive 
racial inequality” (Bonilla-Silva, 2000, pp. 189-190). That the All Blacks are 
browning becomes proof positive that the desired goal of racial equality has been 
addressed and achieved. This type of liberal, individualist ideology discourages 
critical reflection on racial politics and minimizes the continued existence of 
racism within rugby and without. It also disguises the material and ideological 
effects of racial inequality and discrimination. To paraphrase Carrington (2001), 
the allure of the spectacle of the brown body has served to “obscure the real 
conditions that many [Pacific] people face.” 
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At the same time the question should also be asked as to whether images of 
sporting success offer up new discursive spaces for the construction of Pacific 
identities, or whether they merely end up replicating pre-existing discourses of 
power. In some way, Pacific All Blacks have become central icons in publicly 
symbolizing the transition of Pacific peoples from itinerant labourers, 
‘guestworkers’, to public citizens. Yet in rugby, citizenship, belonging, is read not off 
the body, but the All Black shirt, eviscerating Otherness and reifying the black 
jersey, the ‘national’ uniform. The All Black jersey, like the body politic, has been 
stretched—like other shared symbols it is being “altered and renegotiated to make 
space for Pacific peoples” (Pearson, 1999, p. 361). But this is success and 
accommodation on Pakeha terms. Confined to sport and light entertainment, success 
stories tend “to reflect processes of cultural assimilation, where Pacific people can be 
reported as successful if they conform to Palangi norms, or if their creativity can be 
assimilated into the dominant culture” (Loto et al, 2006, p. 115). 
The taken-for-granted status of rugby as the national game is important in 
this regard. By way of a non-culturally specific rhetoric, rugby’s claims to being the 
‘national’ sport have the effect of naturalizing cultural values to suit Pakeha. In 
claiming a pakeha view of the world as universal (Bell, 1995), rugby can only ever be 
appropriated as an act of mimicry by the Pacific Other; as All Blacks, they are 
“honorary Pakeha” (Star, 1999, p. 241). Though she is at pains to point out that it 
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may be only one “reception possibility” (or “reading”) of Pacific rugby players, 
Lynne Star (1999) makes precisely this point in her contention that ‘white’ New 
Zealanders (“assumed to be colonisers”) and the few ‘brown’ people trying to 
succeed materially in the ‘white’ system “monopolise representational and identity 
possibilities, causing ‘black’ peoples to be irretrievably alienated from an authentic 
cultural identity uncontaminated by colonisers” (p. 241). Rugby, however egalitarian 
its making, cannot not be entirely uncoupled from its colonial past: it is after all, a 
‘colonial’ sport linked, through myth and nostalgia, to the public expression of 
whiteness. 
It would, though, be a mistake to dismiss the All Blacks outright. Like any 
‘text’ they are open to multiple readings. In particular, as Messner (year) has rightly 
suggested, sport can be used as a means of resistance; and, even if that resistance 
may be symbolic, it provides signs of potentiality, it “operates as an important 
symbolic space in the struggles of black peoples against the ideologies and practices 
of white supremacy” (p. 270). Sport, Messner argues, “must thus be viewed as an 
institution through which domination is not only imposed, but also contested; an 
institution within which power is constantly at play.” Rugby in New Zealand may 
similarly provide a means by which Pacific peoples are able to subvert the racist 
stereotypes left over from not only early colonial encounters, but from a more 
immediate history. It offers the possibility of representing Pacificness in a more 
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favorable light when Pacific people “are predominantly portrayed as unmotivated, 
unhealthy and criminal others who are overly dependent on Palagi support” (Loto 
et al., 2006, p. 100). As Te’evale (2001) contends, “in a society in which Pacific people 
are routinely featured in crime figures and negative social statistics, achievements in 
sport provides a positive image for both individual and collective identities” (p. 
221). And, argue Macpherson, Spoonley and Anae (2001, p. 158), sporting success 
has not only affected “the ways in which Pacific peoples identify themselves”, but, 
moreover, has changed the way “Pacific peoples are perceived by dominant ethnic 
groups.” Even if this may sound overly-optimistic, images of successful Pacific 
athletes offer a counter to the more frequent representation of Pacific people as 
dependent, deviant, or incompetent. However limiting these images may be, in this 
context it is important to acknowledge 
the new forms of subjectivity and types of cultural capital this situation 
creates for [Pacific] men who suddenly find themselves with a degree of 
public visibility and (symbolically at least) with a sense of empowerment and 
increased visual prestige in otherwise marginalised circumstances 
(Carrington, 2001). 
 
Rugby should therefore be considered a contested space. To be sure, as I 
suggest above there are risks in studying Pacific peoples through rugby. But 
physical expressivity is both constitutive and dynamic: it possesses a historical 
and cultural agency which generates, shapes, and interprets changing meanings 
within sporting space. The body (and thus the sporting body), as Foucault has 
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famously argued, is produced in discourses and in the everyday practices that 
structure the way experiences of the body of organized. It is thus always in a 
political field where “power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they 
invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, for it to carry out tasks, to perform 
ceremonies, to emit signs” (Foucault, 1991, p. 173). Yet, for Foucault, such a body 
“also produces power that facilitates resistance, rebellion, evasions, and 
disruptions” (Feminist Theory and the Body, p. 313). In other words, “where 
there is power, there is resistance” (ibid). 
The use of the work of Foucault in relation to the body, power, and 
difference has implications for the critical analysis of the use of the body in 
exercise, sport, and leisure spaces. Generally, we tend to think of sport as an 
“ideologically conservative phenomenon” (Bale, 2004, p. 151) because it provides 
little or no scope for improvisation among athletes when they are bound by 
strict, standardized rules and regulations. As a consequence, it could be argued 
that “whereas forms of representation such as literature, drama and dance 
provide a site of resistance for colonised peoples, the protocols of achievement 
sport prevented analogous forms of resistance from taking place” (Bale, 2004, p. 
151). As Jean Marie Brohm once put it, “sport is a positivist system and as such 
always plays an integration and never oppositional role” (1978, p. 178; emphasis 
added). Yet Foucault opens up possibilities for understanding power dynamics 
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in sport as having an ebb and flow, for us to see sport cultures as possessing 
what Stuart Hall (1981, p. 228) calls a “double stake…the double movement of 
containment and resistance, which is always inevitably inside it.” 
In order to grasp this interplay of power and resistance, it should be 
pointed out that power in this model “is not a thing, is not imposed from outside 
its subjects, but is rather a process, the outcome of a series of interacting and 
potentially contradictory relations in which [subjects] are necessarily involved” 
(Writing on the Body, p. 204). Resistance becomes an integral part of the 
processes of power because power does not cohere into organized ‘blocs’, it is 
not a coercive force which subordinates one group to another, but ‘circulates’ 
through in all social relationships, in all “processes that generate and enable any 
form of action, relationship or social order” (Barker, 2002, p. 177). In the 
introduction to Power Games, John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson criticize recent 
theorizations of power locate power in “one source or another,” or confuse 
power itself with of its particular forms (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002, p. 8). They 
suggest several “key works on the sociology of sport” (p. 8) as having tended to 
fall into this trap. Tomlinson elsewhere makes a similar critique in his 
introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Sport and Social Issues on ‘Power’ 
(Tomlinson, 1998). In both instances, the authors are critical of those works that 
offer an all-too-simplistic approach to power, an “all-or-nothing model of 
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resistance, which separates the process of resistance from the power dynamic 
itself” (Tomlinson, 1998, p. 237; see also, Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002, p. 5). In 
his piece, Tomlinson cites Lukes (1974) as offering an alternative, more relational 
definition of power as “The capacity to produce, or contribute to, outcomes—to 
make a difference to the world. In social life we may say power is the capacity to 
this through social relationships: it is the capacity to produce, or contribute to, 
outcomes by significantly affecting another of others” (cited in Tomlinson, 1998, 
p. 237). By such a definition, argues Tomlinson, “resistance to domination—as in 
the refusal to comply—must itself be seen as a form of power” (p. 237). 
This surely echoes Foucault famous contention that “Power is not simply 
repressive; it is also productive.” As he explains, 
Power subjects bodies not to render them passive, but to render them 
active. The forces of the body are trained and developed with a view to 
making them productive. The power of the body corresponds to the 
exercise of power over it. Hence the possibility of a reversal of that power. 
 
Foucault in this way rejects a simple, hierarchical approach to power, suggesting 
instead that power is never an absolute. Power, he argues, 
comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing 
opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and 
serving as a general matrix—no such duality extending from the top 
down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of 
the social body. 
 
On one level, this could be read as rather foreboding, in that power for Foucault 
is dispersed through the network of relationships which make up society; if 
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power is not localized it becomes ubiquitous, diffuse and circulating, it poses 
difficulties for the issue of resistance. Foucault certainly leaves himself open to 
the charge of proposing a totalizing system in which there are no actors or spaces 
for resistance. Yet as Foucault is at pains to stress, power and resistance are 
ontologically inseparable, they exist as conditions of possibility each for the 
other. Power, in his terms, creates the conditions for counter-flows of resistance 
to emerge, and where there is power there is resistance; they are symbiotic or 
agonistic. Indeed, for Foucault, it is, as Nash points out, “only where there is the 
possibility of resistance, where subjects are not fully determined but may realise 
different possibilities from the range with which they are faced, that it is 
meaningful to think in terms of power.” 
Resistance, like power, is also diffuse. Thus, there are certain elements that 
escape power, “if only momentarily, and these elements give rise to resistance” 
(Newman, 2007, p. 89). Foucault’s portrayal of power relations, however 
constrained, therefore implicitly includes a vision of political agency (Johnson, 
1997). Indeed, unlike the ‘strategic’ conception of power he offers in earlier 
works such as Discipline and Punish, in later works freedom and autonomy are 
central components of Foucault’s critical project. In particular, he proposes that 
“opposing to categories of the ‘law’ and of ‘prohibition’ those of the ‘art of 
living,’ ‘techniques of self,’ and ‘stylization of existence.’” In these “practices of 
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creativity”, he argues, are the grounds for resistance. In a more specific sense, 
Foucault speaks of the “tactical reversal” of the “various mechanisms” of power 
relations. By tactical reversal Foucault means to suggest that “conflicts that are 
necessarily intrinsic to all power relations” and thus particular arrangements of 
such relations could be thwarted through its own techniques” (Thompson, 2003, 
p. 114). 
In some ways, rugby, to borrow from the great Trinidadian cricketer and 
scholar Learie Constantine, “is the most obvious and some would say glaring 
example of the black [Polynesian] man being kept in his place” (quoted in Searle, 
1990, p. 35). Rugby is an arena in which the success of Polynesian men does not 
contradict the representational genealogy of them as inherently ‘physical 
warriors’ that has pervaded the New Zealand social narrative (Hokowhitu, 2003, 
2004). Yet although rugby may have served as the Pakeha game in New Zealand, 
it nonetheless possesses an explicit political significance because the body in 
movement can itself assume a deeper symbolic significance. In Performance as a 
Political Act (1990), for instance, Randy Martin argues that the performing body—
for which we could substitute the sporting body, for as Rinehart (1998) notes, 
“sport is a performance” (p. 4)—is by its nature involved in resistance to the 
“symbolic”, or that which “attempts to limit the meanings of action and the 
body, to channel the flows of desire” (Carlson, 2004, p. 154). The performing, and 
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especially the kinetic, body, says Martin, can “instigate a tension in the social 
body”, with individual performances create the spaces of “interventions, 
ruptures in the conditions of reproduction of dominance.” The creative of 
Polynesian men on a rugby field are thus moments of aesthetic expression and 
political claim. 
Stuart Hall’s notion of articulation seems germane here. Of the 
construction of discursive formations Hall contends that there is “no necessary or 
essential correspondence of anything with anything.” According to Hall the 
strength of the concept of articulation is that it signifies not only “to express” but 
“to connect”: 
Thus, a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how 
ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together 
within a discourse, and a way of asking how they do or do not become 
articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects (Hall, 
1986, p. 53). 
 
Articulation thus complicates the relationship between individual action and the 
broader social structure. If, as Hall suggests, the subject is related to discursive 
formations through the process of articulation, then it allows us a means of 
explaining “how individuals within a particular society at a specific historical 
moment wrest control away from the dominant forces in a culture and attain 
authority over their lives” (Means Coleman, 2002, p. 221). Material conditions 
matter, but they do not ‘determine’ in the traditional sense: articulation describes 
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the means by which cultural elements can be joined together as well as the 
contingent nature of those linkages. Coming back to rugby, we could say, 
following St Louis (2000), that its internal discourses, via performativity, can be 
articulated in different ways. This is the “syncretic dymanic” of the Pacific rugby 
player, his potential to “critically appropriate elements from the master-codes of 
the dominant culture and ‘creolise’ them, disarticulating given signs and re-
articulating their symbolic meaning” (Hall, 1990). 
(Re)reading Rugby Through C. L. R. James 
C.L.R. James provides perhaps the best illustration of the political role of 
sporting performativity in re-articulating this discourses of sport regarding ‘race’ 
and ‘nation.’ His body of work, and in particular the seminal work Beyond a 
Boundary, “illustrates how the political and artistic engagements of a 
decolonizing subject can refunction the master discourse of ‘dialectic 
materialism’ without being complicit in restoring or recuperating domination” 
(Beyond postcolonial theory, p. 228). What has perhaps the most important 
repercussions for the study of sport is the way James calls attention to the arena 
of cultural politics—the social and political struggles waged through culture. As 
Grant Farred reminds us, James points to the way in which: 
The cultural is not only insistently political, particularly within the context 
of colonization (and postcolonialism), but frequently the most complex, 
unrecognized (by the colonizer and the colonized elite), ideologically 
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embattled mode of politics in a society in which repression is rife in all 
other forms of human activity (2003, p. 135). 
 
Beyond a Boundary, James’ brilliant examination of the relationship between 
cricket and anti-colonial struggle in the West Indies, is perhaps the most vivid 
example of this ideological commitment. Here James also provides us with a 
powerful model by which to conceive of athletes as agents and not merely 
‘victims.’ In brief, James argues that cricket was central in shaping a politicized 
sense of ‘West Indian’ identity during colonial rule by the British. In particular, 
for James cricket was the idiom through which both creativity and resistance 
flourished in the face of colonial subjugation. Paradoxically, to do so, cricket, as a 
cultural practice, had first to be learned and assimilated according to the terms of 
the dominant colonial order; only then could the game become a stage for 
subversive anti-colonial performance. As Farred has elsewhere noted “Precisely 
because the colonized were immersed in and observant of the codes of the native 
British game they were able to transform the sport into a vehicle for Caribbean 
resistance” (Farred, 1996, pp. 170-171). Cricket, perhaps the English game, could 
therefore be mobilized in the interests of West Indian self-determination: “the 
sport through which the English sought to define a distinctively English ethos 
and identity was appropriated and turned against them to embody the colonized 
peoples’ aspirations and self-definitions” (Needham, 2000, p. 32). 
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To me there is a decided resonance here with Homi Bhabha’s reading of 
the Foucauldian model of power as productivity as described above. 
Undoubtedly, cricket is grounded in a social reality and the play of colonized 
West Indians is grounded in terms selected by the dominant class (the ‘codes’ of 
cricket); but there are points of “cultural openness” (Kim, 2000) which allow for 
the possibility of subversion and “the twisting of meaning away from an out of 
the hands of the colonizer” (p. 98). We can take cricket as an example of Bhabha’s 
‘colonial discourse’, being as it is an “apparatus of power.” Yet for Bhabha any 
colonial discourse can be “harnessed to sharpen the critical edge of a truly post-
colonial discursive practice” (George, 2003, p. 58). The important concept here is 
the ambivalence of colonial discourse. Neither positive nor negative, colonial 
discourse “being two places at once”—the colonizer and the colonized, the self 
and the Other—is therefore susceptible to subversion, to being politically 
transformed. It becomes part of a subversive strategy, “for if the ambivalences of 
colonial discourse were deployed for the exercise of colonial power, those very 
contradictions limit colonial power from within, thereby making it possible for 
an anticolonial articulation” (George, 2003, p. 58). One of the interesting 
repercussions is that oppositional actions need not be intentional because 
“colonialist representations are always overdeterminations, and are always 
ambivalent” (Slemon, 1994, p. 24). Between James and Bhabha what we have, 
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then, is a basis for resistance to the oppressive structures and ideologies of 
colonialism that “proceeds from a strategy that inhabits some of those very 
(metropolitan/colonial) concepts and beliefs through which the colonized 
peoples’ subjugation was secured” (Needham, 2000, p. 30). 
From Benjamin’s (1973) essay The Task of the Translator, Bhabha derives the 
notion of “cultural translation” to describe these new enunciations, or 
rearrangements, of colonial discourse. The metaphor is telling because it brings 
our attention to the fact that, with regard to colonial discourse, “any change in 
the statement’s conditions of use and reinvestment, any alteration in its field of 
experience or verification, or indeed an difference in the problems to be solved, 
can lead to the emergence of a new statement.” In the colonized’s translation of 
colonial discourse what we get is the “emergence of a new statement.” Coming 
back to James and West Indian cricket we can see how a symbol of ‘Englishness’ 
(cricket) was seized upon to represent West Indian (colonized) nationalism; it 
became a ‘new statement’ that “destabilize[d] cricket’s ability to represent only 
the self-definitions of English national character” (Needham, 2000, p. 34). 
Translation is thus the ‘performative’ nature of cultural communication; it is the 
mode by which colonized subjectivity is effected. 
Implicitly translation takes on many connotations that recent work on 
performativity has developed in other areas. I am thinking here in particular of 
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Judith Butler’s (1990) insistence on the transgressive potential of embodied acts. 
Following Foucault, Butler’s theory of performativity has opened the way for 
‘agency’ in post-structuralist formulations of ‘productive power.’ In explaining 
how gender binaries come to be subverted, Butler also provides a way to 
understand a similar subversion of the colonizer/colonized binary via the 
(re)articulation of colonial discourse: 
The subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated 
because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process 
of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely 
through the productions of substantializing effects. In a sense, all 
signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat; 
‘agency’, then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that 
repetition. If the rules governing signification not only restrict, but enable 
the assertion of…new possibilities for gender that contest the rigid codes 
of hierarchical binarisms…[I]t is only within the practices of repetitive 
signifying that a subversion of identity become possible (1990, p. 145). 
 
In Butler’s estimation racialized, gendered, and/or sexualized identities are to be 
understood as “performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said 
to be [their] results” (1993, p. 25). She is careful to emphasize the instability, “the 
deconstituting possibility” in this process of ‘citation’ or ‘repetition’: 
[I]t is by virtue of this reiteration that gaps and fissures are opened up as 
the constitutive instabilities in such constructions, as that which escapes of 
exceeds the norm, as that which cannot be wholly defined or fixed by the 
repetitive labor of that norm. 
 
Mirón and Inda (2000) refer similarly to the “deconstituting potentiality in the 
process of reiteration, making the subject the site for the perpetual possibility of a 
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certain resignifying process, the site for the proliferation of certain effects that 
undermine the power of normalization” (p. 95). Performativity thus “calls 
attention to those constitutive instabilities that contest the naturalizing effects of 
discourse” (Mirón and Inda, 2000, p. 95). 
It is important to understand that ‘performativity’ is not the same as 
‘performance’: if performativity is the process through which the subject 
emerges, performance is something the subject does (Butler, 1993). As () explains, 
“if performativity is bringing into existence a state of being through an act, 
whether linguistic or a subversion of gender, performance is precisely the act: the 
doing that enacts signification.” Performance can therefore be seen as “the site in 
which performativity materializes in concentrated form, where the concealed or 
dissimulated conventions of which acts are mere repetitions might be investigate 
and reimagined” (Diamond, 1997, p. 47). Because it functions as a medium 
through which cultural practices are reinscribed or reinvented, the body becomes 
a multiple and major source of signification in performance. That is, performance 
positions the (postcolonial) body as a particularly charged site of cultural 
contestation. Yet, as Victor Turner points out, when taken as a cultural 
‘performance’ we can begin to see that physical displays 
Are not simple reflectors or expressions of culture or even of changing 
culture but may themselves be active agencies of change, representing the 
eye by which culture sees itself and the drawing board on which creative 
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actors sketch out what they believe to be more apt or interesting ‘designs 
for living.’ 
 
The performance of the sporting body therefore has a profound social resonance. 
As James reminds us sports such as cricket are political theatres of movement, 
and in the body there is capacity for expression and resistance in those moments 
when “statements from one institution [are] transcribed in the discourse of 
another” (Bhabha, 1994). 
James also reminds us that as much as we can take sport as a performance, 
it is a performance equal to those of ‘arts’ such as dance or theatre. That is, James 
alerts us to the artistic quality human movement and sporting ‘performance.’ In 
the chapter “What is Art?” in Beyond a Boundary James explicitly makes the case 
for cricket being a worthy end of inquiry, on a par with the visual or performing 
arts. For James cricket is “not an instance of ‘light’ art, which he happens to find 
stimulating, nor an instance of ‘popular’ culture, although it is certainly popular” 
(Lazarus, 1992, p. 95) On the contrary, “cricket,” he writes, “is first and foremost 
a dramatic spectacle. It belongs with theatre, ballet, opera and the dance” (p. 
196). I am not so much interested in whether cricket, or in this case rugby, fits the 
true definition of art—indeed, if it could even be said that such a definition 
exists. However, I do wish draw attention to a critical feature of James’s use of 
the term: its relative autonomy (St Louis, 2007). 
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James is concerned with aestheticism, with cricket’s “beguiling 
characteristics” (St Louis, 2007, p. 165), but he does not wholly divorce them from 
content, and, in particular, the material inequalities of colonialism. For Adorno, 
modern art is critical of, and relatively autonomous from, the current political 
and socio-economical system. In his view, modern art is relatively free from the 
dominant ideology, pace the cultural industries in which “art and ideology are 
becoming one and the same thing.” Marcuse likewise stresses the necessity of 
art’s autonomy, derived, in part, from it ability to stand in opposition to society 
(Marcuse, 1978). James, on the other hand, was dialectic in his thinking of art and 
social reality: 
On the one hand, the aesthetic lexis and technical sophistication of cricket 
enables it to express social complexities, and on the other, social 
complexities inform and reproduce the representative sophistication of 
cricket. 
 
For Lazarus (1992) and St Louis (2000, 2007) James is thus offering a “a 
sociopoetics of cricket, an approach to the game that will make neither the 
mistake of supposing it to be less than a form of art, nor the mistake of supposing 
it, as a form of art, to be autonomous” (Lazarus, 1992, p. 98). 
In making the equation of cricket and art, James also strives to upset 
“established cultural hierarchies and categories” (p. 125). This is especially 
evident in a passage in which James admonishes the famous commentator 
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Neville Cardus for not recognizing democratic implications of cricket’s “aesthetic 
appeal.” Cardus, he writes, is a victim of 
categorization and specialization, that division of the human personality, 
which is the greatest curse of our time…The aestheticians have scorned to 
take notice of popular sports and games—to their own detriment. The 
aridity and confusion of which they so mournfully complain will continue 
until the include organized games and the people who watch them as an 
integral part of their data (pp. 191-192). 
 
For James the audience is inseparable from cricket’s aesthetic dimension, and 
vice-versa. As Featherstone (2005) notes, as “the great sportsman performs 
minutely and extravagantly the complexities and contradictions of his time and 
place…the spectators are not passive consumers, but constituents of what is 
always in some sense a culturally meaningful drama” (p. 78). This is one of 
James’ key ideas about the notion of cricket-as-art: not so much its content, but its 
structure. For James, it is “the spectator’s appreciation of and position within the 
structure of cricket [that] makes it an art” (King, 2001, p. 122). As he writes, 
“What matters in cricket, as in all the arts, is not finer points but what everyone 
with some knowledge of the elements can see and feel. It is only within such a 
rigid structural frame that the individuality so characteristic of cricket can 
flourish” (pp. 197-198). In this passage James’ dialectic appreciation of the 
colonial project—as embodied in cricket—is apparent. Though cricket may have 
been a site of indoctrination, it is also the vehicle through which minor acts of 
resistance are instigated. 
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To be sure, James’s belief in sport as a “legitimate” art-form has been 
widely-criticized (see for example, Hartmann 2003; Surin, 1995; Tiffin, 1995). 
Hartmann (2003), for instance, accuses James of failing to adequately 
problematize his obvious affection for cricket’s “moral-democratic value and 
make-up” (p. 473). He is blind too, Hartmann continues, in his “faith in the 
democratic ideology he believes is contained, cultivated and conveyed in sport 
culture”; especially, given recent scholarship that attests to democratic discourse 
and ideology themselves as inherently racialized. James he contends, fails to 
recognize the “comfortable homology” between sport culture and liberal 
democratic ideologies (p. 474). As a consequence James he fails to identify 
cricket’s import as a “pedagogical tool” of colonialism (Baucom, 1999). Certainly, 
in his support for this most imperial of sports, James could well be accused of 
what Allen Guttmann calls “a typically liberal fixation on the rules of play” 
(1994, p. 27). Cricket, according to Young (1999) was one of those “English 
achievements” about which James was always “somewhat romantic”, an 
example of how he “never succeeded in throwing off the cultural imperialism to 
which he had been subjected during his formative years” (p. 301). But James to 
me is patently aware of these contradictions, and Beyond a Boundary must be 
understood as his attempt to find a “resistant strain” within a game that 
“represented so much of what he wanted to eliminate” (Stoddart, 1998, p. 84). 
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For instance, James seems acutely alive to the strictures of race and class in 
the game. In the chapter on the black Trinidadian batsman Wilton St. Hill James 
clearly concedes race to be a factor in Hill’s non-selection for the 1923 tour to 
England (seen more generally in the often fierce debates over other selections 
that persisted well into the 1920s that he documents in the chapter “Patient 
Merit” [see also Malcolm, 2001]). More than this, Hill’s failures on the subsequent 
tour of 1928 were, according to James, not just a matter of skill. As Smith 
explains, by James’ account “St. Hill’s underachievement as a batsman…has to 
be understood in terms of his social origins and a resultant lack of self-
assurance…the ante on cricketing success was the chance to transcend his origins 
in the black lower-middle-classes” (p. 99). For James “St. Hill’s failure was not 
his alone, but a representative failure reflecting a certain prematurity, a certain 
lack of cohesion in the social consciousness of the classes whose aspirations were 
expressed in St Hill’s batting” (Lazarus, 1992, p. 105). The high expectations of 
black Trinidadians simply proved too much for St. Hill. There are other parts, 
too, of Beyond a Boundary where James could hardly be accused of idealism. As 
Smith notes, for instance, James “account of the class rivalries that structured the 
formation of different black clubs on the island…makes absolutely clear his 
awareness of the game’s relationship to hierarchies of social power, and the 
presence within cricket of discrimination and overt prejudice.” James, argues 
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Smith, “knew very well that this cultural game was not ‘fair.’” Cognizant of the 
way West Indians have internalized the ambivalent history of cricket, James 
understood that artistic/sporting production is (re)articulated in an externally-
regulated space. 
Bringing these arguments back to the sporting body, it could be said that 
James’ reading of cricket as a performance was contingent upon understanding 
bodily production as (conjuncturally) specific inflections of performativity (St 
Louis, 2000). That is, James is interested in the aesthetics of bodily response at 
particular historical moments (Featherstone, 2005). He inserts the cricketing body 
into the heart of systems of society, of metaphor, and of identity in the West 
Indies. Thus, as much as giving us pause to consider sport as art, James 
considered the body to be central to the definition of the possibilities of colonized 
West Indians. The body for James became a legitimate and proper tool for 
examining and understanding West Indian society. It is important to stress here 
that sport is a physical act. In the case of James it is movement—the aesthetics—
of cricket which are the “essential components” he attributes to the political 
power of the sport (King, 2001, p. 132). It is the batsman’s posture or stroke-
making that become the mode of social representation. Witness James’ famed 
description of Arthur Jones’ ‘cut shot’: 
The crowd was waiting for it, I at my window was waiting…[Jones] 
walked with quick steps and active shoulders. He had a pair of restless, 
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aggressive eyes, talked quickly and even stammered a little. He wore a 
white cloth hat when batting, and he used to cut. How he used to cut! I 
have watched county cricket for weeks on end and seen whole Test 
matches without seeing one cut such as Jones used to make, and for years 
whenever I saw one I murmured to myself, ‘Arthur Jones!’ (p. 5). 
 
Over the near-two pages that follow, James’ focus is upon what is happening on 
the field, on the technique and styles of play; it is the aesthetics of bodily 
movement which he uses as a basis for examining the changing relationship 
between art and society, between cricket and popular democracy. He is even 
more explicit in the (post)colonial implications of the sporting body in a later 
essay on the great Barbadian cricketer Garfield Sobers: “his command of the 
rising ball in the drive, his close fielding and his hurling himself into his fast 
bowling are a living embodiment of centuries of a tortured history” (James, 1989, 
p. 232). 
As I outlined in Chapter 3, the body has certainly been at the centre of 
justifications of colonialism as well as the processes through which the colonial 
project was enacted. On one hand, the body was, in the Foucauldian sense, an 
object of discipline, something to be corrected and constrained. This line of 
thinking takes the body as a site for discursive control. On the other, scholars 
such as Said have revealed how the representation of the non-Western body has 
also served to legitimate colonial invasion and rule. In either case such 
scholarship tends to present the other as a particular kind of ‘victim.’ But the 
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body is not simply an object of discursive processes nor a passive object of 
arrangement. Though it has become a “staple critique”, St Louis (2007) is critical 
of the way in which “the dialectical existence of resistance within oppression” 
within cultural studies is all-too-frequently located within discursive formations, 
“making the physical apparatuses of social control less amenable to subversive 
de- or re-signification” (p. 169). Sport, he argues, has been 
systematically misunderstood as a site of physical domination and 
ideological manipulation by logocentric social and cultural critics. This 
critical orthodoxy has effectively suspended its own sophisticated 
analyses of the complex negotiations and concessions within cultural 
reproduction, and didactically dismissed the existence of any counter-
hegemonic capacity with the lower-order sensory repertoires of sport (pp. 
169-170). 
 
For James, however, “the individual agent within society is not disembodied 
consciousness, but instead a vital individual whose conscious and socially 
meaningful activity is articulated through their eloquent body” (pp. 170-171). 
James therefore “accords the body a historical and cultural agency in 
generating, shaping and interpreting changing meanings within the contested 
spaces of postcolonial societies” (Featherstone, 2005, pp. 69-70). Hence, and in 
sum, we could suggest that, as a cultural practice, sport, and the sporting body, 
must therefore be understood as “neither total domination nor pure resistance” 
(St Louis, 2007, p. 167). To be sure, in thinking through James, there is the issue of 
the contemporary relevance of his work in a world of globalized, media-
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controlled sport. Surin (1995, 1996) poses precisely this question, suggesting that 
while James’ work may have been pertinent to the anti-colonial struggles of the 
1930s through 1960s, it is “too compact and unified to account plausibly for 
developments in the game after the 1960s” (1996, p. 194). McCarthy (2007) 
similarly cautions us against “overstating the radical potential in contemporary 
cricket given its corporatization.” Finally, Featherstone (2005), echoes both Surin 
and McCarthy when asks “how transferable James’ analysis of body culture can 
be to the more recent circumstances of sport” (p. 85). However, unlike Surin or 
McCarthy, Featherstone goes on to suggest that James’ insights have lost little of 
their cogency. His argument is worth examining at because it provides a useful 
summary of how the Pacific body ‘performing’ on a rugby field may provide an 
opportunity for ‘artistic’ resistance to racialized imaginings of New Zealand 
national identity. 
To show how the sporting body continues to possess a radical potential 
despite the more recent circumstances of sport, Featherstone takes up the 
unlikely figure of Australian leg-spin bowler Shane Warne: a bleach-blonde, 
“brutally sunblocked”, “barbecue-tubby”, Anglo-Australian. He points, in 
particular, to Warne’s dismissal of the England batsman Mike Gatting in 1993 
with a delivery now commonly referred to as ‘The Ball of the Century.’ For the 
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uninitiated it is perhaps worth quoting a description from Sydney’s Daily 
Telegraph: 
Warne began his run-up—just a few casual steps—before releasing the 
ball with an almighty flick of the wrist. The ball continued straight for 
three quarters of its flight, until the viciously spinning ball swerved wildly 
to the leg side. The ball pitched well outside the leg stump, gripping 
viciously, turning past Gatting’s outside edge to just clip off stump…the 
bemused Englishman [trudged] back to the pavilion, still trying to work 
out what had just happened. 
 
“Does James’ sense of body culture have any relevance to such moments?” asks 
Featherstone. While Warne’s ball only emerges within the context of what “is an 
imperial game that necessarily contains and retains the contradictions of the 
imperialism that made it” (p. 86), Warne’s performance 
nevertheless suggested the potential for the body culture of cricket to 
develop and startle. Its compelling theatre demonstrated the capacity…in 
play to embody and dramatize cultural contradictions. Those 
contradictions were displayed in the material and physical movements of 
play that adjusted historical expectations and assumptions embedded in 
the sport and made them new…In a startling way, [Warne’s ball] marked 
a change within the postcolonial theatre of sport, even as that sport 
appeared to be becoming a formalized, globalized performance devoid of 
history (p. 87). 
 
Whilst “sport’s more visible and commodified body cultures are in some ways 
limited in their social narratives” (Featherstone, 2005, p. 95), Warne’s ‘Ball of the 
Bentury’ reminds us that “the body is always simultaneously inscribed in both 
the economy of pleasure and desire and the economy of discourse, domination 
and power” (Bhabha, 1989). 
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Following Featherstone, I wish to conclude by suggesting that the body in 
rugby is similarly “a historical and cultural body, and its ‘texts’ are both rich and 
complex” (Featherstone, 2005, p. 95). Recent critical discussion of the body in 
post-colonial spaces, in particular, has stressed the complexity of the ways in 
which the body can be constructed, and “has elaborated its ambivalent role in the 
maintenance of, and resistance to, colonizing power” (p. 152; Post-Colonial 
Studies). While rugby can certainly be oppressive, so too it has its expressive 
aspects. That is, as much the rugby field is underpinned by a white, colonial 
imperative, as a social space it may also provide expressive opportunities for 
Pacific peoples. We cannot deny the political resonance of seeing Pacific people 
attain a status routinely denied them in other walks of life. As Carrington (2002) 
has argued what we might term “the racial signification of sport” 
Means that sports contests are more than just significant events, in and of 
themselves important, but rather that they act as a key signifier for wider 
questions about identity within racially demarcated societies in which 
racial narratives about the self and society are read both into and from 
sporting contests that are imbued with racial meanings…sports can be 
seen at one level as a transgressive liminal space where Black men can 
attempt, quite legitimately, to (re)impose their subordinated masculine 
identity through the symbolic, and sometimes literal ‘beating’ of the other, 
that is, White men. 
 
Finally, because the ‘rugby body’ “is never simply a passive object upon which 
regimes of power are played out” (Gilbert and Tompkins, 1996, p. 204), the on-
field movement and stylings of Pacific players articulate a certain politics of 
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diasporic nationhood and social struggle. For instance, there may actually be 
something in the Pacific ‘style-of-play.’ Whereas the predominant characteristics 
of the Pakeha game have been orderliness, discipline and resolution, the Pacific 
game reflects a different rationality. As opposed to excess or irresponsibility, 
‘Island magic’ may represent a rejection of the coercive moral and ethical codes 
of colonial/Pakeha rugby. It may very well subvert the cultural subjugation of the 




A Reflection on Being Pakeha 
 
In a few months New Zealanders will go to the polls to decide their next 
government. As always in New Zealand, one election issue already doing the 
rounds is the issue of race relations. One matter proving divisive in this regard is 
the question of whether to abolish the Maori seats in Parliament that were 
established in 1867. Those who favor the move have become increasingly loud in 
recent years. As has their philosophy: ‘one law for all’, that New Zealanders ‘One 
People.’ This One People argument has long been one of the “identifiable and 
recurring themes in Pakeha talk about Maori and Maori/Pakeha relations” 
(McCreanor, 2005, p. 55; see also Abel, 1997; Bell, 1996, 2004). Now it appears to 
be also becoming a more powerful part of the wider “standard story” (Fish, 2005) 
that frames race relations in New Zealand, part of a commonly recognisable 
dominant discourse that reproduces the status quo (Levine, 2005; McCreanor, 
2005). There is reason to be concerned, or at the very least suspicious, about the 
rise to prominende of such a discourse. The notion that New Zealanders are or 
could be—so to speak—‘ethnically-unmarked’ buries diversity and suggests a 
unity which simply does not exist. As Rudman (2006) reminds us, it is naïve “to 
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think we can all become one big happy family if we pretend we don’t come from 
different ethnic or racial backgrounds.” 
The idea of one people denies individuals the possibilities of membership 
in communities that provide meaning and certainty, that may have great 
personal and psychic import, and that form the myriad layers of a person’s sense 
of self. Potentially too, it undermines a group’s claims to self-determination as 
well as proscribing any pretense it may have to collective political rights 
(Murphy, 2001). I say all this because, although it appeals to some sort of colour-
blind neutrality, the One People rhetoric effectively consolidates New 
Zealandness as synonymous with Anglo-Celtism, albeit without acknowledging 
it. Allusions to one’s status as an ‘ordinary New Zealander’ has the effect of 
redefining citizenship and naturalizing exclusion without any direct reference to 
culture or race, yet undoubtedly the state of being unmarked is the privilege of 
white/Pakeha New Zealanders: only they have the privilege of being just New 
Zealanders (cf. Dyer, 1997). 
That the ‘We are all New Zealanders’—or ‘We are all Kiwis’—rhetoric 
naturalizes cultural values to suit those in positions of power—working as it 
does to exclude any resistant group (Bell, 1995)—is behind my preference for 
using instead ‘Pakeha’ over terms such as ‘white’, ‘European’ or simply ‘New 
Zealander’ when referring to people and influences ‘from Europe.’ Doing so is a 
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politicized choice that requires some discussion. First, what exactly is meant—or, 
more properly, do I mean—by ‘Pakeha’? 
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that Pakeha is, as sociologist 
Avril Bell (2004, p. 122) notes, “a contested term without one clear meaning” (so, 
of course, it must be said is ‘Maori’ [see Cunningham and Stanley, 2003; Durie, 
1998]). Larner (1995) has similarly noted how, as an identity, it “is not fixed, nor 
is it self-evident, and it can mean different things in different contexts” (see also 
Spoonley, 1991). So while Hokowhitu (2004) takes Pakeha as “the common name 
for New Zealanders who identify predominantly with a European genealogy” (p. 
278) this glosses over the political ramifications of its use. Given the tenor of his 
work, this is likely a preclusion of space rather than a failure of acknowledgment 
on Hokowhitu’s part. In fact, it is clear that notions of power and dominance are 
assumed in his use here of the term ‘European.’ He is wholly correct in doing so: 
few could possibly deny that those of ‘European descent’ are not the dominant 
cultural group within New Zealand society. My preference for Pakeha is by no 
means an attempt to distance myself from this fact, to commit and act of 
presentism which confines European dominance to the past. Completely the 
opposite. Following, Spoonley (1988), Pakeha must be understood as a reference 
to those “whose cultural values and behaviour have been primarily formed from 
the experience of being a member of the dominant group of New Zealand.” I see 
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this as inherent to defining Pakeha, immediately positioning it in terms of 
contemporary power relations (‘the dominant group of New Zealand’). This is 
precisely why talk of ‘mainstream New Zealand’ cannot be pared from ‘non-
Maori’ or ‘non-ethnic.’ 
It is hardly surprising that the successors of European settlers should want 
to continue the practice of calling themselves merely New Zealanders or Kiwis. 
All sorts of mundane but pervasive symbols reinforce the notion that New 
Zealandness is synonymous with whiteness. Biculturalism aside, New Zealand’s 
sense of itself as ‘unique’ is largely predicated upon banal vernaculars such as 
rugby, farming, and beer, or forms of parochial post-War-era kitsch which locals 
know more popularly as ‘Kiwiana’ (see Barnett and Wolfe, 1989). But as a recent 
New Zealand Post stamp series demonstrates, “the items that are affectionately 
regarded by New Zealanders themselves as important and familiar parts of their 
national culture” (New Zealand Post, 2007) frequently draw from a exclusively-
Pakeha iconography. The formation of national identity is also dependent on the 
acceptance of certain myths pertaining to the ‘unique qualities’ possessed by 
Kiwis, and, again, these are fastidious in their ties to white-settler pioneerism 
and Pakeha mastery over nature (A. Bell, 2006; Bell, 1995). Formative in most 
New Zealanders’ sense of their national identity are the ideas of a ‘pastoral 
paradise’ that is clean and green (Conrich and Woods, 2000), an enterprise 
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culture that favours a ‘have-a-go’ spirit (Seuffert, 2006), a view of ourselves as 
‘do-it-yourselfers’, for whom anything is possible using a bit of ‘Kiwi ingenuity’ 
(Brown, 1997)—all are arguably nostalgic renderings of a vanished pioneer 
society, undue in their focus on “settler whiteness” (Ingram, 2001), the 
nineteenth century, and in particular on the valorisation of Eurocentric notions of 
settlement and growth (Henry and Berg, 2006). These public displays and 
discourses blur the lines between nationality and ethnicity, they confuse ‘New 
Zealand-ness’ with ‘Pakeha-ness.’ For those in the majority (Pakeha), their 
national identity thus neatly complements, and often outweighs, their sense of 
being ethnically distinctive within New Zealand. All those who are marked as 
Other by this hegemonic ‘national’ subject position—whether indigenous or 
immigrant—tend to be marginalised (Berg & Kearns, 1996; Henry and Berg, 
2006). As Pearson (2003) explains, for these ‘ethnic minorities’ “the language and 
culture they use and experience within their private lives is less likely to match 
that used in public space. Consequently, they are far more likely to have an 
ethnic sense of themselves that is not framed by ‘the nation’ and the state” (p. 
89). In both historical and contemporary senses, then, for most New Zealanders a 
sense of ‘belonging’ has been tied to whiteness (Murphy, 2003). 
I am not wishing to suggest here that the boundaries of defining who is an 
‘ordinary New Zealander’ have not blurred over time. Rather, I am trying to 
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stress how political rhetoric “routinely exploits this expression” (Ward and Lin, 
2005, p. 161) to distinguish those of European descent from Maori and ‘migrants’. 
That is, ‘ordinary New Zealanders’ are most often white. It is also interesting to 
note of the relation between ethnic identity and national identity in New Zealand 
that for Pakeha their sense of the former is considerably weaker than the latter. 
As Ward and Lin (2005, p. 162) have found, “many New Zealanders of European 
descent deny, disregard and avoid their ethnicity or conflate it with 
nationality…there is an ambivalence about ethnic heritage and identification in 
many Pakeha and a preference to concentrate on national level identification” 
(hence, the desire of the aforementioned Census-takers wishing to identify 
simply as ‘New Zealander’). 
This sense of Pakeha as being the natural, inevitable, ordinary way of 
being a New Zealander is, of course, endemic to whiteness generally rather than 
being a distinctly Antipodean character trait. It is well-documented that 
members of dominant groups in society have a weaker sense of ethnic identity 
than their ‘minority’ counterparts (Aanerud, 1997; Dyer, 1997; Frankenberg, 1997; 
Giroux, 1997). This captures a key aspect of what Maher and Tetreault (1998) 
describe as the “pervasive power of whiteness” (p. 155): its ability to remain 
unmarked, unnamed, and invisible. Implicitly, the dominant group (in this case 
Pakeha) becomes the norm with which others are compared. As Cosgrove and 
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Bruce (2005) note, “whiteness works by representing itself as normal and 
universal at the same time that it racially marks those who are ‘non-White’ and 
‘other’” (p. 337). Or, as Richard Dyer has famously put it, “white power secures 
its dominance by seeming not to be anything in particular.” 
With “whiteness masquerading as universal” (Frankenberg, 1997, p. 3) 
most Pakeha New Zealanders do not see themselves as having an ‘ethnicity’, 
which is instead “only a problem for minorities” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 119). 
Indeed, in a recent survey of New Zealand adults, only 35 per cent European-
New Zealanders agreed that there was even such a thing as a ‘Pakeha identity’ 
(Liu, 2005). Alluding to a chimerical ‘real New Zealand’ or ‘real New Zealander’ 
thus masks a discursive investment in whiteness on the part of Pakeha. To 
borrow from bell hooks, we could say it reveals how Pakeha “have a deep 
emotional investment in the myth of ‘sameness’ even as their actions reflect the 
primacy of whiteness as a sign informing who they are and how they think” 
(1997, pp. 167–168). 
If New Zealand is typical of other settler colonies of the British Empire in 
that “the dominant Anglo Saxon group is usually not seen as an ethnic group 
because its ethnicity has constructed the mythology of national identity” 
(Ashcroft, Ashcroft, and Tiffen, 1998, p. 82), then what also hinders the 
recognition of whiteness in New Zealand is a lack of consensus among the 
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majority as to what, if anything, they should call themselves. A plurality still 
prefer the term ‘European New Zealander’, while a growing number refuse 
ethnic labels, referring to themselves as ‘New Zealanders’ or ‘just Kiwis’ (Liu, 
1999). Other studies have also found a resistance to acknowledging an ethnic 
identity or, again, a tendency to emphasize national heritage over ethnic 
background (Liu, 2005; Thomas and Nikora, 1994; Ward and Lin, 2005). 
I see the rejection of Pakeha as particularly troubling. A tick-box option 
“NZ European or Pakeha” was used in the 1996 Census, but it was subsequently 
dropped because, according to Statistics New Zealand, “it did not provide a 
good measure of ethnicity.” In 2006, while “New Zealander” was a separate 
category for the first time (forming part of the “Other Ethnicity” category in 
calculations), anyone who wrote Pākehā in the space marked “other” was 
“coded” as “New Zealand European” (Statistics New Zealand, 2007). Statistics 
New Zealand’s guide to collecting Census ethnicity data, “Statistical Standard for 
Ethnicity 2005”, tellingly makes no mention of Pakeha as a category (in fact, they 
no longer use the term in any of their public documents). It is not entirely clear as 
to why Pakeha has fallen from grace in the eyes of New Zealand’s data gatherers. 
Partly, it is a move to shy from controversy: Statistics New Zealand have 
themselves described Pākehā as a “problematic term” (Statistics New Zealand, 
2005). However, more likely it reflects the way “some European New Zealanders 
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won’t have a bar of the Pakeha label because it is a Maori term they see as 
‘foreign’ and possibly derogatory” (Pearson, 2003, p. 90). For instance, a Human 
Rights Commission Review of Ethnicity Statistics in 2001 found that one of the 
most common complaints to the former Race Relations Office was from people 
objecting to being labelled “Pakeha” (Barnard, 2001). Many still see Pakeha as 
pejorative, erroneously believing it to be a disparaging reference meaning ‘white 
rabbit’ or ‘white pig’25—despite the fact that such myths have been long been 
(see, for instance, Bayard [1995]). 
The anxiety over ‘Pakeha’ among some European New Zealanders may 
also have to do with the implications it carries of being an outsider. It is, after all, 
an ethnic label originally coined by Maori to refer to British settlers, who they 
saw as ‘foreigners’ (Hokowhitu, 2004). ‘Pakeha’ intuitively challenges the 
traditional power dynamic because it is an ethnicity that could be seen as 
ascribed as opposed to claimed. As Worby (1994) fittingly notes, “whatever else 
it may be, ethnicity, conceived as a practice, is fundamentally about the power to 
name others” (p. 371; original emphasis). In the South Pacific the power to name 
and represent is usually the privilege of the colonizing West. Further, this power 
to name was, to borrow again from Worby, “increasingly bound up with an 
imaginary knowledge of the relationship between ethnic identities and socio-
                                                          
25 In this way, European misunderstandings of Pakeha mirror the misconceptions which swirl 
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geographic space” (1994, p. 371). That is to say, ethnicity was (and is) ineluctably 
linked to place: or, as Bell (2006, p. 254) succinctly puts it, “claims to peoplehood 
and territorial belonging are inseparable.” For successive generations of white 
settlers, the right to claim their status as ‘New Zealanders’ has been predicated 
on establishing links to the land. For European New Zealanders their connection 
to the landscape is a means by which to construct their indegeneity. In voicing a 
sense of belonging to the land—what O’Connor (1989, p. 101) terms 
“landship”—they have attempted to assert not only their difference from an 
inherited tradition (see Phillips, 1987), but establish their ‘authenticity’ (Dominy, 
1995). Place is thus fundamental to the establishment of personal and group 
identities and the formation of biographies (see King, 1991, 1999). 
Place in New Zealand must therefore be seen as “as something other than 
a physical setting, or as passive target for primordial sentiments of attachment” 
(Rodman, 1992, p. 641) as it is highly politicized, a means by which European 
New Zealanders cement their political and cultural foundations. It has been a 
means too through which to exercise colonial power. As Simon Featherstone 
argues, land “was both the material and ideological base of colonialism” (2005, p. 
201). In claiming rights to the land, white New Zealanders have been able to 
(re)imagine themselves as ‘hosts’ rather than ‘immigrants’, in doing so 
                                                                                                                                                                             
around its Samoan equivalents ‘palagi’ and ‘papalagi’ (see Tent and Geraghty, 2001). 
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establishing their right to script the nation (who belongs, who doesn’t, on what 
terms?). It has in turn aided the naturalization of whiteness as the mainstream, 
European New Zealanders becoming the unreflexive “managers” of the 
“managed” (Hage, 1998). In New Zealand, as elsewhere in the British colonies, 
narratives of the relation between people and place have consolidated the rights 
of settlers to belong and to rule. Thus, in reminding European-New Zealanders 
of their own status as ‘migrants’, ‘Pakeha’ may stir a sense of ontological unease. 
On this issue, Avril Bell has described New Zealand’s settler culture as “fragile” 
because, as migrants, they lack “roots” (Bell, 2006). The relationship between 
people and place, she argues, has “‘shaky’ foundations…when those claims are 
made by settler peoples” (p. 255). 
Bell goes on to point out that Pakeha “are not only the descendants of 
migrants, they are the descendants of colonizing migrants” (p. 255; emphasis 
added). Up until the 1980s, ‘colonization’ was a term largely unproblematized 
among European New Zealanders. The term was used uncritically to celebrate 
the exploits of British settlers toiling in a strange and hostile land. “It was a 
commonplace of early New Zealand history and literature” writes Romaine (p. ), 
“that the country had no past before Europeans arrived.” The land in these 
nostalgic renditions was, in essence, empty, and only cursory reference was 
made to the impact of settlement on the indigenous population. This 
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foreshadowed emotional attachments to the land among Pakeha that were 
largely unencumbered by the presence and connections of Maori. 
The late 1960s, however, witnessed what Pearson (2000) describes as “the 
renewed, strengthening and more expansive politicisation of aboriginal peoples” 
(p. 95). During this time ‘colonization’ came to mean something entirely 
different, attention was turned to the ‘impact’ of the colonial encounter on Maori. 
In the context of the Maori cultural renaissance of the 1970s—in which vocal 
protests and demands about land rights and ownership eventually forced a ‘full’ 
recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi as the ‘founding document’ of the nation—
being a ‘colonizer’ became “a morally doubtful occupation” (Bell, 2006, p. 256). 
For many ‘colonialism’ is now the ultimate term by which to characterize the 
‘damage’ inflicted by Europeans upon Maori, either individually or 
institutionally, symbolically or materially. Like Frykenberg’s (2003) description 
of the terms in South Asia, in New Zealand ‘colonial’, ‘colonialism’ and 
‘colonialist’ “have now become the pejorative devices or epithets of choice” (p. 7). 
The history of Pakeha settlement has thus become, as Bell contends, “an 
increasingly problematic ground on which to assert a sense of cultural identity” 
(p. 256). As a consequence ‘Pakeha’ as term for European New Zealanders could 
be seen not only as a reminder that their culture is the result of recent 
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transportation, but, further, highlights “the immorality of that transplantation” 
(Bell, 2006, p. 256). 
This is, of course, only one reading as to the reasons why some Europeans 
resist(/resent) being called ‘Pakeha.’ In reality, there are multiple, and often 
complex, reasons for individuals choosing to accept or reject Pakeha as an ethnic 
label. Some are even quite prosaic on the matter, seeing it less as “a term of 
abuse” than 
simply a descriptive word applied to non-Polynesian people and things in 
New Zealand that derive originally from outside New Zealand—most 
often from Europe, and even more specifically, because of the nature of 
our history, from the United Kingdom (King, 1991, pp. 15-16). 
 
Historian Judith Binney, for instance, calls herself a Pākehā saying, “I think it is 
the most simple and practical term. It is a name given to us by Māori. It has no 
pejorative associations like people think it does—it’s a descriptive term” (quoted 
in Barton, 2005). Urry (1990) takes this argument further, calling Pakeha “an 
empty category as it does not represent an identity but merely means non-
Maori” (p. 20). 
I believe that Urry is half right. He is correct in that, with regard to the 
relationship between Maori and non-Maori, “anything in New Zealand that is 
not specifically Maori would, in the Maori language, be identified as Pakeha” 
(King, 2004). Historian Michael King has persuasively argued that Pakeha is not 
necessarily a reference merely to whiteness (cf. O’Connor, 1990). In his 1985 
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“ethnic autobiography”, Being Pakeha, King simply defines Pakeha as “denoting 
non-Maori New Zealanders”26 (1985, p. 12). This omission of ‘color’ is a conscious 
act on King’s part. Urry’s insinuation that Pakeha as a category is constituted 
solely by absence is, however, more problematic. The idea that Pakeha “have no 
culture” (as once famously suggested by British author and MP Austin Mitchell 
[Mitchell, 1972]) suggests the Pakeha power is in now way cultural. It would, to 
borrow from, Rasmussen et al. (2001, p. 10), “seem to rule out approaches to 
understanding how [Pakeha] hegemony is built through cultural praxis as well 
as inquiries into the symbolic dimensions of racial domination.” Secondly, the 
romanticized, and inherently oppositional, view of ‘Maori culture’ privileges 
‘Maori-ness’ as “the authentically liberatory counterpoint” (p. 11) to ‘Pakeha-
ness.’ Neither are there clear and identifiable lines that separate ‘Pakeha’ from 
‘Maori’: among both Pakeha and Maori, ethnic subjects are variously positioned, 
viewing and living ‘Maori-ness’ or ‘Pakeha-ness’ in a heterogenous manner. 
‘Pakeha’, as I see it, is a term that is neither vacuous nor apolitical. First, 
New Zealand’s links with Britain have become steadily more attenuated. What 
some have dubbed ‘white New Zealand culture’ now differs significantly from 
the European roots whence they came. If Pakeha implies things that are ‘non-
                                                          
26 My own definition of ‘Pakeha’ is influenced by Ross Himona’s definition. Himona states that 
linguistically it just means “a New Zealander of non-Maori and non-Polynesian heritage without 
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Maori’ then it equally denotes “things that are no longer simply 
European…people and things that derive from abroad but that, through the 
transformations of history and geography, through their new characteristics and 
combinations, are now unlike their sources and antecedents” (King, 1991, p. 16). 
As Paul Spoonley notes of his preference for the term, “Why do I call myself a 
Pakeha? First of all, it clearly says what I am not. I am not European or even a 
European New Zealander. I am a product of New Zealand, not of Europe. I am 
not English, despite immediate family connections with that country. Nor am I 
Maori or one of the other ethnic groups that exist here” (Spoonley, 1991, p. 146). 
Michèle Dominy adds that “we cannot assume that settler cultures are merely 
derivative” (1995, p. 359), and as W. H. Oliver (1991) has noted of nineteenth-
century attempts to “replicate either the essence or an aspect of British society” in 
New Zealand: “[they] did not work. New Zealand is not at all like the society 
from which my father escaped” (p. 97). 
Admittedly, New Zealanders once thought of themselves as ‘British’—
albeit ‘Better Britons’ (Phillips, 2007). But, this sense of belonging to the British 
Empire has faded throughout the course of the previous century. As King notes: 
A huge change has taken place in my lifetime. When I was a child in the 
1940s and early 1950s, my parents and grandparents spoke of Britain as 
home, and New Zealand had this strong sense of identity and coherence 
                                                                                                                                                                             
any connotations.” He considers that ‘Pakeha’ “is most used to describe white non-Maori, as they 
were the original colonists, but it can apply equally to Asian, etc.” 
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as being part of the commonwealth and a the identity of its people as 
being British. That of course has changed. I doubt if you’d find anybody 
now who would see the New Zealand identity in that way. 
 
“There is amply sufficiency of cultural features and products”, King writes 
elsewhere, “that have been so transformed in New Zealand as to be 
distinguishable from their origins” (1991, p. 17). 
Interestingly, King has gone as far as suggesting ‘Pakeha’ to be a “second 
indigenous New Zealand culture” (1991, p. 19; see also Mulgan, 1989). For King, 
being Pakeha is to be both not British and ‘native’ (the latter being a term he 
chooses to use in an updated edition of his autobiography [King, 1999]). In an 
interview shortly before his death in 2004, he argues that the term ‘European’ is 
“no longer accurate or appropriate”: 
Maori came to New Zealand from Eastern Polynesia. We don’t know how 
long it took to actually turn their backs on their culture of origin and 
decide they were Maori, but it was probably only three or four 
generations. The point at which it happened was when they stopped 
looking over their shoulder to the home culture and just got on with being 
the people they were in a new country. My view is that Pakeha have been 
here long enough now to have done the same thing and are ‘a second 
indigenous culture’. And I don’t think that’s a particularly provocative 
thing to say. Like most Pakeha, I’ve been to Europe and felt that sense of 
affinity—but I am not European (quoted in Butcher, 2003, p. 44). 
 
Pryor et al (1992) would probably suggest this as being typical of how, as 
colonial societies mature, there is an increasing tendency for settler-descended 
populations to see themselves as ‘indigenous.’ And, as they note, this desire to 
move beyond colonization and Empire must be approached with caution. First, 
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as I have already suggested, the act of ‘becoming indigenous’ frequently makes 
recourse to narratives of belonging based on ‘a oneness with the land’ (for 
parallels in Australia and Canada see Hage [1998], O’Dowd [2006], and Mackey 
[1999]). In this case King stresses that “in identifying my own culture as Pakeha, I 
do so as one who has always taken it for granted that I belonged in this land” 
(quoted in Locke, ?, italics my own). King is not the only one to question who is 
part of the indigenous group and to stamp his sense of belonging via the 
landscape. Charles Royal, for instance, has suggested “the concept of ‘tangata 
whenua’ [literally, ‘people of the land’ in Maori] should no longer be exclusive to 
Maori but be part of a new language to include all those who share and are 
committed to a spiritual relationship with the natural environment” (Royal, 2007; 
see also Rosier, 1991; Spoonley, 1991, 1995). The longing for ontological footing, 
though, is also an expressesion of a desire to sever the ties to British ancestry, 
and the cultural baggage such ties bring with them. As Pearson (2000) explains, 
claims to being a ‘nativity’ among Pakeha are not only an declaration of the 
“right to be ‘in place’”, but a “wish to distance oneself from the alleged or 
acknowledged past misdeeds of the British” (p. 103). In asserting their 
attachment to place, Pakeha often forget how “the history of how that 
attachment was secured” (Bell, 2006, p. 256). As Mark Williams reminds us, to 
claim that one is ‘home’ by turning to the land and away from Europe is 
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therefore in the “interests of the claimants more than it is in those of the native 
peoples themselves” (1990, p. 213). 
It should also be remembered that evasion and denial have become the 
hallmarks of contemporary settler societies. Renan (1990) has famously pointed 
out how the grand stories of nation suppress the brutality of their construction. 
Hobsbawm (1983) and Anderson (1991) have likewise argued that the ongoing 
imagination of nations must forget the modernity of their emergence. In similar 
fashion, in New Zealand it could be argued that the emergence of Pakeha(/white) 
nationalism represents how European New Zealanders are remaking themselves 
by deliberately forgetting their history. As Bruce Jesson writes in response to the 
publication of King’s Being Pakeha: 
Racial conflict was one of the formative experiences of New Zealand 
society. Pakeha New Zealanders are the products of an invading culture. 
As individuals we can be magnanimous or guilt-stricken, according to our 
inclination. But as a society we have this amazing capacity for self-
deception. For more than a century we smugly believed that this country 
was a model of racial harmony, that we were one people. Maori 
radicalism has put an end to that particular delusion, and we are now in 
the process of putting down new layers of hypocrisy. 
 
Ani Mikaere (Mikaere, 2004) and Avril Bell (e.g., Bell, 2006) have been equally as 
suspicious of Pakeha claims to indigeneity, suggesting it fails to acknowledge 
how Pakeha have benefited from the their ancestors’ injustice. Mikaere, for 
instance, argues that there is little difference between talk of Pakeha indegeneity 
and the ‘We’re all New Zealanders now’ rhetoric of Brash that attempts to “deny 
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personal responsibility for the detrimental impact on Mäori of colonisation”: “A 
commitment to forget is clearly something that the asserters of Päkehä 
indigeneity share” (Mikaere, 2004). Bell makes similar claims, but is also 
concerned about the political impacts of European-New Zealanders claiming 
indigeneity. She notes how indigeneity has a very specific meaning in 
international law, and argues that, as a consequence, “to claim Pakeha 
indigeneity is to deny the difference between the Pakeha relationship to this 
place [New Zealand] and the Maori relationship” (quoted in Corballis, 2007). 
In large part I agree with these criticisms, and, like McCreanor (2005), I 
reject uses of the term Pakeha that have sought to undermine the status of Maori 
as tangata whenua “by claming an equivalent indigeneity” (p. 53). I nonetheless 
choose to position myself as Pakeha. On some level, I call myself Pakeha because, 
to quote Hutchinson (1991, p. 130), it just “feels right.” First, it is ‘of New 
Zealand’ and my ethnic identity is certainly a product of being born and raised 
there. At the same time, the term does not confuse or conflate this ethnicity with 
nationality (as do Brownlee, Brash, and their ilk). Beyond the fact that “strictly 
speaking, New Zealander is a nationality not an ethnicity” (Robson and Reid, 
2001, p. 13), when nationality replaces ethnicity it legitimizes the “exploitation 
and even oppression” of minority groups—whether ‘national’ or ‘ethnic’—
within the territorial bounds of the state (Oommen, 1997). Subsuming one within 
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the other effectively obscures the inequality of ethnic experience. In Stuart Hall’s 
terms the “brutal” collapsing of nationality and ethnicity is “a way of warding 
off or refusing to live with difference” (Hall, 2000). 
The implicit expectation that nationality and ethnicity should coincide 
should thus be seen as evidence of what Gilroy (1987, p. 50) has called a “cultural 
racism” which displaces and dominates “equally lived and formed” identities. 
As Spoonley writes of the New Zealand context, the appeal to an idea ‘we are all 
New Zealanders’ is a “particular form of nationalism [that] is often contradicted 
by the racism of its adherents” (1993, p. 6). Or in Ansley’s (2003) more pointed 
terms, it could be said that the notion “‘we are all New Zealanders’ stands for 
intolerance” (p. 19). The inherent racism of the call to make New Zealander an 
ethnic group perhaps comes into sharper relief if we consider its backers. As 
writer and social commentator Tze Ming Mok drolly observes: 
Is it just me, or is the email urging you to write ‘New Zealander’ in the 
ethnicity box for the Census circulating primarily amongst…Pakeha New 
Zealanders? Quelle surprise. I guess people who have a burning need to 
deny their ethnicity are predominantly white, and they know it. 
 
Of the people who consider their ethnicity as “New Zealander”, she writes that 
“I think we can be pretty safe in assuming that the market for this muddy 
thinking is nearly entirely Pakeha.” 
If the call to recognize New Zealander as an ethnicity is ignorant of the 
fact that New Zealandness as a category “has always been racialized through 
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and through” (when, as Hall [2000, p. 222] may have asked, “has it connoted 
anything but ‘whiteness’?”), then to insist that we should be only New 
Zealanders is also to deny the importance of ethnicity. Ethnicity, for instance, has 
been shown to perform deep psychological functions. As an example, it has been 
argued that individuals need a firm sense of group identification in order to 
maintain a sense of well-being, and that ethnicity provides individuals with a 
sense of belonging that contributes to a positive self-concept (Phinney, 1990). 
Obviously, too, there are significant political and economic ramifications in 
failing to recognize ethnic identities. Numerous authors have shown how 
ethnicity can “serve as a basis for group solidarity, combine into symbolic 
systems for defining grievances and setting agendas for collective action, and 
provide a blueprint or repertoire of tactics” (Nagel, 1994, p. 163). Claiming 
ethnicity may be variously a strategy to gain personal or collective political or 
economic advantage, to dramatize injustice, or to animate grievances or 
movement objectives. 
Not just at the local level: ethnicity frequently forms the basis of 
transnational alliances. As Davis and Moore contend, “ethnic affinity” can “serve 
as a conduit for the exchange of information and as a potential motivation for 
action” (p. 173). Regional- and national-level ethnic rights organizations 
oftentimes provide the ‘building blocks’ that link state agencies, national and 
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international NGOs, and multi-lateral development agencies within wider 
transnational networks. What Kearney (1991) dubs “transnational ethnicity” also 
challenges established understandings of governance, citizenship rights, and 
political participation that are too frequently allied to the state. These are not the 
‘ethnic groups’ of traditional sociological representation, instead they are 
communities rooted in local places but simultaneously global in nature. They are, 
in Swyngedouw (1997) terms, ‘glocalized’ communities. Though they may hinge 
on ethnic identity or identity politics, they in fact provide alternative forms of 
political and cultural organizing that are “rooted in local places (communities, 
territories), and that are simultaneously global in nature (i.e., represented 
through, and in part forged by, national and transnational networks) (Perreault, 
2003, p. 70). Ethnicity so conceived, may thus be seen as a “process of ethnic 
recovery based not so much on collective memory or shared experience, but on 
networks of indigenous political leaders, national intellectuals, and foreign 
researchers” (p. 79). We must therefore remember that one’s ethnic identity is 
situational and changeable, “constantly undergoing redefinition and 




Notes on ‘Cultural Studies’ 
 
(Stuart Hall) On Theory 
In the introduction I have suggested that I have attempted in this dissertation to 
theorize the ‘postcolonial moment’ of New Zealand rugby. I then went on to 
suggest how ‘postcolonialism’ and ‘postcolonial theory’, while not always 
explicit, form the (‘ontological’) theoretical underpinnings of my analysis in this 
dissertation. However, it perhaps important here to offer a few brief words of 
how I ‘approach’ theory, and in the ‘process’ of ‘theorizing.’ In line with the 
cultural studies tradition (see Hartley, 2003), I see ‘theory construction’ as a self-
reflexive discursive endeavor  which seeks to interpret and intervene in the 
world (Barker, 2002). I see theorizing as less a drive for purity or fluency, than as 
an attempt to construct narratives which seek to describe, define, and explain 
particular empirical phenomena at particular (conjunctural) moments. That is, the 
meaning and effects of any concrete practice—its conjunctural identity—are 
always over determined by the network of relations with which it is articulated 
(Andrews, 2002; see also Hall, 1996). 
It is important to note, however, that what is theoretical stable throughout 
this dissertation is a Gramscian understanding of “conjunctural knowledge”, or 
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what Simon During describes as “knowledge situated in, and applicable to, 
specific and immediate political or historical circumstances” (During, 1993, 97). 
Thus, while Stuart Hall’s famed metaphor of theoretical, that of “wrestling with 
the angels” is wholly appropriate to the present analysis, it should also be 
recognized that at the conceptual core of my contextual analysis is a Gramscian-
informed “Marxism without guarantees” (Hall, 1996). I discuss this notion in 
greater detail below, but my nod to Gramsci here is indicative of a particular 
strand of cultural Marxism that ultimately informs my thinking throughout the 
course of this dissertation. It is Marxian in the sense that I take ‘the social’ as 
‘determined.’ However, following Stuart Hall (see esp. Hall, ), I assume, 
a different conception of ‘determinancy’ from that which is entailed by the 
normal sense of ‘economic determinism’, or by the expressive totality way 
of conceiving the relations between the different practices in a social 
formation. The relations between these different levels are, indeed, 
determinate: i.e. mutually determining. The structure of social practices - 
the ensemble - is therefore neither free-floating nor immaterial. But neither 
is it a transitive structure, in which its intelligibility lies exclusively in the 
one-way transmission of effects from base upwards. 
 
Put differently I assume, as Hall, that there is no necessary correspondence 
between the various elements of society and the overbearing economic realm, 
and reject vulagr Marxism’s claims as to “political outcomes and the 
consequences of the conduct of political struggles [being] foreordained in the 
economic stars.” 
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This type of contextual cultural studies requires a critical engagement 
with theory. Here I again see the work of Stuart Hall as emblematic. For Hall 
theory is always a “detour” (Hall, 1986; see also Grossberg, 1992; Slack, 1986). It 
is not something to be applied formulaically, deployed without reflection or 
criticism. Rather, it a strategic resource, something engaged in response to a 
particular politically-defined question (Grossberg, 2001). It is specific to context, 
always in accord with the demands of conjuncture. As Slack (1996) explains, 
cultural studies works with the notion of theory as a conceptual tool to help 
“ground our engagement with what newly confronts us and to let that 
engagement provide the ground for retheorizing” (p. 113); it is always 
“developing in relation to changing epistemological positions and political 
conditions” (p. 112). Such a critical engagement with theory is perhaps nowhere 
more succinctly captured than in Hall’s oft cited (1992) metaphor of “wrestling 
with the angels”: as he suggests, “the only theory worth having is that which you 
have to fight off, not that which you speak with profound fluency” (Hall, 1992, p. 
280). To borrow from Lawrence Grossberg (1997), particular theories pull you in 
specific directions, they lead you to ask certain questions, to make certain 
observations: it is not an issue of theoretical fit, but rather, a case of critically 
examining what is useful and appropriate within a particular empirical context. 
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Perhaps the most famous example of the way Hall approaches (and 
certainly one of the more significant contributions to cultural studies)—and the 
way those of us in cultural studies should approach—theory is in his offering of a 
“marxism without final guarantees” (Hall, 1983, 1986, 1996); a new interpretive 
strategy, first outlined in the 1970s, and which has very much paved the 
direction for cultural studies. Contextually, there were (at least) two significant 
(and interrelated) factors in which Hall’s analysis was grounded. Firstly, and 
with regard to theory, by the 1970s cultural theorists “were explicitly engaged in 
critiques of ‘classical’ or ‘orthodox’ marxism and its reliance on two related 
forms of reductionism: economic reductionism, which relies on a limited reading 
of Marx’s notion of the relationship between base and superstructure; and class 
reductionism, which relies on a limited reading of Marx’s notion of class” (Slack, 
1996, p. 116). Secondly, closely related to the latter and with regard to historical 
conjuncture, was the emergence of the New Right within British politics during 
this period; and, significantly, cultural studies lacked the “interpretive tools 
needed to explain the working class popularity of a political ideology which did 
not seem to represent the interests of the working class” (Andrews and Loy, 
1993). As Hall has described it, cultural studies was a “two paradigm” (see Hall, 
1980) affair—divided between the ahistorical determinism of structuralism 
(exemplified by the work of Louis Althusser) and the romanticized humanism of 
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culturalism (best embodied in the work of E. P. Thompson and Raymond 
Williams)—neither of which could account for the popularity of Thatcherism 
among Britain’s working classes. 
However, for Hall, Althusser’s work on ideology was significant because 
it “reasserted the conception of ideologies as practices rather than as systems of 
ideas…ideologies were materially located” (Hall, 1980, pp. 32-33). Conversely, 
Hall also believed popular culture to be a site of ideological contestation (see 
Hall, 1981), and therefore that “the human agent is not structurally positioned 
within an ideological field, rather it actively produces meanings of social 
experience which explore, reproduce, contest, and hence create, the world in 
which it lives” (Andrews and Loy, 1993). As Hall argues, “if the function of 
ideology is to ‘reproduce’ capitalist social relations according to the 
‘requirements’ of the system, how does one account…for ideological struggle?” 
(Hall, 1996, p. 30). Yet, Hall did not dismiss Althusser’s work outright. Instead he 
sought retain its theoretical relevance while expanding it using more recent 
theories on ideology (Hall, 1986). In particular, Hall turned to Antonio Gramsci 
whose work he saw as rejecting “any form of reductionism—especially that of 
‘economism’” (Hall, 1980, p. 35). Central to Hall’s theorizing was Gramsci’s 
notion of hegemony, what Hall has described as the “winning and shaping 
consent so that the power of the dominant classes appears both legitimate and 
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natural” (Hall, 1977). Through Gramsci, Hall argued that popular culture was 
not merely a site in which ruling-class ideology was simply imposed, but rather 
it should be conceived as a social “zone of contestation” (Hall, 1981), the ground 
in and over which different interest struggle for hegemony. Hall thus sought to 
analyze “hegemonic,” or ruling, social and cultural forces of domination and to 
seek “counter-hegemonic” forces of resistance and struggle. This means studying 
“not how people are in a passively inherited culture but what we do with the 
cultural commodities that we encounter and use in daily life (“practice”) and 
thus we make as “culture”” (Frow and Morris, 2000, p. 331). 
On Articulation 
Via a complex synthesis of Althusser and Gramsci—what Andrews and 
Loy (1993) describe as a “grafting” of the former’s “structurally overdetermined 
conception of ideology” onto the latter’s “conjunctural understanding of the 
relationship between hegemony and national popular consciousness”—Hall was 
thus able “to develop a materialist definition of culture” (Hall, 1980, p. 27), which 
related the “cultural” to the economic, the political, and the ideological. In Hall’s 
marxism without guarantees, however, materialist was deployed in a more 
limited sense: grounded in historical conditions, determinacy “had to be thought 
not as emanating from one level of the social totality—for example, ‘the base’—in 
unilinear fashion but as an ‘over-determination.’” (Hall, 1980, p. 29). As Andrews 
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and Loy (1993) explain, “within Hall’s conjunctural framework, meanings and 
identities are continually contested, there being no guaranteed essence to any 
manifestation of cultural existence. There is in fact no necessary correspondence 
or no necessary non-correspondence between specific meanings and identities, 
and particular cultural practices” (see also Hall, 1985, 1986). As Hall puts it: 
ideas do arise from and may reflect the material conditions in which social 
groups and classes exist. In that sense—i.e., historically—there may well 
be certain tendential alignments…[but] the tendential lines of forces 
define only the givenness of the historical terrain…ideas only become 
effective if they do, in the end, connect with a particular constellation of 
social forces. In that sense, ideological struggle is part of the general social 
struggle for mastery and leadership—in short for hegemony (Hall, 1996, 
pp. 42-43). 
 
Reconceptualized by Hall, the problematic of cultural studies thus became 
closely identified with the problem of the “‘relative autonomy’ of cultural 
practices” (Hall, 1980, p. 29): that is, the “linkage between the articulated 
discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical 
conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected” (Hall, 1986, p. 53). Implicit in 
this framework is the concept of articulation, what Hall describes as “the form of 
the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain 
conditions…The so-called ‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of 
different, distinct elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because 
they have no necessary ‘belongingness’”(Hall, 1986, p. 53). Thus, “unity is the 
‘result of many determinations,’ the product of a particular articulation of 
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distinctions and differences rather than of similarity and correspondence” (Hall, 
1980, p. 29). Both methodologically and theoretically, articulation is “perhaps one 
of the most generative concepts in contemporary cultural studies” (Slack, 1996, p. 
112). Methodologically, it serves as a “framework for understanding what a 
cultural study does” (Slack, 1996, p. 112), while theoretically it is neither 
reductionist nor essentialist. Further, through articulation Hall emphasizes that 
theory and method must be understood—as they have been in cultural studies—
as developing in relation to changing epistemological positions and political 
conditions: articulation is grounded in historical context, it is a contextually-
specific map of the social formation—thus, Grossberg’s (1997) description of 
cultural studies as a “contextual theory of contexts.” 
Notably, however, articulation should be seen as merely a process of 
description, but, rather, the mapping of the conjunctural relation between an 
ensemble of particular practices and forces, is a necessarily counter-hegemonic 
practice. Articulation is a theoretically-informed political practice, a process of re-
articulating contexts. It is a project of social transformation in which the 
researcher aims to “specify forces of domination and resistance in order to aid 
the process of political struggle” (Kellner, 1997, p. 19). Indeed, for Hall, 
articulation was an interventionist strategy: 
The aim of a theoretically-informed political practice must surely be to 
bring about or construct the articulation between social or economic forces 
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and those forms of politics and ideology which might lead them in 
practice to intervene in history in a progressive way—an articulation 
which has to be constructed through practice precisely because it is not 
guaranteed by how those forces are constituted in the first place (Hall, 
1985, p. 123). 
On Articulation and ‘Method’ 
With regard to the relation between articulation and method, on one level, 
unearthing this socially and historically contingent matrix of social, economic, 
political, and technological ‘articulations’ arguably “represents the primary 
method of contextual cultural studies” (Andrews, 2002, p. 114). Indeed, the 
process of “articulation” has been described by Lawrence Grossberg (1997) as the 
“methodological face” of cultural studies. In brief, articulation can perhaps be 
best understood as the active creation of context by “forging connections 
between practices and effects” (Grossberg, 1992, p. 54); or, to quote Stuart Hall, 
an articulation is: 
the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different 
elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, 
determined, absolute and essential for all time. You have to ask, under 
what circumstances can a connection be forged or made? The so-called 
‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct 
elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have 
no necessary ‘belongingness.’ The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage 
between the articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, 
under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected 
(Hall, 1986, p. 53). 
 
On a practical level—and, acknowledging the danger that my portrayal 
intimates articulation to have “formal, eminently transferable properties” (Slack, 
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1996, p. 113)—this means systematically identifying “what, if any, social forces 
are interacting with one’s object of analysis, what, if any, political forces are 
interacting with one’s object of study, and so on” (King, 2005). Having completed 
this task, “it will be necessary to think about how these specific forces, which are 
at present inserted into the artificially discrete analytical categories of the 
“social,” “political” and so on, intersect with one another. These overarching 
categories will thus fall away, and one will be left with a complex web of 
particular forces” (King, 2005). 
On Discourse and Discourse Analysis 
At various junctures throughout this dissertation I have discussed how I 
understand ‘discourse’ as a particular way of representing ‘New Zealanders’ and 
‘Pacific peoples’, ‘we’ and ‘they’, and the relations between them. Discourse in 
this sense is a group of statements that provide a framework, or language, for 
talking about, or representing, knowledge about Pacific peoples and ‘European’ 
New Zealanders. While I am more generally concerned with ‘mapping’ the 
“discursive formation” (Foucault, 1972; see also Foucault, 1980), the web of 
relationships between discursive practices and the contexts in which they occur, 
it is perhaps worth making a few comments on the “textual orientation” 
(Fairclough, 1992) of discourse analysis. That is, my arguments herein are based 
on a close analysis of discourse within ‘texts’, whether written, spoken or visual. 
 488 
My interest here is in the strategic workings of these texts in contributing to a 
particular construction of the ‘Pacific Other.’ My approach may be best 
described, after Fairclough (1989, 1992, 2003), as a textually-oriented discourse 
analysis (see also Barker and Galasinski, 2001). It is difficult to formalize and 
standard approach to discourse analysis and, as a perspective, discourse analysis 
“does not have a rigorously defined theoretical or methodological structure” 
(Adams, 2003, p. 233). As Jane Adams notes, scholars working within this 
tradition “tend to borrow rather eclectically from a wide variety of leading 
scholars, including theorists who are epistemologically opposed on key issues” 
(p. 233). Methodologically, discourse analysis is equally diverse. This makes 
describing ‘rules’ of method a decidedly complicated task. Because the process 
tends to be ‘data-driven’, even formulating a traditional ‘research problem’ belies 
‘normal’ conventions. Rather than looking for answers to a specific problem, 
what the research is ‘about’ emerges in, rather than prior to, the analysis: it is less 
about resolution per se than about how a problem may itself be constructed. On 
these lines, I began this dissertation only with a broad interest in rugby, Pacific 
peoples, and the cultural politics of identity. I then drew on a wide range of 
‘data’ including, but not necessarily limited to, political speeches, policy 
documents, press and television reports, popular non-fiction and literature. My 
primary consideration in selecting these texts was, to borrow from Tonkiss 
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(2004), in their “relevance to the research problem, rather than simply the 
number of texts analyzed” (p. 376). 
This does not mean, again to quote Tonkiss, that “one simply ‘selects out’ 
the data extracts that support the argument, while ignoring more troubling or ill-
fitting sections of the text. Contradictions within a text…can often be productive 
for the analysis” (p. 377). To be sure, in generating and analyzing a series of texts, 
a discourse ‘analyst’ will always be open to claims about partiality in the 
selection of these texts, given that “only a small amount of discourse can be 
studied effectively in any detail” (Marston, 2004, p. 8). For this reason, any 
results, conclusions and interpretations ensuing from the analysis are inevitably 
tentative and qualified (Litosseliti and Sunderland, 2002). Discourse analysis 
always remains a matter of interpretation. As there is no hard data provided 
through discourse analysis, the reliability and the validity of one’s 
research/findings depends on the force of the argument. However, we would be 
wise to remember here that, while it is often tempting to impose interpretation 
on a text, it is difficult to do so when such interpretations are not supported by 
the data (Booth, 2006). We cannot, as Tonkiss writes, “make the data ‘say’ what is 
simply not there” (p. 377; original emphasis). In this dissertation I work from the 
assumption that media discourse encourages dominant readings, whilst still 
acknowledging the potential for resistant readings and textual ambiguity. My 
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analysis is premised on a lengthy and involved engagement with a large corpus 
of publicly available texts/‘data’. The benefit of this longer acquaintance with 
these texts, as well as the socio-cultural context within which they are produced, 
is the ability to discern ‘telling illustrations’ of the dominant discourse. By 
dominant discourse here I am referring to a discourse that “serves as a matrix for 
its members’ discussions on various issues” (Karim, 2003, p. 5). In Stuart Hall’s 
terms, that dominant discourses embody 
the dominant definitions of the situation, and represent or refract the 
existing structures of power, wealth and domination, hence that they 
structure every event they signify, and accent them in a manner which 
reproduces the given ideological structures—this process has become 
unconscious (Hall, 1997). 
 
As Hall intimates, dominant discourses are widely accepted as self-
evident. They therefore constrain and enable the personal construction of 
meaning in particular, predictable ways. The dominant discourse in essence 
provides a common field of meaning, and my aim herein is to study how certain 
types of media discourses manage, despite competition from other discourses, to 
remain dominant (Karim, 2003). In this way dominant discourses can be taken as 
the ‘hegemonic’ discourses that delineate the common sense of a culture. It 
should be noted that my purpose is to set out the ways in which dominant 
discourses of Pacific-New Zealand culture, not to establish what this culture ‘is.’ 
Raymond Williams has spoken of “cultural formations” as 
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effective movements and tendencies, in intellectual and artistic life, which 
have significant and sometimes decisive influence on the active 
development of a culture, and which have variable and often oblique 
relation to formal institutions” (1977, p. 117). 
 
Such cultural formations help to set the framework within which matters are 
discussed (McCrone, 2001). Following Williams, my interest in this dissertation is 
with the dominant social discourses of ‘Pacific peoples’, ‘Pacific Islanders’, and 
‘New Zealanders’: with their normative character, with how they reproduce the 
status quo, and with how they continue to shape the ‘social imaginary.’ 
On the Politics of Cultural Studies 
As Grossberg (1997) maintains, articulation calls for both deconstruction 
and reconstruction, it “attempts, temporarily and locally, to place theory in 
between in order to enable people to act more strategically in ways that may 
change their context” (p. 261). It is the intervention into contexts; “it is about the 
possibilities for remaking the context where context is always understood as a 
structure of power. But the very structure of the context is precisely where one 
must go to relocate the power that is operating, since contexts do not exist 
independently of power” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 261). However, as Hall (1980, p. 69) 
has warned, “articulation contains the danger of high formalism.” Given the 
“corporatization of university life and its rationalization across national borders 
toward an increasing similarity at the level of institutional values and 
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procedures” (Frow and Morris, 2000, p. 319), there is a chance that, “as it 
becomes a more institutionally acceptable academic practice, the ‘problem’ of 
articulation will be cast more as a theoretical, methodological and 
epistemological one than a political and strategic one” (Slack, 1996, p. 125). This 
is true perhaps of not only articulation, but cultural studies itself. For instance, 
Hall, perhaps typical of his disdain for all things “academic”27, has been wary of 
the “disciplinization” of cultural studies (see Hall, 1992, 1996), suggesting its 
growing popularity has sometimes led to the formalization of its practices 
(particularly by those universities aiming to capitalize on its “success.” Similarly, 
Handel Kashope Wright has suggested that, “at various sites [cultural studies] 
appears to have become a largely academic exercise, abandoning its praxis roots, 
its characteristic of being at once an academic (anti)discipline and a political 
project, a theory-informed discourse and a community-based practice” (Wright, 
2001, p. 133). 
With regard to the veracity of Wright’s allegation, in the first instance, 
Hall (2001) has also argued that the dissemination of cultural studies (in both a 
geographic and disciplinary sense) has meant a “pluralisation of what cultural 
studies was,” which in turn has—in some places—led to “a weakening of its 
                                                          
27 As Hall describes himself: “I don’t know whether even now I would call myself an academic. 
I’m an intellectual…I’m a public intellectual and I'm committed to ideas, and to serious work of 
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critical and political impulse.” In particular, he has been especially critical of the 
de-politicization of cultural studies work in the United States, and has elsewhere 
lamented the demise of the Gramscian organic in favor of the career intellectual 
(see Hall, 1992). Similarly, Lawrence Grossberg in Bringing it All Back Home 
(Grossberg, 1997) has claimed that the Left in America has “retreated from the 
politics of policy and public debate into the politics of theory and the theory of 
politics.” Though I would Rojek and Turner’s (2000) assessment that criticism 
has been more important than political strategy in cultural studies (for, as I have 
suggested, articulation is itself an interventionist political act), I would concur 
with Grossberg (1997, pp. 268-269) in his assessment that the second of Gramsci’s 
goals for the organic “has yet to be realized: to share that knowledge with people 
who want to do something with it. That, it seems to me, is the problem facing 
cultural studies—as well as many other forms of intellectual discourse.” 
Despite these reservations, we should not forget that from the very 
beginning cultural studies has always been political in nature, “firmly anchored 
in a strategy of political struggle” (Davies, 1990, p. 2). Cultural studies is always 
interventionist in the sense that it “attempts to use the best intellectual resources 
available to gain a better understanding of the relations of power (as the state of 
play of balance in a field of forces) in a particular context, believing that such 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the mind, but academia, it’s not for me, I didn’t want a career in academia. I went to cultural 
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knowledge will better enable people to change the context and hence the 
relations of power” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 253). Further, while its project is always 
political, always partisan, “its politics are always contextually defined” 
(Grossberg, 1997, p. 253). For cultural studies, theory and method always 
understood as “developing in relation to changing epistemological positions and 
political conditions” (Slack, 1996, p. 112). Thus, cultural studies is “always 
open—not just with regard to disciplines, traditions, and genealogies; not just 
with regard to objects, methods, theories, and politics—because culture, power, 
and the relations between them are always changing” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 252). 
Moreover, cultural studies shares with other forms of qualitative inquiry “a 
strong interest in the use of dialogic, collaborative, and composite modes of 
writing and research to foster more open and responsive relations between 
academics and the communities with whom they work” (Frow and Morris, 2000, 
p. 330): the “intellectual project of cultural studies is always at some level 
marked, we would argue, by a discourse of social involvement” (Frow and Morris, 
2000, p. 327: see also Bennett, 1997, 1998). 
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